

UNIVERSITY OF ST. MICHAEL'S COLLEGE



3 1761 07097020 7





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

THE
DUBLIN REVIEW.

THE

DUBLIN REVIEW.

VOL. XXIII. NEW SERIES.

JULY—OCTOBER,

MDCCCLXXIV.

LONDON:

BURNS, OATES, & CO., 17 & 18, PORTMAN STREET,
AND 63, PATERNOSTER ROW.

DERBY: RICHARDSON & SONS.

DUBLIN: JAMES DUFFY; W. B. KELLY; McGLASHAN & GILL.

BALTIMORE: KELLY, PIET & CO.

MONTREAL, CANADA: D. & J. SADLER & CO.

1874.

LONDON

WYMAN AND SONS, PRINTERS, GREAT QUEEN STREET,
LINCOLN'S INN FIELDS, W.C.

THE
DUBLIN REVIEW.

JULY, 1874.

ART. I.—THE VATICAN DEFINITION ON
INFALLIBILITY.

Constitutio Dogmatica prima de Ecclesiâ Christi.

The Centenary of St. Peter; The Œcumenical Council; The Vatican Council and its Definitions. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster.* London: Longmans.

IT is now just four years, since the Vatican Council expressed part of the Church's traditional doctrine on her own authority in teaching, by defining that the Pope is infallible in his *ex cathedrâ* declarations. Since that time a movement has proceeded within the Church, resembling that which ordinarily takes place on the like occasions. At first those Catholics, who are more or less out of harmony with the traditional doctrine to which we have referred, raised various questions about the authority of the Definition. "The Council was not free, nor capable therefore of putting forth an obligatory judgment"; or, "its decrees do not bind, until the Bishops shall have subscribed their names"; or "various Bishops tolerate its denial." As time went on however, the emptiness of such pretexts became so transparently obvious, that no Catholic of the most ordinarily loyal disposition could be hoodwinked by them; and those therefore of whom we speak naturally had recourse to the expedient, of minimizing the force and significance of what had been defined. Moreover it is only fair to add, that others have been led in a similar direction, by motives of (as we think) misplaced charity; by the desire of removing difficulty from the path of an inquiring Protestant. "The Definition implies"—so some Catholics have more or less distinctly expressed themselves—"that *ex cathedrâ* Acts are at last comparatively few; that they are strictly con-

* These three Pastorals are now in one volume, the "*Petri Privilegium*." We name them separately, for convenience of reference.

fined to the exposition of revealed dogma; that there is no ground for those notions about the *extent* of infallibility, which would make that prerogative so heavy a burden to the faithful." Nor has such language been altogether confined to laymen; on the contrary, one or two theologians of deserved authority have incidentally used expressions, in which for our own part we are unable to follow them.

Under these circumstances, it will be more satisfactory if we directly encounter such statements. A few years ago, we took part in advocating those "notions about the extent of infallibility," which the Definition is supposed to disparage; and it seems therefore almost our bounden duty, either to express our abandonment of them, or to show cause for retaining them as firmly as ever, the Definition notwithstanding.* In doing the latter, we shall have here and there to reproduce various salient ecclesiastical facts, which we were constantly pressing on our readers' attention some five years ago;† but which, after so long an interval, we trust we may recall to their memory without exciting their distaste. Nor need they fear a revival of the lengthened controversy, then brought to an end; as we have no intention of adducing from general "*loci theologici*" any fresh argument whatever in defence of our position. The thesis which we desire to establish, is essentially defensive and negative; viz: that there is nothing, either in the Vatican Definition or its attendant circumstances, which disparages in the slightest degree that doctrine on the extent of infallibility, which we have humbly maintained. At the same time, in order more forcibly to advocate this negative thesis, we shall further point out, that the Definition and its attendant circumstances—so far from pressing against us—have a real and indeed very strong bearing in our favour.

We must begin by stating, with sufficient precision for our present purpose, the doctrine which we advocated in time past on the extent of Papal infallibility. In the Preface to the First Dogmatic Constitution of the Vatican Council,‡ Pius

* The "*Guardian*" of April 29th, in a trumpety article which hardly deserves notice on any other account, says that its writer "has been told" by various Catholics "that Dr. Ward's teaching is plainly inconsistent with the Vatican Decree."

† Dr. Ward's last direct treatment of the subject was in a Latin pamphlet, "*De infallibilitatis extensione*," published in 1869. In that pamphlet, one or two subordinate, but not altogether unimportant, portions of what he had originally maintained are either retracted or expressed with some hesitation. This was done, in deference to the judgment of one or two eminent theologians.

‡ This Constitution will be found at engta in our number of July, 1870, pp. 208-223.

IX., having referred to the deplorable intellectual evils of the time, went on to say, that "the Church's deepest compassion is stirred by these errors," and that "at no time can she rest from testifying to and proclaiming the truth of God." "We, therefore," he continues, "treading in the footsteps of our predecessors, have *never ceased*, in accordance with our *Supreme Apostolic office*, from teaching and defending Catholic Truth, and reprobating perverse doctrines." He had already said the same thing more fully in his "*Quantâ Curâ*."* He begins this Encyclical by reminding the bishops of Christendom, "with how great care" his predecessors had laboured "by their most wise Letters and Constitutions, to expose and condemn all those heresies and errors," which in their time afflicted the Church. In like manner, he adds, "scarcely had we been elevated to the Chair of St. Peter, when . . . according to the duty of our Apostolic ministry, and following the illustrious example of our predecessors, we" began "raising our voice: and in many published *Encyclical Letters, Consistorial Allocutions, and other Apostolic Letters*, we have condemned the chief errors of this our most unhappy age; and we have excited your admirable episcopal vigilance, and we have again and again admonished and exhorted all sons of the Catholic Church to us most dear, that they should altogether abhor and flee from the contagion of so dire a pestilence." The position then which we assumed was this. When the Pontiff, "in accordance with the duty of his Apostolic ministry" and his "supreme Apostolic office,"—following up the course of "those most wise Letters and Constitutions," whereby his "predecessors" "exposed and condemned the heresies and errors of their time,"—proceeds to "reprobate the perverse doctrines," and "condemn the chief errors, of" his "most unhappy age,"—he is speaking ex cathedrâ. But Pius IX. did precisely this—as he expressly declares—in various Encyclicals, Allocutions, and other Apostolic Letters. Therefore, in those Encyclicals, Allocutions, and other Apostolic Letters, he was speaking ex cathedrâ. It has surprised us that any Catholics have been found, to dissent from what seems to us so very irresistible an inference; but this is not the point on which we are here to insist. We are here merely to argue, that there is nothing in the Definition of 1870 which discredits our conclusion, but in fact very much the contrary.

It will save the necessity of future digression if, before we enter on our direct thesis, we draw attention to a very impor-

* This Encyclical will be found at length in our number for April, 1865, pp. 500-513.

tant preliminary. There can hardly be a more dangerous mistake, than to suppose that no interior assent is due from a loyal Catholic to the Church's teaching, except in the case of those judgments which are strictly infallible. This mistake is combatted by F. Newman, for one, with his accustomed vigour of language. "In matters of conduct," he says, "of ritual, of discipline, of politics, of social life, in the *ten thousand questions* which the Church *has not formally answered*, even though she may have *intimated her judgment*, there is a constant rising of the human mind *against the authority of the Church and of superiors*; and that, in proportion as each individual is removed from perfection." This sentence is from his volume on "Difficulties felt by Anglicans" (new edition, pp. 264-5), and we have italicised various of its expressions. According to F. Newman then, there are "ten thousand questions" on which the Church may have "intimated her judgment" without imposing it; ecclesiastical "superiors" are rightly employed, in pressing such judgment on the acceptance of the faithful; and these in their turn do not hesitate interiorly to accept it, except in proportion as they are "removed" from spiritual "perfection," and "rise against the authority of the Church."

As regards indeed one particular class of doctrinal judgments which are not strictly infallible,—we mean those pronounced by a Pontifical Congregation,—Pius IX., in his well-known Munich Brief, has expressly inculcated the duty* of interiorly accepting these judgments. Nor is this by any means pure theory; but, on the contrary, it has constantly been exemplified in practice. Take, e.g., the well-known condemnation of seven ontologistic propositions. No one ever alleged, that this condemnation was strictly infallible; yet, when Mgr. Hugonin was nominated Bishop of Bayeux, the Holy Father required him to retract those philosophical doctrines, favouring the seven propositions, which he had formerly maintained; and he readily obeyed the requisition. Moreover, the most superficial students of Catholic philosophy are aware, that ontologism is no isolated doctrine; that those who give it up after having once held it, have to change their whole intellectual attitude, towards a considerable number of fundamental propositions. Yet this great intellectual surrender is made by the good Catholic as a matter of course, in deference to a confessedly fallible ecclesiastical Decree.

* He says that educated Catholics are "bound in conscience" to this. ("Ex conscientia obstringuntur.") Our readers will find a careful exposition of the whole passage, in our number of July, 1871, pp. 148-151.

Some persons have found it difficult to understand, what kind of assent it is which can possibly be due, to a judgment not strictly infallible. We have on former occasions given various instances to illustrate its character. Thus, a youth of fourteen years old is being instructed by his father, to whom he has every reason for looking up, in the facts and principles of history; he accepts the whole instruction with unqualified assent, nor does the very thought of its being erroneous in any particular so much as enter his mind. Again, I feel ill, and send for a physician of first-rate eminence, with whose integrity I am intimately acquainted. "Your case is distressing," he says, "but very simple. You have a rheumatic fever; there is no doubt about the matter." I must be very strangely constituted, if I do not yield firm intellectual assent to this judgment. And considering the intimate relation which exists between the Holy Ghost and the Church, where is the difficulty of supposing, that even those judgments of hers, which are not strictly infallible, are nevertheless watched over with such constant Divine supervision, that the one course of orthodoxy and security lies in humbly assenting to their truth?

Such assuredly is the teaching of the Holy See; as is evident in the case of ontologism just mentioned, and still more obviously from the Munich Brief to which we have also referred. Then again Pius IX., when repeating his condemnation of Günther, thus pronounces:—

"The original censure of that philosopher's works by the Congregation of the Index, sanctioned as it was by our authority and published by our command, ought to have been amply sufficient, in order that the whole question should be considered as having received its final decision (*penitus dirempta censeretur*); and that all who glory in the Catholic name should clearly and distinctly understand that obedience was altogether due, and that the doctrine contained in Günther's books *might not be regarded as sound* (*sinceram haberi non posse*)."

For a similar purpose, we will cite the still more remarkable instance of Louvain traditionalism. This doctrine was not otherwise censured, than by a Congregational judgment expressing its own Papal confirmation. The inculpatated Professors declared, that this judgment was "disciplinary" not "doctrinal"; and that it demanded, not interior assent, but only abstinence from open contradiction. This plea was peremptorily rejected,—with an expression of surprise that it could have been advanced,—by Cardinal Patrizi writing in the Pope's name; and the Professors were required to sign a declaration, that they "*fully, perfectly, and absolutely* submit themselves to

the "relevant "decisions of the Holy See, . . . reprobating and rejecting every opposite doctrine."* From these two cases—the case of Günther and of Louvain traditionalism—a disjunctive proposition inevitably follows. *Either* the extent of infallibility is to the full as large as we have ever maintained;—*or* there may be a doctrinal judgment not infallible, to which "full, perfect, and absolute" interior assent is due from every Catholic. And the same remark may be made concerning that doctrine on the Pope's civil principedom, which is taught in certain specified Allocutions and Apostolic Letters. The Syllabus—avowedly issued by the Pope's express command—declares that "all Catholics" owe to this doctrine their most firm adherence (*firmissimè retinere debent*). *Either* in those Allocutions and Apostolic Letters he had been teaching *ex cathedrâ*,—*or* most firm interior adherence may be due from all Catholics to a Pontifical instruction not strictly infallible.†

F. Franzelin takes up the position which we are here defending, in a scholion on "the Subject and Object of Infallibility," of which we published a translation in July, 1871, pp. 258—268. The Holy Father, says this illustrious theologian, "may prescribe opinions to be followed or proscribe them to be avoided," even "without the intention of infallibly deciding the truth by definitive sentence." In such case, he adds, it is "unsafe and incompatible with the submission due to the divinely-constituted magisterium," for a Catholic to decline the interior acceptance of such authoritative direction. Such teaching, he considers, is issued by the Pope as exercising "the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision"; and whereas to infallible teaching is due the assent of faith,—whether immediately or mediately divine,—to *this* teaching is due what he calls "*religious assent*."

Similarly speaks F. Newman in the "Apologia" (p. 389). "I submit myself," he says, "to those other decisions of the Holy See, theological or not,‡ through the organs which it has itself appointed, which, waiving the question of their infallibility, on the lowest ground come to me with a claim to be accepted and obeyed." The meaning of this latter word

* The documents concerning this very remarkable case will be found in our number of January, 1868, pp. 279—289.

† Our own firm conviction is, that this doctrine has been defined by the Pope *ex cathedrâ*: but (as we have often pointed out) this by no means implies, that the doctrine is a revealed verity and a dogma of the Faith.

‡ F. Newman does not of course mean, that Pontifical Congregations can pronounce on matters which are *in no sense* theological. The distinction which he intends must be, between decisions which set forth some integral part of the Deposit, and decisions which merely set forth some truth important for secure *preservation* of the Deposit.

“obeyed” is fixed by the accompanying word “accepted.” That the decisions of which F. Newman speaks are doctrinal, is manifest—not only from the context of the whole paragraph from which we have made the extract,—but also from his saying, that he “waives the question of their *infallibility*.” Now to “accept” a doctrinal decision, cannot possibly mean anything else, except to yield it interior assent.

But in fact the word “obeyed,” taken by itself, cannot fairly bear any other signification. All loyal Catholics admit as a matter of course, that “obedience” is due to the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation. Now in such a case, what can possibly be meant by this word “obedience”? Sometimes one comes across the implication, that a certain purely external obedience is alone required; that it suffices, if Catholics do not openly write and publish a contradiction of the inculcated doctrine. But no one can have duly pondered his words, who gives such an answer as this. Is there then to be a clique of Catholics, forming a kind of secret society on the basis of some condemned opinion? May they encourage each other in their acceptance of such opinion, and use every means in their power to diffuse it, saving only that they do not actually print and publish their sentiments? And is this forsooth *obedience* to a doctrinal decision? Is it the Church’s intention to effect *this*, when she issues such a decision?

Another interpretation will perhaps be given of the word “obedience.” Perhaps it will be admitted, that each dissentient is required to conceal his dissent from all others; but it will be added, that he may freely cherish it within his own breast. On such a supposition, indefinite numbers of Catholics will exist—no one being able to guess who and how many they are—who indulge in silent protest against this or that doctrinal judgment, each within the gloomy depths of his heart. Surely no one will doubt, that such constant and irksome self-restraint as this would be an immeasurably heavier and more intolerable bondage, than the very simple course of submitting their intellect to the Church’s judgment. But one cannot in fact gravely contemplate so preposterous a theory.

A somewhat different reply has before this been given to the question, wherein consists due obedience to the doctrinal decree of a Congregation. It has been said, that Catholics should *presume* the decision right, until they see some ground for doubt. But—putting aside (what is not here in point) the intolerable presumption of an individual pitting his judgment against the Church’s authoritative teaching—no one can call this *obedience* to the decree, but the very reverse. If I resolve on stealing as soon as my funds may

run low, I am at this moment transgressing the Seventh Commandment. In like manner Catholics, who resolve to withhold their assent from some doctrinal decree as soon as their private judgment may incline to a different opinion, are ipso facto disobeying the decree.*

Evidently obedience to a doctrinal decree cannot mean anything other, than its interior acceptance. The youth of fourteen years old, who has had every reason for full confidence in his father, takes for granted that his teaching in this or that particular instance is salutary and true. The patient, who by long experience has acquired an intimate conviction of his physician's skill, never dreams of doubting, that that physician's confidently expressed judgment on the character of some malady is a true judgment. On how much stronger grounds, and with how far greater firmness of conviction, will the loyal Catholic adhere with profound interior assent to any doctrine, which the Church may teach him through the tribunals, appointed by her for that express purpose!

We may refer, for a fuller exposition of what we would say on this matter, to our number of July, 1871, pp. 143—154; where we have set forth various reasons for our thesis, and have replied to all the objections against it, which we have seen adduced, or can think of as adducible. Nor will our readers have failed to anticipate the bearing of our remarks, on the question immediately before us. If firm interior assent be due even to the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation,—far more obviously must it be due to those “condemnations of the chief errors of our most unhappy age,” which Pius IX. testifies that he has issued “according to the duty of his apostolic ministry,” “in many published Encyclicals, Consistorial Allocutions, and other Apostolic Letters.”

Indeed no one has ever denied, nor can any one possibly deny, that so much as this is expressly declared by the Vatican Council, in the “monitum,” on which so much was said at the time, and which closes the first Dogmatic Constitution, the “*Dei Filius*” :—

But since it is not enough to avoid heretical pravity, unless those errors also be diligently shunned which approach it more or less closely, we admonish all of the duty of also observing those Constitutions and Decrees, whereby such evil opinions, which are not here distinctly enumerated, have been proscribed and prohibited by the Holy See.

Here is no possible question of what the Jansenists used to

* There is nothing whatever, in the case of Galileo, adverse to this doctrine; as we consider ourselves to have shown conclusively in our article of July, 1871.

call "respectful silence." Not only must heretical pravity be "avoided" (*devitare*), but errors, which more or less nearly approach it, must be "shunned" (*fugiantur*). In other words, every Catholic is not merely bound to abstain from *publicly expressing* such errors,—but to "shun" them, and so interiorly to dissent from them. And in order that this interior dissent may be secured, he is warned of his duty of "observing" those Constitutions and Decrees whereby they are proscribed. The Council then warns the faithful of the duty incumbent on them, that they yield interior assent to those Pontifical Acts, which condemn non-heretical errors.

And here we are reminded of a very important result, which the Vatican Council seems indirectly to have produced. No well-intentioned Catholic now openly alleges, that he is at liberty to dissent interiorly from those judgments of the Church, which he may not account strictly infallible. The reverse indeed was always the case with truly loyal Catholics. From the moment when the Index condemned the seven ontologicistic propositions, every Catholic philosopher renounced them; though much question was raised, as to what was their precise import. Those good Catholics who (most strangely to our mind) have doubted whether the *Syllabus* were *ex cathedrâ*, do not dream nevertheless of doubting, that all children of the Church are summoned to reject and contend against the errors there condemned. But there were Catholics claiming to be the Church's defenders who professed a very different maxim, when we began writing on the extent of infallibility; nor should we otherwise have raised the question at all. In England there was a small, but certainly very able, knot of writers—to whom the name of "Catholic" could not with truth (so far as then appeared)* have rightly been refused—whose maxims were the very reverse of what we have just expressed. Their fundamental principle was the impassable gulf which they alleged to exist, between a definition of faith and any other judgment of the Church; and they boldly professed, that they yielded to the latter no kind of interior assent. Looking to France, things were even much more anxious; in proportion as illustrious champions of the Church, like M. de Montalembert and his friends, were likely to have more weight with the Catholic body, than the writers of the "Home and

* We add this parenthesis, because subsequent circumstances have made it very doubtful, whether some of them at least did not doubt, or even deny, the infallibility of those Pontifical *ex cathedrâ* Acts, which had been accepted by the Episcopate. We do not admit that any one so thinking could truly have been called a Catholic.

Foreign Review.” Nothing could be more indisputable—hardly any one even affected to dispute it—than that the Church had pronounced earnestly and repeatedly against that doctrine concerning liberty of worships and the press, which the “Liberal Catholics” adopted as their very central stand-point. We have never failed to recognize the sincerity and piety of these excellent men; nor have we attempted or in any way wished to undervalue the vast services, which they rendered the Church in the earlier part of their career. But we hold strongly, that their later attitude was calculated to inflict a grievous wound on her authority; and that M. de Montalembert in particular,—disinterested and noble as was his character,—by some of his later exhibitions—particularly by his truly deplorable oration at the Munich Congress—has left a dark blot on his character as a Catholic public man. The dangers however to which we have referred are now happily dangers of the past; and it seems to us that well meaning Catholics have seldom been more united with each other than now, in a common intellectual subjection to the authority of the Holy See.*

We have no reason then, for any active revival of controversy concerning the extent of infallibility; and our present purpose (as we have already said) is essentially defensive. Still,—since it has publicly been alleged, that the Definition of 1870 implies some disparagement of the doctrine we had maintained,—we are called upon promptly to encounter this allegation. But further, there is no security against some future *revival* of disloyalty, within the Church, against the Church’s teaching. Now we are confident that no argument can

* The following sentences from the “*Études*” of June, written on occasion of Pius IX.’s twenty-eighth anniversary, are well worthy of citation.

“When the Syllabus first appeared, could one have hoped that numerous assemblies of Catholics, and that journalists assembled in congress, would [so soon] have loudly professed their absolute adhesion to the doctrine of Encyclicals and to the dogma of Pontifical infallibility? . . .

“Contrariwise to all the predictions of a spurious enlightenment, the voice of the Vicar of Jesus Christ has pierced through the din of this tumultuous age and the vain noise of parliamentary declamations. Sophism and blasphemy are indeed still heard; but nothing has been able to prevent the word of Pius IX. from reaching the most humble of his children. . . .

“He has testified true doctrine to his brethren the Bishops; and in strengthening their faith has secured their unanimous and invincible resistance to revolutionary tyranny. He has saved the principles of right and justice; he continues to diffuse among the people the salutary instructions of the Gospel. The word, which comes forth from his prison, reaches forth through the Church to enlighten souls, dissipate doubts, console sadness, to preserve the weak from discouragement, and to elevate all hearts above the oppression of law and the chains of persecution.

consistently be maintained against such disloyalty, except by a position, substantially identical with ours, on the extent of infallibility; and if this be so, it is a matter of real, and possibly even of pressing importance, that Catholics should not be prejudiced against that position, by any vague idea of its having been in some way discredited by the pronouncements of the Council. It is important therefore to show, that nothing of the kind can truly, or even plausibly, be maintained.

Certainly at the outset it does seem an unpromising task, to quote the Vatican Definition as telling against us. According to that Definition, the Pope speaks *ex cathedrâ* and infallibly, whenever, "in discharge of his office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, he defines, according to his supreme Apostolic authority, a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church." Take then any given error, which Pius IX. may have condemned in some one of the Allocutions and Apostolic Letters mentioned in the "*Quantâ curâ*"; and apply successively to such condemnation those characteristics of an *ex cathedrâ* Act, which have been laid down by the Definition.

Did he condemn that error "in discharge of his office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, according to his supreme Apostolic authority"? He replies, in the "*Quantâ curâ*," that he uttered his pronouncement "according to the duty of his Apostolic ministry"; and "treading in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessors," who (as he had just declared) had been in the habit of putting forth "most wise Letters and Constitutions," for the purpose of "exposing and condemning all heresies and errors" which were noxious to faith and morals.

Then, in condemning this given error, was Pius IX. "defining a doctrine"? Of course he was defining the doctrine, that this or that opinion is an error.

Was it "a doctrine concerning faith or morals"? He declares that his predecessors had been in the habit of condemning "heresies and errors, adverse to our divine Faith, to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, to purity of morals, to the eternal salvation of souls"; and that in this pronouncement he has been following their example.

Was he defining a doctrine "to be held by the Universal Church"? He expressly declares that, when "condemning the chief errors of this our most unhappy age," he had also "excited the admirable vigilance" of all Catholic Bishops, and "admonished and exhorted all sons of the Catholic Church" "to abhor the contagion."

It really seems to us, that if the Fathers of the Council had had the "*Quantâ curâ*" expressly in their mind, they could hardly have declared, more distinctly than they did, the *ex cathedrâ* character of the condemnations mentioned in that Encyclical. Word seems to tally with word, and clause with clause. And we think that the truth of our conclusion will even more manifestly appear, if we consider successively the various arguments which have been urged on the other side.

I. Some have spoken, as though the very fact of the Bishops having been silent e.g. on the Syllabus, involves some disparagement of its infallibility. But nothing can be simpler than the reply to this. Those questions which concern the *extent* of infallibility were, by common consent of all the Fathers, adjourned to the second year of the Council. The reasonableness, or rather absolute necessity, of such a course is evident on the surface. The "subject" of infallibility is one question; its "object" or "extent" quite a different one. The only choice was, between deciding one of these questions and deciding neither. But it was immeasurably more important to decide the former than the latter: because when once the doctrine was defined that the Pope's infallibility in defining is co-extensive with the Church's,—the Pope himself would be able at any moment to define what that extent is; and to secure universal acceptance of his definition. But, in fact, there was a still stronger reason than we have mentioned, for defining at all hazards the "subject" of infallibility. It had appeared, as time went on, that there was a body of actual heretics, calling themselves Catholics, who denied infallibility to the Pope even when teaching in union with the Episcopate. It was a matter of first necessity, to exterminate these misbelievers from the Church's visible communion. Now the Archbishop has clearly explained, how difficult it was to find time for carrying through what was actually accomplished; had more been attempted, nothing whatever would have been done.

It was obvious that the length of time consumed in the discussion, reformation, and voting of the *schemata* was such, that unless the Constitution *De Romano Pontifice* were brought on immediately after Easter, it could not be finished before the setting in of summer should compel the Bishops to disperse. Once dispersed, it was obvious they could never again re-assemble in so large a number. Many who, with great earnestness, desired to share the blessing and the grace of extinguishing the most dangerous error which for two centuries has disturbed and divided the faithful, would have been compelled to go back to their distant sees and missions, never to return. It was obviously of the first moment that such a question should be discussed and decided, not, as we should have been told, in holes and corners, or by a handful of Bishops, or by a faction, or by a clique, but by the largest possible

assembly of the Catholic Episcopate. All other questions, on which little divergence of opinion existed, might well be left to a smaller number of Bishops. But a doctrine which for centuries had divided both Pastors and people, the defining of which was contested by a numerous and organized opposition, needed to be treated and affirmed by the most extensive deliberation of the Bishops of the Catholic Church. Add to this, the many perils which hung over the continuance of the Council; of which I need but give one example. The outbreak of a war might have rendered the definition impossible. And in fact, the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff was defined on the 18th of July, and war was officially declared on the following day. ("Vatican Council," pp. 53-4.)

II. To proceed. Some theologians—perhaps unconsciously influenced by the desire of avoiding controversial difficulties—have at various times laid down stringent rules, limiting the number of *ex cathedrâ* Acts.* The commonest of these alleged rules has perhaps been, that no Act is *ex cathedrâ* which does not express an anathema on dissentients. Certainly no corroboration of *this* view can be obtained from the Definition; which does not so much as *hint* at the notion, of an anathema being the necessary accompaniment of an *ex cathedrâ* Act.

But oddly enough (unless our memory deceives us) we have seen the exact opposite of the above doctrine expressed by a Catholic writer. We have seen it said, that, according to the Vatican Definition, no mere condemnation of heresy or error (and for that reason not the Syllabus) can possibly be *ex cathedrâ*; because the Council speaks only of defining doctrine, and not of condemning error. Such an opinion would certainly lead to singular results. One inference from it would be, that the condemnation of Baius, Jansenius, and Quesnel had not been *ex cathedrâ*; nay nor even the Pope's confirmation of the Tridentine Canons. It can hardly be necessary to explain, that, when the Pope declares this or that thesis to be a heresy or an error—in this declaration he is (by the

* Janus and other writers of his stamp have conferred on us a real service. Every past fact has been raked up, which the most eager and keen-sighted scrutiny could torture by ever so violent a process into an objection against Papal infallibility. Now we say unhesitatingly, that hardly one of those objections is less easy of solution on the theory which we have ourselves humbly maintained as to the extent of infallibility,—than it would be on the most stringent theory which has ever been devised.

In our opinion, the controversial labour which, more than any other, is rendered necessary by such writers as Janus, is to investigate the degree and manner in which a disciplinary Act can be truly considered to involve a practical teaching of doctrine. This very important question however we ourselves avowedly left on one side, in our discussions on the extent of infallibility.

very force of terms) defining a *doctrine*; the doctrine, that such thesis is a heresy or an error.

III. Others have alleged that, according to the Definition, the Pope's power of infallibly determining doctrine is confined within the limits of defining revealed dogmata: that it does not extend consequently to declaring dogmatical facts; or canonizing saints; or condemning errors, whether theological or philosophical, which may be ever so injurious to the Faith, without actually contradicting it.

At starting these theorizers are met by an extrinsic difficulty. Those theologians who drew up the schemata which, by the Holy Father's command, were to be placed before the Bishops in the second year of the Council, must (if any men) be good authorities on this question. Now Card. Antonelli expressly admitted, in his letter to Count Daru,* the existence of a canon among these schemata, defining under sanction of anathema, that the Church's infallibility "extends, not only to the Deposit of the Faith, but to *all that is necessary for the preservation of that Deposit.*" And Card. Antonelli, while making the obvious remark that the Canon may possibly receive some "modification from the judgment and decision of the Episcopate," nevertheless declares that in itself it is no more than "the exposition of the maxims and fundamental principles of the Church; principles repeated over and over again in the Acts of former General Councils."

However, let us turn to the Constitution itself promulgated in 1870. And let it be remembered, that no theologian ever claimed infallibility for the Church in matters purely secular, but exclusively in matters connected with the Deposit of Faith. This has been from first to last our own humble doctrine; we have never even dreamed of alleging that the Church can condemn any errors, except those which in her judgment are injurious or perilous to the dogmata of Revelation. Our opponents consider even this excessive; they contend that, according to the Constitution of 1870, the Pope's infallibility extends no further, than the actual declaration of some revealed truth and the anathematization of its contradictory heresy. We need hardly add that if the *Pope's* infallibility in defining is thus limited, so also must be the Church's; for the Definition expressly declares that the former is co-extensive with the latter.

These Catholics chiefly appeal, not to the Definition itself, but to two sentences in its Preamble. This is a little amusing;

* A translation of this letter will be found in our number of July, 1870, pp. 225-231.

because such thinkers, when any *opponent* of theirs cites a Preamble, promptly extinguish him by the reply, that a mere Preamble can have no doctrinal authority. For our own part however, we have always maintained that a Preamble has *great* doctrinal authority; as being the Church's authentic exposition of what she means by the defining words. By all means therefore, let us give every possible weight to those sentences in the Preamble, which are alleged against us. They run as follows; and in our comment on them we are but repeating what we have already urged in our article of January, 1871.

"The Roman Pontiffs [have from time to time] defined as to be held those things which, with the help of God, they had recognized as conformable with the Sacred Scriptures and Apostolic Tradition. For the Holy Spirit was not promised to the successors of Peter that by His revelation they might disclose new doctrine, but that by His assistance they might inviolably keep and faithfully expound the Revelation or Deposit of Faith delivered through the Apostles."

Now it is seen at starting, that the interpretation of these words which such critics suggest, "*proves too much*," as the saying is. If, by the phrase "new doctrines" Papally undefinable, were designated *all* doctrinal statements without exception which are not contained in Scripture and Tradition,—what would follow? On such an hypothesis it would be a "new doctrine" Papally undefinable, that Jansenius's book contains five certain propositions in its legitimate objective sense; it would be a "new doctrine" Papally undefinable, that this or that canonized person is a saint; it would be a "new doctrine" Papally undefinable, that the Council of Trent is Œcumenical. On such a view then as that which we are opposing, the Vatican Council would have quite incidentally and by the way—when not occupied at all with defining the "object" of infallibility—denied the Church's infallibility in dogmatical facts; her infallibility in the canonization of saints; her infallibility in the authentication of Œcumenical Councils as such. On the other hand, those very theologians, who are most explicit in laying down the wide extent of infallibility, are no less explicit in declaring, that the Church has no power of "coining new doctrines"; and a very little consideration of the above-quoted passage will amply suffice to show its true meaning.

We will begin with the *latter* of the two sentences; and when that is understood, the meaning of the former will become obvious enough. "The Holy Spirit," says the Council, "was not promised to the successors of Peter that by His revelation they might disclose new doctrine, but that by His assistance they might inviolably keep and faithfully expound the Revelation

or Deposit of Faith delivered through the Apostles." A contrast is most manifestly intended in this sentence, between the Apostles on one hand and post-Apostolic Popes on the other. First then as to the Apostles. They "disclosed new doctrine" under the Holy Ghost's "revelation."* Here two things are included: firstly the Apostles were conscious organs of revelation; and secondly in that capacity they from time to time disclosed new doctrine. At any given period antecedent to S. John's death, one cannot be certain that some new particular was not added to the Deposit: some particular, known to the Apostle himself by his conscious acceptance of a revelation from the Holy Ghost; and believed in by Christians, because they held firmly that he was the *organ* of such revelations. Now it is easily imaginable, that successive Popes should have been invested by God with the very same power; and it is wonderful indeed how many even well-educated Protestants imagine, that this is the very Catholic doctrine of Papal infallibility. It was of great importance therefore, or rather in some sense absolutely necessary, that the Council should expressly disavow so anti-Catholic a notion.

The Council then draws two contrasts, between the Apostles and S. Peter's successors in the Papacy. And first for the first of these. To the Apostles the Holy Ghost spoke as *revealing* (*Eo revelante*): post-Apostolic Popes He only influences as *assisting* (*Eo assistente*). In other words, Apostles spoke as conscious instruments of the Holy Ghost; whereas post-Apostolic Popes possess no consciousness whatever of His action upon their minds. The "revelation," accorded to an Apostle, entirely dispensed with any intermediate human agency; whereas the "assistance," given to a post-Apostolic Pope, not only is compatible with, but *demand*s the co-operation of human means. An Apostle simply declares that which he knows God to have told him; but a post-Apostolic Pope must go through some process of reasoning, in which this or that verity, contained in Scripture and Tradition, is a conspicuous premiss. And thus we are led naturally to the *second* contrast intended by the Vatican Council between the two. The Apostles could disclose new doctrine; but S. Peter's successors in the Papacy have no other office in their infallible magisterium, except that of inviolably guarding and faithfully expounding that one Faith once given, which was finally closed and sealed up at the Apostles' death.

* The question of *Scriptural* inspiration is not here involved: *that* was enjoyed by S. Mark and S. Luke, no less than by S. Matthew or S. John; while many Apostles were not Scripture writers at all.

Now there are various verities, which are not in themselves revealed, but which nevertheless are so intimately *connected* with revealed truths, that unless they be accepted with unreserved assent, the Pope has no sufficient power for guarding and testifying the Deposit with due efficacy and impressiveness. We will not here enlarge on a theme, which is familiar to the readers of our REVIEW; but will content ourselves with giving one prominent *class* of instances in the Archbishop's words.

There are truths of mere human history, which therefore are not revealed, without which the Deposit of the Faith cannot be taught or guarded in its integrity. For instance, that S. Peter was Bishop of Rome; that the Council of Trent and the Council of the Vatican are Œcumenical, that is, legitimately celebrated and confirmed; that Pius IX. is the successor of Peter by legitimate election. These truths are not revealed. They have no place in Scripture; and except the first, they have no place in Tradition: yet they are so necessary to the order of faith, that the whole would be undermined if they were not infallibly certain. But such infallible certainty is impossible by means of human history and human evidence alone. It is created only by the infallible authority of the Church ("Vatican Council," p. 68).

By the phrase "new doctrine" then, the Council indubitably meant to express—not such truths as these—but "doctrine newly revealed." And this obvious interpretation being supposed, nothing can run more naturally than the two sentences before us. "The Holy Spirit," says the Council, "was not promised to the successors of Peter, that by His revelation they might disclose new doctrine." All Catholics are here in absolute accordance: no Catholic dreams that any successor of S. Peter has been, as such, recipient of a "revelation"; it is a mere Protestant misconception, to suppose that any such theory exists. On the other hand, the Holy Ghost *was* promised to them, "that by His assistance they might inviolably keep and faithfully expound the Revelation or Deposit of Faith delivered through the Apostles": and moreover, as the Council evidently implies, was promised to them (as teachers) for no *other* purpose whatever. Manifestly we do not tend ever so distantly to disparage this statement, when we further say that one *means* whereby the Holy Spirit assists them in the due custody and exposition of the Deposit, is by enabling them to define infallibly certain non-revealed verities: verities which are of such a nature, that their hearty acceptance enables Catholics to apprehend revealed truth far more effectively and persuasively.

We can now easily explain the preceding sentence, which says that Roman Pontiffs have from time to time defined "those

things which with the help of God they had recognized as conformable with the Sacred Scriptures and Apostolic Tradition.” The Council does not say, “those things which are *contained* in Scripture and Tradition,”—but uses a far more general phrase: “those things which are *conformable*” thereto. When a Pontiff is defining one of these ministrative and subordinate doctrines of which we speak,—he is contemplating Scripture and Tradition; he is anxious for the due protection or the more effective inculcation of the dogmata therein contained; he condemns some given error, as *perilous*, as *injurious* to those dogmata; or he defines some positive truth, which will give them deeper hold on the mind of Catholics. Scripture and Tradition constitute his one norm and standard: the interests of Scripture and Tradition are those which alone influence his Act. To define e.g. that Alphonsus de Liguori is a Saint, is to define a verity which is in the highest degree *conformable* to Scripture and Tradition, though certainly not *contained* therein.

We should add, that the whole run and drift of the paragraph conclusively disproves the possibility of such an interpretation as that which we are opposing. It is occupied with recounting historical facts; with approving the whole series of definitions, which successive Pontiffs have issued. “Our [Pius IX.’s] predecessors ever made unwearied efforts, that the salutary doctrines of Christ might be propagated among all the nations of the earth; and with equal care watched that it might be preserved genuine and pure. Therefore the Bishops of the whole world” ever applied to the Apostolic See when danger to the Faith sprang up; “and the Roman Pontiffs”—using such “help” as “the exigencies of times and circumstances demanded”—“defined as to be held those things which, &c.” But it is beyond the possibility of question, that (whether in confirming councils or otherwise) successive Pontiffs have defined many truths, which are not contained in Scripture and Tradition. They have defined that the Three Chapters,—and again that the “Augustinus” of Jansenius—expressed heresy; that the Vulgate is authentic; that the word “Transubstantiation” has been aptly used; and so on with a thousand other instances, which might easily be added.

So much on the Preamble. As to the Definition itself, it seems studiously framed to *exclude* any such narrow interpretation as that suggested. It does not speak of the Pope defining “*dogma revelatum ab Universâ Ecclesiâ credendum*,” but “*doctrinam de fide et moribus at Universâ Ecclesiâ tenendam*.” When the Pope defines some non-revealed verity, he ipso facto defines that such verity is intimately bound up with faith and morals; and he is necessarily therefore defining

“a doctrine concerning faith and morals.” Moreover, observe the word “tenendam.” When revealed truths are spoken of—such as can immediately be believed with *divine faith*—the word “credendæ” is (we think) more commonly adopted. On the other hand, whenever truths are inclusively spoken of which *cannot* be believed with immediately divine faith, the word “tenendæ” is invariably used.

IV. Another allegation has been, that the word “define” limits ex cathedrâ Acts to those cases, in which the verities declared, or the errors proscribed, are expressed in definite propositions and with precise scientific analysis; that the word “define” excludes any prolonged and sustained exposition of doctrine, especially such rhetorical and flowing pronouncements as e.g. the “Mirari vos.” It is truly singular that such a point can have been taken, considering the extraordinary facility with which it is refuted. For let us consider this very “Mirari vos,” which is certainly among the most rhetorical Acts ever issued by the Holy See. Its author Gregory XVI. declared subsequently in so many words to the whole Catholic Episcopate, that, in that earlier Encyclical, he had, “according to the authority given him,” “defined” “the Catholic doctrine” concerning the obedience of subjects, indifferentism, liberty of conscience, &c. &c.: moreover that this is the doctrine “which alone it is lawful to follow;” and which, “according to the duty of his office,” he had “proclaimed to the whole Christian flock.”* The term

* We subjoin the sentences containing these expressions, from the Encyclical “Singulari nos”:—

“Singulari nos affecerant gaudio illustria fidei obedientiæ ac religionis testimonia, quæ de exceptis ubique alacriter Encyclicis nostris Literis datis die 15 Augusti anni 1832 perferebantur, quibus sanam quam sequi unicè fas sit doctrinam, de propositis itidem capitibus, pro nostri officii munere Catholico gregi universo denunciavimus.

“Ipse [Lamennais] oppugnamdam evertendamque suscepit Catholicam doctrinam, quam memoratis nostris literis tam de debitâ erga potestates subjectione, tam de arcendâ a populis exitiosâ indifferentismi contagione deque frenis injiciendis evaganti opinionum sermonumque licentiæ, tam demum de damnandâ omnimodâ conscientiæ libertate, teterimâque societatum vel ex cujuscunque falsæ religionis cultoribus in sacræ et publicæ rei conflatarum conspiratione, pro auctoritate humilitati nostræ traditâ definivimus.”

In an article which we published in January, 1865—afterwards reprinted in Dr. Ward’s volume on “Doctrinal Decisions”—we drew out the cumulative evidence, which shows so very irrefragably that the “Mirari vos” was an ex-cathedrâ Act. We began with the confidential Letter sent to Lamennais by the Pope’s command, in company with a copy of the Encyclical; we proceeded to cite Pontifical letters to various Bishops; and concluded with the above-cited language, addressed to the whole Episcopate. The “Guardian” of May 13th alleges that, by bringing together such evidence, we

"defines" then means simply "finally determines"; and has no reference whatever to the particular *shape* which may be assumed by this final determination.

V. Lastly it seems to be thought by some, that, according to the Definition, no Act is *ex cathedrâ*, which does not *express* the Pope's intention of obliging the faithful to assent. For our own part we have consistently and earnestly maintained, that *extrinsic* circumstances will often be sufficient to make known such intention. Take the "*Mirari vos*," on which we have just now been speaking. It is impossible to imagine words more express and unmistakable, than those whereby Gregory XVI. in the "*Singulari nos*" declared what had been his intention in the earlier Encyclical: but that earlier Encyclical itself most certainly expresses no such intention. Now we entirely fail to apprehend, what part of the Vatican Definition can be even alleged as ever so distantly implying, that an Act, in order to be *ex cathedrâ*, must express its own *ex cathedrâ* character. According to the Definition, the Pope speaks *ex cathedrâ* whenever under due conditions "he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals, to be held by the Universal Church." Let us give an obvious illustration. No Pontifical utterance can perhaps be named, which has been so prominently declared *ex cathedrâ* by theologians of every school, as S. Leo's Letter to S. Flavian. In the great Gallican controversy of two centuries back, its *ex cathedrâ* character was the chief fixed point round which the battle raged. "*S. Leo's letter was ex cathedrâ*" said the Gallicans; "and yet observe that the Council of Chalcedon re-examined it." "No doubt it was *ex cathedrâ*" answered their opponents; "but the Council did not re-examine it, in any sense which implied its fallibility."* For those who

"affirm" that Cardinal Pacca's confidential letter was a Papal *ex cathedrâ* Act. Why in the first place it was only one particular out of a long series. But had it stood alone—take a parallel case. S. Leo published *ex cathedrâ* his well-known dogmatic letter to S. Flavian, which in no way expressed its own *ex cathedrâ* character. Suppose one of the Bishops, to whom he sent it for subscription, had inquired of him whether it was to be taken as definitive and irreformable; and had been answered in the affirmative. According to the "*Guardian*," this private response would have been an *ex cathedrâ* Act! In our case there was a special unfairness in the "*Guardian's*" criticism; because the one test, on which we have throughout laid greatest stress as establishing an Act's *ex cathedrâ* character, has been its being *published* by the Pope for the Church's instruction.

* Bellarmine is the only theologian we ever heard of, who doubted that the Letter was *ex cathedrâ*. As to the other Ultramontanes, it is the more remarkable that they should so persistently take for granted its *ex cathedrâ* character, because they would have been relieved of much controversial difficulty had they called this into question.

may not otherwise have access to it, we may mention that we printed it in our number of April 1868, pp. 492-497. They will see that it does not hint ever so distantly, at S. Leo's intention of obliging all Catholics to assent. Nevertheless when one finds him circulating it among the various churches—requiring the subscription of Bishops to it—claiming infallibility for it by his Legates at Chalcedon—accepting with complacency the declaration of Western Bishops that they accept it as their symbol of faith—one sees irrefragable proof of what he intended it to be. Now of course it is impossible to exaggerate the improbability, that the Vatican Council should have issued a Definition, excluding this Letter from the number of infallible declarations. But this is not our present point. We will ask our readers merely to *assume*, that S. Leo wrote his Letter with the intention of binding Catholics to assent; and that he sufficiently manifested to them that intention, by extrinsic indications. In that case assuredly he “defined a doctrine concerning faith, to be held by the Universal Church.” No one, we suppose, will doubt this obvious statement. Indubitably then the phraseology of the Vatican Definition in no way implies, that a Pontifical *ex cathedrâ* Act must itself express the Pontiff's intention of obliging the faithful.

We have now gone through all the arguments which (so far as we know) have been adduced for thinking, that the Vatican Definition in any way discredits the doctrine we have always maintained on the extent of infallibility. Our purpose has been essentially defensive; because the Council only professed to pronounce on the “subject” of infallibility, and it has therefore as yet defined nothing on the “object” thereof. Yet we think that it has given various somewhat strong indications in our favour; and these we will now proceed to mention.

We have already stated our own general doctrine, with sufficient precision for our present purpose; but we will here express it in a somewhat different shape. Within the local Roman Church, the “*Ecclesia urbis Romanæ*,” there is preserved, by special assistance of the Holy Ghost, indefectible purity of doctrine and tradition; in such sense that she is the standard and source of doctrinal purity to all other churches in Christendom.* Now what we maintain is, that this inde-

* Here are the Archbishop's words on the “*Ecclesia urbis Romanæ* :” “If any one shall answer that these evidences do not prove the infallibility of the Pope, speaking *ex cathedrâ*, they will lose their labour. I adduce them to prove the immemorial and universal practice of the Church, in having recourse to the Apostolic See as the last and certain witness and

fectible and authoritative orthodoxy is constantly issuing in *ex cathedrâ* Pontifical Acts. We cannot think that such Acts are rare and exceptional; we hold on the contrary, that they are ordinary and matter-of-course events in the Church's history. We have already argued, that there is nothing in the proceedings of the Vatican Council to discredit such a view; and we now add that those proceedings do much to give it positive support.

I. The first fact which we shall mention in this connection, is derived from the *Postulatum* for a definition, which received the signature of some five hundred Bishops while the Council was sitting.* If any persons are to be considered authentic expositors of the Church's mind on the meaning of the Definition, it must be those who petitioned for it and were afterwards its chief supporters. Now, in their Appendix, they accumulated various testimonies to the dogma which they wished the Council to define; and one of these testimonies is the Address made to Pius IX., at the Centenary of 1867, by the assembled Episcopate. In that Address occurs the following passage:—

Never has your voice been silent. You have accounted it to belong to your supreme office to proclaim eternal verities; to smite with the sword of your Apostolic utterance the errors of the time, which threaten to overthrow the natural and supernatural order of things, and the very foundations of ecclesiastical and civil power; to dispel the darkness which perverse and novel teachings have shed over men's souls; and to declare, persuade to, and approve all that is needful and wholesome to the individual, to the Christian family, and to civil society: so that at length all may attain to know what it is, that every Catholic should hold, retain, and profess. For that exceeding great care we render to your Holiness the deepest thanks; and with endless

judge of the divine tradition of faith. That they prove this no one will, I think, deny. Even those who imagine that Honorius was a heretic, have never ventured to incur the condemnation of Peter de Osma, who affirmed that 'the Church of the City of Rome may err.' Even the Gallicans of 1682 professed to believe the See to be infallible, while they affirmed that he who sat in it was fallible." ("The Œcumenical Council, &c.," p. 91.)

We may be allowed to refer, for our own apprehension of the Church's doctrine concerning the indefectible orthodoxy of the *Ecclesia urbis Romanæ*, to our number of Jan., 1870, pp. 197, 198. Here, however, we must make an obvious explanation. In that article we said, that the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation are the most authentic exposition of Roman doctrine, except only Pontifical *ex cathedrâ* pronouncements. This statement proceeded on our own principle, that all such Acts as those mentioned in the "*Quantâ curâ*" are *ex cathedrâ*. Those who do not accept this principle, must at all events (as we have urged) regard such Acts as even more authentic expositions, than Congregational decisions themselves, of the pure and supremely authoritative Roman tradition.

* This *Postulatum* will be found at length in the Archbishop's Pastoral on "The Vatican Council," pp. 163-71.

gratitude, and, believing that Peter has spoken by the mouth of Pius, therefore, whatsoever you have spoken, confirmed, and pronounced for the safe custody of the Deposit, we likewise speak, confirm, and pronounce; and with one voice and one mind we reject everything which, as being opposed to Divine faith, the salvation of souls, and the good of human society, you have judged fit to reprove and reject. For that is firmly and deeply established in our conviction, which the Fathers at Florence defined in their decree on union, that the Roman Pontiff "is the Vicar of Christ, head of the whole Church, and father and teacher of all Christians." *

Here it is declared, that Pius IX.'s "voice has never been silent," so frequent have been his doctrinal utterances; and that all those utterances have been accepted by the Episcopate. But those Bishops who signed the *Postulatum* declared (by the very fact of citing the Address at all) that, in their judgment, all these unceasing doctrinal utterances had been ex cathedrâ; because the one and only point of their citations was, to show (as they themselves express it) "the common opinion of Bishops, concerning the supreme and *infallible* authority of the Roman Pontiff in matters of faith and morals." †

II. Our second testimony is from the Preamble to the Definition. This Preamble singles out three in particular, from all the ecclesiastical authorities which might have been adduced, for the dogma to be defined. The first of these is the well-known formula, prescribed by Pope Hormisdas to the Eastern Bishops; and we will cite the account of this formula, given by the Archbishop in his Pastoral on "The Œcumenical Council." We italicise one clause:—

"The first act of salvation is to keep rightly the rule of faith, and in no way

* Quoted by the Archbishop in his Pastoral on the Centenary, p. 32.

† The Archbishop thus comments on this part of the Address, in his Pastoral on the Centenary:—"By these words the Bishops did not confirm the Acts of the Pontiff as if they needed confirmation, nor accept his declarations of truth and condemnations of error as if they needed their acceptance. They did not intend or imply that the supreme Pontifical Acts since 1862, in the form of Allocutions, Briefs, Encyclicals, and the Syllabus, were of imperfect and only inchoate authority until their acceptance should confirm them. Nothing was further from the thoughts of the Pastors of the Church. They recognised the voice of Peter in the voice of Pius, and the infallible certainty of all his declarations and condemnations, in virtue of the supreme and singular prerogative of Doctor of the Universal Church, given by our Lord Jesus Christ to Peter, and through Peter to his successors. They renewed, before the tomb of the Apostle, the adhesion they had already given, one by one, in the midst of their flocks, to the successive utterances of the Sovereign Pontiff, as these, from time to time, had reached them. The Encyclical '*Quantâ curâ*' and the Syllabus or compendium of eighty condemnations in previous Encyclicals and Allocutions—all these had been at once received by them as a part of the supreme teaching of the Church, through the person of its head, which, *by the special assistance of the Holy Ghost, is preserved from all error.* They did not add certainty to that *which was already infallible*" (pp. 33, 34).

to deviate from the decrees of the Fathers. And inasmuch as the words of our Lord Jesus Christ cannot be passed over, who said, 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church,' &c. . . . these words are confirmed by their effects, for in the Apostolic See religion has been always preserved without spot." Then follows a condemnation of heretics and of all in communion with them. "*Wherefore we receive and approve all the Letters of Pope Leo, and all that he wrote concerning the Christian religion.*" Therefore, as we have said, following in all things the Apostolic See, and professing all its decrees, I hope to be worthy to be in that one communion with you which the Apostolic See enjoins, in which is the perfect and true solidity of Christian religion "(p. 86).

It is not then S. Leo's Letter to S. Flavian, which *alone* is *ex cathedrâ*; but "*all his Letters,*" "*all that he wrote concerning the Christian religion.*" How numerous and frequent therefore must have been S. Leo's *ex cathedrâ* Acts!

III. Further, let the following sentence of the Preamble be duly pondered:—

"But since in this our age, in which the salutary efficacy of the Apostolic office is more than ever required, not a few are found who oppose its authority, we judge it to be absolutely necessary solemnly to assert the prerogative [of infallibility in *ex cathedrâ* Acts], which the Only-Begotten Son of God vouchsafed to unite with the supreme pastoral office."

In this age then, more perhaps than in any other, it is "absolutely necessary" for "the salutary efficacy of the Apostolic office," that its prerogative of infallibility be universally accepted. But there is no other function of that office which by possibility could derive additional efficacy from such acceptance, except only the function of teaching. Pius IX. then, with approbation of the Council, declares that the teaching, put forth by the Pope against the chief errors of this age, will derive much additional efficacy, from a universal belief in the infallibility of his *ex cathedrâ* Acts. It is plain then, by the very force of terms, that his teaching against the chief errors of his age has been *ex cathedrâ*; and he himself announces in the "*Quantâ curâ,*" that such teaching is contained in a constant series of Encyclicals, Allocutions, and other Apostolic Letters.

At last however (to repeat a former remark) the most direct and strongest evidence, derivable from the Council for our thesis, is a comparison, between the description which the Bishops give of an *ex cathedrâ* Act on the one hand, and the description on the other hand given by Pius IX. in the "*Quantâ curâ,*" of what he had done in the various Encyclicals, Allocutions and Apostolic Letters to which he refers.

And let it be remembered, that avowedly it was no part of the Council's intention to *define* any thing concerning the extent of infallibility, before its second year of session ; so that we have no means of knowing what doctrine on the matter the Bishops had in their mind, except by means of hints and implications casually (as it were) let drop. Humanly speaking, there seems little chance of the Council reassembling for an indefinite period ; but there remains always the possibility that, as the Holy Father judged a definition on the object of infallibility to be in itself desirable, he may himself promulgate one *ex cathedrâ*. Of course, should this occur, all loyal Catholics will do their utmost to put aside all preconceived notions ; and will aim at no other end, than that of submitting themselves simply to the letter and to the spirit of whatever the Holy See may determine. We hope that for our own part we shall not be backward in fulfilling this duty.

On one point however, good Catholics have now the firmest conviction. Nothing will ever be defined, tending ever so remotely to discredit the indubitable proposition, that firm interior assent is due to those repeated utterances, whereby Pius IX., "in fulfilment of his Apostolic office," has "condemned the chief errors of the age"; as well as to all other Papal pronouncements, similarly circumstanced. We do not see that any great practical evil could immediately result from a doubt, however unreasonable we may think that doubt, whether such pronouncements are strictly *ex cathedrâ* and infallible.* But if at any future time influential Catholics were again to be found, professing that no such Pontifical Act has peremptory authority over their interior convictions,—this would indeed be a serious calamity. Of such calamity however, at present, (thank God !) we can discern no sign whatever.

We have cited F. Newman in corroboration of the truth, that interior assent is due from Catholics to many propositions which the Church has not defined ; and we ought not therefore in fairness to ignore the fact, that he has in the very same volume (pp. 376 and 369, note) disavowed all agreement or sympathy with our opinions on the extent of infallibility. Yet it seems to us, that whatever objections can be raised by externs against our own doctrine, will tell quite as strongly against *his*. He holds that there are "ten thousand questions,"—on which the Church has not indeed expressly spoken,

* We say "immediately" result : because no one can tell what *future* harm might ensue from a mistaken doctrine, however at the time comparatively harmless.

—but which no Catholic can answer in any way but one, without betraying deficiency in spiritual attainment, and more or less of a rebellious spirit; nay, that private judgment on them is “barely lawful.”* It seems to us, we say, that such a doctrine as this is as fully open to the cavil of externs, as our own can possibly be considered. But we contend most confidently, that neither of them is fairly open to cavil at all.

The “Guardian,” in its article of April 29th to which we have already referred, maintains substantially, that such a view overthrows that very doctrinal unity of the Roman Catholic Church, on which her children have ever insisted as on her most characteristic mark. And though the article itself is too feeble to bear a reply, we have no doubt that the above-mentioned objection is thought cogent by large numbers external to her communion. “See,” they say, “here is a vital doctrinal division within the Roman Catholic Church; viz. between those who do, and who do not, accept certain of her judgments and intimations.” We maintain on the contrary, that there is no kind of ground for this objection. We maintain, that the doctrine upholden, whether by F. Newman or by ourselves, not only sets forth strongly the Church’s existent doctrinal unity;—but supplies in addition what may be called a potential doctrinal unity of extreme value, to be realized by those of her children who shall come forth as her intellectual champions.

Firstly then as to the Church’s existent doctrinal unity. The number of Pontifical Acts is very large indeed, of which no Catholic doubts the infallibility. Not to mention the long and illustrious series defining, under different aspects, the dogmata of the Blessed Trinity and Incarnation,—look at the Council of Trent alone;† and consider how vast is the ground which it covers. Since its conclusion, there have been condemnations, doubted by no Catholic to be infallible, of Baianism, of Jansenism, of unduly lax and unduly rigorous casuistry, of Quietism, of Pistoianism (if we may coin a word), of Gallicanism. All these successive condemnations were at first called into question by some well-intentioned Catholics, as not certainly infallible; but all have now found

* We here refer to the passage quoted in an earlier part of our article, and to a sentence which follows it. “For all these reasons,” continues F. Newman, “there ever has been, and ever will be, a vast exercise and realized product, partly praiseworthy, partly *barely lawful*, of private judgment within the Catholic Church.” Private judgment, in opposition to the Church’s intimations, cannot be described by him as “praiseworthy”; therefore it is described by him as “barely lawful.”

† We assume of course that a Council is infallible, in virtue of its ex cathedrâ confirmation by the Pope.

their way into the universally admitted catalogue of *ex cathedrâ* Acts. There existed from the first within the Church—and by help of these definitions there has securely and even increasingly been maintained—a profound doctrinal unity, on all which concerns the true type of Christian character and the practical road to salvation. In the Catholic Church, one definite body of instruction, whether as to dogma or as to practice, is placed alike before student and peasant—to be apprehended by them of course variously, according to their respective mental endowments, but nevertheless one and the same—whether they are only seeking to obey God's commandments, or whether they desire to advance interiorly in His love and service. It is not relevant here to enlarge on this verity; but (as we shall now proceed to explain) no part of our special doctrine, concerning the extent of the Church's authority in teaching, tends ever so remotely to discredit or disparage it. On many occasions we have urged it to the best of our power.*

Now there are innumerable questions—unmeaning to uneducated men or to men immersed in professional life—but which constantly occupy the mind of those given to theological, philosophical, and certain other studies. And no inconsiderable number of these questions are such, that this or that given answer to them (were it to gain ground among thinkers) would after the lapse of time grievously corrupt that central body of dogma, which (as we have said) is the Catholic's strength and support, whether he be learned or simple, on his road to heaven. In like manner certain views on ecclesiastical or other politics may be taken up by public men, from which a similar result would in due time ensue. Such questions of course occur to intellectual Protestants, no less than to intellectual Catholics; and as Protestants have no standard of common appeal, the necessary result in *their* case is, that such Protestants, however zealous for the glory of God, often waste the greater part of their strength in mutual attack, and from their disunion are comparatively powerless to defend those very interests which they have most at heart. The case is entirely different with Catholics, precisely because they can contemplate an external standard of truth. Loyal Catholics, who are given to such speculations or pursuits, make it their very principal work to look up to the Church's guidance; and in proportion as they do so, they form a united phalanx, in

* Nowhere is the truth more impressively and persuasively stated, than in F. Newman's volume on "The Difficulties felt by Anglicans," from p. 271 to p. 276.

defence of the Church, her God, and her Redeemer. Thus, in addition to the unity of all Catholics in revealed dogma, there is also readily attainable a union of all cultivated Catholics in the external defences and accessories of such dogma.

But of course, at this or that period, there may be cultured Catholics, who approach these speculative or practical questions without due deference to the Church's teaching; and of these we cannot but think, that (from the very fact of their being Catholics and therefore the less objects of suspicion to their brethren in the Faith) they are commonly more dangerous to the Church, than avowed heretics. It is for this reason, that the phenomena, presented some ten years ago by "Liberal Catholicism" in France, appeared to us fraught with such grave peril. Here were excellent self-sacrificing men, sincerely persuading themselves that they were the Church's advocates, and yet, in the very central doctrine of their advocacy, rebellious against her teaching.

But does it at all follow from such a view, that men of this kind are external to Catholic unity or revealed dogma? By no manner of means. Their speculations, it is true, *tend* to corrupt revealed dogma; but then such tendency would have its practical issue in the *future*. Meanwhile the disloyal Catholic, whom we are contemplating, holds, in common with his brethren, the whole body of revealed truth; and sincerely believes that there is nothing in his maxims, which tends in an opposite direction. So F. Newman expressly says, that the "ten thousand questions" of which he speaks are not matters of religion proper, but "of conduct, ritual, discipline, politics, social life"; while for ourselves indeed we should add far more emphatically, "of philosophical and historical speculation." By such instruments as these it is, that the disloyal Catholic threatens such grievous calamity to the Church's dogma; but he has not on that account less sincere faith in that dogma, than have other Catholics. How far he is morally blameworthy for such disloyalty—how far the "impulse of rebellion," mentioned by F. Newman in an earlier sentence, is formally, deliberately and culpably such—is an inquiry, we need not say, which none can solve except the Searcher of hearts.

If such views as we have just expressed are true, no one will doubt that they are of vital importance; and it is because we are firmly *convinced* of their truth, that we have from the first laid such emphatic stress on all those doctrines, which concern the Church's authority in teaching.

ART. II.—LONDON POOR AND LONDON WORK.

In Strange Company: being the Experiences of a Roving Correspondent.
By JAMES GREENWOOD, "The Amateur Casual." Second Edition.
King & Co. 1874.

The Unprofessional Vagabond. By THOMAS CARLISLE (Haroun Alraschid).
Low & Marston. 1873.

IT is pretty nearly agreed on all hands that the time for writing the history of a country, merely through the acts and characters of its sovereigns, is gone by, never to return. The splendid figures of past days, Charlemagne, Richard Cœur-de-Lion, St. Louis, the Black Prince, and Henry V., are lastingly framed for us in a vaguely known but majestic Past, such as will, probably, never be reproduced in the world.

For it is with the heroic-historic world much as with the natural. The vast pines and gigantic ferns, the megalonx and the great saurians, filled the air and cast their beneficent shade, or roamed the wastes of land and water as lords of all, trampling or devouring, as it seemed to them good. And so with the majestic or warlike kings who stood out so grandly in their day; a day which is in like manner past and done with, and laid by, though for our most instructive use.

Here, however, we must take care not to be misunderstood; for the Middle Ages had another aspect entirely distinct from that which we have mentioned. They were a time wherein the normal relations between Church and State were in some sense theoretically accepted, and wherein also (amidst whatever amount of practical wickedness) all men's notions of right and wrong were based on the Christian standard. This influence of the Church over society was no mere transitory fashion of the world, which, by the very necessity of social progress, must in due time pass away;* on the contrary it would have remained until the Day of Judgment, had it not been for men's wilful wickedness and rebellion. But there are perhaps not a few, who pass through life cherishing

* For a fuller exposition of what we here intend, we may be perhaps allowed to refer to our article on the Encyclical and Syllabus (April, 1865), pp. 493-498.

a kind of sentimental regret for the institutions of the mediæval period,—not because of their being so saturated with Christianity and the Church's influence—but because of those purely temporal characteristics, which we began with mentioning, and which may be summed up by saying that society was then in a far less advanced state of civilization than at present. And even as to those who are more reasonable in their lamentations over the Past, it may sometimes happen that they are not sufficiently alive to the weighty truth, that the Present is the wise man's vineyard, his whole capital upon which his life-work must be bestowed.

The present is to be prized also upon other grounds ; though nothing of course can in any degree compensate for the Church's dethronement from her high position. But in its purely temporal aspect, it possesses many great advantages over what went before. So long as heroic kings, or kings with the prominence of a few great nobles, ruled, as it is now called, personally, or with irresistible influence, in any state, so long was the area of labour with its rewards narrowed in its limits. The gradual course of social history has indefinitely widened the area of labour, and consequently indefinitely also distributed its rewards, each according to its kind ; while at the same time, and underlying all these, the pressure of civil tyranny has been lightened by the multiplicity of forces brought to bear upon it, to mitigate its cowardly wrong-doing.

Both in the earlier and later condition of society then, there were great goods and great evils as regards the relation between rich and poor ; nor have we here any intention of inquiring on which side—so far as merely secular elements are concerned—the advantage lies. From the days when the Jewish kings “sat in the gate” to do justice to such of their poor as came to plead their cause before them, the same practice has been repeated again and again by rulers for the use of the common people. Our own Alfred daily heard the complaints of his poor subjects, and either did justice between them or relieved their wants. St. Louis, in like manner, spent part of every day under his “spreading tree,” hearing and judging “the cause of the poor and him that had none to plead for him.” Wherever, in short, we find this beautiful symbolic figure of a just absolute king standing out in strong relief in history, there also we find the poor protected with justice, sheltered, and fed. So also with the great nobles who shared the same character and attributes. Their courtyards were the resort of the hungry and naked, the sick and infirm ; and doles of food, clothing, and medicines were as much a

part of the necessary order of the day as the regular household meals.

It has been largely held among us that the dissolution of the monasteries by Henry VIII. was the cause of the terrible distress, beggary, and famine which afflicted this country in the following reigns; and that numbers of the poor, who had been accustomed to succour from the monastic orders, perished for want of that help. The dissolution of the religious houses did, undoubtedly, cause sharp local and temporary distress; and the more so, because instead of being effected by degrees, or with anything like humane preparation and warning, the monasteries and great English abbeys were closed suddenly, while their ample revenues were plundered by the accomplice nobles, instead of being applied to any forms of social relief. But the wide-spread condition of misery and famine which obtained during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries also in France—where the still more numerous religious foundations remained untouched, dispensing enormous alms—was more hideous and lasting than at any time in this country, and we must seek for the causes of this condition of our lower classes lower down than in any such temporary deprivation of external aid.

Nay, we are even bound to admit, in the cause of truth, that the monastic alms, originated by the purest Christian charity, had been for many years abused; and that whereas this help had been originally intended for the sick, the infirm, the very young, and the aged unable to earn their own bread, they had been gradually encroached upon by the strong and capable of work, who thus possessed themselves of the rewards of labour without undergoing its toil. By this abuse, there had gathered about the enormous area of Church-lands a wide fringe of worthless, mendicant paupers: debased in morals, and altogether degraded in their tone and habits of life, exactly as our pauper and pauper-criminal classes are at this day. The same facts were more widely noticeable in France, where the Paris archives give the most minute and curious details of the continuous efforts made during the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries to repress beggary and the vast network of imposture and crime which systematic mendicancy and the preying upon others never fail to produce. The poorer classes in our own country recovered with energy (materially) from the blow dealt them by the suppression of religious houses, and although it must have fallen heavily upon the sick, the aged, and the incurably infirm, the labouring poor manfully bestirred themselves to seek and find work, and by hook or crook, the mendicancy, which is always foreign

and distasteful to the essential English character, notably decreased. Private or State charity also disposed of the more obvious forms of misery, and a variety of hospitals, founded by the generosity of (chiefly) London merchants, sprang up. It is impossible to deny that for a while, at least, the decrease of beggary, idleness, and the lowest fringe of idle criminals, which is the unfailing residuum of begging, was remarkable in England and Scotland in the seventeenth century.

But, in the meanwhile, the last forms of despotic and would-be despotic royal rule vanished with the Tudors, Cromwell, and the Stuarts; the sovereign power filtered down through Ministers, the Houses of Parliament, the House of Commons alone, the Press, public opinion, and extended suffrage, till we now find ourselves, so to speak, flattened out into a commonwealth with a hereditary monarchical Protector, and with accumulations, more or less disorderly, of the lower and lowest masses, which it has become nearly impossible to supervise, and at times exceedingly difficult to control. And the latter proportion of these changes, moreover, has come about so rapidly that there has been no time to foresee, much less to prepare for, certain ominous elements in our present social state.

Our condition might, in this current year of 1874, be sketched in something like this outline. We possess our kindly and gracious Queen—whom may God long preserve!—whose powers of lessening the distress and misery of hundreds of thousands of her subjects are limited to the depth of her own private purse; and who cannot so much as suggest of herself a single measure acting either upon the poor or the criminals of her own dominions. Gone for ever are the days when Queen Victoria might sit in the Long Walk or on the Slopes at Windsor Castle, hearing and succouring her oppressed, or needy, or sorely-tempted subjects. The most abject starvation, the most gigantic impostures, and the most brutal crimes lie about her parks and walls; yet the Queen can no longer stretch out her sceptre one inch to relieve, to rectify, or to punish any of these forms of evil.

We possess, indeed, our Parliament and our Courts of Law; though of the latter it has been notably shown by a late trial that it may require years of anxiety and suspense, and the expenditure of many thousands of good money, together with (possibly) the lives and health of several persons concerned, before some scanty measure of justice and punishment of the guilty is obtainable. And lastly, we keep on foot an army of some ten thousand police to maintain order in our capital against a second army of criminals, evil-doers, and vagabonds,

sometimes reckoned at thirty thousand, which is well calculated to keep the first-mentioned army constantly employed and in good working order.

But as the healthy condition of any State and the sound efficiency of its Government are to be judged by the normal well-being of the masses of its people, let us inquire seriously how we stand in this respect. Setting aside now the country districts and manufacturing towns, let us ask what is the condition of London and its suburbs with regard to that stratum of population which is, we will not say "known to the police," but which are at all events *unknown* to the general run of the clergy, ministers of all shades and colours, district visitors, and even "Bible-women," and alas! with few exceptions, also to any living influence except that of the doctor now and then.

Mr. Greenwood, whose book is worth attention, has probably seen as many of the unknown and hidden classes of London life as any man. He has made it his business, for several reasons, to seek them out and to describe their state and surroundings, though at times with that strong, coarse colouring which is known among scene-painters as "splash-work." And there is no doubt that Mr. Greenwood has "splashed" his horrors thick and strong, being well aware, as so experienced a judge of press competition must be aware, that if nothing very beautiful as well as new is at hand, something unspeakably repulsive will answer the writer's purpose as well. Still, the districts he openly mentions are free to any one who chooses to visit them, and no one has ever contradicted or attempted to run down his account of them with ridicule. In his chapter on the Golden Lane Mission he thus speaks:—

Golden-lane, seen in looking down from an elevation of eighty feet or so, is very different from Golden-lane viewed from the pavement. In the latter case all that may be seen is the bare lane itself, and let the explorer beware that he uses his eyes not too diligently in this beyond compare the very ugliest neighbourhood in London—in all England. . . . Spitalfields is very bad. Probably, in the event of a ruffian show, Flower and Dean-street and Keate-street could produce specimens that would leave all other competitors far behind; but Spitalfields produces only ruffians of a certain type. Mint-street and Kent-street—those old plague-spots that disgrace and disfigure the fair face of the borough of Southwark—teem with blackguardism and vice; but here, too, you find that the birds who here flock are strictly of a feather. Cow-cross, again, is a terrible place, but it is chiefly the hideous habitations and the extreme destitution of the inhabitants that make it so.

Golden-lane, however, with its countless courts and alleys, left and right, may truthfully boast of exhibiting each and every one of the objectionable

characteristics above enumerated. Its thieves are the most desperate and daring in the world ; it is rich in examples of that even more dangerous scoundrel, the "rough." Annually it yields its crop of coiners and smashers ; it is the recognized head-quarters of beggars and cadgers ; while as for costermongers, they must be three thousand strong at the very least. It is the "slummiest" of slums. There are China-yard, Cowheel-alley, Blackboy-court, Little Cheapside, Hotwater-court, and many a dozen besides, nestling closely about the feet of the gaunt Costermongers' Mission House—originally intended for a model lodging-house. . . . Awful places ! As far as the eye can reach—not very far, for, high up as the roof of the Golden-lane building may be, the supply of pestilent mist from below is constant and steady—east, west, north, and south, is to be seen nothing but an intricate net-work of zig-zag cracks, chinks, and crevices, which really are courts and alleys, threading among houses teeming with busy life. . . .

The life that stirs in these black, crooked lanes, not wider than the length of a walking-stick, scarcely seems human. Creatures that you know to be female by the length and raggedness of hair that makes their heads hideous, and by their high-pitched voices, with bare red arms, and their bodies bundled in a complication of dirty rags, loll out of the patched and plastered holes in the wall that serve as windows, and exchange along with their opposite neighbours compliments or blasphemous abuse ; or shaking their bony fists, shriek down threats and curses on the juvenile members of their kind, who roll in the gutter and bite and scratch each other for possession of decayed oranges and apples that the resident costers throw out in the process of sorting. . . .

"But," the reader may say, "there is at least this consolation in so wretched a neighbourhood, there can be but very little drunkenness. Intoxicating liquors are expensive luxuries."

Very expensive ! A "quartern" of gin costs exactly as much as four pounds of bread. Nevertheless, within a circle of a furlong from the Mission House, the enormous number of *eighty-three* public-houses thrive and grow fat. It is computed that the same amount of space affords homes and haunts and hiding and abiding-places for rather over twenty thousand canting beggars, thieves, tramps, costermongers, small shopkeepers, everybody ; and we may easily imagine the influence of such a prodigious outpouring of rum, and gin, and whisky on such an inflammable mass. It was in the midst of this sink of vice and drunkenness, and of every conceivable iniquity, that eight years since one man, single-handed and almost unaided, dared to set up his tiny tent and commence a crusade of reformation. That man was Mr. J. Orsman ; and there he is still, encouraged by his successes, and patiently plodding, working at his business in business-hours, but giving to the good cause, without fee or reward, his "spare hours, Sunday and week-day." *

Whatever or whoever Mr. Orsman may be, his name, on account of his intentions, deserves to be held in honour. Once a year he gives a good supper of bread and meat to the beggars

* "In Strange Company," pp. 13-16.

and tramps in the lodging-houses round about, and he invited Mr. Greenwood to be present. Uninvited, we also can take our places at this dreary feast.

The place was very full. Below there is sitting accommodation for between two and three hundred, and above there is a gallery in which perhaps two hundred more might be seated. . . . But the faces ! It was impossible to look on them without considering the question, How can such as these be good ? Of how many generations of neglect, of vice, and unavoidable grovelling at the foot of the social ladder is this the result ? Each and every one of the ragged, squalid, terribly dirty creatures before me—not the dirt of labour, but a smoky, ingrain grime, resembling the tarnish on neglected brass or copper—had come away from the great fire that invariably is kept burning in the common lodging-house kitchen, and had made a journey, long or short, through the snow and the biting wind in order to secure a meal of bread and meat. The guests at Mr. Orsman's supper were only some of them beggars. Very many were poor wretches driven by hard necessity to seek temporary refuge at a tramp's lodging-house, to whom a meal of half a pound of wholesome meat, with bread, was a feast indeed.*

Mr. Orsman has, in some way or ways unknown, raised funds sufficient to give a Wednesday dinner to about three hundred starved, neglected children of the same district. This feast also with much greater (comparative) satisfaction Mr. Greenwood beheld :—

At stroke of one o'clock they come trooping in, and as they come their tiny, ill-shod feet, and their uncovered arms and legs blue with cold, faster and thicker yet, and there is still a mob behind. I have misgivings as to my friend's declaration that there will be enough for all and to spare. Here they come, each one bringing his or her "dinner things." Handless jugs, milk-cans, baking-dishes, sauce-tureens, small-sized tin saucepans, publican's beer-cans, tin washing-bowls, anything. One family in particular was a sight to behold. A fortnight or so back a woman had died in one of the alleys, and under such suspicious circumstances that it was at first supposed she had been murdered. A coroner's inquest thought otherwise, and the matter dropped. But she left six little children behind her, a boy, the eldest, of twelve, and a girl, a patient, shrewd, poor little thing of nine, who now had to be mother to the remaining four. She had brought them out to dinner, and carried the motherless baby, four months old, in her mites of arms ; and there being no room on the forms, and finding, perhaps, that so sitting she could best feed baby, and the next-sized youngster, who was little better than a baby, she squatted on the ground with the little brood round her, distributing Irish stew, as grave and solicitous as a matron of thirty. . . . It was not a pretty sight, it was indeed a painful and distressing sight, if you made merely a sight of it. The forms round the sides of the

* "In Strange Company," pp. 16, 18, 19.

room were filled, and the floor was literally covered with a swarm of children greedy for food as little pigs, and now that they had the rare chance, partaking of it pretty much as little pigs would—literally so in some cases. . . . But at least there was this consolation when swallowed . . . it satisfied the famished three hundred heartily, completely, as was clearly manifested by the mellow way in which they sang their simple grace after meat, the good missionary accompanying them on his harmonium.*

Among all the good things actually set going and kept up by this grave, indefatigable mission-worker, is the "Barrow Club," of which Lord Shaftesbury is a member; instituted because not one "coster" in twenty owns a barrow of his own, and the hire has been a considerable burden upon them. The costermonger joining this club pays a shilling a week towards a barrow, to which a bonus of four shillings is added, as encouragement. He thus gets his new barrow for about six-and-forty shillings. Lord Shaftesbury's barrow is called "The Earl," and is often lent out to some poor fellow who has none.

There are also belonging to the Mission House a soup kitchen, a sick and burial club, a clothing fund, a maternity fund, giving food and baby-clothes to poor lying-in women, a penny bank, a sewing-class, a free library, a ragged day and Sunday-school, and evening classes for reading, writing, and patching. This last is really a very touching invention of ingenious charity. There are many boys frequenting the classes, whose mothers are dead, or habitual drunkards and wanderers, so that there is no one to put a stitch in their ragged clothes; and they are now told that if they choose to learn such rough tailoring as would suit their views, needles, thread, and "pieces" would be forthcoming, together with a kind, elderly married woman to show them how. The class is strictly private, and limited to thirty, and the poor little ragged tailors find the "patching" class a very great and real accommodation.

Mr. Greenwood opens vistas of unspeakable horrors in the neighbourhood of Golden-lane:—

There are lodging dens in this lane of horrors which no decent man dare enter. . . . Terrible stories are still whispered about the worst of these Golden-lane lodging-houses, of which there are seven that, in the aggregate, make up" about five hundred beds every night. I am informed, on good authority, that occasionally the scenes to be witnessed in at least one of these houses are appalling. This is after the police have made their last inspection for the night, in accordance with the terms of the Lodging-house

* "In Strange Company," pp. 20—23,

Act. The most favourite entertainment at this place is known as a "buff ball," in which both sexes—innocent of clothing—madly join, stimulated with raw whisky and the music of a fiddler and a tin whistle.*

Accompanied by Mr. Orsman, Mr. Greenwood went over one of the most creditably conducted lodging-houses, which provides nightly for about ninety persons. In it a lodger is allowed to go to bed as dirty as he likes, and as a rule he avails himself to the full of the considerate arrangement :—

I went up-stairs and into the many floors of the great rambling old house—at one time a mansion of considerable pretensions, judging from the width and rich carving of the oaken stairs—and peeped into the various dormitories. Paid inspectors visit these places now. I very much question, however, if Mr. Inspector would care to pass a night there himself.†

The law lays down that every married couple should have a room to themselves; but it is carried out by mere matchboard partitions not reaching to the floor, nor by any means to the ceiling. But filthy and unwholesome as these inspected lodging-houses are, there are other dens to which in comparison these are palaces of refinement and comfort. The hideous dens known as hot-water lodging-houses,—from their custom of keeping a huge pot of hot water always on the kitchen hob,—which are unlicensed and illegal, and yet are allowed to flourish and swarm by the police authorities and sanitary officers in Little Cheapside, Cowheel-alley, Reform-place, and Hot Water Court,—are wholly without beds and bedsteads, and allow of about twenty persons lying in their rags on the floor. In one of these horrible nests of infamy a little girl died of scarlet fever, surrounded by nineteen men; who went out the next day with their rags full of fever to spread it wherever they travelled. The greater number of "hot water" lodgers are professional beggars and tramps, and are some of the vilest as well as the most dangerous of their detestable class.

Not without hearty sympathy from us does Mr. Greenwood say, as regards the Golden-lane missionary :—

What it is to labour day by day and week by week, in wintry frost and snow and summer's pestilent heat, among these dreadful places, must be left to the reader's imagination. It is easy enough, however, to comprehend this much. It is not every man has courage and confidence and patience enough to take on himself, without fee or reward, the tremendous task not only of amending the morals of this great horde of twenty thousand steeped to their

* "In Strange Company," p. 26.

† Ibid., pp. 27, 28.

necks in vice and misery, but likewise of feeding swarms of neglected and hungry little children.*

At another tea at another "Mission-house" or Hall, in White Horse-yard, Smithfield, where the Cow-cross-alley costermongers were regaled, Mr. Greenwood observed a valiant attempt on the part of the guests to make themselves clean and presentable. It seems that the calculations made for this "tea" averaged ten thick slices of bread-and-butter to each person, say two thousand slices in all, besides huge hunches of seed and currant cake.

There had been made from the tall roof of the Mission-house a display of limelight, which threw its dazzling, unearthly glare through the darkness on the surrounding courts and alleys with an effect that was appalling. Between the Sessions House and the New Meat-market may be reckoned a score or so of such hideous "No thoroughfares" as are to be met with in no other part of London. Maybe there are many who, passing along Turnmill-street towards the Metropolitan Railway-station, have ventured to peep into the two feet wide entrances to nests of squalor; but such a glimpse gives them no more idea of a Cow-cross-alley's hidden mysteries than is to be gleaned of the wonders of the ocean by the contemplation of a bag of Mr. Tidman's sea-salt. The sun even knows very little about the matter, for its rays can penetrate only to a little distance between these black crevices, flanked on either side by tall, time-wrecked, crazy houses, each with its ten, twelve, or fourteen rooms—for the cellars count as such—and each of these again in its turn an abode for a family. It was startling to see the fashion in which the inexorable limelight ripped away the dense alley mist that clung like a sable cloak about these horrible habitations and exposed them. You could see through the uncurtained windows sheer into scores of rooms, . . . the walls bare and smoke-begrimed, the floor naked, except for the sack or strip of old carpet before the fenderless fireplace, round about which the squalid family huddled. You could see, as plainly as though you were within three yards of them, what were the rags they wore, and how insufficient they were to cover the poor little bodies of the children. You could make out too, quite distinctly, what a dreadful contrivance a Cow-cross-alley bedstead is in many cases, and picture to your mind what a terrible hardship you would find it to have to lie on such a heap of rags and under such a coverlet.†

If Cow-cross-alley and its surrounding network of hideous courts were the only nests of filth and disease, moral and physical, in London, we should not grumble so much. But there is not a vestige of over-colouring in Mr. Greenwood's words when he says in another place that, "in spite of all that has been done in the way of bettering the dwellings of the poor of the metropolis, and despite our vaunt that

* "In Strange Company," p. 32.

† Ibid., pp. 43—45.

London is the healthiest city in the world, its courts and alleys—east, west, north, and south—may still be reckoned in thousands, the majority of them being unfit for human residence, and not a few in such condition that many people would not believe in a fairly-written description of them. . . . It is a simple fact that within three miles of St. Paul's there may be found at least a thousand dens of squalor that are a shame and disgrace to any civilized nation" (p. 179).

For humanity's sake it would be well, were it possible, to cut away a good-sized block of fair average London squalor, and carry it out into Hyde Park, where it might be exhibited! In the south, between London Bridge and the Elephant and Castle, is the Mint, with its awful colony of Irish; and to the left is Kent-street, with its network of slums that give harbourage to as many individuals "known to the police" as Newgate would hold, even if they were packed close as barrelled herrings. Or the Surrey-side of Blackfriars Bridge, somewhere about Windmill-street, in the New-cut, or Vauxhall, where the potteries and gas-works are. In the east you might take a hundred examples; but I should recommend a neighbourhood between Rosemary-lane and Limehouse-hole. In the north, a choice sample of alley-life may be met with between the Philharmonic Hall and Islington-green; westward the choice might lie between Peter-street and Parker-street, in Drury-lane. But it would be fairest, perhaps, to take a slice out of the City. It is rotten to the very core. The block I allude to is bounded on one side by Turnmill-street and on the other by Red Lion-street; and how it has escaped the vigilant eyes of the sanitary commissioners and their large staff of officers, constantly on the look-out for this sort of thing, is a puzzle to me. To be sure, the Sessions House, in which the judges have so often publicly expressed their opinion that half the vice and immorality existing among the lower classes is due to their herding together in pent-up slums, overshadows the place in question, and thus they may, in the semi-darkness, have missed it; but surely they might have smelt it—it stinks aloud. If that square half-acre, including Broad-yard, and Bit-alley, and Frying-pan-alley, could be taken up without so much as disturbing a donkey stabled in a kitchen, or a gutter with a baby playing in it, and transported to Hyde Park,—it might be railed in so that none of the creatures could escape, and a deep trench filled with some pleasant disinfectant might surround it,—I venture to predict that it would attract more visitors than the first palace of glass and iron.

As guide and expositor at this amazing exhibition of the wild tribes of Turnmill-street, I would engage the worthy missionary Mr. William Catlin, who would have stranger tales to tell than had a namesake of his, who years ago published his experiences among the North American Indians. In his safe company I have penetrated the fastnesses of Little-Hell—so Broad-yard is called—and have trod the dark places of Frying-pan-alley, where, excepting his own and that of the policeman, the face of a white man is never seen, the natives being at best of a greyish slate colour. There was some stir at that time—now nearly four years ago—and a peremptory requisition was made on the owner of the houses to fix up a capacious cistern, and he

complied. Months afterwards no water had been laid on, and the said cistern served as a secluded roost for the ragamuffins who were bold enough to climb up into it.*

"Scores of costermongers inhabit the alleys of Turnmill-street," and through their openings is to be seen the horrible practice of "'livening" the green stuff with which they originate and spread the varieties of enteric disease throughout the summer and early autumn months in the capital. Unspeakable things could, perhaps, be sketched of these alleys for the Hyde Park Exhibition.

Men, women, and children by the dozen, herding in these crippled old houses, the kitchen-floors of which rot in stagnant pools, and are even too bad for the occupation of the by no means particular Little Hellites, and the roofs of which are so shattered and broken, that when it rains every available scrap of crockery, with tubs, and pots, and kettles, have to be spread about the floor to catch the descending down-pour. Houses, the stairs of which are full of ragged, splintery holes and which have a dangling rope to assist the descent, the legitimate handrail having been appropriated for firewood long ago. The missionary might also tell of poor wretches who are too proud to beg or to go into the workhouse, and who every day of their lives set out to pick up their daily bread—cast-out crusts, bones with scraps of meat on them, *literally out of the kennel*—and who retire at night to sleep on filthy rags and shavings; of little children who never come out to play for months together, because they have no rags to cover them, and who amuse themselves within doors, naked as young Kaffirs—a tribe they not a little resemble both as regards colour and the fashion of wearing their hair. There are sweeps living in the alleys, and there the bed is made and the food is cooked, all among the fat, full bags of soot. The good missionary could also tell of families living within his sphere of action who keep the wolf from the door with cat's-meat-skewers, cutting and pointing them for a halfpenny a gross, and finding their own timber; of the blind and paralytic, and many who in the cold winter-time, lying ill and helpless on their dreadful beds, would starve outright did not charitable crumbs fall to them somehow. Nor must it be supposed that these lodgings are cheap; on the contrary, they are villanously dear. The owners of these piggeries know that lamentably plentiful as slums are, they are not a bit more so than the demand for them. It is no exaggeration to say that many of these horrible houses realize more rent than tenements of a like size in a fashionable London square. It is one of the safest investments in the world for a heartless speculator. He is all right as long as he can stave off the sanitary inspector and those who regard it as their duty to call public attention to his mean selfishness, and demand that, for health and decency's sake, he should no longer be allowed to fatten on vice, and disease, and dirt.†

* "In Strange Company," pp. 180—3.

† Ibid., pp. 185—7.

We must give yet one more extract from Mr. Greenwood's book, as it is upon a subject which perhaps concerns ourselves the most of all; and this, for the present, shall be the last. Our own sympathies—everyone's sympathies—in this doleful tale, as it were, of the circles of the condemned, must be with the children who form so large and pitiful an element of ruffian and vagabond London life. What can we glean, therefore, beyond a chance weekly or yearly hour snatched from the dreary reckoning of their lives by some "tea and turn-out" holiday, of the records given of the age of innocence, laughing gaiety, and freedom from all care? Mr. Greenwood travelled up to the Angel at Islington to judge of this branch of his subject for himself, and we can accompany him and do the same.

Day and night you may find them [boys] there—paper boys, fusee boys, crossing-sweeper boys, boys out of number, who are nothing in particular "at present," three-feet-high merchants, ruined through rash speculations, and "rubbing on" until a lucky windfall sends them a sixpence with which to go to market again; dirty, houseless, poor little gutter prowlers, who ever keep a bright look-out, are never down-hearted, live on from day to day, and at night find shelter for their capless, unkempt heads, God only knows how . . . There they were as that miserable winter's day was closing in with drizzling rain, that was ten times colder than snow.

He first fell in with a blacking-boy with a stock-in-trade of three cakes of blacking, who besought him to buy the three halfpenny-cakes for a penny. Next, he engaged a fusee-boy, and after that an older, lawless savage, looking about eleven, but really thirteen, to accompany him and have some food, and relate their experience of life.

A quarter of an hour later we four—the blacking-boy, the cigar-light vendor, Mr. Ginger (the red-haired savage), and the reader's humble servant—were comfortably bestowed in the parlour of a little alehouse in the Pentonville-road, with bread and cheese before us, and a glorious fire burning in the grate, in the fender of which my thrifty blacking-boy laid out his little stock to dry.

Ginger's delight when the landlord brought in along with a big loaf the half of a huge Cheshire cheese, was a sight to behold. . . .

"He's forgot it, aint he?" he said, handling his knife as though sadly tempted.

"No, he hasn't forgotten, my lad," said I, "he'll fetch it away when we have done with it."

"When we have done with it! What, are we going to eat as much as we likes on it?"

"Yes."

Ginger lost not a moment more. Licking his lips as I cut him a liberal

slice, he pounced on it and on a hunch of bread with a degree of voracity that spoke of long fasting.

I explained briefly that I wished to know their home and their means of living; and I first addressed myself to the blacking-boy.

"I am nine and a half," said he, "and I lives in Playhouse-yard, in Whitecross-street. It ain't a house, at least it ain't a house wot you goes indoors to, with tables and chairs, and a fire."

"Ah, ah!" remarked Ginger; "no, there ain't much room for furniture in Billy Jaggs's house, but it's werry comfortable, and, wot's more, it's regler. It's a barrer."

"A baker's barrer," poor little Jaggs hastened to explain—"one of them with a lid. The baker lets me sleep there, and I watches out for the cats.

"Are your parents alive?" I asked him.

"I ain't got no mother, I've got a father; I sees him sometimes. He don't live up my way, he goes to fairs and that. I ain't got no brothers. I've got a sister, she's in the hospital. She used to work up Mile End way, at the lucifer factory, till she got the canker making of 'em. She's been in the hospital ever so long. That's why I don't sell 'lights.' I can't bear the sight of 'em. I'm on my own hands. I earns all I gets."

"Are you ever ill?"

"I haint been ill a long time, not since the middle of summer, when I had the measles. No, I didn't sleep in the baker's barrer then, I knowed a pipemaker, and he let me lay in his shed, and his missus was werry kind to me. I do werry well. I hardly ever goes without grub. I most times saves three halfpence for my breakfast, and this cold weather I gets a ha'porth of bread and a ha'porth of peasoup. I sell out somehow every night. I gets a dozen cakes of blacking for tuppence-ha'penny, and I in general clears about fivepence. Dinner time I gets a baked tater, or sometimes a ha'porth of fried fish. All I got left, 'cept three ha'pence for breakfast and stockmoney, we spends at supper time. We goes together, four or five of us, sometimes to the soup shop, sometimes to the baked tater and fish shop . . . Once a p'liceman took away my box, blacking and all, cos I checked him. It was more'n a week before I could make another start. I washes myself sometimes, not often; I ain't got no towel and soap."

"Were you ever in trouble?"

"I never was locked up; cert'ny *not*. Don't I think I should be better off in the workus? No, I don't want to be shut up anywhere."

"Can you read?"

"No, I can't read, nor write neither. I never was in a school—never was in a church. I don't like to be shut up anywhere." . . . The little fusee-boy, between eight and nine, had a mother and "regler lodgings," but Ginger's account of the parent was not pleasant.

"I'd rather be without a mother than have a oner like her; there's him and his two young brothers and his sister wot sells button-olers (flowers for button-holes), and she grabs all they earn, and gets drunk with the money, and punches them about orful, cos they don't bring her more. Their only

good time is when she is in quod—she is there now for twenty-one days—good job if she was dead.”*

It further transpired from the fusee-boy that his small, hump-backed sister of thirteen kept house for them, and gave them one hot meal at night—sometimes a stew made of the bits of meat cut off the skins and ears of bullocks, and sold for twopence for a “heap” of about two pounds. That he never had been or now went to any school, or into a church, and neither could read or write. Questioning “Ginger,” otherwise John Galloper, as to his means of getting a living, Mr. Greenwood was answered that he “let the living get itself;” that sometimes he begged, and sometimes took what he wanted, and that his life altogether could best be described as “a mixshure;” that he lodged in Golden-lane, sometimes at the “Nussery” and sometimes at Dunn’s; that he did not know whether he had any father or mother, for “they didn’t care nothing about him, and he didn’t want ’em to.”

It was perfectly clear, as the embryo convict was told, that his days would end among a gang in some stone-quarry, or other convict works, at Chatham, Dartmoor, or Portland, if indeed he did not meet with a violent end. There is not a shade of exaggeration or colouring in this whole melancholy and most touching story. Mr. Greenwood heads his chapter “Three of Ten Thousand;” but it is more than probable that it might be reckoned as three out of nearer to thirty thousand waifs and scum-balls that continually float hither and thither on the fringe of the social wave, till they are finally lost in the depths of the criminal class. The “Unprofessional Vagabond,” in his various rounds, gives us also a sickening insight into the normal condition of the children of the East-end of London, when he successfully personated the character of a “Tom-tom Wallah.”

The prevailing types of humanity at the East-end are three. First, the workman, beery, stolid, but amidst all his roughness, kindly-hearted, upright, manly, and good-natured. Next, the Mongol, with square, low forehead, strong jaws, receding eyes, prominent cheekbones, and flat noses—of such are the fish-hawkers, pugilists, and professional burglars. And lastly, the ape-demon class, of stunted growth, narrow chests, bleared eyes, with hardly human instincts, who are suckled on stolen goods and weaned on petty larceny. *How intensely saddening, how portentous to remember that such a miserable type of humanity—if one dare so to class it—is a necessary consequence of modern civilization!* I went, attended by my escort (two or three hundred yelling children), and dived into the peculiarly

* “In Strange Company,” pp. 1-7.

savage district lying south of Old Ford and Bethnal Green-road. I knew it to be the most dangerous part of my days' work, and to tell the truth was half inclined to shirk the job ; but since I desire with all my heart to ascertain past all doubt the real thoughts and feelings of our waifs and strays, there was nothing for it but to wander into the head-quarters of scoundrelism. Back I trudged towards the Gore Arms, escorted through the slums by two or three hundred tatterdemalions, who, when I would no longer dance or sing for their amusement, refreshed themselves by pelting the poor tom-tom wallah with stones and cabbage-stumps. Very happy was I, when, on emerging in Old Ford-road, these imps delivered a farewell stone-volley, accompanied by a full-mouthed bellow of bitter curses—it was awful to hear such terrible words from babies' lips—and I trudged on.*

We do not doubt that our readers are now saying that these extracts are enough, and more than enough, to convey a sufficient idea of the rascaldom of London. But they must bear in mind that after all, they are still in the category of comparing the packet of Tidman's sea-salt with the raging and boiling Atlantic ocean. Strongly as he writes, Mr. Greenwood's sketches are after all the slightest outlines of certain salient, merely external features of misery ; silent and speechless outlines, too, or as the panorama of a battle compared with the battle itself. He has not dared—for no man could so dare—to convey the slightest impression of the far worse horrors which the hearing ear adds to the seeing eye among the alleys and courts of London life. A veil is drawn over the blasphemous curses, the brutal oaths ; the unutterably obscene filth of the language ; the shrieking hideous unnaturalness of the cries and voices, hardened and thickened by habitual drunkenness and delirium tremens ; the fiendish jests and laughter that are more terrible to the imagination than even the blinding oaths and curses. Perhaps no one, not of themselves, who has not chanced to hear the volleys of unspeakable abomination poured forth by an infuriated convict under punishment, could ever gauge the blackness of the gulf into which the vagabond classes of our towns have fallen, or understand what has to be done before they can be raised again, even to the lowest level of ordinary social standing. And it is into and surrounded by such conditions of life as these, that thousands of our children are born. They open their eyes, say, in the foulest of the foul lodging-houses of Golden-lane, the walls darkened with swarms of vermin and crusted with dirt ; they inhale fetid stench instead of God's pure air, and their ears drink in curses and evil words as their first knowledge of language, as their first knowledge of a

* "The Unprofessional Vagabond," pp. 45-48.

mother's love is drunken violence, and of a father's care brutal and perhaps murderous blows. The instincts of Nature, which uphold the tigress and the she-bear in the duties of motherhood, are drowned in the drunken woman, just as the natural instincts of protection and nurture which male animals show, are blotted out in the drunken man. It is in vain to appeal any longer, as formerly, to these stirrings of a beautiful God-given nature among us, such as we might find among heathen and savage nations. They are blotted out by, first, the destruction of the Faith, and then by the gradual rottenness of a corrupt pseudo "civilization." By the failure and break-down, that is, which is essentially inherent in the loss of faith. The Bible, which for a while stood as some kind of bulwark to many against sin, has become a despised bye-word; the ministers of religion, who once opposed to the flood of vice some faint, feeble defences, are laughed by our lower population to scorn; while the progress of drunkenness, and every imaginable association for the spread of unbelief, sedition, and the casting away of all moral restraints, have so loosened the ties between husband and wife, parent and child, and man and man, that they may be said no longer to exist.

In fact—and this is another outgrowth from the loss of the Faith, and consequently of the destruction of the one true Brotherhood and Equality—every class of labourers seems to be arrayed in warfare against their employers, and to look upon them as their natural enemies, instead of in the true light, as their greatest benefactors and most valuable friends. In this Labour and Capital warfare, the strikes for higher wages on the part of skilled labourers, or the closing of employments and removal of works to other markets, the lower fringe of the poorer classes first of all suffer terribly, and then often sink out of sight into a lower depth, where they are for ever lost to social view. For first the "little home," so long maintained at a ruinous rent and with such earnest struggle, is broken up and sold out; the father goes to "look for work," and never turns up again; the mother takes to drink and petty larceny, and after a series of county imprisonments, is sentenced to a term of penal servitude; the children drift away to systematic pilfering under a thief's schooling; and then that which was once a fairly religious and respectable labouring family, has crossed the fatal line downwards, and all those lives, so far as any good is to be gained from them in this world, are swept away and lost.

Not one, nor one hundred such instances, has any one whose work lies among convicts weary cause to chronicle

in his experience ; till heart-sick and sorely tried in his faith on account of the mysteries of life, he cries out, with a loud and bitter cry, "Lord ! carest Thou not that these souls perish ? "

He is tried in his faith—let no one be startled or scandalized at the plain words—because every honest and earnest worker among the poor of our great cities, and specially, now, of London, clearly measures the ever-widening gulf between the rich and poor, and the frightful inequality between these two great divisions of society, which are meant to aid and sustain each other. On the one hand, he sees wealth growing more colossal ; property centralizing about one man's desires, till villages, hamlets, mills, farms, cottages, are swept away to make room for his deer, his pheasants, his grouse, and his trout-fishing, till every vestige of the poor man's roof is wrecked and every spark of his hearth-fire quenched ; and there comes about a crystallization (so to speak) of the rich man's insane selfishness, and almost a worship of his insanely-multiplied and wickedly costly possessions.

On a Christian view of the case, the rich are stewards rather than owners of these possessions : the stewards, not to dole out to their workpeople portions of broken meat and bread and cast-off clothing, or fractions of elementary teaching to suit their own views ; but to stretch out a hand to those whom they employ, and lift them up to the fullest advantages of which their life allows. To help them, in short, first to possess and then to enjoy, in their degree, all the pleasures and gifts which they themselves possess and enjoy in a wider measure. The leisure to read, and what to read ; the eye and ear for beauty, and the uses to be made of beauty ; the desire for cleanliness, neatness, and adornment in easy, simple ways and materials. The desire and then the habit of making home bright, attractive, and pleasant, and of centering there the useful and agreeable occupations of the family, in which the father, mother, and children can take their parts. The cultivation of music, drawing, wood-cutting and carving, with this end ; the communication of free, simple good breeding, gentle manners, speech, and laughter, and simple good taste in dress and house furniture, and colours ;—all these benefits are due from the rich to the poor, or, as it is now expressed, from capitalists to labourers. If they were bestowed—and among ourselves they are bound to be done on every Christian principle—we should not be compelled with sorrow to see the two great divisions of society drawing apart like threatening armies, preparing for the day of a terrible and most fatal strife.

Wherever the spirit of Christian Brotherhood is seen at work, even in ever so small a circle, something of the results we speak of are found. Wherever a house of Sisters of Charity is stationed (we speak of them because of their conspicuous success on account of that spirit), a ring of humanizing influence girdles it round. If we watch one of the Sisters at work, or follow her into a house, we see that she acts in no stereotyped fashion, she follows no dictated forms or formulas, she neither talks down to the people nor preaches to them, but takes a chair and enters into conversation, and skilfully finds out their wants as one of themselves, showing herself only better than themselves to be able better to help them. Wherever this Sister goes, she carries with her a little atmosphere of *brotherhood*; using her modest, gentle, but firm speech, and simplicity of good manners, and kindly inquiry into the present trouble or want, to show or to oppose some plan of remedy. Gradually and imperceptibly, in the track that she frequents, the horrible filth of the dwellings vanishes; there is an attempt to make what sweetness and wholesomeness soda and hot water can achieve; hands and faces lose their worst grime, the more repulsive hair is combed, children are sent to school, men and women living in sin are cleansed by confession and married, and even the hideous shrieks and language of drunkenness are pruned, if they are not cut up by the root. Yet the Sister has had no money, and very little of any kind of external relief to give, while her pious words have been few and of the simplest kind. She, alas! is no capitalist of this world's goods. If she were, she would soon change the whole face of the London slums; but though silver and gold she has none, she gives freely of such as she has, which is the only true and available Christianity, of *going down among the people* as an equal, to lift them up to the level on which she firmly stands. As did Our Lord when He abode with us in the Flesh; when He sat by the well of Samaria, and dined with Zaccheus, and supped at Bethany, so does the Sister of Charity follow in His steps, and in her degree works the same cures for the uttermost woes of life.

And now let us go on to a further consideration; viz.—that the weakness of the diffusion of power in the body politic need only be temporary, and that under certain conditions it need not be found at all. It can only be called temporary, for it is in no way essential to any State. We are weak simply because we are not Christian; and because we persist in substituting false maxims of a spurious political economy—spurious because both bad morality and bad science—or a spurious non-believing philosophy for the doctrine of the

Gospel. Instead of labouring to bring about the equitable or proportionable distribution of power, we persist in substituting one absolutism for another : now allowing that which was kingship, or the rule of the strong, to be gathered up into the iron grasp of wealth, or some exclusive monopoly of production, or the licentious absolutism—satirically called “freedom”—of the press. And thus, by abetting the dominion of these more than Thirty Tyrants, we allow the woes and needs of the wretched multitude to be gibbeted instead of redressed. They are “locked out,” or led into strikes, to starve ; thrust into uncleanly workhouses and workhouse hospitals, to perish by fevers and unwholesome food ; while as to their dwellings, and sympathy with their life, there is a wholesale association of Dives’ to thrust out Lazarus and his dirt and rags beyond the farthest gate. And it is by our helping to raise this persistent, invariable, ever-recurring wall of demarcation,—we must repeat this again and again,—that Lazarus remains in his dirt and his rags.

Under certain conditions, in fact, the diffusion of power ought to be one of the greatest blessings that can befall any social body. The Church has never decided or implied that one form of civil government is better than another. Nay, it is now one and now another—now an Imperial ruler with personal government, now a federal commonwealth—that she distinguishes with her blessing and fervent praise. There is neither virtue nor evil inherent to a crown ; nor is real and widely-diffused liberty more essential to a republic than to an empire. The conditions of the true equality and brotherhood lie in the greater or less degree in which Christianity is carried out ; by which we mean, in this place, not orthodoxy nor the formal expression of theological dogma, but the spirit and example of Our Lord Jesus Christ as He lived on earth. That men should do as they would be done by ; that they should mete to others as they would be measured to again ; should give to them that ask ; feed the hungry and thirsty ; clothe the naked ; and defend the fatherless and widow from injustice and oppression.

According to the wider and deeper fulfilment of these conditions, a greater external equality will also be found. There will then be less colossal aggregation of wealth, more general well-being. Let no one think that by thus speaking we propose to cut up large properties into peasant-farms, or to advocate the Irish cry,—“Every man his bit of land.” The peasant-farm ends in starvation and ruin, and the “bits of land” would but add to the army of our paupers. Neither, still less, let it be imagined that we have strayed into the

sloughs of Comtism, and secretly desire to establish an English Commune; for that, which is the lowest, is also the most hideous of all the Absolutist forms. What we do mean is, as has been said farther back, that if wealth is used to give a helping hand to the poor and labouring classes for the purpose of lifting them up and teaching them what to desire and enjoy, a great share of what is now lavished upon excessive indulgence and the monstrous accumulations of luxuries and possessions, will be diffused among our poorer brothers and sisters in a reproductive form. It is said, plausibly but falsely, that selfish luxury is not really selfish, because the employment it gives is "good for trade." Granted that all productive labour remunerates the producer, it is surely a short-sighted political economy to prefer such productions as only benefit one side, when, by diffusing benefits among others, we secure both the productive labour and the farther lasting *and reproductive* advantage. For instance, if a rich man keeps a drag and gives a hundred and fifty guineas apiece for his eight horses, it is true that he benefits the coach-builder, horse-dealer, and harness-maker: but he himself only enjoys playing coachman for a limited (or unlimited) number of hours; which is an unproductive pleasure, *i.e.*, one which ends in himself. But if the same man renounces this idea, and instead, provides yearly a dozen donkey-carts and donkeys, and twenty or thirty barrows, to so many working men, he not only gives employment to productive labour, but raises so many families from the condition of want, and puts into their hands the means of competence (given that they abstain from drunkenness) for generations ahead. And in this country, when once a man with energy and purpose is raised above want, there is no saying to what degree of competence he may attain. Or again, if instead of worrying her husband to rush with her from London to Scotland, to Rome, and Pontresina in the same twelvemonth, a lady will persuade him to build four new cottages, with decent accommodation and appliances for leading a Christian life, on his estate; some of the wealth now crystallizing their love of pleasure into permanent hardness, will flow out as a fertilizing rill to humanize, to raise, and refine four whole families, whose younger branches again will go out furnished with education and tastes fitting them to rise into a higher status, and so able to do good to numberless others in their turn. It is this grand Christian self-denying principle of *substitution* in charity which so conspicuously needs development among ourselves. Our practical charity eminently needs enlightenment according to the needs

of the day ; and for want of it, we are dragged with difficulty in the rear of social needs, instead of being, as Catholics ought to be, and as they are so prominently in France, pioneers on the way.

Much of this is owing to certain stereotyped ideas and habits of language and acting. It is fit and proper, when profiting by the Sacraments, to give alms ; therefore many excellent, well-meaning people will drop a coin into the nearest poor-box, or—what is really an evil—into the hand of some lazy, filthy thief-beggar, who is always to be found crouching outside the church-door. The intention has been good. The “alms” are given, but they were not bestowed *as any substitution for a pleasure or want, but as something that can easily be spared*. The devout communicant who so dropped the shilling or half-crown to save the trouble of choice or inquiry, will perhaps next bend his steps, if a man, to lose five or ten pounds at pool at his club, or her steps, if a woman, to Gunter’s for a guinea pie, or to a fruit-shop to order an expensive pine, for a select “little dinner” which will cost between twenty and thirty pounds. It is not in such alms as these that Our Lord takes delight. The widow who threw her mite—as she thought—unseen, into the treasury, *substituted all that she had*, food, drink, everything that money can represent, for her gift to God ; and we may rest assured that He who so commended her in loving admiration to His disciples, royally repaid her in this world also for the self-sacrificing deed.

If the whole subject of almsgiving were fully opened and remodelled among us, the amount of good to be done, and the resources of now wasted money to be utilized in God’s service, is incalculable. We need only point to the missions founded, the churches built, the convents supported, the schools opened, in the poorest districts and under the most incredible difficulties through the length and breadth of the land, to assure ourselves of the fact that there is an amount of energy, and courage, and resources of ingenious charity among us sufficient to meet almost any demands that could be made upon them. Nor is there a shadow of English boastfulness in this assertion. Our help is in the God Who made heaven and earth, and we may take for our use in our appeal to Him, His own words : “All the beasts of the woods are Mine : the cattle on the hills and the oxen. I know all the fowls of the air . . . the world is Mine, and the fulness thereof.” And not only the natural fulness, but the stores of that supernatural wealth which are poured down at the prayer of faith : the multiplied bread, the ever-flowing oil, and the

transformed wine, which are never lacking in God's service, and at the fervent prayers of His faithful children. Taking the word and promises of God in our hand, let us then be wise with the wisdom of this world as to our work, and strive to organize a more enlightened almsgiving. For instance, we would suggest, as some help, that every Catholic, at this present time (man and woman), should: First, make himself aware of the condition of the poor, not our own poor only, but of the general population, and specially now of London, where Catholic union and organization most fails in strength, and probably in its results. Next, should choose out, as far as he can, some one species of need that attracts him, or that he thinks he can fairly master and deal with; and, Lastly, that he should strive to develop, or aid in developing, or join in the effort when made, the best attainable organization in the service of that need, so as to bring about in it the utmost possible results. For the sake of this special need each one should lay aside such sums as he gives in alms, deprive himself at intervals of certain luxuries, tastes, or pleasures—all lawful and good of their kind—and work at this branch of charity, during the time he can give to it, as one of the settled duties of his life. One moderate body of very ordinary people, thus organized and driving at one and the same object, would soon find that they made their conspicuous mark upon that object, and, after a few years, would be astonished to find what results had been achieved. The early annals of the Immaculate Conception Charity are a striking proof of this principle. Formerly the Westminster Association alone, chiefly by the pence of one of the poorest and lowest districts in London, rescued thirty-three orphans yearly from loss of faith, and supported them till they obtained places and work—some of them being raised by their education to superior employments.

Some such organization as this, with weightier support from a higher class of associates, is urgently needed for giving apprenticeships to our boys and girls, especially our boys. We believe that there is not as yet a single effort of the kind among us, and the want of it is most injuriously felt by our orphanages, certified schools, and reformatories; though these last form a separate subject, of which we may possibly speak in another place. It is universally agreed on all hands that our primary education is of first-rate quality. It is so good of its kind, indeed, that it could scarcely be surpassed, and the instruction given in our training-schools and many of our orphanages, both in religion and primary lay subjects, is infinitely superior to that produced by any of our colleges

throughout the country. It is a saddening thing to witness, that when a boy has been taught—and beautifully taught—the whole range of subjects embraced at North Hyde; and the youth can produce writing, bookkeeping, with admirably-worked arithmetic, and even the drawing of maps, plans, and a variety of useful subjects, with great perfection, there is scarcely an outlet for him; that he is often kept waiting for some employment for long weeks and months, with depressed spirits and the loss of all stimulus to work, and after all, perhaps, is forced to return to the status from which he started, and to throw away his valuable education in the common material work of a bricklayer's labourer, for which there are more than sufficient candidates. If a dozen ordinarily energetic Catholics were to combine to form the nucleus of an Apprenticeship Committee, denying themselves the waste of chance injurious almsgiving and a few superfluities, four or five of these fine intelligent fellows might be yearly started in life with a future secured.

And so again with our choirs. A Choral Association, such as now exists in nearly every Anglican diocese with excellent results, might take it in hand to furnish a couple of boys yearly from North Hyde for their chief London parish choirs, leaving them free as apprentices, or in a place, to pursue some week-day employment. Those who visit the orphanage at North Hyde, and it is much to be lamented that visitors there are so few, will be astonished and delighted to see a ring of little fellows belonging to the band quickly formed, and while the dullest of them brighten up with pleasure and are put on their mettle at playing before strangers, the music cards are set up, horns, clarionets, drum and triangle take their places, and some pretty stirring piece of music is very respectably performed. In fact, there is a considerable number of boys at North Hyde, ready-made, so to speak, for choirs, by their aptitude for reading music and keeping time alone.

One word more, and we have done. It may be said that the great advance made in Catholic good works of late years has been ignored by us, and that what has been done should have been pointed out, as well as that almost boundless field which lies without labourers. Yet we believe we are justified in saying that those self-denying and energetic toilers who have achieved the more signal successes among the London poor, would be the first to concur with us in emphasizing the want of co-operation, steady organizing principles, and persistence in certain lines of direction, as well as the lamentable waste caused by undiscerning almsgiving. If we took counsel of

—only to name a few—Canon Gilbert,*—Mr. Barge, the veteran priest of St. Patrick's,—Fathers Keens and Canty, whose work has so eminently told in the lowest and wildest regions of slums, and among the more difficult and dangerous London classes,—we believe that their verdicts would not only unanimously bear us out, but also proclaim with a thousand-fold power what our feeble voice and partial knowledge seek to make known. And so with the magnificent efforts made by the Archbishop of Westminster, to redeem our workhouse children and Arabs of the gutters. No one knows so well as he, that the efforts hitherto successful are now again failing us; and that—taken at its best—our system of orphanage and certified and industrial schools is blocked by the non-existence of after-organization for the apprenticeship, protection, and safe emigration of the children turned out into life.

Again, and lastly, every step gained is to the Christian labourer only the forerunner of those other steps which lie before him hereafter to be taken. "*Donec dies*" is his motto, which spurs him from looking back or resting on his deeds, and, to the noble and magnanimous soul, the darkest shadow thrown on the night that draws round him is, that in it he can no longer work.

Though

We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven : that which we are, we are ;
One equal temper of heroic hearts
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will,
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

* The mention of Canon Gilbert's name necessarily obliges the notice also of his great work, the Providence Night Refuge, which for many years has wrought such eminent good for souls in harbouring poor wanderers at night. While active works among the crowded and more dangerous districts of London were elsewhere still unknown, Canon Gilbert, with true genius, seized upon the urgency of seeking rather the lost than the respectable sheep, and bravely set on foot one of the most difficult of good works, that of housing vagabonds at night. Let all those interested, or seeking to be interested, in the London Poor, and who have not seen it, pay a visit to this Refuge, and gather from its founder or the intelligent superior of the house, some of the details of its success.

ART. III.—A REPLY ON NECESSARY TRUTH.

[The following is part of a paper, read recently by Dr. Ward at a philosophical society. It contains hardly any argument which has not already appeared in our pages ; but perhaps its publication will be serviceable, as exhibiting our general reasoning on the subject in a greatly compressed shape.]

AT the March meeting of our Society, Mr. — read a paper, criticising some articles which I had published in the DUBLIN REVIEW on necessary truth. I was prevented from being present on that occasion : but had the case been otherwise, I do not see how I could have defended myself fully, except by reading another paper in reply ; and if another paper were to be read, it had better (I think) be printed and circulated beforehand. Nor, considering the vital and critical importance of the question, do I consider that any apology is due for bringing it a second time before our Society.

My best course will be, firstly to select, from the various arguments I have used, those which are most strictly relevant to Mr. —'s objections ; and then to consider those objections. But before doing either of these things, I must make a few preliminary remarks, to make clear the point at issue.

I. I will call the two contending parties by the respective name of necessists and phenomenists. The latter hold, that all our knowledge is derived from experience ; whereas the former maintain, that considerable portions of it are acquired *à priori*, and possess the character of necessity.

II. Many phenomenists deny the cognisableness of necessary verities, on the ground that we have no means of knowing that the subjective declaration of our faculties corresponds with objective truth. Mr. — however does not at all take up this ground ; and in the present paper therefore, I shall assume that it is untenable. I do not of course mean that necessists have any right to take its falsehood for granted, or are exempt from the obligation of disproving it : on the contrary, one of the articles noticed by Mr. — is devoted to the express purpose of such disproof. But no one can always be proving everything ; and in this paper I am not engaged with what Catholics call the rule and motive of certitude. My present thesis in fact may be expressed hypothetically. "If the declaration of our faculties is known by us to correspond with objective truth,—then necessists are right, and phenomenists wrong, in their respective doctrines."

III. Next we have to ask, what is meant by the phrase "necessary verities." On this again I have no difference with Mr. —. I may explain the term "necessary verities" with sufficient accuracy for my present purpose, by saying that they are verities "which could not be otherwise"; "the reversal of which is outside the sphere of Omnipotence." Those verities which are not "necessary" are called "contingent."

IV. Non-Catholic writers of either school have divided propositions into "analytical" and "synthetical." It so happens however, that Catholic philosophers use these respective words in a fundamentally different sense. I have therefore availed myself in the DUBLIN REVIEW of Sir W. Hamilton's phrases "explicative" and "ampliative," to express what is substantially the same distinction; and for my own part indeed I think this a more serviceable terminology. I call a proposition "explicative," when its predicate does no more than express in other terms what has already been expressed in its subject. It is an "explicative" proposition e.g., that "hard substances resist pressure"; because resistance to pressure is that very quality, which is expressed by the word "hard." In fact, all "explicative" propositions are reducible to the form "A is A." The above-named proposition signifies neither more nor less, than that "all hard substances are hard."

It will be better however to divide propositions in this respect not into two but into three classes. There are (1) "Identical propositions" or "truisms"; in which the predicate expresses no more than has been explicitly expressed by the subject: as "this apple is this apple," or "this apple is an apple." There are (2) "explicative" propositions; in which the predicate expresses no more than has been implicitly expressed in the subject: as "hard substances resist pressure," or "a square is rectangular." And there are (3) "ampliative" propositions, in which the predicate expresses what has been neither explicitly nor implicitly expressed by the subject: as "diamonds are combustible," or "the base angles of an isosceles triangle are mutually equal."

Now, though Mr. Mill uses some extraordinary language on the matter, I cannot fancy that phenomenists in general would have any difficulty in saying, that both "identical" and "explicative" propositions are "necessary." So Mr. — very reasonably (p. 4) gives, as one meaning of "necessary truths," "truths which are implied by the very use of certain words." In so speaking, phenomenists are in no way unfaithful to their characteristic doctrine, that all our knowledge is derived from experience; for surely the proposition "A is A" cannot be said to convey any knowledge worthy of the

name. The point at issue then between them and their opponents, is this: they deny that there are any *ampliative* propositions cognisable as necessarily true; whereas necessists maintain, that there is a large number of ampliative propositions cognisable as necessary.

The question at issue then between phenomenists and necessists is, whether certain ampliative propositions are cognisable as necessarily true; nor is it possible (a philosopher of either school will readily admit) to exaggerate the importance of this most vital and critical issue. Now I think there is no other field on which this battle can be so decisively fought out, as that which I chose, and on which Mr. — has assailed me; the field of geometrical truths. There are various reasons why I think this; and Mr. — has incidentally named a strong one. "The words which relate to time, space, and number," he says most truly and importantly, "are perfectly simple and adequate to that which they describe; whereas the words which relate to common objects are in nearly every case complex, often to the highest degree." This statement includes arithmetical science as well as geometrical; but I will not on the present occasion refer to the former science more than I can help, because some able thinkers are of opinion that arithmetical axioms are explicative and not ampliative. This opinion, I confess, surprises me; and it is opposed as heartily, both by Mr. — and by Mr. Mill, as it would be on occasion by myself. But it will be immeasurably more convenient, to abstain from complicating the present all-important question with another entirely different.

Now my critic will certainly admit, that, if reason declares the necessary truth of geometrical axioms, it no less certainly declares the necessary validity of the syllogistic process; and consequently, that to establish the necessary truth of the axioms, would be to establish the necessary truth of the whole fabric of geometrical science. This therefore is to be now our immediate point of debate: are geometrical axioms cognisable as necessarily true? And by "axioms," of course, I mean those ampliative truths, which the geometer assumes as indisputable and uses as first premisses. Mr. — holds that their truth is not otherwise known to us than by experience: necessists affirm on the contrary (1) that they are cognisable by us quite independently of experience; and (2) that they are cognisable by us, not as mere facts, but as necessary truths.

The axiom, which throughout my articles I have chosen for the purpose of illustrating this question, has been the axiom that "all trilateral figures are triangular:" and I have chosen

this, because (for reasons which will presently appear) it is more calculated than any other for establishing an absolutely crucial test. Of course indeed, as Mr. — enunciates a universal negative, his opponent has a right to choose his own instance for establishing the affirmative; but still I will not fail, when I have done with my own chosen illustrative axiom, to deal directly with his. I have now however to establish, that the triangularity of trilaterals (1) is not a fact made known to us by experience; and (2) that it is known to us as a necessary truth. I begin with the former.

I am so very confident of my cause, that I earnestly desire to exhibit the phenomenist theory at its thoroughly best advantage. I will put it therefore this way. The proposition was once placed before me for the first time in a formulized shape (perhaps in some "object-lesson"), that "horses differ greatly from each other in colour." Though (by hypothesis) I have never before expressly contemplated this proposition in form, I at once recognize it as expressing a freshly familiar truth; a truth vividly known to me by every day's experience. Now the very same thing took place—so phenomenists would say—when the proposition was first placed before me in a formulized shape, that "all trilaterals are triangular": I recognized it at once, as expressing a freshly familiar truth, vividly known to me by every day's experience. According to them, the triangularity of trilaterals is a truth as freshly known to me by daily experience, as is the fact that horses are of different colours, or that wood floats on water.

Now I affirm as an indubitable matter of fact, that a phenomenist is here contradicted by the most obvious experience. I affirm as an indubitable matter of fact, that ninety-nine hundredths of mankind—not only do not know the triangularity of trilaterals with this extraordinary freshness of familiarity—but do not know it *at all*. Those who have not studied the elements of geometry—with hardly an exception—if they were told that trilaterals are triangular (and if they understood the statement) would as simply receive a new piece of information, as they did when they were first told the death of Napoleon III. Then as to those who are beginning the study of mathematics. A youth of fifteen is beginning to learn geometry, and his tutor points out to him that every trilateral is triangular. Does he naturally reply—as he *would* if his tutor were telling him that *horses are of different colours*—"of course the fact is so; I have observed it a thousand times?" On the contrary, in all probability the proposition will be entirely new to him; and yet, notwithstanding its novelty, will commend itself as a self-evident

truth on being duly pondered. Lastly, take those who learned the elements of geometry when they were young, and are now busily engaged in political or forensic or commercial life. If the triangularity of trilaterals were mentioned to them, they might remember that they had been taught in their youth to see the self-evidence of this truth; but they would also remember, that for years and years it had been absent from their thoughts. Is it seriously my critic would allege, that they know the triangularity of trilaterals with the same freshness of familiar experience, with which they know the tendency of fire to burn and of water to quench it? or with which they respectively know the political events of the moment, or the practice of the courts, or the habits of the Stock Exchange? I am sure that he has far too much practical sense for such an outrageous paradox.

But is it not then—he might ask—a matter to every man of every-day experience, that trilaterals are triangular? If by “every-day experience” he means “every-day *observation*”—and his argument requires this—I answer confidently in the negative. In the first place—putting aside that very small minority who are predominantly occupied with mathematical studies—the very notion of a “trilateral” does not occur to men at all, except accidentally and on rare occasions. It is not because your eyes light by chance on three straws mutually intersecting, or on some other natural object calculated to suggest a trilateral—that therefore any thought of that figure either explicitly or implicitly enters your mind. You are probably musing on matters indefinitely more interesting and exciting; the prospects of the coming parliamentary division, or the point of law which you are going down to argue, or the symptoms of the patient whom you are on your way to visit, or the probable fluctuation of the funds. The keen geometrician may see trilaterals in stocks and stones, and think of trilaterals on the slightest provocation: but what proportion of the human race are keen geometricians?

Then secondly—still excluding these exceptional geometricians—for a hundred times that observation might suggest to you the thought of a trilateral, not more than *once* perhaps will it suggest to you the *triangularity* of such trilateral. Mr. — himself will admit, I suppose, that such *explicit* observation is comparatively rare; but he will urge probably, that you *implicitly* observe the triangularity of every trilateral which you remark. I will make then a very simple supposition, for the purpose of testing this suggestion. I will suppose that all *rose stalks* within the reach of human observation

had leaves of the same shape with each other. On such supposition, the shape of its stalk-leaves would be a more obvious and obtrusive attribute of the rose, than is triangularity of the trilateral; and yet, beyond all possibility of doubt, one might very frequently observe a rose, without even implicitly noticing the shape of its stalk-leaves. I can testify this at first hand. In a life of sixty odd years, I have often enough smelt roses and handled their stalks; and yet I had not the slightest notion whether their leaves are or are not similarly shaped, until I asked the question for the very purpose of this illustration. And it is plain that if I had not observed the mutual dissimilarity of their leaves,—neither should I have observed their similarity did it exist. Now I appeal to Mr. —'s common sense, whether what I said at starting is not undeniably true; viz., that every ordinary person is very far more likely to observe the shape of rose-stalk leaves, than to observe the number of angles formed by the sides of a trilateral.

Here then let me sum up my reasoning in favour of my first thesis. The phenomenist admits, that we can know with absolute certainty the triangularity of all trilaterals; but he adds, that our mode of obtaining that knowledge is experience and observation. My first thesis has been merely negative; viz. that these assuredly are not the ways in which such knowledge is gained. For this statement I have given two reasons. Firstly, not one man in a million *has* observed the fact, that trilaterals are triangular; and secondly, in the enormous majority of instances, when the axiom is first known by us, it is accepted as an entirely new proposition, and yet as being (notwithstanding its novelty) self-evidently true.

My second thesis is, that this axiom is known by us as necessarily true. For this also I give two reasons.

(1). I do not see how any one can deny—certainly Mr. Mill expressly admits—that the triangularity of all trilaterals can be known by purely *mental* experimentation; by the mere process of *imagining* a trilateral. The axiom then is self-evident; by which I mean, not merely that it is *immediately* known, but also that it is known to be true by the mere process of being duly pondered. Now I am assuming in this paper, that the declaration of our faculties infallibly corresponds with objective truth. Take then any trilateral, which can be formed by Omnipotence itself: we know infallibly of this trilateral, that it is triangular. Or in other words it is outside the sphere of Omnipotence, to make a trilateral which shall not be triangular.

(2). My second reason for my second thesis is based on that conviction of necessity, which inevitably arises in our mind, when we contemplate this or any other geometrical axiom. We pronounce at once,—on the question being placed before us,—that the triangularity of trilaterals is not simply a fact which prevails within the region of our experience, but a truth which could not be otherwise; of which Omnipotence could not effect the contradictory. I allege this as a psychological experience, of which every one must be cognisant who carefully and fairly examines his own mind. If phenomenists reply by denying this experience,—they may benefit themselves in argument, but I am confident they will greatly lose in influence. The psychological fact to which I appeal is so very obvious to the careful and unprejudiced inquirer, that if phenomenists were avowedly driven to take refuge in its denial, such an inquirer would need no more to convince him that phenomenism is false. Mr. Mill admitted always, that the psychological fact *is* as necessists allege; and he did his best accordingly to reconcile the fact with his theories. Here indeed I may be allowed perhaps to say, that in my humble judgment no other person has done nearly so much as Mr. Mill to promote the spread of phenomenism; and that the reason of his success was partly his unusual power of apprehending an opponent's point of view, partly his exemplary candour in admitting facts which (on the surface at all events) told against him. I am the more desirous to express my sense of what seem to me his rare philosophical endowments, because just now there is, I think, a tendency even within his own school, unduly to disparage them.

Let me now return to this conviction of *necessity*, with which we contemplate a mathematical axiom. Such conviction cannot be possibly due to the mere frequent experience and observation of that axiom. As to the particular axiom before us, I have been pointing out that the triangularity of trilaterals is a fact by no means frequently, but on the contrary very rarely, observed. On the other hand take a fact which we *are* constantly experiencing and observing, the warmth-givingness of fire. Every Englishman has more frequent experience and observation of this, than he has of even two and two making four: yet there is no kind of conviction existing in our mind as to the necessity of this fact; we see no repugnance whatever in the notion, that in some other planet a substance may be found, which in every other respect resembles fire,—in consumption of coal or wood, in destroying or melting this or that portion of matter—but yet which does *not* possess this

particular property of imparting warmth. It is impossible therefore that our conviction of necessity can arise from uniform experience and observation: because that which we have hardly ever (if ever) observed—the triangularity of trilaterals—we regard as necessary; while that which we have habitually and unexceptionally observed—the warmth-givingness of fire—we regard as contingent.

I have now stated my two theses, and for each of them have given two arguments. I am quite unable even to guess how Mr. — would reply to these arguments, because (though their exposition occupied many pages of the DUBLIN REVIEW) he has apparently failed to observe them. Instead of replying to the arguments which I did adduce,—he apparently credits me with another which not only I did not adduce, but which I expressly disavowed, and should repudiate I may almost say with abhorrence. He understands me as arguing, that geometrical axioms are necessarily true, because we cannot conceive their contradictories. Imagine a *Catholic* of all men committing himself to such an argument! Imagine a *Catholic* implying, that what is inconceivable is necessarily false! Did any one e.g. ever dream of maintaining that human beings on earth can conceive in its integrity the dogma of the Blessed Trinity? Of course I heartily agree with my critic, that things, utterly inconceivable by the human intellect, may to beings of a higher nature be the simplest of truths.

I now come to the axiom selected by Mr. — as his illustration; viz., that “a straight line is the shortest path between two points.” And I admit readily, that my argument does not come out at once so irresistibly in this as in the former case, because we have all indubitably very often observed the truth of this particular axiom in a large variety of shapes. So much as this however may be said without further investigation. Mr. — will not allege, that different geometrical axioms stand on different footing. If he once admitted it to be a necessary truth that trilaterals are triangular, he would no less admit it to be a necessary truth that a straight line is the shortest path between two points.

But there is at last no difficulty in dealing with this axiom as with the other. Let me suppose Mr. — to have some pupil, an intelligent and educated youth, and to be placing before him what purports to be a map of the moon, so far as observation has enabled us to know it. He would not hesitate, while drawing inferences from that map, to assume that a straight line is the shortest path between two points. But the pupil, having imbibed his teacher’s phenomenistic doc-

trines, demurs to this. "I know of course," he urges, "that in Europe or in the United States this is true of straight lines, because otherwise we should certainly have heard the contrary. But we can have no communication with inhabitants of the moon, nor any possible means therefore of knowing how the case stands in that satellite." How would Mr. — reply?

And this leads me to notice an argument of my critic's, which has also on two or three occasions been urged by Mr. Mill. "The possibility of making and using maps," he says, "is a fact taught by experience." By help of maps "we can reason about the relations to each other of the objects represented, as well as we could if we confined our attention to the things themselves, and indeed in many instances much better." This is true within certain limits, but surely untrue beyond those limits. Suppose I have before me the map of a landed estate in Wales, and know from competent authority that the relative distance and position of the various parts are there represented with great accuracy. There are many inferences which I can draw from that map more readily than "if I confined my attention to the things themselves." True; but *what* inferences? Those, and those only, which have for their premisses (in addition to the data of the map) mathematical truths. Suppose I wished to find out what are the qualities of the soil, or what the colour of the neighbouring sea, or whether there is coal or precious metal below the surface: of what use would the map be to me for such purposes as these? I should be acting very absurdly no doubt, if I sent to Wales to inquire whether throughout the given estate a straight line is the shortest path between two points; but I should act no less absurdly, if I attempted to discover the nature of the soil by arguing from the map. Why does this distinction exist? Of course, because mathematical truths differ from such other facts as I have mentioned, by being cognisable independently of experience.

Mr. — has a little misapprehended the question I asked concerning the region of the fixed stars. It was this: how can we tell that, in the region of the fixed stars, trilaterals are triangular and a straight line the shortest path between two points? Mr. — considers that we only know these truths *as regards our own planet* by means of experience; and *experience* has certainly nothing to report on the question, whether these axioms hold good in the stellar region. Indeed this fact alone ought surely to refute the phenomenistic theory. Imagine grave philosophers, telescope in hand, endeavouring to discern some trilateral in distant space, in order that they may carefully count the number of its angles!

I will be very brief on Mr. —'s concluding reference to arithmetical truths, because (as I have already said) I think it would be a pity if our discussion proceeded along two different grooves. But as he has expressed his opinion on this head, I suppose I may fairly be expected to express mine. Briefly then I will say this. (1.) I agree with him as to the fundamental axiom of arithmetic: that axiom being, as I conceive, that objects of thought are not varied in number, by being arranged in different groups. (2.) I also agree with him, that this axiom is ampliative and not merely explicative. (3.) I hold however, in opposition to him, that the axiom is known independently of experience and as a necessary truth. (4.) I do not see any impossibility in his supposition, that there should be "a world in which the fact of putting two pairs of" material "things together should reduce the number to three." (5.) On such a supposition,—if the inhabitants possessed reason,—they would know with absolute certainty that two and two make neither more nor less than four; and they would know therefore that some power is constantly at work, destroying material objects which had existed, or uniting material objects which had been distinct. As Mr. — has not given any reasons for his opinions on this head, I need not assign any reasons for mine.

Such are those philosophical views of mine, which we are now to discuss.

ART. IV.—AMERICAN POETS.

SECOND PART.

Lars. A Pastoral of Norway. By BAYARD TAYLOR, Author of Goethe's Faust, translated in the original metres. London: Strahan & Co. 1873.

Poems by Walt Whitman. Selected and edited by WILLIAM MICHAEL ROSSETTI. London: John Camden Hotten. 1868.

The Biglow Papers. By JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL. London: John Camden Hotten. 1868.

Songs of the Sierras. By JOAQUIN MILLER. London: Longman & Co. 1871.

Hans Breitmann's Ballads. (Three series.) London: Trübner & Co. 1871.

Southern Poems of the War. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. London: Trübner & Co. 1869.

The Poet at the Breakfast Table. By OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES. London: Routledge & Sons. 1872.

The Pennsylvania Pilgrimage, and other Poems. By JOHN GREENLEAF WHITTIER. Boston: Osgood & Co. London: Sampson Low & Co. 1872.

John Greenleaf Whittier's Poetical Works. Complete edition. London: Macmillan & Co. 1873.

WE endeavoured in our last number to show the natural advantages possessed by American poets, and the clear reflection of national scenery to be found in their works. We traced the rise of American poetry, and passed briefly in review the writings of Mrs. Sigourney, the chief poetess of the United States, of the classical William Cullen Bryant, the Catholic aspects of Longfellow, the Quaker-like purity of Bayard Taylor's verse, the Catholic poetry to be found in periodicals, and the moralizing humour of Oliver Wendell Holmes. Resuming our subject at the point where we were obliged to break off, we now proceed with our intended sketch of those poets in America who have distinguished themselves most highly in their own country, and have the best claim to be welcomed in ours.

In his "Incident in a Railway Car," James Russell Lowell

has inserted what seems to give his ideal of poetry—at least of poetry in his own hands.

Never did Poesy appear
So full of heaven to me, as when
I saw how it would pierce through pride and fear
To the lives of coarsest men.

It may be glorious to write
Thoughts that shall glad the two or three
High souls, like those far stars that come in sight
Once in a century ;—

But better far it is to speak
One simple word, which now and then
Shall waken their free nature in the weak
And friendless sons of men ;

To write some earnest verse or line
Which, seeking not the praise of art,
Shall make a clearer faith and manhood shine
In the untutored heart.

He who doth this, in verse or prose,
May be forgotten in his day,
But surely shall be crowned at last with those
Who live and speak for aye.

In accordance with this view, James Russell Lowell has declined from the higher walks of poetry—from rivers raging among rocks and trees bronzed with Indian summers—from ideas and scenes such as would have rejoiced Keats, Shelley, and Tennyson—to give vent to his political principles in humorous pieces written in the Yankee dialect. His fame was made by the “Biglow Papers,” which may be regarded as an anathema on the Mexican War; and in these Papers his democratic proclivities and his burning hatred of slavery recommend themselves to notice in musical and comic verse. They are pervaded also with moral earnestness, and marked by strange spelling, colloquial familiarities, and frequent allusions to Holy Writ. The phraseology is often scriptural, and the irreverence which they display must be ascribed, not to the author, but to the habits of the people whose *patois* he adopts. Englishmen cannot but be shocked when the Supreme Being is treated with *American* freedom. But beneath Lowell’s free-and-easy diction, his rude and homely satire, and never-failing fun, there is a substratum of fine feeling, scholarship, and sound sense, which compensates for many flaws. We would rather see the name of God used with honest, though undue familiarity, than ignored altogether, as by Walt Whitman, the

apostle of matter and the idolater of the flesh. The following stanzas, taken from the anti-slavery poem, the "Cruetin Sarjint," will illustrate our point.

Ez for war, I call it murder,—
 There you hev it plain an' flat ;
 I don't want to go no furdur
 Than my Testyment fer that ;
 God hez sed so plump an' fairly,
 It's ez long ez it is broad,
An' you've gut to git up airly
Ef you want to take in God.

'Taint your eppyletts an' feathers
 Make the thing a grain more right ;
 'Taint a follerin' your bell-wethers
 Will excuse ye in His sight ;
 Ef you take a sword an' dror it,
 An' go stick a feller thru,
 Guv'ment aint to answer for it,
God'll send the bill to you.

Wuts the use o' meetin'-goin'
 Every Sabbuth, wet or dry,
 Ef it's right to go amowin'
 Feller-men like oats an' rye ?
 I dunno but wut it's pooty
 Trainin' round in bobtail coats,—
 But it's curus Christian dooty
 This ere cuttin' folks's throats.

* * * * *

Jest go home an' ask our Nancy
 Whether I'd be sech a goose
 Es to jine ye,—*guess you'd fancy*
The etarnal bung waz loose !
 She wants me fer home consumption,
 Let alone the hay's to mow,—
 Ef you're arter folks o' gumption,
 You've a darned long row to hoe.

Who would suspect that this comic strain proceeded from the author of "My Study Window," and "Among my Books"—volumes of essays replete with every sign of extensive learning and refined taste ? If Lowell's Essays have a literary fault, it is that they are too clever—full to overflowing of pointed allusions, images, and anecdotes. It would be well sometimes if his mind were less wealthy, or if he forgot some of his riches. He takes us too often off the line, to pick up a beautiful shell, or admire a choice plant. He overcharges his page with illustrations. His luxuriance resembles that of

many a plain in Southern climes, where you are knee-deep in flowers and cannot make way through the long grasses and aromatic shrubs. If such be the opulence of Lowell's prose, it would be surprising if his poetry, whether serious or humorous, were not marked by peculiar beauties. The "Cathedral" and "Under the Willows, and other Poems" cannot fail to gratify all who can distinguish between verse and poetry. Lowell does not merely imitate beauty, he creates it; and the creation of beauty is the essence of poetry. In all compositions which have been really received as poems, we shall find that the imaginative or, speaking more properly, the creative parts only, have insured them their success. This essential, for which we sigh so often in reading what *would be* poetry and is only rhyme, or perhaps not even that, is decidedly not wanting in Lowell's effusions. They have in them a principle of life, a subtle ingenuity and an inward glow. The word and the thought are as bride and bridegroom, according to that spirited precept:—

Sei die Braut das Wort,
Bräutigam der Geist.

"The Heritage," for example, concentrates much power and feeling in exalting the lot of the poor above that of the rich. There may be some straining of the argument, some special pleading, some designed forgetfulness of the many temptations inseparable from poverty, but poetry is not always to be taken *au fond de la lettre*; it is enough for poetic purposes that it treats any one subject beautifully and satisfactorily from a particular point of view. "The Dandelion" is another of Lowell's poems enfolding in its bosom much poetic wealth. He speaks of the flower as "fringing the dusty roads with harmless gold"; of children as "high-hearted buccaneers," who pluck and hold up the dandelion, "o'erjoyed, that they an El Dorado in the grass have found"; he calls it "the Spring's largess," which most hearts never understand to take at God's value. He encircles it, in short, with the rainbow colours of a heart alive to the delicate traceries of Nature's hand. He is full of feeling without sentimentality, and full of art without being artificial. Granted that the highest and most spiritual condition of man is one of continuous joy and content, there is, nevertheless, something in humanity so sad, so compassed about with every species of infirmity, that poetry loses half its power and sweetness when it ceases to make pain beautiful and sighs melodious. Lowell has all the wailing which belongs to a child of song, and perfectly understands how tears are expressive of the deepest emotions, whether of sorrow or joy. Yet he is full of

hope, and believes that mainspring of all heroic deeds and sufferings to be divine in its nature and origin :—

Nor is he far astray who deems
That every hope, which rises and grows broad
In the world's heart, by ordered impulse streams
From the great heart of God.
God wills, man hopes.

Rich as we are in poets of our own country, we often find it difficult to believe that, in the commerce of the mind, we have much to gain by the importation among us of poetry of the United States. Longfellow, indeed, we have long regarded almost as one of ourselves, but with this exception there is among English readers in general little knowledge or appreciation of American poetry. We are apt to look on Yankees in the mass as vulgar, sectarian, swaggering, democratic, money-worshipping folk, who have degraded the English language to a colonial level. But whatever advantages the Mother Country may have over the new Republic, they are balanced, and the Americans would think overbalanced, by advantages on the other side. Purity of style and diction is certainly not lost among their writers of the higher order, and in the vast territory of the United States there is more than enough material for artists, novelists, and poets of every kind and degree. John Greenleaf Whittier is a poet who deserves to be better known in England for his "Songs of Labour," "Home Ballads," and "Voices of Freedom." He is doubtless a mild poet; but mild poetry, like mild air, mild weather, and a mild climate, has its charm. Let no one think that genius is absent from smooth and faultless versification. It may not indeed be genius of the highest order, yet without genius metric melody can never be produced. A critic of some ability has said, "This power over verse, as it is one of the most primary, so also do we regard it as one of the most final tests of a true poetic vocation . . . other powers may be preferred for dignity or value; none is more of the essence of the art of poetry, or so positively discriminates that from all other forms of art. None, therefore, is more essential to the poet, or more symptomatic of his rank." Metric melody, also, seldom stands alone; the very power which produced it is a guarantee for the possession of other cognate powers; and hence we find that, in almost all cases, the melody of a composition is the measure of its ideas and images also. There is another piece by Whittier well known among us in consequence of its being so often recited at Penny Readings and such-like entertainments. It is "Maud Muller," she who—

On a summer's day,
Raked the meadow sweet with hay.
Beneath her torn hat glowed the wealth
Of simple beauty and rustic health.
Singing she wrought, and her merry glee
The mock-bird echoed from his tree.

Well; it is a simple tale—a mere nothing to tell—but very beautiful and very touching. A judge rides by; he draws his bridle in the shade of the apple-trees, and asks for a drink of water from the spring at the hands of Maud Muller. And she thinks and sighs, and sighs and thinks how she should like to be a judge's wife; and the judge, riding away, thinks and dreams, and dreams and thinks how he should like to quit the dusty purlieus of the law, and exchange the weary fencing of stifling courts for the

Low of cattle and song of birds
And health, and quiet, and loving words.

But the judge marries a wife of rich dowry, who lives for fashion, as he lives for power. But often his thoughts revert to the vision of the barefoot maiden raking her hay; and Maud Muller's musings no less often turn on the rider who thanked her so graciously for the cooling draught, and talked so kindly of the hay and the weather,

the grass and flowers and trees,
Of the singing birds and the humming bees.

Now mark the conclusion, which for delicacy of touch may match with the workmanship of any master-hand.

Alas for maiden, alas for judge,
For rich repiner and household drudge!
God pity them both, and pity us all,
Who vainly the dreams of youth recall:
For of all sad words of tongue and pen,
The saddest are these—"It might have been!"
Ah well! *for us all some sweet hope lies*
Deeply buried from human eyes;
And in the hereafter, angels may
Roll the stone from its grave away!

It is better to analyze one poem than to make general remarks on a dozen. The "Brother of Mercy" exhibits Whittier's peculiar style and distinctive merits in a brief compass. A porter by the Pitti wall in the Val d'Arno is lying on his mat, about to die, while a barefoot monk of La Certosa sits at his side. A Brotherhood of Mercy, in their

black masks, is seen moving in that direction, and Piero Luca, the porter, laments that, for the first time their bell has sounded during forty years, he is unable to join in their merciful task. He loved the work, he says; it was its own reward. He did not count on it as an offset against his sins, or as lessening his debt to the free grace and mercy of his Lord. The monk endeavours to console him with the prospect of eternal rest, the white robe and the golden crown. But Piero tosses on his sick pillow, and says in the most naïve humility and, if we may so say, hallowed misconception of the heavenly world—

Miserable me !

I am too poor for such grand company ;
 The crown would be too heavy for this grey
 Old head ; and, God forgive me if I say,
 It would be hard to sit there night and day
 Like an image in the Tribune, doing nought
 With these hard hands that all my life have wrought
 Not for bread only, but for pity's sake.
 I'm dull at prayers : I could not keep awake
 Counting my beads. Mine's but a crazy head,
 Scarce worth the saving if all else be dead.
 And if one goes to heaven without a heart,
 God knows he leaves behind his better part.
 I love my fellow-men : the worst I know
 I would do good to. Will death change me so
 That I shall sit among the lazy saints,
 Turning a deaf ear to the sore complaints
 Of souls that suffer ? Why, I never yet
 Left a poor dog in the *strada* hard beset,
 Or ass o'erladen ! must I rate man less
 Than dog or ass, in holy selfishness ?
 Methinks (Lord, pardon, if the thought be sin !)
 The world of pain were better, if therein
 One's heart might still be human, and desires
 Of natural pity drop upon its fires
 Some cooling tears.

The perceptions of the poor monk reach no further than those of the poor dying porter. He thinks Piero's words profane; he crosses himself; cries "Madman ! thou art lost !" and flies with the pyx in his hands. The conclusion cannot be told better than in the writer's own words :—

The sick man closed his eyes with a great groan
 That sank into a prayer—"Thy will be done !"
 Then he was made aware, by soul or ear,
 Of somewhat pure and holy bending o'er him,

And of a voice like that of her who bore him,
 Tender and most compassionate : " Be of cheer !
 For heaven is love, as God himself is love :
Thy work below shall be thy work above."
 And when he looked, lo ! in the stern monk's place
 He saw the shining of an angel's face !

One cannot, of course, fail to see with regret that the good man who wrote this beautiful poetry indulged a perverse animus against the Catholic religion. He might have portrayed the character of Piero equally well without making the monk so stupid as to mistake the dying man's spiritual condition, and so harsh and unjust as to withdraw the last sacrament ; for " he took up his pyx and fled." That the humble porter should outwit the priest, and that the angel's face should shine where the monk's was stern, is a transparent Protestant trick. It will suit a large majority of American readers, perhaps of English too, but this is a poor criterion of merit. *Il y a parier*, says a French writer, *que toute idée publique, toute convention reçue, est une sottise, car elle a convenue au plus grand nombre.*

The life of Edgar Allan Poe is a melancholy one—the record of a wandering star—of life, genius, happiness, and usefulness marred by the one degrading vice of intoxication, to which he owed his untimely end. With an acute ear for the music of verse, and a keen sense of the beautiful, he wove the chains of earthly passion round the wings of his soul, and dragged her into the dust of death. He might have used the words of the Bishop of Hippo in the " Confessions," and have said :—*" Amabam pulchra inferiora et ibam in profundum, et dicebam amicis meis : Num amamus aliquid nisi pulchrum ? "* Five-and-twenty years have passed away since he expired in a hospital at Baltimore at the age of thirty-eight. He who had himself asked in the " Black Cat," " What disease is like Alcohol ? " died of *delirium tremens*, yet he still lives in the poems which he wrote, as he himself assures us, without a purpose, because they have each a music inseparable from the sentiment they breathe, and a finish due to consummate taste. " He had," says one of his critics, " an exquisite eye for proportion, and every little poem is carved like a cameo."

The misfortunes of many other children of song met in Edgar Allan Poe. Like Byron, he was a spoilt child, and, like that noble poet also, he lampooned his patron. Like Shelley, he was expelled from his University. Like Sheridan, he married a girl without dowry, like Burns he caroused, and, like Savage, he ate in misery the bitter fruits of dissipation. He was as precocious as Chatterton ; and among his misfortunes may be numbered that of having published a volume of

poems while still a boy. The strength of wing expended in such premature flights would be turned to better account if reserved to a later day. The rise and growth of youthful vanity would be checked, and more correct taste cultivated for higher efforts. Poe's early effusions, however, were full of promise, and Mr. James Hannay dwells with enthusiasm on one in particular, entitled "Helen." "Could anything," he asks, "be more dainty, airy, amber-bright than this is? Its elegance is Horatian. It is *merum nectar*, as Scaliger says of the Ode to Pyrrha." Yet this poem is said to have been written at fourteen. His playful sonnet "To Science" may be quoted as a specimen of his youthful faculties. It sins against the laws of the sonnet in its structure, but the expression is graceful, especially in the concluding line.

Science, true daughter of old Time thou art,
 Who alterest all things with thy peering eyes.
 Why preyest thou thus upon the poet's heart,
 Vulture, whose wings are dull realities?
 How should he love thee? or how deem thee wise
 Who wouldst not leave him in his wandering,
 To seek for treasure in the jewelled skies,
 Albeit he soared with an undaunted wing?
 Hast thou not dragged Diana from her car,
 And driven the Hamadryad from the wood
 To seek a shelter in some happier star?
 Hast thou not torn the Naiad from her flood,
 The Elfin from the green grass, and from me
 The summer dream beneath the tamarind-tree?

With all his faults, it is to Poe's credit that he has not transferred the irregularities of his life into his verses in any offensive and immodest way. They are like wild flowers, and for the most part they breathe sweetly. In one, and in one only, we even catch a glimpse of an aspiration after the highest created Beauty in the person of the blessed Mother of our Lord; but we can draw from it no grave conclusion, so incongruous does it seem with the sparkling levities in the midst of which it is found, and which moralize too plainly, and say:—

Alas! his young affections run to waste
 Or water but the desert.

The "Hymn" is as follows, and it is so devoid of poetic merit, that the writer could hardly have thought it worth preserving except as a record of something which God had done for his soul. Yet we cannot be sure even of this much, for in the midst of his orgies he was always conversing with

spirits, and pitying beautiful angels seemed, to his disordered fancy, to spread their wings over the living ruins of his soul and body.

At morn, at noon, at twilight dim,
 Maria, thou hast heard my hymn :
 In joy and woe, in good and ill,
 Mother of God, be with me still !
 When the hours flew brightly by,
 And not a cloud obscured the sky,
 My soul, lest it should truant be,
 Thy grace did guide to Thine and thee.
 Now, when storms of fate o'ercast
 Darkly my Present and my Past,
 Let my Future radiant shine
 With sweet hopes of thee and Thine !

If he had felt this intensely, he would probably have expressed it in finer poetry, and have applied to it that melodious system of repetition and refrain of which he was a master and the inventor. Tennyson and Swinburne have often imitated his recurrent music, and though this is frequently nothing more than a poetic trick, there are cases in which it admirably expresses genuine and deep feeling. It is on the "Raven" that Poe's reputation is mainly founded. It was received in the United States with rapturous applause, and the author himself was so intoxicated with vanity as to pronounce it the best poem that ever had been or would be written ! It is beyond doubt a masterpiece of versification, and the delight of Music Halls and Assembly Rooms when recited by readers such as Fanny Kemble and Mr. Montesquieu Bellew. It is highly characteristic of Poe when Poe is at his best, yet it is surprising rather than great. "It may be described," Lady Pollock says, "as the remorseful shriek of a troubled conscience ; it projects strange phantoms, it is a startling representation of a special form of delirium in a diseased mind, and its peculiarities of rhyme and rhythm force it upon the attention. . . . It has more of spasm than of true vitality ; but it is not altogether devoid of beauty. Its tricks of manner recommend it to vulgar tastes, and having enjoyed an immense immediate popularity, it is likely to be rated much lower a few years hence than it is now. Already it has sunk below the first estimate formed of it." The author was indeed poetic rather than a poet. He looked on Life and Nature with a poet's eye, and he encircled himself wherever he went with gorgeous images and smooth cadenzas. Yet, with the exception of the "Raven," "Lenore" and the "Bells," he has written scarcely anything that will long defy the rust of time. We

cannot do more at present than ring one of his own changes on the "Bells."

Hear the sledges with the bells—
Silver bells !

What a world of merriment their melody foretells !

How they tinkle, tinkle, tinkle

In the icy air of night !

While the stars that oversprinkle

All the heavens, seem to twinkle

With a crystalline delight ;

Keeping time, time, time

In a sort of Runic rhyme,

To the tintinnabulation that so musically wells

From the bells, bells, bells, bells,

Bells, bells, bells,

From the jingling and the tingling of the bells.

Ralph Waldo Emerson, now upwards of seventy years of age, was the son of a Unitarian minister, and at one time discharged the like office with his father in Boston, his native city. The charms of literature, however, and of a literary career, withdrew him from the pulpit at an early period of life, and led him to devote all his time and attention to pursuits congenial to his taste. Brighter talents and keener sensibilities than his have seldom been united ; but, although they have made him a most successful writer of prose, they have not sufficed to make him a popular or even an agreeable poet. We read his best pieces with an uneasy feeling, and it seems as if the author had composed them with effort and under restraint. Yet, speaking artistically, they are full of truth and beauty. They *are* poetry, and being such, we can sometimes hardly account for their giving so little pleasure. They rise and fly above the common level ; but they lack sunlight on their joyful way, and freedom on their wings. They have no sustained flight. They do not move like Virgil's Dove, who—

Aëre lapsa quieto,

Radit iter liquidum, celeres neque commovet alàs.

They limp, and halt, and start, and leap, and fairly tumble ; then mount and play fantastic tricks, sparkle with a sudden fire, and as suddenly are lost in mist. No one can read the forty pages which "May Day" fills without feeling convinced that it brings together more lovely images of Spring than were probably ever before collected into so small a compass :—

The million-handed sculptor moulds
Quaintest bud and blossom folds,

The million-handed painter pours
Opal hues and purple dye ;
Azaleas flush the island floors,
And the tints of heaven reply.

Yet the effect on the whole is not pleasing. Bewildered with a multitude of beautiful objects, we ask for the genius which can reduce them to order, and give them significancy. Seven-syllable lines, moreover, are too jingling to satisfy the ear except in brief lyrics. No amount of exquisite fragments will produce a whole without an adequate design. All Emerson's poems are fragments, and these again are fragmentary. His *disjecta membra* want a uniting idea. What are oases of surpassing beauty, if severed from each other by sands, and brushwood, and swamp? Of all he has written in verse the "Poet" and the "Humble Bee" are the least open to this censure. There we find a store of poetic ideality, the finest perception, and a way of expressing things truly original. If he only had a true system in his head, he would be a glorious poet in spite of artistic defects. But he has none. He has all his life been striving to elaborate one, and he has not succeeded. An oppressive vagueness and insufficiency pervades his verse, because he is ever teaching what he has not learned. He would be an apostle of truth, and he knows not what truth is. Beauty, that is created beauty, he knows and loves. He has been from his youth

. . . . A forest seer
Minstrel of the natural year,
Foreteller of the vernal ides,
Wise harbinger of spheres and tides ;
A lover true, who knew by heart
Each joy the mountain-dales impart :
It seemed that Nature could not raise
A plant in any secret place,
In quaking bog, on snowy hill,
Beneath the grass that shades the rill,
Under the snow, beneath the rocks,
In damp fields known to bird and fox,
But he would come in the very hour
It opened in its virgin bower,
As if a sunbeam showed the place,
And tell its long-descended race.
It seemed as if the breezes brought him,
It seemed as if the sparrows taught him,
As if by secret sight he knew
Where in far fields the orchis grew.

Many events are in the field
 Which are not shown to common eyes,
 But all her shows did Nature yield
 To please and win this pilgrim wise.
 He saw the partridge drum in the woods,
 He heard the woodcock's evening hymn,
 He found the tawny thrush's broods,
 And the shy hawk did wait for him.
 What others did at distance hear,
 And guessed within the thicket's gloom,
 Was showed to this philosopher,
 And at his bidding seemed to come.

Almost all the requirements of poetry are fulfilled in these suggestive lines; but it is not often that we find in his verse a long passage so well sustained, so delicate and perspicuous. Thirty-five years have passed since public attention was called to the strangely perplexed system of thought which he had to propound. It was on a Sunday evening in July, 1838, that he delivered an address to a senior class in Divinity College, Cambridge, and discussed from the most transcendental point of view the questions of man in his relations to the universe; of Christ and Christianity; the actual state of religion, and similar lofty themes. He developed in his lecture what some termed a "Sublime Creed," and others described as an "Idealistic Pantheism." It was, in fact, like many of his subsequent works, a *rifacimento* of the speculations of Carlyle and Coleridge, hard to be understood, and strongly spiced with the transcendentalism of Germany. A definite creed only can support a solid superstructure of verse. The mythology of ancient Greece and Rome had a certain grandeur, artistically considered, because it was at least definite, and the same may be said of Protestant poetry, so far as it retains the fundamental doctrines of the Faith; but when a poet's brains are addled by the pantheistic doctrines of Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, and Jean Paul, his verses are inevitably marked by feebleness and obscurity. This it is which mars the music of many a mighty master of German song, and often makes their hymns and aspirations like sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And this leads us to observe another fatal blemish which Emerson has in common with many writers of the Victor Hugo stamp. He insults the majesty of the Son of God by extolling Him as a man, by placing Him in the list of heroes and sages, side by side with reformers and legislators, "kings and saviours" of high repute. Thus in his "Song of Nature" he speaks of

One in a Judæan manger, [Christ]
 And one by Avon stream, [Shakspeare]

One over against the mouths of Nile, [Saul of Tarsus]
And one in the Academe. [Plato]

And so again in one of those quatrains in which he was fond of completing a thought, in imitation of Goethe and Schiller :—

I see all human wits
Are measured but a few,
Unmeasured still my Shakspeare sits,
Lone as the blessed Jew.

“Hans Breitmann’s Ballads,” by Charles G. Leland, are one of the many offshoots of Lowell’s “Biglow Papers.” They have imported, however, a new element into the composition of American humorous poetry. The hero, Hans Breitmann, is a native of Germany, and has not been long in the United States. His language, therefore, is a ludicrous mixture of two others, easily amalgamated, because of kindred origin. De Quincey informs us that “the absurdissimo proposilio” of making English more musical by introducing Italian forms and terminations, “met with no encouraggiamento whaterino;” but he would not have said as much of an alliance between English and German, if he could have read Hans Breitmann. There is a coarseness in these poems which will often be offensive to a refined English taste; but in sly satire and broad fun it would be difficult to find anything to surpass them. The bad spelling, the German pronunciation of English, and the admixture of German words, are not mere tricks; there is, besides all this, a substratum throughout of genuine humour. The author’s keen sense of the ludicrous is contagious, and he who does not laugh over Hans Breitmann’s *abandon* has no laughter in him. He would be proof against Molière, and Liston could not have disturbed his gravity. The dash of sentiment—and German sentiment too, vague as a mist smitten with a sunbeam—that Hans often throws into his merriest strain is as perfectly amusing as the most patent jokes :—

Hans Breitmann gife a barty—
Where ish dat barty now?
Where ish de lofely golden cloud
Dat float on de moundain’s prow?
Where ish de himmelstrahlende stern—
De shtar of de shpirit’s light?
All goned afay mit de lager beer,
Afay in de ewigkeit.

Can anything represent more exactly the way in which Germans too often make sentiment take the place of virtue,

and principle, in their words and writings, flies off in moonlit effervescence ?

In the "Philosopede," again, we have a most facetious skit on the nineteenth-century-men, each of whom strides his bicycle and outruns everybody if he can.

Herr Shnitzerl make a philosopede,
 Von of de puttyest kind,
It vent mitout a vheel in front,
And hadn't none pehind.
 Von vheel vas in de mittel, dough,
 And it vent as sure as ecks,
 For he shtraddled on the axel dree,
 Mit der vheel petween his lecks.

Of course Shnitzerl and his philosopede came to grief—a circumstance deplored with much pathos :—

Oh, vot ish all dis eart'ly pliss ?
Oh, vot ish man's soocksess ?
Oh, vot ish various kinds of dings,
And vot ish hobbiness ?
 Ve find a pank-node in de shtreedt,
 Next dings der pank ish preak ;
 Ve folls, and knocks our outsides in,
 When ve a ten shtrike make.
 So vos it mit der Schnitzerlein
 On his philosopede,
 His feet both shlipped outside-ward, *shoost*
Vhen at his exdra shpeed.
 He felled oopon der vheel, of coorse ;
 De vheel like blitzen flew !
 And Schnitzerl he vos schnitz in vact,
 For it shlished him grod in two.
 Und as for his philosopede
 Id cot so shkared, men say,
 It pounded onward till it vent
 Ganz tyfelwards afay.
Boot where ish now der Schnitzerl's soul ?
Where dos his shbirit pide ?
In Himmel droo de endless plue
It takes a medeor ride.

One of the editors of the Breitmann Ballads, in speaking of them has said, "There are abysses under abysses of cryptic and concealed fun"; and it would be difficult to invent a higher commendation. The grotesque language in which they are clothed is not unreal. It is the droll broken English (quite distinct from the Pennsylvanian German) spoken by

millions of uneducated or half-educated Germans in America, immigrants chiefly from Southern Germany. They roll on a variety of subjects, social and political, and lay bare many of the rascalities of United States politicians no less than many of the absurdities of German philosophers. Thus in a poem in which the superiority of Germans to all the rest of mankind is maintained, and in which we are told

Dat der Deutscher hafe *efen more intellects dan he himself soopose*,
the speaker frankly avows his inability to understand himself, and adds:—

Ash der Hegel say of his system—dat only von mans knew
Vot der tyfel id meant—und he couldn't tell—und der Jean
Richter, too,

Who saidt: "Gott knows I meant somedings vhen foorst dis
buch I writ,

Boot Gott only wise vot das buch means now—for I hafe
forgotten it!"

Some slight knowledge of German is necessary in order to take in the wit of these Ballads and even their sense, but the editions published by Trübner & Co. are amply provided with glossaries. Mr. Charles G. Leland has just published "*Gaudeamus*; Humorous Poems—translated from the German of Joseph Victor Scheffel and others." The translations are cleverly executed, but translated wit is always cumbrous. Even the "*Jobsiad*" of Kortüm is heavy in Mr. Brook's English. The best of the pieces in "*Gaudeamus*" are travesties of science, and some of them are occasionally rather coarse. The same may be said of the poems of Bret Harte, which have acquired a popularity in America and in this country far beyond what their merits justify. They are often not only vulgar but profane, and the only excuse for him is, that, having chosen to mould his characters out of clay of the commonest and coarsest kind, he puts such language into their lips as becomes their origin. Sometimes he glazes the clay; paints tender pictures on it; adorns it with little gems of virtue or feeling, all the more resplendent because set in a sordid frame. He finds, in short, noble qualities in the lowest and roughest of the human race. He has the dry, quaint humour of Artemus Ward and Mark Twain, *plus* a Bret-Hartean pathos.

"That Heathen Chinees," the famous cheater at Euchre, or the American *écarté*, was Bret Harte's first and great success. There is, no doubt, a depth of humour in it which is very ingenious, but the wit of *Jim* and *Dow's Flat* has too much dross mixed with it to be recommended or approved. Reading poetry used to be regarded as a recreation; it is now made a

labour. Persons are now continually exhorted to read what they cannot understand, or what they find as difficult as a Sphinx's enigma. It is not enough that serious poetry, or as it is called, philosophical poetry, should be obscure, humorous verse as well is made as hard to work as a sum in the Binomial theorem. Bret Harte is not free from this algebraic kind of wit. Of course, *he* would complain of the dulness of his readers and critics. But readers *are* dull—that is, very often;—and critics—well—they are not impossible to please. When Bret Harte wills, he can be perspicuous enough, as in a fine song called the “Reveille.” It is worthy of its name. It reminds us of Bürger and Beck, of Simrock, Mosen, Strackwitz, and Herwegh. Bret Harte can be clear even when witty, as in “Penelope.” He can be almost pathetic, as in “Fate,” and tenderly descriptive, as in the “Seabird” and the “Mountain Heart’s Ease.” Here is a specimen of his best manner—peculiar enough, thoughtful, and suggestive. A stranger elegy was never written; yet it scarcely requires a comment. The “In Memoriam” explains itself,—“The Watchman of Ephraim,” as Osee says, “was with my God.”

RELIEVING GUARD.

T. S. K.—*Obit March 4, 1864.*

Came the Relief. “What, sentry, ho !
 How passed the night through thy long waking ?”
 “Cold, cheerless, dark,—as may befit
 The hour before the dawn is breaking.”
 “No sight ? no sound ?” “No ; nothing save
 The plover from the marshes calling,
 And in yon Western sky, about
 An hour ago, a Star was falling.”
 “A Star ? There’s nothing strange in that.”
 “No, nothing ; but above the thicket,
 Somehow it seemed to me *that God*
Somewhere had just relieved a picket.”

It is now nearly twenty years since Walt Whitman’s “Blades of Grass” were first published, and as they have undoubtedly exercised a wide and lasting influence, notwithstanding their peculiar form, we feel bound to submit them to a careful analysis. Mr. William Michael Rossetti was principally concerned in introducing his works into the English market; and when it is remembered that Mr. Rossetti is the bosom friend of Swinburne, our readers will not be surprised to hear that Walt Whitman, as an author, is the embodiment of all that is most opposed to the Catholic religion. It is curious

also to observe that Mr. Rossetti's first estimate and admiration of the works of this poet appeared in the *Chronicle* for July 6, 1867, under the article "Walt Whitman's Poems." In consequence of this article, as he himself informs us, he was requested to edit a selection from Whitman's writings. Happily these poems, or Ossianic effusions, fraught with the most dangerous principles, do not come before the world in an attractive shape. A certain rhythm runs through them, but they have no rhyme, except in a few instances, nor are they even in blank verse. They are far less poetic in form than the Psalms and Prophets in Hebrew, or Southey's "Thalaba the Destroyer," and may be regarded, as some one has said, "as a warp of prose amid the web of poetry." Thus even in composition, they are but a mongrel breed—a hybrid monstrosity. For this reason, indeed, Walt Whitman has adopted his strange attire. It strikes the eye; it imposes by its novelty; it bespeaks the audacious personality of the man himself. He claims to be the man of the period—the voice of Republican America. His claim is admitted by his admirers. He cannot be dealt with as a child or a fool. He is neither. He is the exponent of democracy; the champion of humanity; the nineteenth century incarnate. Man, individual and *en masse*, that is his theme. For him, evil has no existence, or if it exists, it is well that it should exist.

I am myself, (he says) just as much evil as good, and my nation is—and I say there is in fact no evil,

Or, if there is, I say it is just as important to you, to the land, or to me, as anything else.

(*Chants Democratic.*)

His grandfather was "the great Quaker Iconoclast, Elias Hicks," and as dispositions of mind and body are alike hereditary, we find in the grandson an Iconoclast of another type. Whitman's ambition is to break in pieces every sacred image and construct a theory of humanity entirely his own. That his enthusiasm is genuine may be inferred from the fact of his devoting himself to the care of the sick and wounded, in the field and in the hospitals, during the Civil War between the North and the South. It is not, however, the less to be dreaded on that account. Benevolence and Atheism were combined in Shelley, and so are self-sacrifice and Materialism united in Walt Whitman. He was in advance of his time, as to his new doctrine, when he first wrote, and though his materialistic ideas have now become far more common, he is in some respects in advance of his time still. The day of his influence, therefore, is not over, for he is more logical than many of his fellows, and carries out their notions into results

from which they themselves would perhaps recoil. He is come, this Auguste Comte in verse, this demolisher of all religion, to "inaugurate a religion." They are his own words.

. . . . The whole earth (he adds) and all the stars in the sky, are for religion's sake.

I say no man has ever yet been half devout enough ;

None has ever yet adored or worshipped half enough ;

None has begun to think how divine 'he himself is, and how certain the future is.

I say that the real and permanent grandeur of these States must be their religion ;

Otherwise there is no real and permanent grandeur ;

Nor character, nor life worthy the name, without religion ;

Nor land, nor man or woman, without religion.

There is vigour and power enough here, and truth too, if the words were interpreted in a right sense, but whether these long, wavy, "Leaves of Grass" deserve, as poetry, the praises lavished on them by Messrs. Emerson, Rossetti, and Swinburne, we leave to our readers to judge. It is more to our purpose to inquire what is the "greater religion," the germs of which Walt Whitman drops in the earth. It is not, you may be sure, the Catholic religion, nor is it Christianity in any sense, though the Bible is one of the writer's favourite books. It is, as nearly as it may be described, the Religion of Humanity—the religion for which Mazzini fought with the pen and Garibaldi with the sword. You may infer what it is from a passage in the Preface to "Leaves of Grass" written by the poet himself:—

There will soon be no more priests. Their work is done. They may wait awhile—perhaps a generation or two—dropping off by degrees. A superior breed shall take their place—the gangs of Kosmos and prophets *en masse* shall take their place. A new order shall arise, and they shall be the priests of man, and every man shall be his own priest. The churches built under their umbrage shall be the churches of men and women. Through the divinity of themselves shall the Kosmos and the new breed of poets be interpreters of men and women, and of all events and things they shall find their inspiration in real objects to-day, symptoms of the past and future.

Though this passage is printed as prose, it is quite as much poetry as the "Leaves of Grass." It represents the ideas of Comte as developed in his "Positive Religion." Yet it must not be supposed that Walt Whitman is a plagiarist in any sense. He does not strictly follow Comte, Mazzini, Victor Hugo, Huxley, or Tyndall, though he may by accident agree with each of them in turn. His system, with its rotten basis, its hideous defects, and its strange admixture of the beautiful and

the grand, is all his own. Materialist though he be, to such an extent as to make matter in general, and our bodies in particular divine, he is not a pure materialist; he teaches the immortality of the soul and body, and in his poems, as by the bedside of the dying, he predicts with the confidence of faith the existence of the soul after death clothed in a finer frame of matter elaborated within us during our earthly life. This is, we believe, a doctrine of many Spiritualists; but Whitman is not properly a Spiritualist any more than a mere Materialist. When we consider the breadth of his system, and the multitude of beautiful truths which he has incorporated into it, we cannot but deeply lament that, either through perversity or defective education, or both, he has not been intromitted into the glorious heritage of the Catholic faith, where he would find all that he now holds of good and true under the seal of the Blood of an Incarnate God, to the exclusion of all that he holds also which is earthly, sensual, and devilish. For him, as for Catholics, but under very different conditions, the air around is full of spirits released from their mortal coil. Yet with this and similarly sublime and consoling reflections, he associates occasionally passages and entire poems so corrupt in morals and so indecent in language that they are omitted in English editions of his works. With Walt Whitman, the body is the soul, and the soul is the body; the corpse that we drop in the grave is "excrementitious"; the real body survives:

Item for item, it will elude the hands of the corpse-cleaners, and pass to fitting spheres,

Carrying what has accrued to it from the moment of birth to the moment of death

It is the soul-body of which he speaks, the magnetic or ethereal body, supposed by some to be formed and still forming within the grosser body which will die. If Whitman could be described in one word, we should call him a Universalist. He has no antagonisms. He accepts all, admires all, loves all. He would embrace all objects, material and spiritual, as if the grasp of his finite intellect were the underlying principle that welds things together, harmonizes all discords, annihilates all distinctions of good and evil, of pain and pleasure, of past and future, time and eternity:—

I respect Assyria, China, Teutonia, and the Hebrews;

I adopt each theory, myth, god, and demi-god;

I see that the old accounts, bibles, genealogies, are true, without exception;

I assert that all past days were what they should have been;

And that they could no-how have been better than they were.

And that to-day is what it should be—and that America is,

And that to-day and America could no-how be better than they are.

If in this place we were discussing systems of philosophy in the United States instead of poetry, it would be necessary to enter more fully into the subject of Walt Whitman's speculations. He is not a mere rhapsodist, nor can he be dismissed as a dreamer or an imbecile. There is more bone and sinew in his pages than in those of any other American poet, and that mainly because his ideas are often new and always daring. But enough has been said here for the guidance of those who are curious about his school of thought, and we must make but one further remark on his character as a poet. Of all American poets he is the most intensely national, and in him the great Democracy of the West has found a man who, as Carlyle says, "will speak forth melodiously what the heart of it means." He has given scope to the gigantic ideas of his people, and to their unparalleled activity and progress in every social and scientific department. His verses, like his genius, are shaggy and unshorn, and they shake the land like a herd of buffaloes thundering over the prairies. Nothing more national than his "American Feuillage," "Drum Taps," and poems on the death of President Lincoln, was ever written; and deeply as we deplore the erratic path into which his eager mind has wandered, we cannot but recognize in his talents a gift of the Most High, and in his writings much that is beautiful and precious in the midst of much that is dangerous and base. Any study of American poetry which did not embrace his works would be imperfect, because he has given it a direction in the line of original and powerful thought. If the Catholic religion should spread more widely in the United States, and obtain a firmer hold, directly or indirectly, over the public mind, the divine alchemy of which they are possessed who "have the unction from the holy One and know all things" might turn much of his alloyed metal into refined gold. Fresh and athletic poetry was what, before Whitman's time, America wanted; and now that the want has in some degree, and under great disadvantage, been supplied, it only remains to impart to the new importation that religious and Christian character which made Dante and Milton rulers in the realms of mind. It is, doubtless, by permission of the All-Wise that poets as well as professors, in America as in England, are ranging themselves with new energy in the ranks of unbelief; but it will be, as ever, the sublime office of the Catholic Church to strike the weapons from their hands, to enrich herself with their spoils, and to yoke them to the triumphant car of Him who cometh with dyed garments from Bosra.

Having said this much of Walt Whitman's compositions, and believing, as we do, that in matter of poetry they represent

the American mind and the state of American society more faithfully than any other poems—shadowing forth with a certain wild magnificence the rapid, gigantic, and terrible growth of principles false and true—we ought perhaps to give a further specimen of the strange long sweep and Hebraic recurrences in the verse of this thorough Yankee :—

Why ! who makes much of a miracle ?

As to me, *I know of nothing else but miracles,*

Whether I walk the streets of Manhattan [New York],

Or dart my sight over the roofs of houses toward the sky,

Or wade with naked feet along the beach, just in the edge of the water,

Or stand under trees in the woods,

Or talk by day with any one I love,

Or sit at the table at dinner with my mother,

Or look at strangers opposite me riding in the car,

Or watch honey-bees around the hive, of a summer forenoon,

Or animals feeding in the fields,

Or birds—or the wonderfulness of insects in the air,

Or the wonderfulness of the sun-down—or of stars shining so quiet and bright,

Or the exquisite, delicate, thin curve of the new moon in spring ;

Or whether I go among *those I like best, and that like me best—mechanics, boatmen, farmers,*

Or among the savans—or to the soirée—or to the opera,

Or stand a long while looking at the movements of machinery,

Or behold children at their sports,

Or the admirable sight of the perfect old man, or the perfect old woman,

Or the sick in hospitals, or the dead carried to burial,

Or my own eyes and figure in the glass ;

These with the rest, one and all, are to me miracles,

The whole referring—yet each distinct and in its place.

To me, every hour of the light and dark is a miracle,

Every inch of space is a miracle,

Every square yard of the surface of the earth is spread with the same,

Every cubic foot of the interior swarms with the same ;

Every spear of grass—the frames, limbs, organs, of men and women and all that concerns them,

All these to me are unspeakable perfect miracles.

To me the sea is a continual miracle ;

The fishes that swim—the rocks—the motion of the waves—the ships with men in them,

What stranger miracles are there ?

In America, as in England, the great poet is still to arise. It is essential that he should be a Catholic—"a poet," as Emanuel Geibel says, "by the grace of God" (*Poet von Gottes Gnaden*). Not that Catholicism need be his subject, but it

should underlie it, and circumscribe it, and hold it in solution. He should see all things from a Catholic point of view, yet see more than most who are round about him, and see farther than his age in general. He should have the versatility of Shakspeare, the might of Milton, the faith of Dante, and the perfect language of Tennyson. He should embrace, so far as one man can embrace, all sciences, have the liveliest affinity for the true and beautiful, wherever found, and the tenderest sympathy with human suffering. He should pierce to the principles underlying facts and binding together disjointed phenomena. He should be as orthodox as the see of S. Peter, yet discern in every error its basis or contingent of truth. He should leave his moral lessons to be inferred, and remember that, for the most part, the mission of the poet is to please rather than to teach. Relying with full confidence on the all-embracing character of his divine religion, he should avoid as a pestilence every species of narrowness, and be content to be often misinterpreted and misunderstood. Originality in a poet is impossible if he be always writing down to the level of inferior understandings. He must be judged by the few, that he may delight the many; and in saying this, we do not for a moment forget that simplicity, directness, perspicuity are the crowning glories of all composition, and especially of poetry. Never before, in the history of mankind, were the materials at a poet's command so rich and varied as they are now. All things are assuming giant proportions—commerce, locomotion, social questions, politics, education, war, sciences, arts. Nature was never observed before as she is now observed, and the novelist's art has laid bare the human heart and depicted the characters of men in such vivid and varied colours as we never saw till of late. Religion itself—our own holy religion—has developed within the present generation, and presented itself to us in a more definite and extended shape than ever. The times are ripe for great poetry and a great minstrel of mankind. Man, the Kosmos, the Bible, the infallible Church, Time, Futurity—what themes! The mere mention of them is inspiring; for what is poetry, but the highest truth and the deepest emotion? Express them as you will, there is music in the sound and rhythm in the language. Where will this poet of the future, who makes Catholicism his standpoint, arise? Will England or America have the honour of giving him birth?

ART. V.—JOHN WESLEY AND THE RISE OF METHODISM.

1. *John Wesley and the Evangelical Practices of the Eighteenth Century.* By JULIA WEDGWOOD. London : Macmillan & Co. 1870.
2. *The Works of the Rev. John Wesley.* 16 vols. London : Conference Office. 1809.
3. *The Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists considered.* By Bishop LAVINGTON. With Notes, Introduction, and Appendix, by Rev. R. POLWHEEL. London : 1820.
4. *The Life of Wesley, and the Rise and Progress of Methodism.* By ROBERT SOUTHEY. 2 vols. London : Longman. 1820.
5. *John Wesley's Place in Church History.* By R. DENNY URLIN. London.

EVERY great religious, like every great political movement, so far as it has arisen out of human causes, comes partly from the action of some one ruling mind in concert, or later perhaps, in conflict with others like itself, and partly from the action of masses of men, who are influenced by, and in their turn influence, those to whom they look up. But all alike have moulded their own characters (from which spring their actions individual or collective) from certain materials, the circumstances in which they were placed by Providence, and those tendencies which they bring into the world with them. For the leader, even be he the most kingly of mankind, is still but human, nay, the more human, the more capable he is of irradiating, or winning, or deceiving, or elevating his fellows. His mother, his father, his home, the traditions of his people, have all acted on that mind, not, however, on a passive material, but on a soul which acts even whilst it is being acted upon. And the masses whom he re-fashions are human beings, severally prepared to welcome his ideas by great causes that have been at work long before. This in nowise removes the accountability of the leader or of those whom he leads, but it explains how they came to act as they did. We propose in the present article to consider the rise of Methodism, a religious movement with which Protestant England was ringing nearly a century and a half ago, as it is now ringing with one of a very opposite character, viewed on the surface, though with more points of resemblance than the fact that they had a common birthplace, the University of Oxford. Methodism, at first a peculiar way of thinking and acting, was moulded into a sect—much as he would have objected to the name—by one man, John Wesley, and of necessity his biography and its history are closely interwoven, the several great steps in its organization being the leading events in its founder's

career. Let us, however, first survey its general antecedents, noticing that its primitive origin may be dated in the year 1738.

When we recall the splendid achievements of England under Marlborough, giving it a name such as it had never had since the days of Edward III. or Henry V., its energy in scientific discovery at the same epoch, on which Newton imprinted a mark so conspicuous among the centuries of civilization, its brilliance in the great writers of the same age, whatever their demerits otherwise,—Pope, Swift, Bolingbroke, Young, Thomson, and the rest, it may seem strange that it is still looked upon as a period, in a certain sense of languor, torpor, and dulness. In a religious point of view the first quarter or more of the last century certainly was such. The heats of the Puritan times had exhausted themselves, and the national mind seemed to desire whatever was most opposed, by its prosaic and even humdrum character, to the excitement in which it had been kept by the saints of the Commonwealth. Of course, to speak of the exhaustion of a nation is purely a metaphorical expression. What it means is, that those who had set the task, and followed it in that generation, had grown old or had died out, without having left behind them a succession of people who were willing to walk in their steps. And this they failed to do, either from the impatient revulsion with which the young throw off a system imposed upon them by their elders, which comes to them, not as it did to those elders, by individual choice or passion, but by constraint, and the shackles of which gall them more than they did their predecessors, or else because, as time had gone on, the elders themselves had sobered down. Cromwell himself in Whitehall, it has been remarked, was not the Cromwell of early days at Huntingdon; and what happened to him happened, no doubt to multitudes of men who had passed through similar states. It was very early perceived that the Puritanical spirit had lost its fervour.

On the other hand, it was not likely beforehand that the Royalist party, when again in power, would make religious habits fashionable, even though the restoration of the national establishment was nearly as essential in their scheme as that of the monarchy. They came in on the ruins of a faction that had made itself odious by hypocrisy. Now the protest which the world naturally makes against that vice is not a resolute practice of virtue, but rather the license of a sinful life, even going beyond what temptation suggests and the conscience at all willingly acquiesces in. The picture of reckless profligacy in the court of Charles II. which we obtain from Pepys and Burnet, and which by no means vanishes as we enter the Georgian era, is the very reverse of that stiff tapestry which hung before the Puritanical régime. Men like Rochester, and, later on, like Charteris and the Duke of Wharton, succeeded to those gloomy but self-indulgent hypocrites of humbler origin,

whom Scott has held up to our disgust in such a character as that of Joseph Tomkins. This revulsion is perhaps best exhibited in the case of Bolingbroke, who had been educated in the strait-laced traditions of the two St. Johns of the Commonwealth, but who became the Alcibiades of his age, adding, however, to that character the part of one of the chief literary prophets of infidelity. It might have been anticipated, were it only to invite comparison with the private life of James II. before misfortune and humiliation had made him a consistent Catholic, that William III. would have been careful to set a better moral example. But it was not so; Elizabeth Villiers continues the chain of court-mistresses, as rapacious, or more so, than any one who had gone before her. The grave Somers, who is praised by all the writers of the Revolution with a sort of sanctimonious admiration, was anything but sanctimonious behind the scenes. As we proceed, Sir Robert Walpole's conversation is described as ranging from politics to uncleanness, and from uncleanness to politics. To form an idea of the moral and religious aspect of the times, Hogarth's paintings are perhaps the best means, comparing them, in order to obtain the effect of a contrast, with such productions in our age as the illustrations of *Punch*. Can anything be imagined more "of the earth, earthy," than the people whom Hogarth must have had before him to enable him to fill his canvas with such forms? How had vice, gross and sensual to a degree rather swinish than devilish, degraded society, when types were common and familiar like those of his parsons? And how sunk in frivolity and licentiousness must not have been the nobles of his age; how low and material even his ideal of a good and honourable career, a circumstance which, more than anything else, shows the general debasement? It is painful thus to speak of a generation from which, not yet very remotely, the England of to-day emerged; and we are disposed to ask ourselves whether truth obliges an essayist treating of a historical period of his country, thus

μνησικακῆσαι τῆς ἡλικίας ἐξ ἧς ἐνεοττοτροφεύθη.

All that can be said in extenuation is, that such large statements by their nature admit of great and noble exceptions, many exceptions, not of individuals only, but of whole classes of people, of which we shall presently speak. It would be a very unjust picture of England at the present time, which should be made up of materials taken only from the police reports. But remembering this, we are still obliged to describe the moral atmosphere of England at the period we are considering as very dark. The Protestant establishment had then, more than ever, taken a thoroughly ignoble attitude. Its political sympathies and professed principles ought to have led it to stand by James II. His imprudence and self-

will, together with the fear and hatred of Catholicism, which was strong enough even to overpower worldly interest, had forced the establishment to relinquish its theory of obedience to the king, and yet its very nature forced it into subjection to the succeeding government which it did not love. Nothing is more chilling to religious fervour than a false position; and that was the case with the Church of England far into the Georgian era. Its office might be compared to the wig of the Lord Chancellor, to the fur and chain of the Lord Mayor. The Church wore the official dress of the State, the formal profession it made of the existence of that which was divine, or rather of the fact that at a distant date divine power *had* interfered with human affairs. The supernatural was registered in the books of the State, but for ages, for decades of centuries, had left man to his own devices, and to preserve himself by human prudence. Even as nominally a Church, the institution was now silent, its convocation having been gagged, and its voice, if voice it could be called, mumbled only in dreary sermons and dull books, protests first against Rome, secondly against "enthusiasm." The state of Oxford, with its grey towers, and its shadowy cloisters, and its green gardens, as beautiful then as now, was even still more strange, compared with modern associations, than that of the nation generally. Drinking, sloth, and what Blackstone calls "a calm middle state of mental and moral inactivity," seemed to have descended over the place like a pall, enwrapping alike the teachers and the taught, the governing and the governed classes. We have only to read the letters from Oxford, genuine or not, in the *Spectator*, mere copies of the heavy wit of those dated from town, the evidence, hostile indeed, but tested by other sources not very overcharged, of Amhurst's satirical paper, the *Terræ filius*, Gibbon's and Adam Smith's testimony, to see to what a degradation Oxford had fallen. And yet, in one sense, perhaps, it has in our days fallen to a lower still. In the times to which we allude, religion was still the pivot upon which the University, as an institution, turned. Perhaps a large proportion of the academicians rarely went to bed quite sober, but still the whole machinery of the place, and the daily round of its duties involved acts of worship. Whilst this remained, revivals like Methodism and Puseyism might have been expected occasionally to show themselves. And the education was still in form, the education inherited from times before the Reformation, though scouted and ridiculed by many even of those whose wits had been sharpened by it. The system consisted very much of public logical disputations, such as are only now known in Catholic Colleges, where propositions are attacked and defended in strict syllogistical order. And certainly there are Protestant works of that date, for example, such as Archbishop King's and Bishop Cumberland's,

showing a metaphysical training, then not uncommon, which we may say at the present day is really no longer extant in the world of Protestant thought, without any disparagement to the great original powers and acquired knowledge of the men of the schools of Mill and Hamilton, or Mansel.

It would leave this rapid view of the state of things antecedent to Methodism in England very imperfect, if we failed to notice the condition of our own religious ancestors of that date, the very small and feeble remnant that represented the Catholic Church where it had been so flourishing. Its relative position to the Protestant establishment was pretty much what a few aged survivors still among us not many years back, could tell of it having been before the last relics of the penal laws were swept away. There was greater liberty than might have been expected, unless where political reasons caused excitement; and conversions were more numerous than one might have supposed, where the Catholics were but in the lull of a persecution as determined (after its own method) as that in Japan. And Catholics themselves liberalized to a degree which was amazing in a suffering church. Thus Hooke, the well-known and very estimable Catholic historian of ancient Rome, told Wesley that he went to church when he had no opportunity of going to what the Methodist leader called "a Romish sermon," and Pope, when reminded by the same Hooke to receive the last sacraments on his death-bed, said he did not suppose it was essential, but it would "look right." One would suppose Protestants need not much have feared Catholics like these. Their fears indeed much exaggerated what was going on. Still there was the Catholic Church not to be overlooked by reflecting minds who took interest in religion; and here and there Catholic books, more or less "adapted," were in use among Protestants; for example, Thomas à Kempis, Cardinal Bona's "Guide to Eternity," &c. Dean Stanhope, an industrious translator of Greek ethical works, adopted this plan. On the whole, then, we find that the materials of religious change in England at this period were, a general deadness which could not last, and must have given place to violent reaction of some sort; great and prevailing dissoluteness of manners which undoubtedly shocked the consciences of the minority; the remains of Puritanism, in and out of the established Church; uneasy political feeling may be added to this, arising from the scruples felt by very many who adhered in their hearts to the exiled dynasty; a dull, tame routine in the national education; yet the external organization of the Protestant church still operating, nay, really more powerful than now, for certainly the modern Church of England could not endure for a year under the scandals in high places which then were borne without any strong expression of impatience; finally, the presence of the Catholic remnant, making itself felt even where its action

could not be traced, for there is always working in it at least the conspiracy of prayer, which baffles all spies. All these agencies existed in England, but, as we shall see, the new sect which formed itself, was very considerably and directly influenced by German heresy, a fresh shoot that had recently sprung from the Lutheran stock, although very soon parted from it. We now pass from the general to the personal antecedents of the religious revolution we have to consider, from causes independent of individuals, to causes set at work by known agents, and in particular to the founder of Methodism, so far as in human affairs any one man can be called the founder of religion—John Wesley.

John Wesley was born at Epworth, in Lincolnshire, in 1703. His father, Samuel, was rector of that place, and had joined the established Church in early youth, though both his father and grandfather were nonconformists, and had also grievously suffered for their nonconformity in the time of Charles II. Samuel appears to have had a good deal of native strength in his character; his change of religion, or rather of sect, had thrown him upon his own resources, but he contrived to get educated as a poor scholar at Oxford, and, being among the very first to support the principles of the Revolution of 1688, was rewarded by the moderate preferment he held for the rest of his life. He had, however, to contend with great pecuniary difficulties all through; but no trace of the gloom or depression that such circumstances often cause, was traceable in the robust and highly sanguine disposition of his son. Samuel married Susannah Annesley, a daughter of a celebrated Nonconformist divine, who, like himself, had quitted the dissenting party at a very early age; in politics, she was Jacobite, though her husband remained so resolutely a Whig, that, on accidentally discovering her views, he for a whole year refused to cohabit with her whilst she held them, and only broke off his absurd and wicked determination when King William III. died. Susannah Wesley was one of those women who are sure to communicate a marked impress upon the minds of their children. Though she left the party in which she had been brought up and joined the established Church when a child of thirteen (which of itself showed a tolerable inclination to judge for herself) she retained, in a very great degree, the Puritanical type of thought, which indeed is not so easily broken off as people suppose, especially when they merely take up one subjective manner of acting instead of another, and not, as in the case of conversion to the Catholic Church, obey an external law, besides receiving interior grace. One of the prominent incidents of John Wesley's childhood, was his being saved from the flames when the parsonage-house was burned down. This happened when he was six years old, and left a strong impression upon his mind. His mother, whilst he and her other children were still very young, began to hold prayer-

meetings in the house, during the long absences of her husband on the duties of convocation. She read sermons, and afterwards held religious conversation with those who resorted to these instructions, usually thirty or forty people. The inhabitants of Epworth were a rough, half-civilized set; and thus we see from what a very early date in his life the future religious agitator and organizer witnessed or heard of processes that must have suggested much of what he himself lived to institute. But his mother almost trained him for that purpose without knowing it. Having been much struck by the incident of his being rescued from the fire, she made him the object of her especial attention among her children, with all of whom she held a weekly talk in private, on the matter of religion. Her way of teaching them to read was peculiar; she began when they were five years old, and then made them learn the alphabet in one day thoroughly, and next day to read a line and then a verse—not in that feeble, hobbling manner of learning a thing gradually by a series of blundering, unconnected repetitions, of which we see the result in the spelling which so deservedly plucks such a goodly number of promising young men in the civil service and military examinations. Mrs. Wesley's method was resolute and accurate, and it was not without its effect on the character, as well as the attainments of her children. It was natural such a mother should gain a powerful command over their minds, but it is a great proof of her extraordinary personal influence, that we find John Wesley himself, not only consulting her on deep points whilst he was forming his opinions at Oxford, but even deferring to her judgment in an important practical question, after the time when he may be regarded as having become a sectarian leader.

When Wesley was a boy at the Charterhouse about twelve or thirteen years old, some extraordinary phenomena took place in his father's house at Epworth, to which a good deal of consideration is given by all his biographers, and there can be no doubt that they may have had some degree of influence on his character, with reference to his views of the supernatural. To give full details of these strange manifestations would take up many pages. We shall merely give some of the most curious particulars. It appears that noises were heard, first of groans, and afterwards of violent knocking, sometimes under the floor, sometimes above the ceiling, sometimes in the air above the heads of the witnesses, and rapidly changing locality; a great crash as though coal was flung down in the passage, jingling as if money was being poured out, shuffling noises as of the trailing of a dress, stamping noises as of people running up and down stairs, latches moving and clattering without anything to account for it—all this went on at intervals by day as well as night, for months together, till panic passed off into familiarity, and yet no clue was found out for the mystery. Once

or twice a glimpse was caught of some object which was thought to look like a badger or rabbit. The knocking seemed to coincide at times with prayers for the Royal family, as if the spirit or whatever was the agent in these proceedings, was hostile to the Hanoverians. Two strange facts were observable in connection with the noises. Before they commenced, the wind commonly rose and blew strongly round the house, and a peculiar sound was heard, compared to a jack being wound up, or to a carpenter planing deal boards. Every possible investigation seems to have been made, but nothing was discovered to throw any light on the causes. It should be added that there is a curious letter from one of John Wesley's sisters, in which, years after, she mentions that this "thing," which acquired in the family the nickname of "Old Jeffrey," was sure to revisit her on the eve of great misfortune. She would have become so accustomed in the present generation to similar phenomena, under the name of "spirit-rapping," that one inclines to pay much less attention to them in the present narrative than Southey and other biographers of Wesley did. Still, the enlarged number of facts have by no means made such matters more intelligible than they were before. The Wesley mystery appears to us to be rendered extremely suspicious by its apparent admixture with politics. The sound of winding-up is another incident that points very much to trickery. There had been a disturbance in a neighbouring town the previous year, which, says Emilia Wesley, "was undoubtedly witches;" and old Mr. Wesley had, for several Sundays before the noises arose, preached against consulting "cunning men," which the Epworth people were fond of doing; so there was a motive for revenge; but whether this revenge was effected by preternatural means, is the question. On the confines where jugglery and witchcraft are so very apt to interlace, it is very dangerous to have recourse too readily to the latter as an explanation. Still, on the whole, we should judge the probability is that the Epworth phenomena were effected by unlawful means. Such means may have been at the disposal of beings, whether human or diabolical, who would use them for paltry and insignificant ends; but to regard the effects as purely natural, would be in other ways very difficult. Much against such a view is the circumstance of signs of extreme agitation shown by the children in their sleep, whilst all this was going on; also that of a fierce mastiff being completely intimidated by the noises. Anyhow, the facts have been before the world for a century and a half, and no writer who has examined them has any satisfactory theory to offer. They cause no difficulty if we take the received and regular explanation, the agency of evil spirits, or of those in league with them. Noteworthy, however, as this episode in Wesley's early life is, we should hardly assign considerable importance to it as a turning-point in the history of his mind.

He shows all through, an extreme readiness to recognize supernatural interference where there was certainly nothing miraculous, but this disposition was evidently so native with him, that it needed not "Old Jeffrey" to give it expansion. "Old Jeffrey" would be looked back to by him as one out of very many instances in which he had witnessed or heard of manifestations not to be explained by natural reasons. It would confirm him in this inclination, but never originated it. Perhaps it may here be well for us to anticipate a little, and summarize very briefly the various forces that do appear to have acted powerfully upon him in the period when a man's character is taking the shape that seldom alters when once it has been attained. First, there were his parents. They represented Church of Englandism, but Church of Englandism acquired by conversion, with a dash of the spirit of nonconformity. To both of them he greatly looked up, and was indirectly and directly influenced by them. Then came Oxford influences, of which, so far as they were personal, we know little or nothing belonging to his undergraduate days. Of their probable general effect we shall speak presently. Next, two years at his father's in the country, deepening the domestic influence. He returns to Oxford, and finds a little society instituted at Christ Church by his younger brother—the second germ of Methodism (in his mother's domestic prayer-meetings and Thursday's talks were its first). A friendship with Mr. Law had a marked effect upon him at this period. After a few years came his mission to Georgia, and this brought him in contact with the Moravians—an element which may be said, when superadded to the material already existing, to have almost created Wesleyan Methodism as a special heresy. True it is, Wesley subsequently broke off from Moravianism but not till it had given him the stimulus which made him what he was ever afterwards. In Georgia, we trace general influences, the action of circumstances rather than of persons. On his return, again Moravian contact was very powerful, especially as presented by Peter Böhler, and subsequently by Count Zinzendorff. Against the latter he soon rebelled, and in point of fact, the work on his mind was practically wrought by Böhler. Whitefield's agency upon him was rather that of bringing him out by a repelling force, making him conscious of that which he held inconsistent with Calvinism, than of exercising any immediate action upon him, which Whitefield was less capable of doing, than many who had far inferior special gifts. After this point, all that remained to complete the Wesley of the religious history of England in the last century, were the circumstances that led him to give an external and independent organization to Methodism, so as practically to break connection with his early beginnings, and constitute himself a religious chief, or rather heresiarch. Let us

now take these steps in his career in order, and with greater detail.

Wesley's real, vigorous self-formation began about the age of two-and-twenty. Previous to that he seems to have been like other young men at Oxford, who had been carefully brought up—not particularly remarkable except for his diligence, for his wit and vivacity, and for his logical ability; which last, as we have already hinted, the system of the university at that time very much tended to assist. This he always acknowledged, much as the writers of the last century were apt to run it down. Foolishly it has since been given up, at the time of the reconstruction of university studies. His preparation for Anglican orders, and his election to a fellowship at Lincoln College, turned his powerful and conscientious mind to the task of fashioning a life for itself. When we read the history of its efforts, we are almost surprised that what took place in Oxford in 1833-45 did not take place at that earlier epoch. There was a great deal in common in the two passages, and some very curious and very complete parallels might be drawn, by those who have read carefully the one and witnessed the other. The important difference was that the great original impulse of the later Oxford movement gave it a defensive purpose, and led those in it especially to maintain the claims of the Anglican establishment to be a true church. Now this was not disputed by those concerned in early Methodism, and their attention was directed to subjective matters, to justification, and the like. Thus, although they began with habits and studies not at all unlike those of the early Puseyites, yet the resemblance did not go much below the surface. The books Wesley most studied for devotional reading were Thomas à Kempis (in the Protestant translation by Dean Stanhope) and Taylor's "Holy Living and Dying." His reflections upon them are worth noticing. The first rather repelled him, from its ascetical style of thought, which appeared to him not reconcilable with the joy and satisfaction to be expected from religion; and he objected to a maxim in Jeremy Taylor, that we ought, "in some sense or other, to think ourselves the worst in every company where we are." We see that these difficulties, *ab initio*, reveal that Wesley's tendencies were not in the direction of either mortification or humility, notwithstanding the great place which self-denial had, externally, in his habits during at least the voyage to Georgia, and always when it was required in the course of his labours. His greatest admirers could hardly say that his was a humble spirit. The earlier works of William Law, under whose personal influence he also came, contributed much to the formation of his religious habits at this period. The effect which these studies would be likely to have upon a mind like his, would be to deepen his sense of religion, as of something really

operative, and not a dead letter, from which long since the soul and energy had departed. There was this decided mark of a great man about John Wesley, that he early began to form himself upon a definite plan. The fellowship at Lincoln was his starting-point. It seemed, by the independence it gave him, and the complete change of position caused by removal to another college, to put himself, as it were, into his own power. Hundreds of men of course have had similar initiations given them, nay, all mankind who have grown to maturity have, each in their respective spheres, but it is the few only that sit down, like Hercules in the fable, at his entrance into life, with the choice for good or for evil shaping itself in distinct outline and vivid colours to their imagination and their intellect. How it came to pass that a mind like Wesley's, with all its logic, all its decision, all its greatness, all its desire to do right, seems never so much as to have placed the Catholic faith before it as a practical question, we need not at present consider. Certain elements were wanting to him, which, a century after his time, were beginning to work actively in Oxford. His first step, however, was to eliminate from his acquaintance persons with whose religious character he was dissatisfied. He observed his visitors narrowly, saw no reason to think that the majority of them truly loved or feared God, and, therefore, whilst he treated them courteously, returned no reply to their invitations that he should return the call. They naturally dropped off, and in this system of repulsion against undesirable friendships, or what he considered such, he persevered throughout life. As an abstract principle, such a rule of action is commendable. Nothing so mars any systematic effort after virtue as contact with worldly or debased minds, when such contact practically implies a community of feeling and interest. Still, like much in Wesley's ways, it is difficult not to suspect an element of spiritual pride in this part of his conduct. He arranged a very orderly scheme of studies to be pursued for some years, and began a diary, which he carefully continued during his career. The voluminous records which are extant under the title of "Wesley's Journal" are the fruit of this habit, and tell very much, but also leave a great deal untold, stimulating curiosity almost as much as they gratify it, like most documents of that class.

On Wesley's return to Oxford in 1728, after two years' absence in his country curacy, he found that his brother Charles at Christ Church had established a sort of religious society, consisting of a few undergraduates, who met to encourage each other in their efforts after a higher life than they found practised around them. They prayed, they visited the prisoners in the gaol, and the poor, they frequented the public offices of religion, fasted on Wednesdays and Fridays, and living according to rule, acquired the nickname,

since so famous, of Methodists, an appellation anciently given to a peculiar school of physicians, but applied, it appears, to certain religionists in England even in the Puritan times. This was only one out of many other ridiculous titles given to the rising party, of which John Wesley was invited to take the lead immediately on his return. For this his powerful moral and intellectual qualities eminently qualified him, and in the tender and affectionate character of his brother, afterwards the great hymnologist of the sect, he found great help all through his career, till at last Charles Wesley shrank from developments, however inevitable, tending to a schism from the schism in which they were born. The eldest brother, Samuel, took a different line altogether, adhering to the beaten track familiar to the Church of England, orderly and religious in its way, but avoiding anything "enthusiastic." The common minds are sure to find out and gather round a great one; and John Wesley soon had a following at Oxford of ardent and sympathizing young men, of whom some, such as Morgan and Gambold, though now forgotten, except by those concerned to study Methodism, influenced their greater teacher in the direction which his views took, whilst still not consciously divergent from their origin. Morgan seems to have seized on the ascetical principle, which at first engaged the party a good deal, though their development, as it went on, showed that, after all, this was but a transitory phase. Gambold took up with Moravianism, which had for a considerable time so very powerful a hold upon the mind of Wesley himself. Hervey, the author of those "Meditations" which in their day had a run something like what "Proverbial Philosophy" has had in recent times, made the spirit that was now stirring familiar to the houses of England in an amiable shape. Above all, Whitefield, an unkempt, forlorn servitor at Pembroke, once pot-boy at a Gloucester inn, but destined to attain a position with which Mr. Spurgeon's, though a good deal less important, may be compared, deserves prominent mention among the early disciples of Wesley, yet more because of his subsequent independent celebrity, than for any influence he exercised on the master.

At this period in the movement a scheme of self-examination was drawn up by Wesley for the use of the society, which, although it is regarded by his followers as belonging to a time when the minds of their founder and his friends were as yet dark as to Gospel truths, at any rate deserves great consideration, as throwing light upon the formation of their religious character. The whole document is too long to extract, yet to give a distinct idea of it, we shall transcribe in full the first three sections of it, and select some of the most interesting questions which occur in the rest of the paper. It is divided into two parts, the first relating to the Love of God and Simplicity; the second to the Love of Man. The former commences thus :—

Have I been simple and recollected in everything I said or did? Have I, 1. Been *simple* in everything, i. e. looked upon God as my good, my pattern, my one desire, my disposer, parent of good; acted wholly for Him; bounded my views with the present action or hour? 2. *Recollected*, i. e. Has this simple view been distinct and uninterrupted? Have I done anything without a previous perception of its being the will of God? or without a perception of its being an exercise or a means of the virtue of the day? Have I said anything without it?

2. Have I prayed with fervour? At going in and out of church? In the church? Morning and evening in private? Monday, Wednesday, and Friday with my friends? Before lying down? On Saturday noon? All the time I was engaged in exterior work? In private? Before I went into the place of public or private prayer, for help therein? Have I, wherever I was, gone to church morning and evening, unless for necessary mercy? and spent from one hour to three in private? Have I, in private prayer, frequently stopt short, and observed with what fervour? Have I repeated it over and over, till I adverted to every word? Have I at the beginning of every prayer or paragraph owned I cannot pray? Have I paused before I concluded in His Name, and adverted to my Saviour now interceding for me at the right hand of God and offering up these prayers?

3. Have I daily used ejaculations? i. e. Have I every hour prayed for humility, faith, hope, love, and the particular virtue of the day? Considered with *whom* I was the last hour, *what* I did, and *how*? With regard to recollection, love of man, humility, self-denial, resignation, and thankfulness? Considered the next hour in the same respects, offered all I do to my Redeemer, begged His assistance in every particular, and commended my soul to His keeping? Have I done this deliberately (not in haste), seriously (not doing anything else the while), and fervently as I could?

We proceed to notice leading points in what follows. A collect is to be used at 9, 12, and 3. Daily meditation. On Sundays an hour is devoted to Thomas à Kempis; on Wednesdays and Fridays a meditation on the Passion. Then, as to the love of man, he asks himself, "Have I been zealous to do and active in doing good? i. e. Have I embraced every probable opportunity of doing good, and preventing, removing, or lessening evil? Have I spent an hour at least every day in speaking to some one or other? Have I given any one up till he *expressly* renounced me? [This seems rather inconsistent with his wholesale clearing of his acquaintances when he became Fellow of Lincoln.] Have I, before I spoke to any, learned, as far as I could, his temper, way of thinking, past life and peculiar hindrances, external and internal? Fixed the point to be aimed at? Then the means to it? Have I, in speaking to a stranger, explained what religion is not (not negative, not external), and what it is; (a recovery of the image of God); searched at what step in it he stops, and what makes

him stop there? exhorted and directed him? Have I persuaded all I could to attend public prayers, sermons, and sacraments? And in general, to obey the laws of the Church Universal, the Church of *England*, the State, the University, and their respective colleges?" The other articles relate chiefly to the duties of giving counsel and showing compassion, and of intercession.

We desire in criticising this scheme of self-examination, not to be too ready to find fault. There is no doubt that those who used it were, at the time, endeavouring, in spite of great obloquy, to lead the best life that their lights enabled them to place before their minds. On the other hand, its author, being already in one sect of heresy, lived and laboured through a long career, the upshot of which was the foundation of another. We cannot, therefore, doubt that some very serious mistakes were committed in the ideal which he proposed to himself even at this early stage of his spiritual history. What were these mistakes? As it appears to us, notwithstanding very much in the scheme that is deeply interesting—much that ought to make those ashamed who miserably fail in the pursuit of aims placed before them by an authority whose voice Wesley never heard, or heard without the grace to obey it; and to make still more ashamed such Catholics as live without forming to themselves any ideal at all, without even attempting to live up to the standard presented to every Catholic in the commonest books of devotion—in spite, we say, of all this, the method is in certain important respects ill-conceived and deficient. For example, the question, "Have I done *anything* without a previous perception of its being the will of God? &c. Have I said *anything* without it?"—is one, as a basis of self-examination, calculated to create an abundant crop of scruples. The distinct previous perception here aimed at, is impossible to be secured, for every one of the multitudinous actions of a day, and, being impossible, the question ought not to have been put in that form. A general intention of doing all for the greater glory of God, made at the commencement, would apply to actions, not wrong, even if unaccompanied by the distinct perception Wesley demands. But it would be practical and indispensable to a holy life, to ask whether this intention has been from time to time renewed throughout the day, and whether acts of the presence of God have been often made or neglected. The same remark applies, though in a less degree, to the question of stopping short in private prayer and "observing what fervour?" The probability is, that those who used this question were anxious about their *feelings* in a way that all sound spiritual doctrine would declare deceptive and dangerous. Again, in the division relating to the love of man, the question, "Have I been zealous and active in doing good? i. e. Have I embraced every probable opportunity of doing good, and preventing,

removing, or lessening evil?" though, taken as it stands, a valuable one, yet, if placed in connection with what follows, and interpreted thereby, is certainly one that also must have disturbed many consciences. Conceive a youth of 18 or 20 asking himself, "Have I spent an hour at least every day in speaking to some one or other?" and if he had not, then blaming himself as having failed in a religious duty. Had all the members of Wesley's clique at Oxford a right to suppose themselves called to undertake this delicate office, and to that extent? And what authority was there to guide them to a just conclusion in the matter? Evidently none, but either the opinion of the two Wesleys, or their own persuasion, that is, the persuasion of very unformed and heated minds, that such was their vocation. Further, the ideal proposed of religion as "the recovery of the image of God," requires to be considered with reference to the whole of Wesley's theological scheme, as it finally shaped itself, before those exalted words could be allowed to stamp an approval on the scheme in which they appear. Lastly, we may make this remark on viewing the paper as a whole. Nowhere throughout the document, is there one word about contrition; not a syllable of sorrow for the sins of which it is presumable, without any lack of charity, the self-examinant, whoever he was, must have been conscious in his earlier days; and again, not a word of resolution to avoid sin, and of prayer to be kept from it. True it is, there is the question, and a very good one, "Have I duly prayed for the virtue of the day, deliberately, seriously, fervently?" But this does not quite meet our difficulty. The absence of contrition and of the sense of perpetual liability to sin is indeed perfectly natural on the principle which Wesley afterwards formulized as a cardinal point in his system. A soul that believed itself, at a given moment, absolutely sure of salvation, would not be likely to trouble itself much with past sin. At this period, however, the omission surprises us, whilst it prepares us *not* to be surprised with the development which his own mind, and with it his sect, took as time went on. In short, although the scheme contains very much that is excellent, as was to be expected from Wesley's religious life up to that point, and although it contains great promise of what might have been the future of the men who used it, had they at the most critical period of their lives, come under Catholic instead of Moravian or Calvinist influences, still a man might in their position have daily used it, and yet have ended the victim of heretical self-will and spiritual self-conceit.

The society fell off a good deal during an absence of Wesley's from Oxford, and was reduced from 27 to 5; this, however, was but a temporary variation. An event of greater importance was the singular episode of Wesley's expedition to Georgia, and residence there for a year and nine months. This was in 1735.

He was invited thither by the trustees of the colony of which the governor at that time was one of the most remarkable Englishman of the last century, Mr., afterwards General Oglethorpe, in allusion to whom Pope's lines are well known.

Or driven by strong benevolence of soul,
Shall fly, like Oglethorpe, from pole to pole.

There was little prudence shown in this move of Wesley's. The object of it was partly, or principally, the conversion of the Indians, and partly the spiritual care of the English settlers. As to the former purpose, Wesley's ideas about his proposed savage flock are worth transcribing. They are much like what Rousseau might have entertained, if he had taken missionary-work instead of infidel sentimentalism into his head, but are hardly what we should have expected from the strong natural good sense John Wesley usually displayed, with all his fanaticism :—

I hope to learn the true sense of the Gospel of Christ by preaching it to the heathen. They have no comments to construe away the text ; no vain philosophy to corrupt it ; no luxurious, sensual, ambitious expounders to soften its unpleasing truths. They are as little children, humble, willing to learn, and eager to do the will of God, and consequently they shall know of every doctrine I preach whether it be of God. By these, therefore, I hope to learn the purity of that faith which was once delivered to the saints, the genuine sense and full extent of those laws which none can understand who mind earthly things.

He was accompanied to Georgia by his brother Charles, and by two of his disciples, Delamotte and Ingham. So far as regarded the great object of the mission, it was a decided failure, and may stand on record as one of the many instances of the sort of blight that appears to attend most Protestant undertakings of the sort. Wesley received little encouragement from the Indians, of whom he had formed such romantic expectations. A conversation indeed is on record which he held with one of the chiefs, curiously illustrating the native ideas on religion ; but Wesley appears not to have made the slightest effort to overcome the difficulties that presented themselves in this part of his work ; and he thus delivers his opinion of the heathen people whom he had proposed to make his catechumens. The facts we should think exaggerated, remembering such interesting testimony as that of Mr. Kohl's "Kitchi-gami" ; but at any rate, the spirit in which they are stated comes strangely from a man who aimed at the apostolic career, and contrasts wonderfully with that of the S. Francis Xaviers and the S. Peter Clavers, being simply an expression of disgust on the part of a thoroughly disappointed person, who had undertaken what he had not the requisite powers to accomplish.

They have no religion, no laws, no civil government. They are all, except perhaps the Choctaws, liars, gluttons, drunkards, thieves, dissembles. They are implacable, unmerciful, murderers of fathers, murderers of their own children—it being a common thing for a son to shoot his father or mother because they are old and past labour, and for a woman to throw her child into the next river, because she will go with her husband to the war.

The mission was equally a failure as regarded Wesley's colonial flock. At this period of his life there was a considerable dash of the High-Church element in his mind. Traces of this will have been noticed in the scheme of self-examination we have quoted, and it is certainly very remarkable how he tended in a direction that even reminds us of the movement of Laud and the other High-Church divines. Thust he rule of S. Vincent of Lerins, *Quod semper, &c.*, at one time attracted him much, and he was fascinated with the writings of S. Ephrem Syrus, another token of sympathies that little belonged to his own age. Still, on the whole, as practically carried out, Wesley's High-Churchism appears to us to have most resembled the combination of "High-and-Dry," with a devotional, but very meddlesome character, of which a typical instance will be found in Dean Granville (who, though a Protestant, followed James II. into exile), whose correspondence has been edited for the *Surtees Society*. Wesley worried the unfortunate settlers by attempting to enforce what he considered the law of the Church in a way to which they were quite unaccustomed. He refused to baptize children except by immersion; he refused a dissenter communion, except on condition of re-baptism, and refused, for similar reasons, to read the burial-service over a dissenter.

But the grand difficulty of all was a good deal mixed up with a certain love-passage which meets us for the first time in his history. There was a young lady named Sophia Hopkey, niece to one of the notables of the colony, Mr. Causton. Wesley (though his mystical reading had led him to favour the idea of a single life as the better for those who could receive it) wished to marry Miss Hopkey, but being at the time wonderfully under the influence of a Moravian so-called bishop and others of that sect, whose acquaintance he had made on the voyage out to Georgia, he thought proper to consult these brethren as to whether it was the Divine will he should marry. The response of each was in the negative, and in this decision, though with very great sense of sacrifice, Wesley acquiesced. The lady soon afterwards married a Mr. Williamson. Strange to say—and a great example of the endless perplexities that must arise when anything like Catholic discipline is attempted in a purely Protestant system, presupposing domestic life as the normal, commendable or thoroughly permitted position of its ministers—Wesley thought it his duty to repel this lady, to whom so lately he had been attached,

from communion, because of some improprieties he believed that he discovered in her conduct. This naturally caused extreme offence and excitement, and the result was a warrant against Wesley for defamation, and complicated legal trouble, a full narrative of which, however amusing, is unnecessary for our present purpose. We may here notice the very singular courtship carried on by Wesley, some years later, in 1748. The lady in this case was one Grace Murray, who had been of great use to him as a person of confidence in his missions, and also as a nurse. They became engaged, but the affair came to nothing, partly from the lady's not knowing her own mind, and partly from what appears to have been the very unjustifiable, though well-meant, interference of Charles Wesley. At last, when of very mature age, John Wesley married a widow, who became the sorrow of his life for twenty years, and ended by deserting him. There is a very curious record of the Murray courtship, the title of which we give below.* All this is, biographically, of great interest, but of no importance as regards the rise of Methodism, except as socially characteristic. We return to our sketch of the latter. In the end, Wesley decided on going back to England. "I shook off," he says, "the dust of my feet, and left Georgia, after having preached the Gospel there (not as I ought, but as I was able) one year and nearly nine months."

The only practical result which the mission to Georgia left as regarded Wesley's career was the bias which he received from the Moravians. The effect, so far, perhaps, was rather moral than doctrinal. He was much impressed by the calmness they showed under circumstances of danger during the voyage, and by the humility of their demeanour. In fact he began to "Moravianize," if we may coin a phrase analogous to that now so familiar with regard to a certain party in Anglicanism who are said to "Romanize." When a man's mind is once set on a certain course, everything seems to conspire to make him go on with it. He had scarcely arrived in London before he made acquaintance with another party of Moravians recently arrived, and especially with Peter Böhler, a man who immediately gained an extraordinary influence over him. There is perhaps no reason to suppose, with Southey, that Böhler must have been a man of very commanding intellect. He had a very distinct hold of what he thought, and his doctrines were just what Wesley himself was tending towards, in the midst of a sort of seething, fermenting mental process, at the time of his return from America. And this clearness of view might very naturally attract Wesley, although a greater man than

* Narrative of a Remarkable Transaction in the Early Life of John Wesley, from an original MS. in his own handwriting, never before published. London: J. Russell Smith, 1848.

his teacher. Wesley had in fact become uncomfortable, and disturbed. He had done, he thought, his best, in living up to the ideas inculcated in his favourite mystical writers, striven to keep the divine law, used much self-denial, mental prayer, good works, and still found no settled peace. The German teacher placed before him an idea of faith in Christ which was a phase of the Lutheran dogma of justification, and Wesley instantly seized it as the key to his difficulties. The signs of it were "a sense of pardon for all past and freedom from all present sins"; and this sense, it was understood, was to be an *instantaneous* work. The German produced witnesses to the doctrine, members of his sect who declared that they had experienced it of their own knowledge; and in no long time, on a given day, May 24th, 1738, and at a given hour, when at a religious meeting in Aldersgate-street, whilst Luther's Epistle to the Romans was being read, Wesley tells us that he suddenly felt this assurance, that Christ had taken away *his* sins, and saved *him* from the law of sin and death. He had previously felt encouraged by opening his New Testament at particular passages, and by an anthem applicable to his case he had heard at St. Paul's. The event in Aldersgate-street was, for Wesley himself, the sensible turning-point, but practically, Methodism as a religious institution, and not merely an association in its nature temporary, like the set he gathered round him at Oxford, had commenced on May 1st, when the first meeting was held in Fetter-lane, as its rules set forth, "in obedience to the command of God by St. James, and by the advice of Peter Böhler." The society was divided into bands of from five to ten persons, meeting once a week, and under an engagement to declare the real state of their hearts, with their several temptations and deliverances, since the last occasion. There was to be a two months' probation; a day of general intercession every fourth Saturday, and a "love-feast" every fifth. Just as in Oxford the way had been prepared for Wesley's organizing hand by his brother in his absence; so now the mind of a large class of the population had been already stirred to its depths by Whitefield's preaching, whilst Wesley was absent in Georgia. The rough draft of the system of bands belongs to Moravianism. Scarcely had it been put into full operation before Wesley resolved on a journey to the headquarters of this sect in Germany, where it was flourishing under its remarkable leader, Count Zinzendorff, to be strengthened in his new persuasion by the example of the holy men whom he expected to find there.

It is unnecessary for our present purpose to enter into any great detail about the history of the Moravian communion. This sect, descending originally from the followers of John Huss, quitted

Bohemia in 1453, and remained on the borders of Silesia and Moravia to a great extent in external conformity with the Catholic Church, until towards the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century, when they moved into Upper Lusatia, where Count Zinzendorff established them, on a place on his estates, since famous by the name of *Herrnhut* (the Lord's watch); and by the force of his rank, commanding character, and religious energy, gave their sect a completely new start. They lived under a constitution or church discipline in which the individual and the family were completely subject to the system. The people of both sexes were divided into classes according to age, and their state of life, married or single; into eleven classes according to their habitations, with helpers, overseers, monitors, &c., and into 90 bands, which met weekly for mutual confession and prayer. The church rulers and other officers were chosen by the congregation, and they with the collective bodies, all had weekly conferences. Husbands, wives, widows, children, were daily visited, the married men by a married man, the wives by a wife. Marriage was not left to individual choice, but required the sanction of the whole church. The community in those days suffered much in the opinion of the world from the nauseous mysticism in which the whole subject of marriage was arrayed in Count Zinzendorff's writings, and elsewhere. There reigned throughout their whole religious system a propensity to classification and inspection with a view to spirituality. What the state of the sect is at this day, the writer has no means of knowing, but the above will probably give a just idea of it in general, as it appeared in Wesley's days. Of Zinzendorff himself Wesley does not seem to have seen very much, and, as will appear presently, he soon divided off from him. However the visit to *Herrnhut* deepened very decidedly the theological impressions to which his friendship with Peter Böhler had already given much shape. There was at *Herrnhut* one Christian David, who had apostatized from Catholicism to Moravianism, and had led the colony into Lusatia. This man, by an abstract of a sermon of his which Wesley gives, must have been of the very temper of which heretical leaders are made. Christian David maintained that a broken and contrite heart has nothing to do with justification as a cause, and *may* hinder it, if a man builds on it. Justification he regarded as something outside of us—the righteousness and blood of Christ.

"There is no connection," he said, "between God and the ungodly. There is no tie to unite them. . . . Works, righteousness, contrition? No. Ungodliness only. This then do, if you will lay a right foundation. Go straight to Christ with all your ungodliness. Tell him, Thou whose eyes are as a flame of fire searching my heart, seest that I am ungodly. I plead nothing else. I do not say, I am humble or contrite, but I am ungodly.

Therefore bring me to him that justifieth the ungodly . . . Here is a mystery . . . Sin is the only thing which divides men from God. Sin (let him that heareth understand) is the only thing which unites them to God ; i.e. the only thing which moves the Lamb of God to have compassion upon, and by His blood, to give them access to the Father." (Wesley's "Journal," Aug. 8, 1738.)

This is pretty much the Lutheran doctrine of justification, which depends on the idea of original sin, as conceived in the same system. There are so many shades of the doctrine that, in considering it, one is reminded of the lines of Horace :—

O here, quæ res
Nec modum habet neque consilium, ratione modoque
Tractari non vult.

But there underlies this idea the following things, (1) That man's original justice consisted in his mere natural constitution, not in any supernatural grace added thereto ; (2) that when man fell, his nature became nothing but a corrupted mass, without the least atom of good in it ; (3) that the restoration of man to the Divine favour is gained¹ by his seizing Christ's merits, whereby he acts, not according to the will of his corruption, which, however, he carries about him as before, but according to the will of the new Adam. Man's nature is purely passive in the whole business. If one asks, how then is an act of faith produced by the human person, how can this corrupted mass germinate into such an efficacious shoot of vitality ? it would be hard to get a distinct and coherent answer. The present writer once heard a Cameronian preacher earnestly caution his hearers against imagining faith itself a work ; there was danger of the notion of merit creeping in even into this carefully guarded circle. Carried out by consistent minds, the doctrine would end, as it often has, in Antinomianism, or the denial of the moral law as binding on the regenerate. It may be well here briefly to contrast with the Lutheran theory, the Catholic doctrine on the subject. Man's primeval justice included a state of obedience of his will to God. His will was free, which made it possible for him to fall. That which was possible, actually happened. He fell, and with the depravation of his will, ensued a displacement and disorder of all the faculties of the soul—not however, such a change as Luther's theory conveys—not, if we may use the expression, a kind of transubstantiation to evil, not a change of identity, not the abstraction of one creature, and the substitution of another, not in short, the removal of the now degraded personality, and the replacing it by a dead mass, which to suppose capable of the apprehension or seizure of Christ's merits the Lutheran remedial theory declares, is manifestly a contradiction in terms ; and on the other hand to suppose such a dead mass

stimulated by Divine actions in the way described, again is a contradiction, since what we here speak of is a personal human soul. The Catholic Church holds that the voice of prevenient grace is heard by what remains of the natural powers, and faith comes of hearing ; there is a beginning of hope, a sense of the fallen state in which the soul finds itself, a spark of love is engendered, and justifying grace is coincident with the act of penance. Man therefore co-operates with God in the process of justification, and sanctification is involved and implied in it. The God of truth cannot *call* just the creature whom he does not *make* just : so the same act by which man is justified, also gives him holiness, capable of and requiring indefinite increase by correspondence with the grace given.

As to the language of Christian David about sin uniting man to God, no doubt, in such a mouth, language could not be more perilous. Yet a sense of cause there is, in which the Church herself calls Adam's sin fortunate, since it earned such a Saviour. And so individual sin, though tears enough can never be shed over it, may still be so overruled in its consequences that a man may rise greater than he fell.

We now return to the history of Wesley's mind. It may be said that from the visit to Germany, he carried away the idea conveyed in Christian David's sermon as the main result, to which must be added the advantage that must have accrued from the suggestive observations of the Moravian religious government to such directing powers as his. But scarcely more than this. Notwithstanding praises which he bestowed upon the sect when he came back, he was not thoroughly satisfied, and a hint he gave in a letter to Count Zinzendorff, about hoping to have an opportunity of speaking freely on a few things of which he did not approve, must have shown the high-born heresiarch that, after all, he was not going to make a vassal of Wesley. The English leader resumed the management of the religious societies which he had formed in London upon his visit to Germany. They began to spread, and manifestations of a peculiar kind were brought about by his preaching. These phenomena consisted in violent, agonizing, bodily convulsions, attending mental struggles of equal vehemence, the people so affected screaming, roaring, rolling, and dashing on the ground in a way that often resembled the demoniacs we read of in Scripture. These conflicts lasted some time, more or less, and then were succeeded by a state of complete tranquillity, in which these sufferers declared themselves in a moment perfectly assured of the forgiveness of their sins. A rich collection of such experiences may be made up out of Wesley's Journal. They will be variously accounted for, according to the view taken of the results which followed, and of mental states generally, outside and

beyond the normal, undisturbed condition of every-day life. That there is a powerful physical sympathy of mind upon mind, no one who has either addressed a large multitude, or observed the demeanour of mobs, when under some powerful excitement, will deny. But we, who believe that super and preter-natural agency is always at work, and at some periods more plain to the senses than at others; and who see what is evident, that all the strange agitation Wesley set in motion ended in the formation of a sect which is one of the widest-spread and most powerful of those that have pullulated from the stock of Lutheranism, will be quite prepared to ascribe it to the deceiving spirit which can simulate the repose of Christian confidence, as easily as he can rend the body and mind of those temporarily in his power. In saying this, we speak of the phenomena on a large scale; not of this case or that, which could only be justly examined upon knowledge of the state of the individual heart; and of that Wesley and the other leaders could have in most cases none. His own account of what he saw is generally very disappointing. Being preoccupied himself with his own persuasions, obtained on the same principle, he took for granted, when he saw a person in the congregation drop down, quiver, writhe, sweat, scream, and then all of a sudden pass off into meek repose, that this result came of the spirit of God. In a curious correspondence with his brother Samuel, who represented the old school of Anglicanism, and felt not the least inclination to sympathize with fanaticism, John alleges cases, which, however strange, might be more likely to influence reasonable minds than the monotonous repetition of the scenes we have noticed. He refers to several instances of conversion wrought "either in sleep or during a strong representation to the eye of their minds of Christ, either on the cross or in glory"; and asserted that such conversions were proved genuine, not by tears and sighs only, "but from the whole tenour of their lives; till then many ways wicked, from that time holy, just and good." Such testimony may be admitted to the fact that their lives underwent a visible and permanent change outwardly for the better. Whether that change was not such as to substitute sins of a far more subtle and deceiving character for those palpable vices and passions of which they had previously been the slaves, is another matter. We know nothing of the history of the individuals, to whom possibly the Catholic faith was never presented. But we can form a notion of this spiritual change Wesley contemplated in his own conversion, and by it can judge without any lack of charity of what such other cases may often have been. A self-examination of his (quoted by Southey, vol. i. p. 212), which we condense as follows, certainly shows a singular elevation of religious pride even in its very expressions of humility. He applies to himself certain tests of

conversion, referring to the words of S. Paul: "If any man is in Christ, he is a new creature." I. Such a man "judges himself to be altogether fallen short of the glorious image of God; to have no good thing abiding in him, but all that is corrupt and abominable; in a word, to be wholly earthly, sensual, and devilish, a motley mixture of beast and devil"—language that ought not to be used of a Christian soul supposed to be in a state of grace, and conveying the Lutheran idea of the corrupt mass acting independently of the faith energizing in the same composed man. But Wesley proceeds: "Thus, by the grace of God in Christ, I judge of myself. Therefore I am in this respect a new creature." (2.) "His judgment concerning happiness is new. . . . He knows there can be no happiness on earth but in the enjoyment of God. . . . Thus, by the grace of God in Christ, I judge of happiness. Therefore I am in this respect a new creature. (3.) His judgment respecting holiness is new. . . . He sees it is the life of God in the soul, the image of God fresh stamped on the heart. . . . Thus, by the grace of God in Christ, I judge of holiness. Therefore, &c. II. His designs are new. It is the design of his life not to heap up treasures upon earth, not to gain the praise of men . . . but to regain the image of God, to have the life of God again planted in his soul. This, by the grace of God in Christ is the true design of my life. Therefore, &c. III. His desires are new, and the whole train of his passions and inclinations, they are now set on the things of heaven. Here Wesley hesitates a little. "I dare not say I am a new creature in this respect, for other desires often arise in my heart, but they do not reign. I put them all under my feet through Christ which strengtheneth me; therefore I believe that He is creating me anew in this also." IV. Wesley then compares his own conversation with that of the true convert, always seasoned with salt, and fit to minister grace to the hearers. "So is mine," he boldly declares, "by the grace of God in Christ. Therefore," &c., as before. V. The actions of such a man are new. "The tenor of his life singly points at the glory of God, all his substance and time are devoted thereto: whether he eats or drinks, or whatever he does, it either springs from, or leads to the love of God and man. Such, by the grace of God in Christ," says Wesley, "is the tenor of my life; therefore, in this respect, I am a new creature." "But St. Paul tells us elsewhere, *the fruit of the spirit is love, peace, joy, &c.* Wesley finds a measure of these in himself, viz., of peace, long-suffering, gentleness, meekness, temperance; yet others he finds not. "I cannot," he says, "find in myself the love of God or of Christ"; he admits he has deadness and wanderings in prayer, rarely more than a cold attention at Holy Communion, no settled, lasting joy in the Holy Ghost, nor such a peace as excludes the possibility of fear or doubt. That on

the whole, though he has not the (proper) witness of the spirit with his spirit that he is a child of God, much less in the full sense of the word in Christ a new creature, still he trusts he has a measure of faith, and is accepted in the Beloved. Now we ask, does this self-examination show Christian humility? Can we imagine such a paper written by S. Francis de Sales or S. Alphonsus Liguori, or the B. John Berchmans? or, not to take examples from the recent Catholic divines, could we imagine it coming from either S. Bernard, or from S. Augustine? On the contrary, a self-satisfaction, almost a conceit, seems to inspire it throughout, leaving a most painful impression on the mind. It is a kind of Litany of self-glorification. True it is, the parenthesis "by the grace of God in Christ," precedes each of those "Therefore," which introduces such very pleasing conclusions about his own state; but the instinct of the least-instructed Catholic would shrink from them, in spite of the thin veil of this formula. A mind thus self-satisfied would, we venture to say, have been in less danger if living in what it admitted to be sin, because the latter condition admits of far easier remedy. Wesley's little treatise, "The Character of a Methodist," where we may suppose his peculiar doctrines rather under than over-stated, displays this same self-satisfaction quite as offensively:—

All that is in his soul is holiness to the Lord. There is not a motion in his heart, but is according to His will. As he loves God, so he keeps His commandments. Not only some or most of them, but all, from the least to the greatest . . . In all his employments, he not only *aims* at this [the glory of God], but actually *attains* it . . . These are the *marks* of a true Methodist. ("Works," vol. vi. pp. 397–399.)

The spiritual pride displayed by Wesley in this singular internal review of his mind we have quoted is exhibited outwardly in a letter he wrote, shortly before his Aldersgate-street conversion, to his old friend and spiritual adviser, William Law. The letter surprises one, not so much for its utter want of humility, as for its want of tact and even good sense, coming from such a man as Wesley. He criticises in very unsparing terms the spirit of Law's teaching, which he had once so much admired, but which he now regarded as imposing an intolerable yoke upon the soul, and contrasts it with the doctrine of a holy man (alluding to Peter Böhler), who had taught him to strip himself of his own works and to flee to Christ. And he rudely demanded of Law how he would answer it to their common Lord that he never gave him that advice? Besides which, he gives his former pastor and master some very plain advice as to his roughness of manner and sour behaviour. Law replied to this much more calmly than might have been expected, yet rather with the self-possession of a mature

mind than with even the semblance of that grand desideratum of all these Protestant saints—humility. Wesley would seem to have administered his rebukes in various directions. His elder brother Samuel and his wife came in for their share, possibly deserved, their fault being a habit of speaking too freely about their neighbours, for which John Wesley thought it would do them good to read the character of “Susurrus” in one of Law’s books. Mrs. Wesley, to use a phrase of the present day, “did not see it.” Samuel, a respectable parson of the old school, in vain tried to curb in the fanaticism of his brother, but evidently with no sort of confidence that his lectures would have any effect.

“As I told Jack,” writes Samuel to their mother, “I am not afraid that the Church should excommunicate him, discipline is at too low an ebb, but that he should excommunicate the Church. It is pretty near it.” The Anglican Bishops of the day appear, in fact, to have been as much embarrassed with the Methodists as their successors have now been for a generation with the Puseyites and Ritualists. Their earnest desire was *quieta non movere*, but Wesley and his followers wished exactly the opposite, and moreover wished this opposite, without formally quitting the establishment. The two Wesleys, in an interview with Bishop Gibson of London, attempted to drive him into a corner, and say whether or no he inhibited from re-baptizing in the case of disputed baptism, (a question foreign to the Methodist movement proper, and part of their early stage of opinion). “Oh, why will you push matters to an extreme?” sighed the poor Bishop, thus goaded. Pulpit after pulpit was closed to them. In Bristol, Whitefield braved the threats of withdrawal of license and excommunication on the part of authority, a sword that could now be hardly drawn from its rusty scabbard—and boldly took to field-preaching, with such success as showed that he had hit upon a plan which the mind of large classes of people at the time were ready for; Wesley saw the moment had arrived for it, and followed Whitefield’s example. It characterizes Wesley’s career throughout (and this is well shown by Miss Wedgwood), that he rather used opportunities than made them, acted not so much on a preconceived system, as accepted ideas that sprang out of circumstances, and sometimes were first suggested by minds greatly inferior to his. The usual physical manifestations attended his addresses at Bristol, which, strange to say, had not at first been obtained by Whitefield, though certainly the most impassioned of the two orators. Miss Wedgwood appears to think Wesley’s writings do not explain this power, and that to modern readers they are dry. We cannot say that we should form the same opinion. They rather remind us of Talleyrand’s criticism on the speeches of Robespierre:—*Ce jeune homme ira loin, car il croit tout ce qu’il dit*. It was through the reason that

Wesley acted upon the passions, not upon the reason through the passions, and, if we mistake not, the former method, in the hands of a speaker *who believes all he says*, will effect ten times more than the feminine, and, in reality, weaker agency of appeals to the heart, not resting on the strong foundation of reason.

We may admire this great natural gift of Wesley's simply as an instrument, but it was one which he used in a self-ordained mission. He had been practically excluded from the pulpits of his Church. What would a saint have done under such circumstances? Suppose S. Ignatius, S. Francis Xavier, or S. Alphonsus forbidden by the bishops of a whole region to preach. The result undoubtedly would have been their giving up their heart's desire at the first hint of authority, and betaking themselves to prayer, which no bishop could forbid. Wesley takes to field-preaching, and regards all England, or the world, as his parish. His career deserves studying in another point of view, as a process, on the one hand, of the successive expulsion of views and influences which he outgrew, on the other, of the gradual construction and organization from within, of a system of which he was the author and autocrat. He was born in Anglicanism, and he retains it, in a certain sense, to his dying day, though he more and more threw off its control. He first gets rid of what we may call the slough that Law's writings had enwrapped him with. Next he flings off Moravianism; then he excludes Calvinism; finally, by exercising the act of ordination, he initiated a new schism, and only the effete condition of his Church prevented his acts being condemned as such. Every step, right or wrong abstractedly as it might be, tended to make Wesley Wesleyan, to bring him nearer the position which belongs to him in the history of Protestantism, that of a new off-shoot from the stock of the Reformation.

The split from Moravianism was due to the incongruity of the principles, both true and false, which the two parties respectively held. The Moravians placed in great prominence the fact that men were and could not but be sinners. No doubt this doctrine was placed by them in a false light, and was understood in the Lutheran sense already explained. Still, take it out of their system, and apart from exaggeration, we may call it a fragment of truth retained by them. Wesley, on the contrary, proclaimed the doctrine of perfection as the Methodist testimony, the peculiar doctrine committed to their trust. He qualified it certainly in such a manner as to make it not inconsistent with the liability to venial sin; nevertheless, as we have seen, he practically failed to make humility its basis, and so corrupted the truth which he had either retained or recovered. The Moravians again based their system upon an exact order, and the repose which attends order under all circumstances. Something of the doctrine of Quiet which characterized a different

school, pervaded their idea of religion. Hence they disliked the wild excitements and convulsive devotion of the early Methodists, a variance which made itself soon felt, and proved that the Methodist idea as it gained form and consciousness, could not long tolerate combination with the Moravians. The Moravians allowed of no degrees in faith or of any justifying faith short of assurance; Wesley, strongly as he held in his earlier stage to what we may call the assurance of the moment, the conviction that *hic et nunc* a man is in God's favour, yet tended to soften this in explanation, and at a later period did not think a consciousness of acceptance essential. The Moravians treated with contempt the use of external means, of sacraments, and good works before acceptance. Wesley regarded such a doctrine with horror. And in general, there was evidently a moral discord between the sects, which came to a crisis in 1740, during Wesley's absence at Bristol, under the influence of a Moravian from Germany, Molther. Like an able leader Wesley took the initiative, and summoned those who held his views to follow him. Next year Zinzendorff came to England, and had an interview with Wesley, the record of which (their conversation was held in Latin) is one of the most curious monuments of the history of Methodism. To bring Wesley round would have been a difficult task for any one, but the dictatorial haughtiness exhibited in Zinzendorff's share of the dialogue shows that, whatever his talents, he was no less deficient in tact and self-command than he was in Christian humility. We have already summarized the doctrine he set forth, but it will be interesting to translate some of the most remarkable sentences, in which it is expressed in Zinzendorff's own words. He said:—

I recognize no inherent perfection in this life. This is the error of errors. I persecute it with fire and sword throughout the whole world. I trample upon it, I consign it to utter destruction. Christ is our only perfection. He who follows inherent perfection, denies Christ. All Christian perfection is imputed, not inherent. A believer is holy only in Christ. He has no holiness at all in himself. The love of God and his neighbour are legal sanctity, not evangelical. Evangelical sanctity is faith. A Christian is not more holy, if he loves more, nor less holy, if he loves less. Sanctification and justification are at the same instant, and admit not of more or of less. A believer never increases in the love of God. We spit and trample upon all self-denial. As believers we do all we wish and no more. We laugh at all mortification. No purification precedes perfect love.

It is to Wesley's honour that he shrank from doctrines like these. His good sense, as well as the reading in which his mind had been steeped at an earlier time of his life, brought the obvious objections to them readily before his mind. Thus, he asked Zinzendorff:—"Is not a father in Christ more holy than an infant,

just born?" And, "does not a believer increase daily in the love of God?" And again, "What does the Apostle Paul mean by his *renovamur de die in diem*"? To this last very pertinent question, Zinzendorff could only give the silly answer. "I will tell you. If lead is changed into gold, it is gold the first day and the second and the third. And so it is renewed from day to day. But it is never more gold than it is the first day." Wesley naturally exclaimed, "I thought we had to increase in grace!" He might have told Zinzendorff that the transmutation of metals was hardly the comparison to make, where, by the very terms of the question, the original object is a being, not a thing. For all that, however, and though Wesley in this discussion was practically on the side of truth, still Zinzendorff's doctrine had been the sting which in the first instance, inflamed his mind, and perhaps he saved a remnant of his orthodoxy at the expense of consistency. A more powerful cause of separation was in truth the discovery, more and more felt every day, that the Moravians differed ethically from the Methodists. They had sprung from different causes, and were different moral creations. The wild and revolting symbolism that characterized their early teaching had no attractions for Wesley, and he disliked the decisive manner in which Moravianism cut itself off from surrounding Christianity. This he himself never really desired, and it was only circumstances that forced him to a certain extent into the mould of a sect, separate from Anglicanism which after his death, his party were led still more to assume. We may here notice that the Moravian system favoured what we should call a devotion to our Lord's Passion, that forms a strange admixture in such a theology. Some specimens in this style from their hymns are quoted by Southey. Like most fragments of Catholic teaching, they would be sure to be distorted, when taken out of their proper connection. Wesley seems to have disliked the mystical, ardent manner of expression indulged in by the Moravians. On the other hand, Methodism was accused very persistently, of an approximation to Catholic ideas and practices, which we shall notice at the conclusion of this article.

It remained for Wesley, having got rid of Moravianism, to eliminate another element with which his mind was unable to work,—that of Calvinism, or the doctrine of election and reprobation as held by the Calvinist school. It may appear strange that, holding as passionately as he did to the idea of what we may call the assurance of the moment, of the certainty of his salvation at any given instant, he should have declined to extend that assurance indefinitely, or rather, infinitely. For if a man's salvation is certain now, and that by a divine, infallible assurance, his fall afterwards would surely be inconsistent with such a certainty, supposed to have been attained at the given moment. But Wesley's feelings and

reason united in rejecting the notion that the goodness of God could doom a number of souls to be lost, do what they would, in which thorough-going Calvinists saw no more difficulty than in the creation of noxious animals. Moreover, his ideas of perfection, as attainable by a Christian, refused to harmonize with the Calvinist principle which, like the Moravian, regarded sin as something wholly external. Carried to an extreme, the latter doctrine is Antinomian, and strikes at the foundation of the moral law, and, consistently, it cannot but do so. The believer is supposed to have no righteousness but Christ's. Of himself he is made up of sin, and that which is so constituted, cannot but sin, though its sins are nothing whilst it holds to faith. Far, indeed, are we from saying that this shocking idea rules the minds of the many people who desire to obey the truth, but have never been entangled in Calvinistic opinions. Wesley, however, dreaded Antinomianism, and had a horror of the darker side of Calvinism. His disciple and colleague in the early action of Methodism, Whitefield, whilst too soft a thinker to feel the difficulty of reprobation, was powerfully attracted to that of election. As dealt with in the Calvinistic theory, however, the one implied the other. The split began as early as 1739, when Wesley preached a sermon against Predestination, which he printed, in obedience to a supposed Divine direction, obtained by drawing a lot, a characteristic practice of his, in which he imitated the Moravians. However, for the present, it was suppressed. Long correspondence followed, the weaker, vainer, but more affectionate mind ineffectually attempting, by passionate, fanatical appeals to draw his stronger, prouder, and more reasoning spirit over to views which the latter had once for all rejected. There is generally, in such a controversy, some error or other committed in judgment which widens the inevitable separation. Such an error was Whitefield's allusion to a former lot-drawing of Wesley's in a matter affecting Whitefield's own movements, in which Wesley admitted himself to have been misled. Wesley publicly tore in pieces the printed letter of his old friend which contained this decided breach of confidence. At last, in 1741, came one of those shocks that portend disruption. A lay-preacher, John Cennick, took upon himself to be the standard-bearer of the Calvinistic revolt against Wesley, and wrote to urge Whitefield to come and stay the plague. Wesley, with consummate tact and decision, expelled Cennick and his followers from the Band-Society, of which they were members; and on Whitefield's return from America, the differences were so recognized by both parties, that although a personal reconciliation did take place, the lines of Arminianism and Calvinistic Methodism became quite distinct. It was not, however, till 1771 that the final breach took place, when Lady Huntingdon, the patroness and foundress of the latter as a sect,

insisted on two pensionaries at Trevecca disavowing the famous Minutes of Conference, in which Wesley, the year before, had put forth distinctly works as a condition of salvation. A superficial accommodation indeed took place after that, which could hardly have deceived the clear-headed of either side. The internal organization of Wesleyanism all this time was proceeding rapidly, as it seems in the distance of a century, yet not hastily, and gaining each development by clever management of circumstances. The institution of classes and class-leaders arose simply from the necessity of collecting money from the poor, which it struck some practical head would be best effected by dividing them into sets of a dozen, one member undertaking to visit the rest and collect,—an excellent basis for religious inspection. Then followed the weekly meeting of the class, and Methodist religious society soon formed itself. Lay-preaching, and, at last (a thing which Wesley adopted *ἐκὼν ἀεκόντι γε θυμῷ*), ordination of ministers independently of the established church; in fact, distinct schism from what he himself regarded as a branch of the church, completed the creation of a new sect, which Methodism undoubtedly became.

Like many heresies, it has grown out into a variety of divisions, in themselves of little interest to us, the importance of their study to the Catholic theologian arising chiefly from the extensive (though diminishing) hold that Methodism has over the lower middle class in English society. In a secondary way also, a certain degree of interest attaches to it, from the resemblance many external to the Church have thought they perceived between the religious manifestations of the sect before us and those of the spiritual life in Catholicism, particularly as exhibited in the biographies of Catholic saints. The elaborate work on this subject by the Anglican Bishop Lavington is a curious illustration of how much can be plausibly said by putting together two totally distinct ideas, and comparing them merely in their external aspect. He ransacks Ribadeneira and similar sources of information for all the telling stories he can find of the zeal and fervour, imitable and not imitable, of the great missionary and mystical saints, like S. Ignatius, S. Peter Nolasco, S. Antony of Padua, S. Catherine of Sienna, and the rest, and caps them with tales from Whitefield and Wesley. No doubt exhibitions of religious ardour, earnest, thorough-going devotion, uncompromising zeal, must have an external resemblance, from whatever root they spring, be it Catholic or Methodist, Mahometan or Montanist. Bishop Lavington, however, forgot that a religion which has none of this can never represent that religion which was to go forth and make disciples of all nations. In whatever degree the Methodists had this fervour, there was stuff in them we should rejoice to have seen Catholicized. But such gifts, even with the faith, do not always argue charity,

and they may always be simulated by the deeper forms of heresy and other false religions.

That there was in Wesley's mind a certain natural affinity to the Catholic religion we should admit. His early studies and habits are enough to show it, as well as the line he took, from his own point of view, against Calvinism. Several passages of his writings also confirm this. Thus he several times quotes De Renty, and particularly in his sermon on Temptation (Works, vol. x. p. 48), where he calls him "that excellent man." He had the sense at least to see the *greatness* of S. Ignatius, whose Life he calls "a surprising book;" and this in the eighteenth century, when it was the fashion to call S. Ignatius a madman, is worth notice, whatever Wesley might say about the badness of his cause (ib. vol. ii. p. 164). And even in the case of conversion to the Catholic Church, in spite of enormous prejudices, he still, towards the very end of his life (in 1786), contended that the convert might have *religion*, which he interpreted to be "the mind which was in Christ Jesus, enabling us to walk as He walked" (vol. xvi. p. 143). Instances of conversion appear to have occurred more frequently than one is apt to suppose in those days. Thus, in 1765, Wesley asks, "What wonder is it that we have so many converts to Popery, and so few to Protestantism; when the former are *sure to want for nothing*, and the latter are *almost sure to starve?*" (vol. iv. p. 263). [We italicize the passage, because it is a statement that sounds oddly, comparing it with the state of things at the present day.] Wesley's liberality, however, by no means prevented his adopting a simply Protestant line as a controversialist; and passages like those we have quoted, compared with examples that might be largely given of the latter description, read painfully when we attempt to apply to his case the doctrine of invincible ignorance.

ART. VI.—CASTANIZA'S SPIRITUAL CONFLICT AND CONQUEST.

The Spiritual Conflict and Conquest. By Dom J. CASTANIZA, O.S.B. Edited, with Preface and Notes, by Canon VAUGHAN, Monk of the English Benedictine Congregation. Reprinted from the old English translation of 1652. London : Burns & Oates. 1874.

The Spiritual Conflict, or the Arraignment of the Spirit of Self-love and Sensuality at the Barre of Truth and Reason. First published in Spanish by the Reverend Father JOHN CASTANIZA, a Benedictine Monk of Onna ; afterwards put into Latine, Italian, German, French, and now lastly into the English tongue, according to the Originall Copy. With many profitable Additions and Explications. The Second Edition. At Paris. 1652.

The First Treatise of the Spirituall Conquest ; or a plain Discovery of the Ambuscado's, and wily Stratagems of our Enemies, in this our Daily War-fare. Enabling the Christian Warriar to foresee and avoid them. At Paris. 1651.

The Second Treatise of the Spirituall Conquest ; or, The Use and Practice of those necessary weapons, which are prescribed in the Treatise of the Spiritual Conflict. Here methodically managed and drawn into seven Exercises, Affective Acts or Aspirations, according to the dayes of the Week. At Paris. 1651.

The Third Treatise of the Spirituall Conquest ; or, The Ascent of the pious soul by Steps and Degrees of Vertues, to the happy Mountain of Perfection. At Paris. 1651.

The Fourth Treatise of the Spirituall Conquest ; or, The Triumph of the elevated Soul, in the amorous embraces of her Divine Spouse. At Paris. 1651.

The Fifth Treatise of the Spirituall Conquest ; Containing The choicest Maxims of Mysticall Divinity. Dilated with points of Practice, Affections and Elevations. At Paris. 1651.

WE have transcribed, in addition to the title of the new issue of the "Spiritual Conflict and Conquest," the detailed titles contained in the old English version of the seventeenth century from which it has been reprinted. They show, as well as anything else, both the nature of the work and the way in which it is put together. Canon Vaughan has given us a very interesting and valuable reprint. From a literary point of view, it is interesting to have reproduced a book written in the seventeenth-century English, in which so

many sturdy confessors and earnest men wrote books that are now preserved with veneration in our libraries. There were more Catholic books written in English during the seventeenth century than there have been during the nineteenth. There is much solidity and good workmanship in these seventeenth-century books. Their writers are men who have something to say, and who have been well taught how to say it. They write for a large but limited class—for the numerous English gentlefolk who, all over the West and the North of England, or in many a town of Flanders and Northern France, still held the true Faith in daily difficulties and with diminishing means; for the English clergy who wanted books of controversy or of asceticism in the seminaries and in their hiding-places; for the bands of monks and nuns, recruited from many an English country-house, which were establishing themselves wherever there was a point near enough the English shores to enable them to get into England when they should be called either to brave the dangers of persecution or to reclaim their ancient abbeys and convents. Their style is sensible and serious, though oftentimes long-winded, and always quaint. There is a print in the 1651 edition of the "Conquest," now open before us, in which a small and heavily-clad Angel is conducting a Pilgrim; and the Pilgrim wears a tall, broad-flapped hat, and an ample tunic girt up in heavy folds over another tunic; his feet are bare and his arms to the elbow, and both arms and ankles are stout and serviceable; his neck is open, he bears a young ash-tree for a staff, and his face is broad and flat. He is an emblem of some point of practical divinity, but he is also an emblem of the books that used to be written for him when he was to be seen on this earth—the stout little volumes of home-spun good sense, of down-right argument, of masterly direction, of pathetic spiritual experience, which some few years ago many of us used to consider merely as "old books," but which the progress of enlightenment is urging able editors to hunt up on the remote shelves of libraries, and to bring out with modern print, modern paper, modern binding, and also with modern prefaces and notes, stating who they are and how admirable they are.

But the special interest of the present reprint is that the first treatise contained in it, the "Spiritual Conflict," is claimed as the original of the world-famous "Spiritual Combat." Most readers are aware of the conflict of opinion regarding the authorship of this celebrated book. We have no intention of pretending to decide the question. Perhaps it will never be decided. Père Brignon, of the Society of

Jesus, writing more than 150 years ago, says with emphasis, "Il en sera donc du Combat Spirituel, comme de l'Imitation de Jésus-Christ; on le lira éternellement, il fera partout de grands fruits; et on ne scaura jamais certainement qui l'a composé." This may be so, but still it may be allowed us to review what evidence there is. D. Lorenzo Scupoli was a saintly Theatine who died at Naples in the year 1620. D. Juan de Castaniza was a holy Benedictine, a Spaniard, a monk of the monastery of S. Saviour at Onna, in Old Castile, who died at Salamanca in 1599. These are the two names for whom, severally, rival commentators claim the authorship of the "Spiritual Combat." It must be observed, however, that it is admitted on all hands that Scupoli wrote the greater part of the "Combat" as we now have it; no one claims for Castaniza that he was the author, in the full sense, of that admirable little work which so many Saints have praised. What is claimed for the Benedictine is this—that he wrote the first sketch or text, to which Scupoli afterwards furnished "enlargements" and explanations. And every one who has handled and examined old editions of the "Spiritual Combat" is aware that it was not at first published in the shape in which we have it now. The ordinary edition consists of 66 chapters.* There are older editions with only 60; and still older ones with only 33; whilst the earliest Italian edition, published in 1589, contains not more than 24. There is the Latin edition of Loricke in 40 chapters; and we have before us an English translation of the year 1698, "revised and recommended" by Dr. Richard Lucas (a Welshman, who became a London rector and prebendary of S. Paul's), in which the number of chapters is 36; though the exact number is due partly to the suppression of the chapters on our Lady and the Saints. The earliest Italian edition was printed at Venice in 1589. This was ten years before the death of Castaniza. The date of the earliest Spanish edition cannot be ascertained. Scupoli was, in 1589, living in retirement and prayer at Venice. The first edition has no author's name; in the second and third the title-page has "By a Servant of God." It is not till 1593 that an edition (printed at Milan) attributes the work to the Theatines, and it is eleven years later (1610) before the name of Lorenzo Scupoli appears on the title-page. Now there is extant a very old English translation "from the Italian." The copy before us is so defaced that no date or place can be deciphered, but it is

* Dr. Pusey's translation (1846) has only 63 chapters; but he leaves out chaps. 48, 49, and 50, which treat of prayer to our Lady and the Saints.

known that it was printed at Louvain in 1598. It contains a curious dedication—or rather the translation of an original dedication—by “Hierome, Count of Portia, the elder,” “to the right reverend Mothers, the Abbess and Sisters of the Monastery of S. Andrew in Venice;” and it professes to be a translation from a work written in Italian “by a servant of God.” Count Jerome, of Portia, whoever he was (the name, in its connection with Venice and the year 1598, inevitably suggests the “Merchant of Venice”), does more than dedicate the book. He claims to be its *first editor*. He says, in the English version of his dedication, “Having in my hands at this time some *written papers* concerning the mortification of our passions (of the which thing I have so many times discoursed with you), I thought it good for your great comfort and help *to put them in print*, and to dedicate them unto you.” It is evident, from these words, that the “servant of God” was either the Count himself (writing under a pseudonym) or, what is more probable, that the author employed or allowed the Count to print his MS. But this much seems certain—that a MS. of the “Spiritual Conflict” was printed for the first time at Venice, and dedicated to the Nuns of S. Andrew’s. And if so, it would appear that the original can hardly have been written in Spanish.

The well-known words of S. Francis de Sales also point to its having been originally written in Italian. He distinctly declares that it was given to him by a Theatine when he was a student at Padua, and that it was written by a member of that Order.* S. Francis went to Padua in 1584, and remained there till 1591. He must, therefore, have received one or other of the very earliest Italian editions. And he might easily have had one, for Padua is only twenty miles from Venice, and in those days there was constant and quick communication by water between the two cities.

It is somewhat difficult to reconcile Castaniza’s claims with these facts. If Castaniza wrote the first sketch of the “Combat,” then it must have been republished, in Italian, at Venice, ten years before his death. It seems difficult to accept the possibility of this, especially if Castaniza did not write it in the early part of his life. It is difficult to suppose that S. Francis de Sales, at least eight years before the writer’s death, should have a copy given him by a Theatine, in Italian, and should be led to believe without hesitation that

* These words of S. Francis, for which neither Canon Vaughan nor Dr. Pusey supplies a reference, do not occur in ordinary editions of the “Esprit.” They will be found, however, in the unmutilated edition as reprinted by the Abbé Depéry, Paris (Gaume frères), 1840, l. xiv., ch. 16.

it was written by a Theatine, and had become as much a text-book for Theatines as the "Exercises" of S. Ignatius for Jesuits. At the same time, it must be confessed that there is a large amount of all but first-hand evidence and of respectable authority for Castaniza's claim. The Latin translation by Loricke, published at Douai in 1612, expressly states that Castaniza wrote the "*Pugna Spiritualis*," and wrote it in Spanish. All through the seventeenth century editions kept coming out, in French, English, or Latin, from Paris, Douai, and London, with the name of Castaniza on the title-page. Not to mention the translation "recommended" by Dr. Lucas and printed in London in 1698 (which was a translation from the French, probably that of Gerberon), we may take, as a sample of a dozen others, the English translation from which the present reprint has been taken. It was printed at Paris in 1652—the first edition 1651.* The translators' "advertisement" unhesitatingly states that they have consulted the "original Spanish" of Castaniza. We have not been able to consult the French translation of Gerberon, which is the edition named by Mabillon in his catalogue of authors for students, and which must have appeared before the end of the seventeenth century; but we have Father Vaughan's authority for saying that Gerberon claimed to have the author's Spanish MS. before him whilst making his translation. If Gerberon had the Spanish MS., and if the early Venice edition was printed from an Italian MS., as we have seen above, the only possible explanation seems to be that some Italian had had access to the very first issue of the Spanish original, and had made a translation, which he brought over to Venice, where it was speedily printed. There is no intrinsic impossibility in this. Of all places in the world, next to Paris, and perhaps we might even say before Paris, Venice was the city where a Spanish book would naturally be quickly translated and reprinted. Venice in the last decade of the sixteenth century was a first-rate power. She had ambassadors in every capital in Europe, and every European court had a first-class legation at Venice. She was a centre of trade, of politics, of theology, and of letters. It was a time when secular learning flourished in many a club and coterie, when many a mind in Venice was half inclined to inaugurate the Reformation in Italy, and when

* The editor states that he has never met with this edition (1651-2) in any catalogue. In the Bibliographer's Manual of Lowndes there is given, under the name Castaniza, an English work called the "*Christian Pilgrim*," 1651, Paris. This is evidently an alternative title of the translation in question, or of a part of it.

the disputes with the Holy See were about to culminate in a defiance and an interdict, Spain fomenting the ill-feeling on both sides, and Henry IV. doing his best to mediate and make peace. Between Madrid and Venice there was constant and rapid interchange of everything that couriers could carry; and for printing what was worth printing there were the famous Venetian presses, and the last of the Aldi had only just left the city with which their name is associated. So that if some devout Spanish gentleman, an admirer of Juan de Castaniza, had obtained from the monk, during the years when Castaniza was court-preacher and confessor, a copy of that "*Perfeccion de la Vida Cristiana*" which we know he wrote, and which, it is alleged, contained the "*Spiritual Combat*" in its primeval state, and had then proceeded to Venice in the train of some ambassador or prince and had given his MS. to an Italian religious, or allowed him to translate it; then we might say that we have an explanation of how it has come to pass that both a Spanish Benedictine and an Italian Theatine have been set down as the first author of the "*Spiritual Combat*." And here we leave the controversy, recommending those who are curious in editions and in matters of authorship to look through libraries wherein seventeenth-century literature is a feature—and there are many such libraries up and down England, besides our great public collections—and gather up the names, dates, places, and other notes of all the "*Conflicts*," "*Combats*," "*Conquests*," "*Pilgrimages*," and "*Battles*" they light upon in their researches. The question of the authorship of the "*Imitation*" has been well fought out, and with fewer materials than might easily be available for a discussion of the authorship of the "*Spiritual Combat*." Meanwhile we cannot blame an enthusiastic editor if he accepts the conclusions of Ziegelbauer and Mabillon.

These remarks will have prepared the reader not to expect, in this reprint, the full text of that favourite spiritual book which perhaps, after the example of S. Francis de Sales, he has carried in his pocket for years. At the same time the old English editor, whom Canon Vaughan reprints, had not contented himself with simply reproducing that "*Spanish original*" which he claims to have had before him. He incorporates with Castaniza's text a considerable number of Theatine "*enlargements*." He does not say from what edition he takes these amplifications; whether from an Italian or a French one, or from an early or a late. He has only the 33 chapters which all but the very earliest editions have. Yet there was an edition printed at Paris in 1608, in French, which contains 66; and our old English editor evidently had

this translation before him. But he has not chosen to reprint all he found there. He has made his selections; or rather he seems to have been contented with the discretion in selection exercised by the Latin editor Loriche in 1612. The result is that we have here a reprint of the "Spiritual Combat" which, as we have said, is a literary curiosity. Whether those who have been accustomed to the common edition will take to the present, with its greater brevity and comparatively primitive arrangement, we do not pretend to say. One reason, however, for giving it a trial we can state without hesitation; it is written in very much better English. Our ordinary version is a translation, not from Scupoli's Italian (which is full of point and energy, though slovenly in style, like most books of the period), but from the French of Père Brignon. This latter is an admirable translation in itself—spirited, terse, and extremely readable; but the English version which is made from it is both infected with French idiom and, being a translation of a translation, removed dangerously far from the original. A single specimen will serve to illustrate this. It shall be from the third chapter, entitled "Confidence in God":—

Ordinary English version.

Is it possible that the amiable Shepherd, Who for upwards of thirty-three years sought after the lost sheep, through rough and thorny ways, with so much pain that it cost Him the last drop of His sacred blood; is it possible, I say, that so good a Shepherd, seeing at last His strayed sheep returning to Him, with a design of being guided for the future by Him alone, and with a sincere, though yet perhaps but weak, intention to obey Him, He should not look upon it with pity, listen to its cries, and bear it upon His shoulders to the fold? Doubtless He is greatly pleased to see it united again to the flock, and invites the angels to rejoice with Him on the occasion.

(Ed. Manchester, p. 13.)

The Reprint of the version of 1651.

For how can it be possible that this holy and heavenly Shepherd, Who, for full thirty-three years space hath so carefully run after this strayed sheep, so lovingly called it home to Himself, so painfully sought it and so dearly bought it with the price of His blood and loss of His life, should turn away His eyes of compassion from it when it cries, calls, and turns itself unto Him? O how can He forget His promise, and not lay it upon His shoulders, and celebrate a feast of joy and jubilation with His heavenly citizens for its happy return! (p. 13.)

The ordinary version here translates Père Brignon word for word; and although the Jesuit keeps pretty close to the Italian, it is, perhaps, the genius of the French language

which seems to prevent him from reproducing the Italian phrase without some perceptible inflation; and what was inflated in the French becomes flaccid in the English. For example, the charmingly weak final sentence beginning with "doubtless" and ending with "on the occasion" is almost entirely Brignon's own, and is dutifully reproduced, in a limp condition, by the good English translator. It is curious to observe, in turning over page after page of the common English version, how flat, tame, and prosaic sentence after sentence comes out; how points seem to be missed and dryness to prevail. This reprint of the old English, on the other hand, brings out the author's point with a sonorous ring of which no language is more capable than cleverly-handled English; and there is a warmth about its phrase and a homely unction, arising from the persistent use of "vulgar" words, which will go far to attract many fastidious and feeble-kneed Christians who are imperfect enough to find the greater number of spiritual books very dry.

The "Spiritual Combat" itself is, of course, far above any praise or commendation that we can give. Its enormous success has been the effect, as far as we can see, of two causes; first, its intrinsic worth as a sound, brief manual of spiritual life, but secondly, and chiefly, because it was the first thing of the kind. During the ages which preceded the invention of printing, "manuals" of any kind there were naturally none; it was useless to compose hand-books when it was impossible to multiply them to such an extent as to put them into the hands which required them. As soon as the world began to use the great weapon of good and evil with which the inventor of the printing-press furnished it, the advantage of little books began to be seen. Whilst clerks brought out folios of divinity and scholars sumptuous editions of the classics, teachers began to write and print "brief instructions," "primers," and "short and easy methods" in grammar, in philosophy, in theology, and, finally, in asceticism. In one respect, there was little or no novelty in such a book as the "Spiritual Combat." Its doctrine, almost its arrangement, are to be had any day in the pages of John Cassian, whom all religious teachers, from S. Benedict downwards, had looked up to as their master in the science of spiritual life. And if any one wanted more detailed instruction, there was the "Secunda Secundæ" of S. Thomas, in which the science of spirituality was engrafted on general ethics. But many a teacher and many a disciple wanted a less book than Cassian or the "Summa." And it might almost be said that the very first book which succeeded in respectably supplying

this want was sure to be an immortal book. The four grand subjects of all instruction in the spiritual life—Perfection, Passion, Virtue, Prayer—whoever first put them down in clear, brief chapters, and gave them to the world in a “pocket” form, if he did not gain undying renown, it would only be because other men got hold of his book and managed to link their reputations with its glory. It is not that the man who originally sketched the “Spiritual Combat” was a common-place man. On the contrary, he must have been one of these geniuses (or saints) whose privilege or grace it is to give the world a new idea on a capital subject. Still, like all inventors, he was sure to come to be more admired than cared for. The “Spiritual Combat” was a book which was sure to be improved as time went on. It was improved by Scupoli up to the time of his death, until it grew to twice its original size—and it seems not unlikely that others besides Scupoli had a hand in the improvements. Soon, however, the improvements began to take the shape of independent books. The “Introduction à la Vie dévote” is directly owing to the influence of the “Combat.” S. Francis reproduced the book which had been given him at Padua in his youth, and which he carried about him in his mature age—reproduced it with the stamp of his own saintly genius, taking off it, so to speak, the monastic cowl in which it originally appeared, and sending it into society in the pleasant and acceptable habit which a Saint like himself knew how to wear. About the same time the great Jesuit books were coming out—Alphonsus Rodriguez, Jerome Platus, and afterwards Scaramelli. Such books did not render a manual unnecessary, but like all really scientific works of large extent, they made it necessary to recast the manuals which had hitherto been accepted. Every order began to have its own manual, every vice its own handbook, and every virtue its own primer. We do not believe—we should not dare to say—that the “Spiritual Combat” is an antiquated book. But it seems to us that its value as a manual of *practice* must decrease from year to year; for practice is a matter capable of being taught with continually improved method and fuller analysis. If the “Spiritual Combat” is to retain its power—as no doubt it does retain its power—it must be by what we may be allowed to call its *dynamic* characteristics. It must be rather because it is a spring of emotion than because it is a rule, a measure, or a guide-post. A book which can touch the heart never grows old. This, it is needless to observe, is the secret of the author of the “Following of Christ.” We have the warning of S. Francis de Sales that comparisons between the “Combat”

and the "Imitation" are somewhat odious. But we cannot be wrong in quoting the words in which he himself draws the comparison. He considered the special superiority of the "Combat" to consist in its order and in its going deeply into things, not stopping short at this or that practice, but giving principles. On the other hand, the "Imitation," with its apothegmatic style, was a better hand-book of prayer and contemplation.* This means, that the "Imitation" speaks to the heart and the "Combat" is addressed to the head; and since it will always be true that motive power is more valuable than good machinery, so it will always be true that the former book will be preferred to the latter. The "Imitation" is one of the great "mirrors of nature" which the world possesses. The universal human heart reads and studies itself in its chapters; its "wisdom is a mirror to the wisest"; and there is no human being but finds in it, for his own wants, sins, and sorrows, that absolute truth of suggestion which sets flowing the springs of his emotion and action, whilst analysis is only too apt to leave him cold and unconcerned. We are far from saying there is nothing of this in the "Spiritual Combat." There is a great deal of it; and what there is comes out very much more strongly in the old English version now reprinted. If any one will compare the following extract from Chapter XIII., "How to Govern our Sensuality," with the ordinary version, he will be sensible how much of the power of a spiritual book depends on the use of language.

When thou findest thy sense fastened upon some creature, reduce it in thy mind to its first nothingness, looking with the interior eye of thy soul upon thy sovereign Creator there present, who beautified it with this being; and taking pleasure in Him alone thou mayest say:—"O divine and desirable Essence, how doth my heart leap for joy that Thou alone art the Infinite Beginning of all created being!"

In like manner when thou takest notice of trees, plants, herbs, flowers, and such other things, thy understanding will soon distinguish how they have no life of themselves, but from that quickening Spirit which falls not under the sense of thy sight; to Whom thou mayest thus break forth:—"Behold the true Life, from Which, in Which, and by Which all creatures live and increase. O the lively and lovely contentment of my heart!"

Also beholding brute beasts, let thy spirit soar up to thy God, the free bestower of all their sense and motion, saying:—"O prime Mover of all things, yet remaining in Thyself immovable, how great is my joy in Thy firm stability!"

Moreover, when thy sense is touched and tickled with some rare beauty,

* *Esprit*, xiv. 16.

separate with all speed that which appears to the eye from the inward spirit which appears not at all ; and considering that all the outward fairness springs only from the invisible Fountain, say with a gladsome heart : —“ O the jubilation of my soul when it thinks on that eternal and immense Beauty, Which is the original source and essential cause of all created comeliness !” Stretching forth thy hand to any action, imagine thy Lord God to be the first cause thereof, and thou only the living instrument of His divine Majesty, to Whom thy soul may thus pour itself :—“ O sovereign Lord of this universe, how truly do I rejoice that I can do no one thing without Thee, and that Thou art the prime and principal Agent in all good actions !”

Taking any refection of meat or drink, reflect Who gives it that gust and savour ; and taking no other content than in Him only, say :—“ Be joyful, O my soul, that there is no true satisfaction out of thy God, and that in Him only thou hast a full abundance of all pleasure !” (pp. 67, 8, 9).

We have not yet done more than allude to a very large part of the reprint before us ; that is to say, to the Five Treatises which follow the “ Conflict ” and are gathered together under the name of the “ Spiritual Conquest.” Here again the question of authorship comes up for discussion. Canon Vaughan is strongly of opinion that the “ Conquest,” like the “ Conflict,” is the composition of Juan de Castaniza. We must say that it seems to us he has little or no proof to offer, beyond the fact that the Paris editors of 1651 state they have taken the First Treatise from Castaniza. It will be seen, from what we have transcribed at the head of this article, that each of the Five Treatises of the “ Conquest,” like the “ Conflict,” was printed as a separate tract ; and that, unlike the “ Conflict,” not one of them bears on its title-page either the name of the Spanish Benedictine or of any one else. Whilst leaving the question to future commentators to discuss, we must confess that we are far more pleased with this reprint of the “ Conquest ” than even with the “ Conflict.” Not only was the former less known—rather, not known at all,—but it seems to us even better worth the knowing. It consists of a set of treatises or *opuscula* containing admirable notes on the spiritual life and exceedingly beautiful “ exercises ” or “ acts ” of the various virtues. Some of it is very deep mystical theology—as the Fourth Treatise, “ On the Steps and Degrees of Divine Seraphical Love ” ; and the Fifth Treatise is perhaps the best instruction on Affective Prayer which exists. The “ Conquest ” is more fervent and eloquent than the “ Conflict.” Page after page reads as if S. Teresa had written it, or S. John of the Cross. If it really came from the pen of a Spaniard, it is not difficult to understand this. Devotion is the flower of true living faith ;

and the deep and tranquil faith with which Spain was blessed during the sixteenth century blossomed not only in sanctity, but in books on Divine Love and on Prayer. The works of the two great Saints just named are well known, and their style; Luis de Granada's two most enduring treatises are those on Prayer and on the Love of God, and Diego Stella, a Franciscan, wrote a most devout affective work on Holy Love. Spanish contemplatives spoke in the lofty and impassioned strains of a love which knew no reticence. Great Saints set the example, and preacher and writer followed it. It is difficult to say who gave the first impulse to the writing of that passionate prose and poetry about divine things which was such a characteristic of Spain at this time. Perhaps it was John Gerson, of Paris, whose *Fifty Properties of Love*, taken from the *Canticles*, was long a text-book in France and Spain. It is certain that the peculiar Spanish affective writing spread widely beyond the bounds of Spain. We trace it not only in Father Baker and Gertrude More, but also in Southwell, Sydney, and Cowley; and Abraham Woodhead published his life of S. Teresa not many years after this edition of the "*Conquest*" appeared at Paris. In the Saints, and the best writers, this language of feeling and affection is always sensible and true; but in inferior hands there was a risk of its running to affectation and mere literary smartness. But there is no trace of this in the "*Spiritual Conquest*." We do find, indeed, the device of alliteration practised with a frequency that reminds us of such lines as

When to the sessions of sweet silent thought
I summon up remembrance of things past—

lines written half a century before the old English editors translated the "*Conquest*." "Solitarily, silently, and sweetly" the soul hearkened to the divine whispers of her Lord—elevated above all "chances, changes, and creatures"; for He is her only "safety, security, sanctity." But the effect is very beautiful sometimes. "Sweet Saviour, remain with me, and let Thy love reign in me, and then I shall neither want other company nor desire further comfort."

The present editor has prefixed a Preface to his edition, and added many notes. In regard to the Notes, they are mostly well-chosen and valuable citations from eminent Saints and spiritual writers. It seems to us that at page 35 the editor has wrongly defined "*Sensuality*," a word which the author himself (p. 30) simply takes to mean the inferior will or the will of the sense, in distinction to the rational or superior will. It would be well to correct this in a second

edition, which we hope will be called for. The pages of this Review are not a fitting arena for the discussion of questions of practical asceticism; but we may be allowed to observe that the Editor is somewhat vague at times in the use of phrases and exaggerated in his expressions—which are matters that should have been seen to in a book on the spiritual life. The phrase, “Liberty of spirit,” is a good one; but there is also such a thing as our Liberty “becoming an occasion to the flesh.”* *Apropos* of a passage at p. 203, the Editor adds a note, in which he strongly and deservedly praises the “Benedictine liberty of spirit” in the matter of Prayer and Meditation. The passage of the author which calls forth this enthusiastic note may be found, in substance, in F. Bellecius, S.J. (p. 212, ed. Poitiers, 1850), and doubtless it is in every book which treats of the subjects in question. It is never allowable to blame “systems” which the Church does not blame. There must be “systems” in the spiritual life as in everything else. Canon Vaughan is hard upon “spiritual diaries” (p. 121). It is hardly safe, one would think, to cast a slight upon a method which S. Ignatius has described and recommended. And does not the whole note seem slightly contradictory to what the author himself says (p. 213), “For the keeping clear of thy conscience, it will be necessary for thee to go down daily into it, and sweep each darkest corner thereof with the besom of diligent examination”? We make these remarks because this valuable reprint should spread far and wide, and its editor should be one who should rather unite all men in the pursuit of Perfection than point out differences. If Juan de Castaniza had departed from neutrality as much as his latest editor, it is to be feared that Lorenzo Scupoli would not have done him the honour to adopt his work, and S. Francis de Sales would never have carried it in his pocket.

Canon Vaughan has given a long and interesting Preface. It contains a Life of Castaniza covering about sixteen pages—rather more than we are led to expect from the writer’s preliminary apology for the scarcity of his materials. We think it only fair to the Editor to conclude this notice with the description of his book in his own words :—

In his “Spiritual Conflict and Conquest” Castaniza reduced to theory what is seen in the lives of the Saints in practice, clearly elucidated and scientifically arranged the principles of Christian perfection, and compressed into two small volumes the whole theology of the Mystical Life. Whatever weapon tends to secure the Christian warrior victory, and to lead him to the

conquest of the "Kingdom of God," may there be found as in a spiritual armoury. The perils he will have to encounter from sensuality, pride, vanity, presumption, despair, self-love, self-esteem, self-seeking, and inordinate affection ; the snares laid by the cunning enemy to entrap him in the steep and narrow path of perfection ; the truths most potent to turn him from sin and lead him to conversion, silence, prayer, and recollection ; the maxims to disentangle him from creatures, draw him from outward multiplicity, and imbue him with inward simplicity, peace, humility, and tranquillity ; the principles to sustain him in dryness, darkness, desolation, dereliction, curb his indiscretion in sensible devotion, guide him in subtle temptations, counterfeit visions and satanic illusions ; the exercises that will at length bring him to absolute abnegation, perfect resignation, spiritual death and annihilation, and finally to transcendent contemplation, wherein the elevated soul, rapt out of itself and transported into the "third heavens" becomes ineffably united by seraphic charity to the uncreated Divinity—all this is portrayed with marvellous lucidity in the "Spiritual Conflict and Conquest," and brought home, in short and practical lessons, to the everyday life of the aspiring and struggling soul (p. x.).

'To all "devout practitioners," then, we recommend it. If it had nothing to offer them but its admirable English, and the Fifth Treatise of the "Conquest," it would be well worth every one's while to make its acquaintance.

ART. VII.—THE FALL OF THE DUC DE BROGLIE AND THE CRISIS IN FRANCE.

*Discours de M. le Duc de Broglie devant la 28me Commission d'initiative,
8 Juillet, 1874.*

ON the 24th of May, 1873, a fierce battle was fought in the French Parliament between the Conservative party, headed by the Duc de Broglie, and M. Thiers, leading the whole Republican host to the onset. M. Thiers was overthrown and obliged to retire, but with a feeling of bitterness and a thirst for revenge, scarcely worthy of such an eminent statesman. The causes of his downfall are tolerably well known ; it may be well, however, at this juncture, to review them up in a few pages.

When, after the awful crash of 1870, a National Assembly, returned according to the best traditions of political freedom, met at Bordeaux towards the close of that year, the anarchy which raged in France was fearful, whilst the German army was still camped on her soil. The capital was in the hands of an infuriated mob, and was to be wrenched from their grasp by what means no one could even dream. Peace was to be made at any cost, though of course not by a besotted revolutionary Government whom no one could trust—Prince Bismarck least of all. To be sure Gambetta still held his dictatorship, still talked of *la guerre à outrance*; but every one knew what that meant—and M. Thiers was then the very first to call him publicly *a raving madman*! In fact, the short-lived administration of the insensate advocate had been one series of blunders—hare-brained plans breaking down one after the other—thousands of brave recruits sacrificed to no purpose—a penniless treasury—half the country laid waste—the other half lorded over by the rabble and demagogues of every hue. Such was the real state of France, the quondam queen of nations; well might she reel and totter to and fro—well might she look aghast at her utter downfall—well might she exclaim in her anguish, *De profundis clamavi ad te Domine, exaudi vocem meam*! Gambetta himself was cowed and appalled at the sight of his own doings—he fled to Spain from fear of popular vengeance!

It is but fair to show what was the condition of France when the present Assembly and M. Thiers undertook to retrieve, as far as possible, that miserable position. The new Parliament had been elected, and had met, in spite of the demagogues, who had wantonly trampled on every liberty of their native country in one of its darkest hours. The people had in general chosen their deputies among the Conservatives, and many a descendant of the oldest families, many an unflinching adherent of the Comte de Chambord was spontaneously—triumphantly elected.

From the very first day of its meetings every eye in the Assembly was fixed on that grey-headed statesman, whose name had been constantly echoed throughout the country for the last twenty years. He had steadfastly fought for the independence of the Papacy, no less manfully for the restoration of constitutional liberty; he had frequently exposed the folly of the nationality principle, forewarned the Imperial Government of the dangers thickly gathering around it, strongly—nay single-handed—had opposed the war with Prussia, and lastly had developed the most surprising energy and talent to avert, as far as lay in his power, the direst

calamities from his long-beloved fatherland. No wonder then that every eye was upon him, that every heart beat with his own. He was acclaimed President of the Republic, Dictator, hardly less than king.

The only drawbacks on M. Thiers's omnipotence were of such a simple and matter-of-fact character, that no man in his senses could have demurred to them. First, the Republican form of government was maintained as a *de facto* government, though it had been set up by a small band of leaders heading a Parisian mob. As it offered, in the present terrific state of the country, a neutral ground for all parties, everyone agreed that the only immediate object in view must be to restore order and tranquillity, as a primary condition for recovering from the actual evils that preyed upon the nation. As to any definitive constitution, be it monarchical or republican, it must be left to calmer times, and to the verdict of the people at large. Legitimists, Orleanists, Imperialists, the wisest among the Republicans themselves, and M. Thiers more than any, all adhered to this fundamental principle of their future policy. We cannot remember in the French annals, and we have studied them closely, any other occasion on which so much true public spirit and wisdom shone forth in such glowing colours.

Indeed it seemed scarcely possible that a numerous body of men should long give up their secret views and convictions for the sole public weal. They are but too apt to consider those views as the only way to attain that weal; and consequently the splits and divisions which have of late marked the career of the French Parliament would have probably broken out far sooner, had not the Prussians on the one hand, the communes on the other, knit together the different groups of Conservatives within its walls. So the sheer necessity of satisfying immediately the demands of the foreign foe, added to the no less imperious urgency of wrenching the capital from the atrocities of the hordes of banditti then threatening to make it a heap of flaming ruins, kept all parties together for one common purpose. The sessions of 1871 and 1872 would certainly be very bright periods in the annals of any nation and any Parliament, whatever might be the form of the ruling Government.

The best proofs perhaps of the moderation and wisdom of all parties consists in their subserviency to M. Thiers's will and pleasure. The majority of the Assembly were decidedly in favour of free trade, and yet they voted themselves protectionists, merely to satisfy the man whom they had placed at the head of the nation. For a long series of years, Legiti-

mists, Orleanists, Republicans, nay, M. Thiers himself, had been steadfastly fighting for a return to freedom of election in the appointment of city magistrates and corporations, which towards the latter end of the Empire had become so many hotbeds of political corruption. Hence the ardent wish of many French patriots to introduce at once a system of municipal reform; yet the plan was shelved for the present, because the President claimed the absolute necessity of retaining the appointment of Mayors in the hands of Government. Doubtless there was and is still some ground for this, since at least one-half of the *communes* of France are despotically ruled by what Englishmen would call gangs of petty besotted demagogues. At any rate the question was dropped for the time being. But it is necessary to recall the fact, were it only to ask how M. Thiers can reconcile his past conduct with his present, for he very lately expressed himself to be of a decidedly contrary opinion, and he now votes for the election of the mayors by the town corporations, and yet the position of affairs is much about the same.

Another question of vital importance was that of universal suffrage in the return of members to the National Assembly. A few days after the advent of the Republicans to power, in September, 1870, they hastened to restore the law of 1849, granting to every Frenchman, of twenty-one years of age, a right to vote in all political elections. Doubtless in this there was nothing very exorbitant, had the law offered any guarantee for the real domicile and identity of the elector. But this was precisely what the law did not do—so little, indeed, that a vagrant, a man condemned for theft, or an insolvent debtor, was entitled to vote and call to account the most honourable citizen in the realm. M. Thiers repeatedly acknowledged the fact in the Assembly, as well as the necessity of quickly modifying the existing legislation in this respect, no less than in some equally urgent.

It had likewise been settled by the Bordeaux compact, as it was called, that the Republican form of government should be maintained as “a provisional necessity,” yet, observed M. Thiers himself, “administered by Monarchists,” it being otherwise exposed to fall to pieces in no time, from the chaotic tendencies, incapacity, and vagaries of its stanchest adherents. In the mean time the country might settle down peacefully to retrieve its deplorable condition, and coolly form its opinion as to the political *régime* under which it should determine to live. This course, however, was not to prevent each party from canvassing for the favour of the nation, as far, at least, as such parties should confine themselves to lawful means.

So matters went on tolerably smoothly between the President and the large Conservative majority which supported him, till, in the latter half of 1872, his own friends observed with regret that he was by degrees drifting towards the Left. He listened to the advice of the man whom he had but lately proclaimed to be "a raving madman"; he maintained in their municipal or administrative posts men who had made themselves notorious for their bitter hatred of all moral and social bonds whatever. At Lyons, at Bordeaux, at Marseilles, and elsewhere, peaceful populations were terrified by a mobocracy, headed by a few reprobates, who knew their own power over the rabble, and openly defied the authority of every prefect successively appointed by the central Government. In every city of importance,—almost in every petty borough, a few upstart demagogues, acting as municipal councillors, went on discussing the wildest political theories in the very teeth of the law, instead of attending to the modest interests of the place to which they belonged, as in duty bound by their election.

Doubtless this was most alarming to the Conservative party, and yet it was not all. The provincial leaders of the revolutionary party were by turns called up to the Presidency at Versailles, there sounded and cajoled, in the very face of M. Thiers's own agents. On the other hand, the culprits who had been condemned by martial law as abettors or accomplices of the horrid Commune, seemed to become a peculiar object of favour with the President of the Republic. Either their sentences were easily commuted into milder ones, or the execution thereof delayed so long, on some flimsy pretence, that they well might dream of escaping scatheless. Rochefort was a remarkable instance of this misplaced lenity.

The consequence of such a line of policy was what might have been expected. The Revolutionary—we do not say the Republican—party, lately downcast and terrified into submission, now sure of support on the part of the Government, once more lifted up its head, and set to work with surprising energy. Electoral and standing committees were quickly organized in every department, in order to insure the return of Radical members, in case any vacancy should take place in the National Assembly. Lists of would-be deputies were sent down from Paris, lists drawn up so as to include a mixture of metropolitan barristers and journalists, and of local grandees of the reddest hue. Instructions were issued at the same time that no other candidates should be tolerated but those adopted by the central committee. So strict is the discipline enforced upon the party and accepted by its adherents, that such a summary

mode of proceeding scarcely met with any resistance, facilitated as it is by the present system of voting, or what is called the "*scrutin de liste*." After the downfall of the Empire, the new Government—wise in their generation—ordained that a list of the different candidates should be drawn up and voted altogether. Of course the elector may strike out or introduce any name he pleases; but as a rule the ignorant mob finds it far easier to go to the poll with a list framed beforehand by their favourite leaders, than to sift the reciprocal merits of the persons who may appear at the hustings. Upon the whole, the system works admirably for the demagogues, while it acts as a paralyzing influence among the Conservatives, who, divided as they are in politics, can be seldom brought to vote for the most honourable men, if they happen to be of a hue the least different from their own. When, however, there was any chance of defeat for the Jacobin party—for so we may really call it, on an election day, a public stump-orator, such as Gambetta or Emmanuel Arago, was despatched beforehand to the scene of the forthcoming contest, in order to inflame the passions of the multitude, and make sure doubly sure. Hence so many Radical elections, which of late have startled France into a fear of seeing a revival of the scenes witnessed in the four first months of 1871.

The Revolutionists were, and are still, most active in another quarter. They were well aware that the rural populations were generally opposed to their ascendancy, not so much on the ground of principle, as being the prime cause of that state of insecurity which prevents trade and agriculture from resuming their former elasticity. In order to counteract these dispositions and win the peasantry over to the socialist doctrines, an extensive system of propagandism through books and pamphlets has been established in Paris and other large cities. The writer of these lines has perused several of those productions, from which he often turned away in disgust. Not only are they full of the foulest calumnies and lies in regard to what every Christian considers as sacred; not only do they purposely set both history and common sense at defiance, but they frequently teem with obscenities of the most horrid description—scoffing at marriage, family ties, moral duties, and inflaming every bad propensity of the human heart. Now, these productions are circulated throughout the whole country by itinerant pedlars, who either sell them for a mere trifle or even distribute them for nothing, having received instructions to that effect from head-quarters. One may well imagine the amount of corruption thus infiltrated through the demagogic press into the most sequestered hamlets. The

object of the propagandists is self-evident:—By undermining the morals of the people, they are sure to make recruits for their own cause. And certainly they are far from wrong in their calculations, as shown of late by certain country elections.

Whilst all this was going on, the attitude of M. Thiers towards the majority that supported him was daily becoming more and more suspicious. On the slightest pretence, he constantly interfered with the debates of the Assembly, threatening ever and anon to resign and leave the country to its fate. He had come to believe sincerely that he was indispensable, that every one was to bow to his sovereign will and pleasure. When once convinced of this idea, he doubtless found it by no means extraordinary to lay down as a fundamental rule of his policy—the final and permanent establishment of a Republic. Now, whatever may be the opinions of any man on this subject, the fact is certain: M. Thiers had not been appointed for that purpose at Bordeaux. He had, on the contrary, settled that the definitive form of government should remain an open question until time, circumstances, and public opinion should decide. Such an uncalled-for attitude, therefore, on his part was sure to rally the whole majority against him; and so it was, for on the 24th of May, 1873, he was beaten, his government overthrown, and himself obliged to resign, to his own great astonishment: After all, it was a peaceful revolution—a fact which France had seldom witnessed for the last fifty years. It did great credit to the leaders of the Conservative party.

Every one knows the result — Marshal MacMahon succeeded to M. Thiers, and the Duc de Broglie became the Premier. On the noble figure of the Marshal it would be needless to dwell; suffice it to say that he has fully justified the hopes placed in his honour and integrity of character. Even in the present dangerous crisis, every eye is upon that veteran soldier as the one beacon in the forthcoming storm.

When the events of 1870 took place, the Duc de Broglie was by no means what we should call a public man. Under the imperial *régime* he was considered as a strong oppositionist, and every nerve would have been strained to prevent him from being returned a member of the Corps Législatif. But after the catastrophes of Sedan and Paris, when the whole body of the nation sought for some remedy to its melancholy position, in the selection of men of birth and property as deputies to the new Assembly, the Duke's large fortune, worthy character, liberal principles and talent, pointed him out as a proper choice to his Norman friends and neighbours.

It was but natural that he should take his seat among the Orleanists or Right Centre, though he was by no means inimical to the Legitimist party, among whom he reckoned many a friend. He was decidedly of opinion that by-gones should be by-gones, and that the two branches of the Bourbon family should henceforward coalesce, in order to save their common country from utter ruin. To such a line of policy we believe that no sane man would demur. On the other hand, the Duke had long been on terms of intimacy with M. Thiers; both of them little suspecting that in the course of two short years they were to become such bitter foes.

Still the Duke had to feel his way. It was soon observed, however, that he often took a leading part in debates; that his opinion was grounded on sound reasoning and paid due attention to facts; that he was a master in the difficult art of managing the minds of men, of bringing them over to his own ideas. At the same time, his language was most correct, sometimes rising to real eloquence, at all times he was vivid and clear—qualities highly appreciated by a French audience. So, little by little, and day after day, his influence increased within the Assembly. People got accustomed to consider him as a *leader*, though no one would acknowledge it, and he himself seems to have been most chary of assuming openly the leadership of the Conservative forces. And indeed so far he was right, for a single false step of his might have overthrown in an instant all his plans for what he considered to be the welfare of his country. In order to understand this, it may be as well to describe what we will call the atmosphere of the present Assembly.

In the eyes of any one familiar with the contemporary history of France, her greatest misfortune and cause of weakness consist in her numberless divisions and parties. In society, it is scarcely possible to meet with two men entertaining exactly the same opinion on any political question. And this makes it ever difficult for a foreigner to form a correct opinion as to the true condition of the country. Of course the same state of things becomes still more apparent in parliament, where the field of battle is far less extensive than out of doors, and contention is constantly tending to become fiercer. Thus, merely on the Conservative side, we meet with the Ultra-Legitimists, the Moderate Legitimists, the Orleanists, and the Left Centre, which seems to oscillate alternately between a Monarchy and a Republic, though now verging towards the latter. What a motley group, and what a task for any statesman to steer among so many rival pretensions, on which his poor ship may split or strand at any time!

At the period, however, when the Marshal MacMahon accepted the Presidency of the Republic and the new Cabinet, and the direction of public affairs, there seemed to be one common link which bound together all these parties—the necessity of opposing a serried front to every attack of the Radicals. This laudable disposition offered a firm basis for the new ministry to stand upon, and they therefore set to work with a will to perform their task. The Duc de Broglie set the example, fearlessly facing a host of enemies, the bitterest and most dangerous of all being M. Thiers. The cabinet, selected from every Conservative group of the house, soon won for itself the appellation of a fighting ministry—*un ministère de combat*—and its members were proud of the name. Those were indeed days of hard work: men of energy and talent had to be chosen to govern departments and remedy, as far as possible, the horrid confusion into which they had been thrown by the Democratic prefects of the preceding régime. At the same time, the very bench itself had to be purified of revolutionary, not republican, elements; for every Conservative and moderate Republican judge was maintained on his seat in the courts of justice. Again, it became daily more and more urgent to put an end to the rule, or rather misrule, of all those petty tyrants who, backed by a scandalous band of demagogues acting as municipal councillors, set both law and reason at defiance, eternally brawling *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*, but trampling under foot the interests entrusted to their care. All this was done coolly, advisedly, noiselessly, yet resolutely, and every report coming up from the provinces attested the feeling of relief shown by the peaceable part of the community at the change. We defy any man who has not taken his information solely from the Radical press, or who knows anything of France, to say the contrary.

And so matters went on smoothly enough at first; the majority of the nation began to look to the future with a certain degree of confidence; commerce and industry revived with surprising elasticity, and the labouring classes were not the last to acknowledge the proffered boon. On the other hand, foreign powers looked on approvingly.

The modest assurance and noble loyalty of MacMahon to his engagements, coupled with the firmness of his ministers, won golden opinions for them in every direction. But these halcyon days were not to last long. It was indeed hardly possible to expect from men conscientiously devoted to the restoration of Monarchy under the old Bourbon dynasty, that they should tamely apply themselves to the permanent establishment of a moderate and sensible Republic governed by

Monarchists. For, in fact, it was really coming to this: *La République sans les Républicains*, as M. Thiers had put it in his quaint way, though he never applied his rule. Marshal MacMahon had been appointed for an indefinite term of years by the Assembly, which had lately come to a decision that certain constitutional laws should be drawn up and voted—laws relative to the Marshal's powers, to the National Assembly itself, and to the electoral system. Of course, all this was to last but for a time, and the question of Monarchy or Republic was still to be considered as an open one; yet still this was something ominous in the eyes of many, who hate the very name of Republic in France, as associated with the idea of wholesale massacre, arson, and spoliation. The recent history of their own times is not, of course, calculated to erase that opinion from their minds.

Such we believe to have been, from all we have heard, the under-current of public opinion in a large portion of the French nation towards the summer months of 1873. When the Assembly adjourned for the season, the most ardent among the Legitimist deputies were beset with accusations of tameness, nay, of cowardice, in the defence of their cause. Why should they thus let the golden opportunity slip out of their hands? Why not proclaim at once the establishment of a Monarchy under Henry the Fifth, the sole lawful heir to the crown? A few bold and chivalrous followers had but to unfold the royal standard, and the whole nation, with the exception of a band of incorrigible revolutionists, would receive their sovereign with shouts of delight. As for compacts, constitutional rights—the parliamentary system, ministerial responsibility, and so forth—why, THE KING, out of his own gracious good-will, would make every necessary concession to the spirit of the age. His hands were full of liberties, which he would be only too glad to bestow upon his people; but he would not submit beforehand to any condition whatsoever; for to treat with the nation, as it were, on equal terms, would be far below his dignity and his divine right. All this was very well for the Orleans family or a De Broglie; but it could not, nor should not, do for the descendant of a heroic race like the elder Bourbons?

And then, after all, was the Duc de Broglie sincere in his professions of neutrality as to the future? Was he not secretly, steadily preparing the way for a second restoration of the Orleans dynasty, in the person of the Comte de Paris? Did not his very ability mark him out fatally as an ambitious man plotting in the dark for his future grandeur under a sovereign of his own making?

Such was the language, far more violent than we can state, held by the organs of the Ultra-Legitimists, to the great regret of their more moderate confederates. In Paris, the *Univers* and the *Union*; in the south of France more particularly, hundreds of local papers sent forth day after day the most virulent diatribes against the supporters of the cabinet as downright traitors to their cause. It is well known that the southern populations generally form two great parties—Legitimists and Democrats. There is no go-between party, which might act as a safety-valve. The same may be said of their religious opinions; so extreme, indeed, that it would be no difficult matter to provoke among them a war to the knife. A Protestant is a Republican native born; a Catholic, an uncompromising Royalist. It is therefore by no means astonishing that such violent manifestations should have inflamed the minds of the people in a part of the country where, it must be remembered, the Prussian invasion had not played havoc, and which had prospered rather than suffered by its effects.

Such was the state of the country and of parties, when the Comte de Paris undertook that memorable journey to Frohsdorf the object of which was to effect a reconciliation between the two branches of the Bourbon dynasty. The noble and open manner in which he accomplished that act met with universal approval, except on the part of some pertinacious unbelievers, who could not bring themselves to understand how anything good or chivalrous could come out of the House of Orleans. But on the nation as a whole the recognition of Henry, Comte de Chambord, as the only king of France, by the grandson of Louis Philippe, certainly made a deep impression. The revolutionary party itself was cowed, and seemed to give up in despair its chaotic views for the future. The Bonapartists, in their turn, were momentarily reticent as to their hopes of an Imperial restoration. The most respectable organs of the press both in and out of Paris were unanimous in their approbation. It would be fastidious to multiply quotations on this head: we shall content ourselves with translating a passage from the *Correspondant*. On the 25th of August it expressed itself as follows:—

The great event of the last fortnight took place at Frohsdorf, whither the Comte de Paris went to present his respects to the Comte de Chambord, the elder descendant of the French Bourbons. The family of our kings thus restoring peace within their own homes is an august example set to our poor country, so distracted by its own divisions that it is powerless for good and capable only of suffering. What good citizen is not tired of having to encounter such a host of enmities, even where harmony and union would be alike necessary and natural? Where is the Conservative who does not look

about him for a surer and sounder support? Where is the patriot who does not rejoice when, on seeing France torn, at the risk of perishing, by the ambition of so many parties, one of them coalesces with another, to increase the strength and honour of the country? Where is the monarchist who has not felt that his only reason for preferring monarchy is not grounded on his attachment to any particular prince, but on his predilection for the hereditary principle as the true foundation of a lasting government? The homage which the Comte de Paris, both in his own name and that of his family, nobly carried to the Comte de Chambord, was an act ardently wished for by many a Frenchman: it now conjures up, as it were, before their eyes, the fond image of a peaceful, powerful, and glorious fatherland. We are bound, therefore, highly to congratulate the House of Bourbon, both in its head and every one of its princes, for having thus, in presence of our mutilated country, restored the unity of a family which founded our national unity. Should we be, however, justified in inferring from the above act that all its consequences are immediately to ensue? In such a grave conjuncture, reserve is not only a delicate feeling; it becomes likewise an imperious duty. Sound policy itself, which of course cannot take into account rash inductions, would alone guard us against any imprudent illusion. No; we must not forget the difficulties we have either to diminish or to prevent before this family union can become a party union, this reconciliation a full and complete understanding. Royalty has rebuilt its own homestead: such is the primary fact. What we now know best, among so many conflicting questions, is that in the eyes of the Comtes de Chambord and De Paris, in the eyes of all who are not deaf to the lessons of history, France under her king can be nothing else but a constitutional monarchy: nobody—whatever Radicals may say to the contrary—pretends to dispose of her without her own assent. “It is now for France herself to speak her mind,” said the Comte de Chambord.

In the above passage we have, if we may so say, in a nutshell, the advantages and difficulties of the situation. To advise prudence and coolness of mind was by no means needless at such a juncture. There were heedless and headstrong passions among the Royalists no less than among the Radical party, and of this fact we shall have abundant proof hereafter. The situation of the Cabinet itself was full of danger, for, on the one hand, it was bound by its very origin to rule according to the wishes of the moderate portion of the Assembly to which it owed its birth, whilst on the other it contained within its bosom more than one member who sided with the Ultras, and was thus disposed to hurry matters on to a crisis. But then again, upon entering upon its official duties, the government had pledged itself to support honestly Marshal MacMahon in his endeavours to restore order and tranquillity; to keep aloof from any interference between the contending parties; to bring forth as soon as possible a series of bills tending to strengthen the hands of the President for

good purposes; strenuously to combat the incessant propagandism of the demagogues by the introduction of new laws regulating and reforming, not curtailing, the electoral system of universal suffrage. All this was doubtless most difficult in the midst of so many seething passions. And yet the Cabinet did hold its own notwithstanding, so much so indeed that the Duc de Broglie soon was attacked as a secret opponent to the accession of the Comte de Chambord and to the reconciliation of the royal family. In reality, he was favourable to both, and most probably had some influence in the determination of the Comte de Paris.

But that very act had naturally carried to the highest pitch the intense wish of the Royalist party to restore the traditional Monarchy, supported by, and bound up with, free institutions. The idea was evidently gaining ground among the most sensible portion of the nation, and even among the working classes themselves there seemed to be a disposition to close with any plan which might put an end to the actual precarious situation, imposing upon them a heavy burden of suffering and misery. There was nothing to fear, on the other hand, from Marshal MacMahon and his Government. They studiously kept aloof, as we said, from any interference in the expression of public opinion in such matters, which, it must be remembered, had been left from the very beginning an open question.

The only party acting with any degree of energy against the Royalist movement were the Revolutionists. They indeed set to work with good will. The Managing Committee in Paris organized a vast system of propagandism of the worst description. Short tracts were issued and widely circulated. In these infamous productions, the restoration of Monarchy under the Comte de Chambord implied, it was stated with brazen impudence, the arbitrary sway of the priest and lord over the whole population, the abolition of religious liberty, the restoration of feudal rights, the system of taxes managed so as to bear exclusively on one or two classes, the destruction of all political freedom and of the rights conferred upon the nation by the revolution of 1789. We have seen some of these tracts, and are able to assert that their stupidity can only be equalled by their effrontery. A band of *commis-voyageurs* were selected for the express purpose of propagating by hundreds of thousands these pamphlets among the peasantry and lower sort of *bourgeoisie*. Now a *commis-voyageur* is in France quite a character. Of course, he first of all attends to the commercial business which brings him in a livelihood; but he has also other fish to fry. He stakes his

reputation on being a freethinker and a free-liver, scoffs at the *curé*, and, above all, has a way of his own in repeating stale jests and cracking vulgar jokes. In politics, as a matter of course, he swears by Gambetta, by the *Siècle*, or, still better, by the *République Française* and the *Rappel*. Had we time and space, we could produce many instances of the evil done by this sort of incendiary propagandism.

But there were urgent reasons for acting with energy in the opposite direction. By degrees public opinion had been awakened to an interest in the matter. During the months of August and September, 1873, there seemed to be throughout the whole country but one single question—Monarchy or Republic. The nation was again in a fever, impatient of its actual precarious condition, trembling for its future, irritated beyond all against its past. They were anxious moments those days for every homestead, wherein every eye was turned, whether in bitter hostility or ardent devotion, towards Frohsdorf. But from Frohsdorf there came not one single word of relief. Why not? Why not take advantage of the propitious hour, when a candid and straightforward profession of constitutional principles on the part of the hereditary representative of the old dynasty might at once rally the nation around his standard?

There were at that very time two groups in the Assembly which every Frenchman, whatever might be his political creed, was watching with the keenest anxiety. The first was the Left Centre, a band of about seventy members, most of them men of property and intelligence, held as Conservatives, and voting with that party on important occasions, but generally siding with M. Thiers. Since the resignation of the latter, many among them seemed gradually drifting towards the Left or Republican side of the House. They are headed by M. Casimir Perier, a son of the celebrated minister of Louis Philippe. One might term them, perhaps, the Girondins of the present time, alternately gravitating towards Royalism, when they are frightened by the destructive designs of the demagogues, or towards Republicanism whenever their fears are somewhat allayed. Such a party would evidently be crushed, with M. Thiers himself, were the Gambettists and his *caput mortuum* to win the battle. At the time we are speaking of, the Left Centre was abashed and humiliated by the repeated defeats of its candidates in every partial election, wherein the Radicals invariably and triumphantly bore off the prizes. It might, therefore, be hoped that at the last moment the majority of the above group would rally to a Constitutional Monarchy under Henry V. At any

rate, their numbers alone would justify the importance attached to their adherence.

The great body of constitutional Royalists in the French Assembly number about 300 or 320 members, who firmly supported the Marshal and his cabinet under the leadership of the Duc de Broglie. Their wishes and doctrines are forcibly expressed in a public speech of M. de Falloux :—

The country (said he on that occasion) would never forgive the Conservatives, would never forgive the Monarchists, in particular, were they merely to heap obstacle upon obstacle, and to sit down calmly looking at ruins, or were they to imagine that they fulfil their duty by prolonging the present state of anguish. . . . But then what form of Government were they to propose? As for the Republic (continued he) it infallibly betrays us into the hands of mobocracy or Cæsarism, and, according to all probabilities, to an alliance between both of them. The duration of the present republic is but a vigil of arms previous to the most horrid civil war. You cannot, therefore, remain for any length of time in so false and perilous a situation. And then he pointed out as the only remedy a monarchy under the house of Bourbon, complete, reconciled, and united.

But then what must be the fundamental principles of such a monarchy? He deemed it ought to be a liberal and parliamentary system, wherein the country would be consulted by the sovereign, such being the tradition of the monarchy itself. In all times (M. de Falloux went on to say), as long as the old *régime* lasted, the Crown was ever in the habit of consulting the country in some way or other. Had it been otherwise, we should have lived under pure absolutism, and that was what the Crown never wished for—in fact, it never was absolute. After the May gatherings we had the States-general; after the States-general we had the Parliaments; and when these independent voices were not stifled—for they were never stifled—but less attentively listened to, we were coming towards '89. So nowadays, no more than in olden times, is there any room for absolutism, no mean term between the arbitrary sway of the sovereign and the consultation of the country.

Passing on from thence to the question of the national flag, he added :—

Pray don't consider it as a military question: no, it is a political question. As for the glory of the white flag, who would presume to contest it? But with a feeling of unflinching tenaciousness, with a blind energy, a notable portion of our people sees behind the white flag the old *régime*, and the startling accompaniment of the bugbear which popular fancy adds to it. It is preposterous, I agree, but nevertheless most certain. Ay, France is frightened at the very idea of the old *régime* as at a nightmare; and that is exactly what she personifies in the white flag. Pray don't irritate unto madness such a monomania. M. Berryer said so twenty years ago, and I had the honour of repeating close by his side: it may come to pass that, after the most shocking catastrophes, the country will accept and even ask for the flag. Would that be any new force added to the Crown? Let us

have pluck enough to say no. When hardly restored to calm, France would soon make the Crown pay for such a momentary forgetfulness of her inveterate prejudices. Under the slightest impulse of ill humour, she would once more snatch up the standard of her prejudices, and in a trice we should have once more revolution. . . . We said these things twenty years ago. Well, have catastrophes been wanting? Were they not appalling—telling, of startling clearness? And yet is France one foot nearer to the white flag? Some people will say it is the indispensable condition for that firm and strong authority the country stands so much in need of. I believe the truth lies in an opposite direction; I believe that those who speak after this manner are going exactly against their object. Begin by satisfying France on certain points about which she is so sensitive, and she will no more be passionately anxious, passionately jealous as to her institutions. Distort her fancy, on the contrary, by a symbol which, after all, has no value but that attributed to it by fancy, and you will give up the reality for the shadow;—you will lead the country on to exact such guarantees—such concessions as are totally incompatible with the tutelary exercise of authority.

The above speech was uttered on the 3rd of January, 1872, before an audience of deputies and other influential men belonging to the extreme Right—the very same who, but lately, contributed to the overthrow of the Duke de Broglie. Falling from such lips two years ago, it reads like a prophecy more than the mere opinion of a public man. At any rate, it was considered as a programme by the Moderate part of the Assembly, and strictly adhered to ever since.

During the crisis of last autumn, and under the impulse of public opinion, a deputation, selected from among influential members of the House, was sent to Frohsdorf, in order to sound the intentions of the Comte de Chambord. Three out of four belonged to his most faithful adherents. M. Chesnelong, the fourth, though formerly a servant of the Empire, has been long held in high esteem for his deep religious feelings, as well as for the integrity and independence of his character. Besides, since the fatal year 1870, he had sincerely rallied to the Royalist party. There were few men in the French parliament better calculated by his moderate opinions and winning manners to conciliate Henry V. He more particularly represented the Constitutionals and the most enlightened portion of the *bourgeoisie*.

The whole world knows the result of that memorable, and, we may now say, melancholy interview, which baffled and blasted the hopes of the best hearts and minds throughout the whole country. It would be useless to dwell upon particulars, which have lately been still further illustrated by the pithy observations attributed to MacMahon on that occasion, observations even now uncontradicted. To convey, however,

some idea of the excitement then prevailing in France, we may state that from the banks of the Loire down to the Pyrenees, preparations for the reception of the King were already pushed forward with vigour, on the faith of a mutual agreement between the Sovereign and the people. It lasted about a fortnight, and then came the thunderbolt: the Comte de Chambord refused to uphold any other flag but his own; and as to any compact with the nation, his hand was full of liberties, but he would not bind himself beforehand to any solemn engagement. He must be accepted on his own conditions and no others. Any one who spoke otherwise in his name simply misrepresented his intentions.

It is certainly a most remarkable fact, that during the previous negotiations at Frohsdorf, the excitement which reigned in France made its appearance in foreign countries. The Austrians, so well known for their prudence and temperate policy, grew wild at the prospect of a restoration of the Bourbon family once more united among themselves. For several days the French Embassy at Vienna was crowded with the highest members of the aristocracy, including some of the archdukes, all complimenting the ambassador on the good luck of his country; all greeting the forthcoming event as the sound basis of a future alliance between France and Austria. At the same time, telegrams were daily sent from St. Petersburg in order to ascertain how matters were proceeding. But from the day when the Comte de Chambord issued his famous letter, in which he cancelled what he had been supposed to grant, the Embassy was deserted and left to comparative loneliness.

The effect in France was of course of a still more decided character. The demagogues and Bonapartists were delighted, they extolled to the skies such an act of chivalrous heroism, as embalming the defunct Monarchy, and burying it for ever in a shroud of gold and silk. Every rational being knew what all this was worth; but such language made a deep impression on the multitude, which took them all for gospel. The effect of the letter on the majority of the Royalist party was totally different. When the emotions of the first hour had somewhat subsided, one of their principal organs gave vent to their feelings in the following terms:—

The Assembly was on the eve of bringing about a union between France and the Monarchy—a union which we wished for, as for the renewal of an heirloom of glory for our dear country. M. le Comte de Chambord deems such a union perilous for his own honour: he has refused to append his signature to the great compact between his kingship and our nation. God alone sees clear enough through the vista of futurity, through the confusion of human concerns; He alone can sufficiently probe the dark secrecy of souls

to form an opinion on the above refusal. We are, doubtless, not the men to deny the nobleness of such language ; but we now suffer so much by it, we feel too keenly its painful results upon the uncertain state of our affairs and on the precarious condition of our country, to bestow upon the decision of the Comte de Chambord that amount of lavish and joyful praise meted out to him by his enemies and ours—the Cæsarians of Radicalism and Imperialism. They both vie in offering him empty praises, empty honour. Those who, like ourselves, probably love the king for the sake of royalty itself,—who patriotically love royalty for the sake of France, those men are sad, sad indeed, and find nothing to rejoice in circumstances which delight Prussia precisely because our hopes are baffled. God grant that experience, with its hard and perilous lessons, may not but too soon, too fully justify our sadness !

The above incidents took place in the month of October, just before the meeting of the Assembly, after the prorogation. Their immediate consequences were a total disruption on the benches of the majority. The seventy members who formed the Left Centre, and had hitherto more or less hesitated between Monarchists and Republicans, were thrown at once, under the guidance of M. Thiers, into the ranks of the latter. There was henceforward little hope of rallying them steadfastly round the Conservative banner. On the other hand, the ultra-Legitimists—numbering about fifty or sixty members—imagined, God knows upon what grounds, that they could turn the scale in favour of their own darling plan of restoring the Bourbon dynasty without further delay. The Marshal had indeed been recognized as the head of a *de facto* republic, but for no definite period. His Government, no less than himself, was bound to follow the dictates of the Assembly ; no constitutional laws, no peculiar organization had yet been even proposed, still less voted for the immediate purpose of strengthening the hands of that Government against the disciplined forces of the anarchical party ; why not take advantage of such a precarious situation to bring in at once the Prince at any cost ? To be sure, such a venture might give rise to a civil war, cause a terrific effusion of blood ; but of course, on occasions like this, certain risks must be incurred, and after all, would it not be better to go to any lengths, to endure any catastrophe rather than give the republican form of government a chance of becoming the settled status of the country, administered and ruled by a succession of Conservative cabinets ? And besides, might not the majority itself, consisting of Royalists, after all, come to rally round and support a small yet resolute band of men determined to go to the length and depth of their convictions ?

Such were the communings and secret councils of the

Chevaux-légers, as they were now called, and who seemed like men firmly resolved to shut their ears and eyes against any contrary opinion, for fear of being inveigled into different conclusions. Others, however, had brought up from their intercourse with their fellow-citizens during the recess, impressions widely differing from these. These deputies belonged to the Government majority. They had witnessed the bitter though unreasoning aversion which both the middle and lower classes bore to the adoption of the white flag, identified in their eyes with the worst excesses of the feudal times. They had likewise witnessed the great advantage accruing to the Revolutionary party in consequence of the recent declaration of Comte de Chambord. They had no less seen the rising discontent of the industrial and commercial classes at so many dissensions and delays, at so much hesitation, altogether amounting to downright impotence. The word *dissolution* was already bandied about, and the Radicals, abetted, or rather headed, by M. Thiers himself, were taking it up as their war-cry. MacMahon and the Duc de Broglie openly declared at the same time that they could no longer assume such heavy responsibilities, if they had not powers sufficient to repress the factious manœuvres of their most daring opponents, who aimed at nothing less than a total overthrow of the Government. They had engaged to secure some sort of stability and order to the anxious nation; but to redeem their pledge, the Assembly was in honour bound to supply them with the means of accomplishing their task.

Consequently, on the 17th of November, the Marshal addressed a message to the House, in which he once more declared that he considered himself as a mere delegate of the Assembly, invested with "parliamentary powers," and ruling by a Government that would acknowledge the national Parliament as their "sovereign judge." But those powers he must have as a *sine quâ non*. Such language was plain enough, and brought forth a reply, which seated him in his present station for a period of seven years, now called the SEPTENNATE. This important vote took place on the 20th of November, after a hot debate, in which the Duc de Broglie took a leading part. We beg the reader to remember the above date, for on that day he certainly became the first man in France, and likewise prepared the way for his downfall a few months after. The Cabinet, after infusing new blood within itself by the selection of some influential men in the Chamber, and the retirement of some others, promised to produce a series of constitutional laws, which had long been in due course of preparation, but were still in abeyance,

thanks to the distracted state of the country and of the Assembly, its too faithful image in this respect.

One would have imagined that a crisis of this kind, coming so shortly after so many crushing disasters, would have rallied the whole body of Conservatives in support of the Government. Quite the contrary. They continued to be divided among themselves, as well in the Assembly as in the country at large. By such divisions they lost many a seat in every partial election, to the great joy of the Radicals, who at every poll were in the ascendant.

There was one man, however, who was determined not to leave any stone unturned, if thereby he might save France. The Duc de Broglie was that man. In the reconstruction of his cabinet, he had handed over the Foreign department to the Duc Decazes, whilst he reserved for himself the management of the Home Office, the most difficult and important of all in the present circumstances. A few days after the 20th of November, he brought forth a bill of a provisional character, authorizing the Government to appoint the mayors in most of the cities throughout the country. It was a flat contradiction to a law voted during the course of 1871, which had subjected those magistrates to election. According to our English ideas, nothing can be simpler, but we fancy many an Englishman would stare, if he saw the elective principle producing the same results as it does constantly in France. After an experience of more than two years, many stanch partisans of municipal freedom, the Duke among others, had gradually come round to an opposite conclusion. The Revolutionists had turned the law to their own advantage, and to such an extent, that in sequestered hamlets, no less than in large cities, they set all law and regular administration at defiance. The cosmopolitan Radicals, who swayed omnipotent over Paris in 1871, well knew their own interests, when they declared the Commune to be their prototype of all social organization. The law had supplied the municipalities with the means of setting up their own policy against the authority of the Assembly and Government. The mayors acted as so many tyrants over every inhabitant who was not exactly of their own opinion. To parade the red flag in the public squares—to be blind as to every street riot—to despise or resist every Government order—to suppress every act of the Assembly, every proclamation of the President—to abolish the police, or at least paralyze its forces—to neutralize the action of the law even for the repression of crime—to make an open profession of atheism—to disorganize the common schools, and tamper with electoral lists, such were the daily achievements of

the village autocrats. All the south of France was infested with this sort of municipal plague.

The law was voted, a law which M. Thiers himself had formerly declared to be so indispensable, that he threatened to resign his presidential functions if he were not empowered to appoint the mayors. He had not, however, sufficient energy to apply it properly, being constantly fettered by his intrigues with the demagogues. The Duke, on the contrary, set to work with energy, and the riotous municipalities soon discovered that they had found a master, and all peaceable people that they now had a protector against their petty tyrants. But this was, after all, but a beginning: the Cabinet enforced its plans for the restoration of order in every direction, whilst applauding Europe began to look upon France as a reviving country. Yet, as long as the President's powers were not finally settled on a solid basis; as long as some sort of constitution did not lay down a few definite rules by which he was to govern; as long as some check or drawback should not be invented to act as a defence against the starts and fits of a democratic Assembly; as long as the whims and whirlwinds of universal suffrage were allowed to run riot, there was no security either for the country or for other nations, though the latter might for a time stand and look on. It was, therefore, to that difficult work that the Cabinet, headed by the Duc de Broglie, applied their energies.

But such a simple mode of acting could not certainly satisfy that extreme portion of the Assembly who go by the name of Cheveau-légers. It has been the ever-renewed misfortune of the elder Bourbons to listen to and follow the advice of a chosen band of adherents, most sincere in their convictions, but most insensate in their line of policy. At Mittau, and afterwards at Hartwell, Louis XVIII. had to resist their suggestions, and still more their accusations, directed against the most devoted followers of his cause, who often were risking their heads to bring about the restoration of the old monarchy, coupling it with certain constitutional reforms, acknowledged by all parties as indispensable after the Revolution of '89. A young writer of rising eminence, M. Thaureau Dangin, lately published in Paris a most remarkable volume, in which he shows, with an abundance of historical evidence, those extreme Royalists, *plus royalistes que le roi*, doing all in their power to stultify and annul the very best efforts of the wisest and bravest defenders of the Bourbon cause. Their baneful influence was felt as early as the year 1794, after the fall of Robespierre. The Memoirs of Mallet Du Pan contain but too many proofs of the fact. They dreamt of no other system but

a thorough, complete reconstruction of the old régime with all its superannuated abuses. Of them the first Napoleon was wont to say, "*Ils n'ont rien appris, rien oublié.*"

When in 1815, after a twofold invasion, bleeding France once more restored her antique dynasty, which she received with joy and blessed for the renewal of peace, the same party was again at work to pull to pieces what had been reared with so much difficulty. In their eyes, the Charter and the Parliamentary system were but an unhallowed compact with the demon of modern times, a compact which every good Royalist must needs tear asunder. One follows with melancholy interest the sober, yet telling, narrative of our author as he shows how the Ultras of those times broke down successively all the props of the throne.

So, as early as 1815, the party violently attacked the Cabinet of M. De Serres, one of the stanchest royalists and most able ministers whom the Bourbons could boast of. He fell under their efforts, and shortly died of grief. His crime was that he governed with the majority—a band of faithful but moderate members.

Then came the murder of the Duc de Berry in 1820, followed by a cabinet at the head of which was placed the rivalrous and high-minded Duc de Richelieu. But he, too, as too moderate, said the Ultras; so he succumbed to their most immoral coalition with the Opposition, the bitterest enemies of Religion and Monarchy.

The Extreme Right was triumphant, and yet they could not even form a cabinet of their own; for though M. de Villèle, who came to power in 1821, had at first taken his seat among them, he was too much of a statesman not to see the dangers to which these madmen exposed the throne itself. He had consequently come round by degrees to share the opinions of the majority. His seven years' administration forms certainly the brightest and most prosperous period of the Restoration, as is now universally acknowledged; and yet he had scarcely assumed the management of public affairs when a bitter, strong, and violent opposition set in against him from that side of the House where he had least to expect it, since he selected among them some of his colleagues in office. At the distance of half a century, it is, however, a curious thing to discover, by the light of newly-published documents, that these stanch defenders of Divine right, these rest among the pure, were not always moved by the purest motives, but condescended to become place-hunters like other men of a more vulgar clay. They even went so far as to threaten a continuation of their hostility, should they not

obtain satisfaction in this respect for themselves and friends. And in fact their opposition became stronger than ever, their immoral combinations with the Left more frequent than ever, to the intense joy of their common enemies, till at last they succeeded in their endeavours, and pulled down the Villèle cabinet, as they had done with others before ; as they did with the shortlived Martignac ministry ; and then they ushered in the Polignac government, with what consummate skill and what signal success for the reigning dynasty the present Count de Chambord must be well aware.*

It is with an express purpose that we have briefly recalled the memories of former times, for the old Ultras of the Restoration seem to have left an active and numerous posterity behind them. The *Cheveau-légers* of 1874 all show a family likeness with those of 1821 and 1830 ; the same blood seems to run through their veins. They all pretend to be religious and conservative men, and yet they have formed an impure alliance with barefaced atheists and revolutionists, whose fundamental principle is the overthrow of all we hold sacred and necessary to the very existence of society itself. This sounds strange, but so it is.

First of all, in the eyes of the Ultra-Legitimists, any measure or cabinet tending to strengthen the hands, to prolong the government, of Marshal MacMahon, is a direct attack upon their own system of Monarchy,—nay, more, it is a crime against the king, as retarding his immediate restoration ; the very fact of which would suffice to cure France of all her evils. To be sure, the country may not be ready for such an event, or she may be intent upon stipulating beforehand some guarantees of one sort or another. That has nothing to do with the matter, and such pretensions must be met with a flat refusal. If her folly and obstinacy should bring down upon her devoted head calamities of the most appalling description ; bloodshed and ruin from civil war, or foreign invasion, perhaps both, woe to her ; yet it may be a means of bringing her back to her senses ; that is, to her only sovereign. Now these doctrines are supported daily in the most accredited journals and no less accredited circles of the party, with what success the reader may well imagine. Radicalism and Imperialism are the only winners.

* We have seldom met with a work so highly instructive on the history of that interesting period. Its effect on the present Conservative party in France has been deep, reading, as it really does, like a prophetic portrait of their own time. We give the title in full for the benefit of our readers :—*"Royaistes et Républicains. Essais historiques sur des questions de politique contemporaine."* Par PAUL THUREAU DANGIN. Paris : Plon. 1874."

Such being the views and policy of the Extreme Right, it was hardly to be expected they should support the Duc de Broglie in his endeavours to establish the Marshal's government on a sound basis. They had hitherto yielded to the pressure of the moderate Legitimists on all important occasions, but henceforward declared opposition to the Cabinet, though they had voted the Septennate on the 20th of November last. They were afraid, in fact, that the nation should become accustomed to, and begin to feel secure under, a rule which, after all, bears the name of a Republic. That it should have a chance of lasting seven years, with a Senate or Upper House of some sort, with an electoral system modified in such a way as to prevent vagrants and the dregs of the population from going to the poll,—all this was too much for the feelings of the Cheval-légiers, and so they coalesced with the Revolutionary party, well knowing they would thereby cause a total rupture in the Conservative majority. Consequently, at the reopening of the session, when an all-important measure for the electoral reform was brought forth by the Duke,—a measure which provoked the fury of the Radicals,—they voted on their side, and thus overthrew the Government, for the Duke had very rightly staked his reputation on that vital question.

From that day—May 16th—the Assembly and the country itself have been one continued scene of confusion. By a singular inconsistency, the former immediately resumed the discussion of those same constitutional laws which had proved the stumbling-block of the preceding Cabinet. A new one was formed, to be sure, but of men whose leading principle is that they must interfere in no political question whatsoever, contenting themselves with doing the humdrum business of their respective offices. The effects of such a system are easy to conceive. As there is in reality no leader nor leading policy, the Assembly goes on debating by fits and starts, which gradually undermine its authority and *prestige* in the country. The public grow more and more indifferent to the petty squabbles and bickerings that now mark its career. The idea of a prompt dissolution, which but lately was a downright bugbear, is fast becoming a household word, to the great delight of the Radicals and Thiers party. The former are intent upon overthrowing any constitutional measure to be voted by the actual Assembly, being sure thus to secure both a dissolution and the return of another thoroughly Radical,—a plan in which they are sure of support from the Cheval-légiers. M. Thiers, again, has but one object in view, that of bringing about a dissolution as an effectual means of unseating the Marshal, and of becoming once more a President.

the Republic. Does he really think the Radicals would bear with him for any length of time ?

The natural result of such a state of things, to which we may add the late shameful scenes between the Imperialists and Radicals, is to disgust sober people altogether, and to detach them from the politics of their own country. There seems to be coming over the best part of the French nation a feeling of lassitude, inducing them to give up their destinies into the hands of any man of ability and firmness who can secure to them a long lease of peace, industry, and moral reform. Be his title King, Emperor, President, Stadtholder, Consul, or Doge, they do not care much ; but once more they are coming to the conclusion that a soldier at the head of the government and the army is the right man in the right place. Hence the actual popularity of MacMahon ; hence the shouts with which he was greeted at the late review. He has earned for himself the golden opinions of all, through his simple, honest, manly, unassuming qualities ; and this the *silent* man, as many call him, seems to have found out at last, if we may judge from his recent proclamation to the army, embodying, in a few short lines, the two ideas of *Right* and *Might*. So, at least, it was instantaneously understood by the Parisian population, and now by the whole people. Such a position over and above all parties is worthy of due consideration and respect.

Together with MacMahon's government, the French nation couples the maintenance of the national standard. Strange to say, and yet it is nevertheless true, the French nation, however effete, however indifferent it may be in regard to political matters, personifies all its past acquisitions and future aspirations as to liberty in the tricoloured flag. Indeed, this feeling seems to have of late become stronger than ever, because it at once recalls the memories of former victories over foreign nations, and of a recent victory over the Commune. In the eyes of many a Frenchman the tricoloured flag is now the standard of order and civilization, planted firmly over and against the red flag, that emblem of misrule and anarchy in its worst forms. Whatever stains of blood and crime may have formerly sullied the splendour of the Tricolour, they have been washed out, expiated by the dreadful, yet great, achievements accomplished under its folds. To suppress it, to replace it by another, which the present generation has long forgotten, has never been taught to revere, would be in their minds to repudiate their own history, to abjure the inheritance of their forefathers.

In holding this language we are merely stating a fact, a feeling, a dream, if you like, but not the less true. A dream may take hold of a man's fancy and mould it indelibly for a certain purpose; and if so with a man, why not with the multitude? To be swayed by dreams, fancies, impressions, feelings, is in the very essence of its nature. During the Middle Ages, the red cross on a man's shoulder was the emblem of suffering Christians in the East, and its very sight pushed on whole nations to their rescue. No great statesman, no great conqueror, ever disdained to rouse the feelings and devotedness of his followers by symbols of this kind. When Nelson nailed England's colours to the mainmast, he well knew the significant purport of that simple act in the minds of his naive but lion-hearted crews. And in this there is really nothing astonishing. Under every clime and every form of government the multitude is the same: it cannot be moved by abstractions, by philosophical, political, or social theories. On the contrary, they are hurried away at once by a tangible matter-of-fact emblem of their own confused ideas; they cling to that emblem at the peril of their own lives, will fight for it, will die for it, and their fond yet blind enthusiasm for a symbol will oftentimes change the face of the earth. It is childish, therefore, to assert, as did the Duc de la Rochefoucauld the other day in the French Assembly, that the white flag of the Bourbons would have been accepted by a grateful nation in October last had not *certain persons* prevented it, for the sake of satisfying their own ambition and maintaining their political station. In the present state of France such an idea is simply ludicrous, for no public man, MacMahon perhaps excepted, can answer for remaining in office more than four-and-twenty hours.

But whilst we were writing these lines we received a most singular confirmation of our views on this subject. The Paris papers published the appeal addressed by the Count de Chambord to the French nation, an appeal which of course produced a sensation. Well, what was the general impression of the press and of the public on reading that noble-minded and touching production? Did it contain anything about the flag? What, not one word? Well, then, it was useless to go farther, and all the rest became vapid. It was only on second thoughts people discovered how Henry rejected all ministerial responsibility in his plans for the future welfare of France, and how closely his Royal constitution resembled the Imperial constitution of 1852.

The proof we believe to be decisive, and we say it with

regret; for we sincerely believe that France would recover her old *prestige* among nations under her old race of kings. It might tend to a restoration of social no less than of monarchical traditions in the best sense of the word; and we can scarcely help thinking that Henry the Fourth of old would have found out a means of quartering his *panache-blanc* with the new fangled standard rather than allow such a question to cost him a crown. An example like his would be well worth imitating, and may be likewise termed a tradition. But it was not to be, it appears, and we can already see the effect of the manifesto on public opinion in the following words of a paper held in high estimation in Paris, and by no means adverse to the cause of Legitimacy:—

Had we held the station of the representative of the antique Royal family of France, we should have preferred retiring from the scene after the dignified letter of October last, instead of that dated July the 2nd. The latter is at once far less explicit and of a more serious character. It is less explicit, since it does not even mention the momentous question of the standard. Far more serious, since it attacks a government regularly established, at least, if it be not yet organized—a government that did not yet exist on the 29th of last October, but which arose, against its own will, out of the condemnation of monarchy denounced, as it was, by its own self. That government now preserves us from a twofold peril—the impossibility of a Monarchy and the probability of Radicalism. We will not add one single word.

Poor France! her princes appear to be struck with blindness, her sages with madness; her public men run backward and forward for some helping hand, which is not forthcoming. Her best citizens go on groping in the dark, and yet finding not an issue, whilst the seething, foaming tide of Radicalism is running in in every direction. Yet a few days longer, and one portion of the quondam majority may be driven over into the ranks of the most moderate Republicans, whilst the Revolutionists chuckle over their victory and prepare already for making the best of their victory. Yet a few days longer, and the moderate Legitimists may, in their turn, from fear of offending their Prince, be forced into the ranks of men whom they may respect for their private character, but whom they consider as Don Quixotes, regardless alike of their own opinions and of surrounding events. Yet a few days longer, and we may see these descendants of the knights of old shaking hands with miscreants whom their forefathers would have cut to pieces; forming combinations and coalitions with a set of adventurers whom they would loathe to receive at

their own houses, and whom a citizen of the United States would utterly despise and avoid.

Is such a policy enlightened, or is it not rather infatuation, when a country is so enfeebled, so beset, by so many imminent dangers as France is at present?

ART. VIII.—APPENDIX TO THE ARTICLE ON FREEWILL.

WE have heartily to thank the "Spectator" (May 9), for a very cordial and eloquent criticism of the article on Freewill, which appeared in our last number. The criticism in question is well worthy of our readers' careful attention, and it has suggested to us a few supplementary remarks. Its principal portion runs as follows:—

Dr. Ward takes the ambiguity out of the common Millite and Bainite argument for determinism, by distinguishing between the *attractions* which act involuntarily upon the will, and which really determine the character and the strength of what he, like Mr. Mill and his school, calls the resultant attraction or repulsion—*i. e.*, the spontaneous impulse which springs out of all these positive and negative attractions—and the *motives*, by which he denotes any kind of resolves to act, including those which are not results of attractions or repulsions exerted on the will, but the product of the will's own force. What Dr. Ward then contends is, that besides the spontaneous impulse which is the resultant of all the various involuntary attractions and repulsions exerted over the will on any one occasion, we are often conscious of "an anti-impulsive effort," which restrains and sometimes conquers this resultant impulse, and which must therefore be due to the pure energy of the will. Of course the determinists would assert, that what Dr. Ward ascribes to anti-impulsive effort and treats as if it were exclusive of the involuntary attractions and repulsions acting upon the will, is really due to a very important, though often latent, element amongst those attractions and repulsions. The determinists allege that the action of the will is always really identical with the direction of its spontaneous impulse, which Dr. Ward earnestly denies; but the way in which the former would state their difference with him would probably be this:—they would say that Dr. Ward's "anti-impulsive effort" must itself originate in some sort of desire or aversion, preference or dislike, or at least in some habit of the mind, which is now perhaps chronic, but is due to former influences of the attractive or repulsive kind; and that Dr. Ward has missed its true nature, only owing to

some disguise of form, which has served to merge the latent attractions or repulsions in the moral or muscular character of the struggles with opposite attractions or repulsions, to which they are apt to give rise. For example, I make what Dr. Ward means by an "anti-impulsive effort" to get up in the morning, when for a moment the resultant of all the attractions and repulsions operative on my will appears to be a "spontaneous impulse" to turn round and drop off to sleep again. But the determinists would probably regard the true rationale of such a case as something of this kind : that what seems mere free volition, is nothing but a rush of involuntary force from half-hidden springs ; the laziness and love of sleep being felt in every nerve, while the source of the desire or tendency by which these cravings are overpowered, is for the moment sunk beneath the surface of consciousness, and to be found in some deep-rooted conviction, or custom, or habit of the past, which at the present moment moulds my *character*, without seeming to fascinate my will.

To this, Dr. Ward, as we understand him, would reply, that he has already taken into account, in computing the character of the "spontaneous impulse" of the moment, all these subtler influences radiating from past emotions or formed habits ; that he has taken great pains to exclude them from the "anti-impulsive effort," and to include them in the resultant attraction or repulsion which involuntarily sways the will before the "anti-impulsive effort" is made. He would say (quite justly, as we think,) that if the determinist cannot directly trace the origin of such an anti-impulsive effort to irresistible attractions and repulsions, but is quite conscious of the *plausibility* of regarding it as a living force putting forth a direct restraint over the resultant of all the complex fascinations and antipathies which spring out of our past character and tendencies, then the determinist is not arguing on the phenomena as they actually appear, but only yielding to an imperious prejudice and superstition, in insisting that what seems a pure anti-impulsive effort is but an involuntary wish or fear in disguise. The *onus probandi* clearly lies with those who assert, that what strikes us all as a pure volition or effort of will, is really an unconscious passion or aversion the character of which we have mistaken. If we are no judges of the distinction between an involuntary attraction (negative or positive) and the dead-heave of volition, the argument fails altogether, and neither determinist nor indeterminist need attempt a problem beyond his powers. If we are judges of that distinction, then we must produce psychological evidence of the paradox, that a tendency rooted deep in character seems to us to be a mere momentary anti-impulsive effort of the will's own creation. And on this point we heartily go with the drift of Dr. Ward's exposition. The whole strength of the determinist's argument lies in his fixed assumption, not in the evidence which he produces. He reasons in a circle. First, that which fascinates the will most powerfully is the strongest motive : next, the motive on which we act must be the strongest motive, and therefore (though we don't know it) it must have fascinated the will most powerfully ; and this though, so far as our consciousness answers to our self-interrogation, it had not fascinated our will at all, but rather repelled it. Dr. Ward's ingenuity, in giving a separate name to the resultant of all the involuntary attractions and repulsions acting

upon our will, and then maintaining that over and above these we are constantly conscious of exerting an "anti-impulsive effort" which neutralizes the spontaneous impulse of the will, puts the vicious circular logic of the determinists in its strongest and most impressive light.

We certainly are ourselves of opinion, that the argument against determinism is more simply conclusive, than our kind critic is prepared to admit. He entirely agrees with us indeed, that determinists fail in adducing any positive ground whatever for their opinions; still he thinks that the utmost argumentative result, which in strictness can be legitimately attained, is the disjunctive proposition: "*Either* determinism is false, *or* the whole problem is beyond the human intellect." We venture to hold on the contrary, with perfect confidence, that the problem (when duly stated) not only is not beyond the human intellect, but receives a solution completely clear and unequivocal.

But on looking back at our article under the light of this thoughtful criticism, we arrive at the conclusion, that we failed in setting forth with due emphasis, and in impressing on our readers with due detail and illustration, the fundamental distinction, on which our whole argument turned; the distinction between what we called "anti-impulsive" effort or action on the one hand, and any different kind of volition on the other. We set forth that distinction indeed (as we cannot but think) clearly enough in one passage: but to set it forth clearly once for all, was by no means sufficient; and we ought to have exhibited it in more various lights and with far greater copiousness of illustration. The passage to which we refer occurs in p. 334, and runs as follows:—

What we allege to be a fact of indubitable experience, is this. At some given moment, my will's *gravitation*, as it may be called, or spontaneous impulse is in some given direction; insomuch that if I held myself *passively*,—if I let my will alone—it would with absolute certainty move accordingly: but *in fact* I exert myself with more or less vigour to *resist* such impulse; and then the action of my will is in a different, often an entirely opposite direction. In other words, we would draw our readers' attention to the frequently occurring simultaneous existence of two very distinct phenomena. On the one hand (1) my will's gravitation or spontaneous impulse is strongly in one direction; while on the other hand at the same moment (2) its actual movement is quite divergent from this. Now that which "*motives*"* affect, is most evidently the will's spontaneous inclination, impulse, gravitation. The determinist then, by saying that the will's movement is infallibly determined by "*motives*," is obliged to say that the will never moves in opposi-

* For convenience' sake, in this paragraph we used the word "*motives*" as determinists do.

tion to its spontaneous impulse. And in fact he does say this. All determinists assume as a matter of course, that the will never puts forth effort, for the purpose of resisting its spontaneous impulse. We on the contrary allege, that there is no mental fact more undeniable, than the frequent putting forth of such effort.

Our chief object then in the following pages is to set forth, as clearly and unmistakably as we can, the distinction intended in this passage; a distinction on which our whole argument rests. Our readers may remember, that we called by the name of an "attraction" (p. 333) "every thought which proposes some pleasure, positive or negative, to be gained by some act or course of action." This terminology being understood, it is very plain (we added) "that every man during by far the greater part of his life is solicited by conflicting attractions; and it is further a manifest and undeniable fact, that, in the very large majority of such instances, a certain definite and decisive inclination or impulse of the will spontaneously ensues." The attraction, to which this inclination or impulse corresponds, we have called the "predominating" attraction; and the allegation of ours, on which our whole argument rested, was this. Very often, no doubt, men act in *accordance* with this spontaneous impulse, and *yield* to this predominant attraction: but by no means unfrequently they *resist* this impulse, and put forth what we have called anti-impulsive effort. This last fact it is which the determinist (as we shall presently point out) is obliged by his doctrine to deny. What we wish first of all to make clear, is the broad and unmistakable contrast which exists, between that class of phenomena which he is obliged to deny, and that other class which he willingly admits. Or, putting the same consideration in a somewhat different shape—we wish to make clear that "desire" is one thing, "resolve" another thing; and that men not unfrequently both "resolve" and act, in *opposition* to their "desire." And as such is the principal purpose for which we are writing this Appendix, our readers must excuse us, should we become tedious by having recourse to some variety of homely illustration.

I. A youth is very unhappy at school: his studies are distasteful, his companions uncongenial, and his teachers unsympathetic. His mind naturally dwells on these facts; and by degrees he comes to feel a strong desire, of not waiting for vacation time, but running away at once. If this continues, he will soon be scheming how to effect his desire. But he suddenly remembers, that the home, to which he might perhaps escape to-morrow, would be a very different home from what it is in vacation time. There would be no smiles of welcome

and plans for his amusement, but in their stead stern reproof and enforced return to school. This negative attraction—the thought of this pain—entirely preponderates over the earlier, and changes his state of mind altogether.

Now let us dwell for a moment on this latter state of mind. In the earlier stage he really *desired* to leave school at once, but in the later stage it would be absurd to say that he desires it at all. Doubtless he may feel, as keenly as he did before, the evils of school; but what he *desires* under existing circumstances, is to stay there. His inclination towards the immediate leaving school may be called (if you will) an “optation”;^{*} but it cannot be called a desire. Or (putting the same thing in another way), there is no need of *self-restraint*, to keep him at school; for he has no real desire of leaving it. There is no need of self-restraint, in order that he may act in accordance with his spontaneous impulse and do just what he desires.

Now let us make a different supposition. At home his only parent is an indulgent mother, who is sure at any time to receive him with open arms. Still she has imbued him with firm religious principle, which has been much strengthened (let us say) by the religious discipline of the school itself. Accordingly the thought soon spontaneously enters his mind, that he would gain far more real good where he is, and that his staying is far more accordant with the Will of God. Now, as we observed in our article (p. 341), “to those who have trained themselves in virtue, virtue itself supplies an attraction; often an exceedingly powerful one.” It may well happen therefore, that the various attractions offered him in pleasing God may predominate over the attraction which solicits him to leaving school, and that here again his true desire is to stay.

But another supposition is at least equally possible. The attraction, which solicits him towards running away, may predominate over the attraction of pleasing God; and his real desire may accordingly be to leave school. From the motive † however of virtue and permanent self-interest, he sets himself to *resist* that which is his spontaneous impulse and real desire;

^{*} From “optarem;” “I should desire it,” were it not for its accompaniments. The recognized Catholic word “velleity” is far more expressive, but it does not express the idea in the text.

† On the sense in which we use the word “motive,” see our article, pp. 335-6; see also p. 346. According to our use of terms, to ask what is my “motive” for some action, is to ask what is that end which I have resolved to pursue, and for the sake of which I resolve on the performance of that action. But if a *determinist* asks me what is my “motive” in some action, he means to ask me what is that pleasure, the desire of which allures me to do what I do.

in conformity with his *resolve* to aim at a certain end, he contends against the *desire*, which of itself would lead him to act in *opposition* to that end. Here is a case, in which "self-restraint" really does come in. As soon as he intermits for one moment his watchfulness and self-restraint, his desire asserts its supremacy and impels his will in its own direction. To cease struggling with himself, is to give up the cause of virtue and self-interest. We do not at all mean that this state of things will probably continue very long; because (as we pointed out in many parts of our article) he will do all he can to effect, that the preponderance of attraction shall be in favour of the end which he has resolved to pursue. But we say that this state of mind, while it lasts, is most unmistakably heterogeneous from that which we last described. Surely no two phenomena can be more clamorously distinct from each other—more impossible to be mutually confused—than the two which we are contrasting. To resist one's immediate desire on the one hand, or to gratify it on the other hand—to practise self-restraint on one hand, or to practise no self-restraint at all on the other hand—these (where distinctly exhibited) are not merely dissimilar, but violently contrasted phenomena.

II. We choose for our second illustration a case, in which the motive of resistance is not virtue at all, but mere worldly interest. I live with an old aunt, from whom I expect a large legacy. I go to a concert with her full permission, on promise of being most faithfully back by a certain hour. While I am in the very height of enjoyment at a symphony of Beethoven's, my neighbour happens to announce the time; and I find I must start at once, and make great haste too, if I am not to give my aunt grievous offence, and imperil the fruit of years' assiduity. It is most probable that I shall start off without delay; but two alternatives are possible, as to my *state of mind* in starting. It may be, that the dismay with which I contemplate the threatened calamity entirely counterbalances the opposite attraction. I make frantic efforts to push my way out, regardless of my neighbours' convenience; the strains of Beethoven are to me almost as though they did not exist; at most, my inclination to hear more of them is no more than a mere optation. On the other hand it may be, that those strains still constitute my preponderating attraction, and that reason has to contend against predominant passion. My *resolve* however is firm not to offend the old lady, and I exert vigorous anti-impulsive effort: nevertheless my will is still under the fascination of the music; and as long as that is within hearing, if I intermit my effort for a moment, I tarry on my

way. During the whole of my passage to the outward air, I am *desiring* to return, though *resolved* to depart; nor is it till the music is out of hearing, that this conflict ceases. Now no one can possibly say, that the two mental states which we have described are similar to each other; for it is most manifest that they are violently contrasted. Self-restraint is the principal feature in the latter case, while it is entirely absent in the former.

III. Our next illustration shall be for the purpose of explaining, that the present issue does not turn at all on the question whether *effort* is put forth by the agent, but only *anti-impulsive* effort. With this view, we will recur in the first instance to the illustration which we derived (pp. 328, 9) from the demeanour in battle of some courageous soldier. He will often put forth intense effort; brave appalling perils; confront the risk of an agonizing death. But to what end is this effort directed? He puts it forth, in order that he may act in full accordance with his spontaneous impulse; that he may gratify what is his strongest wish, his real desire; in order that he may overcome the enemy, obtain fame and distinction, avoid the reproach of cowardice, &c. &c. Such efforts as these we may call "congenial" efforts. But now take the instance of a military officer—possessing real piety and steadfastly purposing to grow therein—who receives at the hand of a brother officer some stinging and (as the world would say) "intolerable" insult. His nature flames forth; his spontaneous impulse, his real present desire, is to inflict some retaliation, which shall at least deliver him from the "reproach" of cowardice. Nevertheless it is his firm resolve, by God's grace, to comport himself Christianly. His resolve contends vigorously against his desire, until the latter is brought into harmony with his principles. Here then are two cases, which agree with each other as being cases of intense effort; but the former is "congenial" effort, while the latter is "anti-impulsive." What is most remarkable in the last-named officer, is his "self-restraint"; but it would be simply absurd to talk of self-restraint in the former instance. No one, who considers ever so little, can overlook the fundamental contrast between the two cases.

Doubtless it may happen—perhaps it not unfrequently happens—that a soldier's pluck and courage may fail him for the moment on some most sanguinary field, and that he reinforces them by anti-impulsive effort. But the cases to which we drew attention as illustrating "congenial" effort, are the far more numerous cases in which nothing of the kind occurs.

One further explanation should here be made. We do not deny that there may be sometimes difficulty in deciding, whether this or that given effort be "congenial" or "anti-impulsive"; but these will always be instances belonging to what may be called the border-land. In such a case, the attractions on either side do not greatly differ in power; and it requires careful self-inspection, to determine on which side the balance preponderates. To take the common illustration—what can be more mutually contrasted than the respective shapes of a straight line and a circle? And yet the small arc of a very large circle is often quite indistinguishable from a straight line. But, though it sometimes happens that the anti-impulsive effort is so slight as not to be easily recognized for what it is,—it happens quite as often that such effort is so intense, as to force its true character on the notice of the most casual observer. We cannot too often repeat, that if there be such a thing in the world as anti-impulsive effort, determinism is overthrown. We are not all concerned therefore to maintain that in *all* cases, but only that in *some* cases, the putting forth of such effort is an indisputable fact.

IV. We will next repeat the particular illustration cited from us by our kind critic in the "Spectator," with the view of more distinctly confronting the difficulty which he expresses. A rises at a given time on some given morning with simplest promptitude and alacrity, under the influence of a firmly-acquired habit; though he experiences at the moment more pain than pleasure in so doing. How is this to be psychologically explained? According to Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain, the explanation is such as the following; and we are entirely disposed to think it correct. It is true enough then, that the rising gives him *at the moment* more pain than pleasure; but at the same time he is keenly conscious, that his lying longer in bed would, on the whole, entail on him greater suffering than his getting up. His real desire then, is to rise from bed. He needs no "self-restraint," in order that he may get up; but he *would* need "self-restraint," in order that he should voluntarily lie in bed.

Now consider on the other hand the case of B. His desire—his preponderating and spontaneous impulse—is to lie in bed; but he *resolves*, from some motive or other, to get up. In order to fulfil that resolve, he exerts himself and puts forth anti-impulsive effort; he exercises manly self-restraint and forces himself to rise, though it be but laboriously and against the grain. A starts from bed by a spontaneous and indeliberate impulse; but B resolves and fails, resolves and fails again, until he at last succeeds by a crowning effort in launch-

ing himself on the sea of active life. Surely no mental states are more unmistakably contrasted, than these two.

According to the "Spectator" however, the determinists would reply, "that what seems free volition" in B's case "is nothing but a rush of involuntary force from half-hidden springs; the laziness and love of sleep being felt in every nerve, while the source of the desire or tendency, by which these cravings are overpowered, is for the moment sunk beneath the surface of consciousness, and to be found in some deep-rooted conviction or custom or habit of the past, which at the present moment moulds his character without seeming to fascinate his will." We must say for ourselves, that we cannot see the slightest plausibility in such a reply. We will go all possible lengths in heartily admitting, that the will is often very powerfully affected by influences, which are for the moment (or permanently if you will) sunk beneath the surface of consciousness. The same thought of pleasure and pain shall occur with equal vividness to Y and Z; and yet it shall impel Y towards action with immeasurably greater power than that with which it impels Z, because of various circumstances in his temperament and past history. Still—look at the matter which way you will—all that these convictions, and habits, and customs, and temperament can even imaginably do, is to effect, that the *desire*,—the spontaneous and preponderating impulse—be this rather than that. But that act of self-restraint or anti-impulsive effort, on which we are throughout insisting, *presupposes* the spontaneous impulse as already existing; nor does it come into action at all, until *after* the desire exists, until habits, temperament, circumstances have done their work.* Here, precisely as before, to

* An objection may be raised against what is said in the text, which it will be more satisfactory expressly to notice. Suppose I desire some given course of action, M; and suppose I nevertheless resist that desire, from the motive of virtuousness or of my permanent self-interest. This motive of virtue or self-interest—so the objector may argue—on entering my mind, becomes in itself an attraction; and may probably enough (on the very principles of determinism) preponderate over the opposite attractions. We answer, that such cases undoubtedly are by no means uncommon; but that they are not the cases on which we rest our argument. If the new attraction preponderates over its rivals,—then my *desire* is no longer for course M, though I may have an *optation* towards that course. In such a case therefore—although the action which I elicit is opposite to that, which *just previously* I had desired;—nevertheless, at the moment of action, my desire and my action are in perfect mutual accordance. But the cases on which we insist are those, in which it is manifest that I *resolve* and *act* in direct opposition to what (at the very moment of acting) I *desire*. The undeniable existence of such cases is the fact, on which we rest as fatal to determinism.

act in accordance with my desire is one thing, and to resist my desire is just the opposite thing. Nor is there the most distant approach towards lessening the saliency and impressiveness of this contrast,—whether the desire has been generated by obvious and recognized influences, or by influences partially or entirely latent. See indeed what we observed in our note at pp. 334, 5.

V. There is one doctrine implied in what we have just been saying, which it will nevertheless be more satisfactory expressly to set forth. It has reference to what we called in our article (p. 342) “non-emotional attractions.” It would be quite unfair to allege that, according to determinists, my action is always determined by that “motive” (as they call it) which is accompanied by the *most vivid picture* of pleasure for the moment. On the contrary they hold, even as a prominent part of their doctrine, that a thought of pleasure or pain may exercise immense influence towards action, while causing nevertheless little or no emotion. We took every pains (we trust) to treat this part of their theory with full justice: see pp. 330, 1; note at p. 332; pp. 342, 3. Take the preceding instance of A rising from bed. The pain of rising may be far more vividly presented to his *imagination*, than the pain of lying in bed. Nevertheless what precisely results from his confirmed *habit* of early rising is, (1) that the pain of lying in bed would in fact be found (when the time came) to be greater than the present pain of getting up; and (2) that this eventual predominance of pain is at this moment duly and influentially appreciated by his practical reason.* Determinists undoubtedly are quite explicit in urging this consideration; and (as we have often said) we are entirely disposed so far to agree with them.

In like manner, suppose I have acquired in great strength what Mr. Mill calls a habit of virtue; i.e. a habit of benevolence. It will happen again and again, that I *spontaneously* practise what in some sense may be called self-sacrifice: that is, I deny myself some great pleasure or endure some great pain, for the sake of benefitting my fellow-men. Moreover I do this, though the pleasure which I forego, or the pain which I endure, is painted on my imagination with immeasurably greater vividness, than is the pleasure which I shall enjoy from acting beneficently, or the pain which I should suffer from acting in a different way.† We need not here give the

* It will be sufficiently clear here from the context, what we mean by this term “practical reason;” and it is not worth while to treat at any great length a matter, on which we are entirely at one with determinists.

† See the passage which we quoted from Mr. Mill in p. 331, note.

explanation of this phenomenon ; because to do so would only be to repeat, almost word for word, the explanation which we just now gave.

We entirely agree with determinists on the existence of such phenomena as these ; but we say that they do not tend ever so remotely to discredit the argument on which we have insisted. In the former of our two instances, my real desire was to get up ; and my inclination towards lying in bed was a mere optation. In the latter case my real desire was to practise self-sacrifice ; and I had no more than an optation towards the contrary self-indulgence. It still remains absolutely true then that, according to determinists, men by the very constitution of their nature are inevitably determined to do what they really desire. See Mr. Mill's express language quoted by us in pp. 330, 331. Though we find no pleasure in such or such an action, he says, "we still continue to *desire* it and *consequently* to do it." "I dispute altogether that we are conscious of being able to act in opposition to the strongest present desire or aversion."

In one word. The whole deterministic controversy turns on this one question : "do I, or do I not, at various times exercise self-restraint ? do I, or do I not, at various times act in resistance (not to a mere optation, but) to my real desire ?" What can "motives,"* or "circumstances," or "temperament," or "habit," or "custom" imaginably do for me, except to effect that my *desire* shall be this rather than that ? How can they imaginably influence my action in those cases, where my action is *contrary* to my desire ? If then there *are* such cases—if it be true that I often act in *opposition* to what at the moment is my real desire—then it demonstratively follows, that my will at such times acts for itself ; independently of "pleasure" or "pain" or "circumstances" or "temperament" or anything else.

And on this critical point we appeal confidently to the experience of any man, who will honestly examine his past and present consciousness. The question, to which our article was directed throughout, was the question we have first named. "Do men ever resist a real desire ? Is there such a thing as self-restraint ?" He would be an unusually bold man who, fairly confronting this question, should answer it in the negative : but to answer it in the affirmative, is to reject determinism in every possible shape.

It is urgently important however, in reference to the course of argument which we hope to pursue in future articles, to

* In the sense in which determinists use that word.

make thoroughly manifest, that determinism is absolutely nowhere, as the saying is ; that it is not only demonstratively, but even visibly and palpably false. We had rather therefore run the risk of saying many words too much, than of saying one word too little. And in accordance with this feeling, we will conclude by drawing out in form the argument, on which we have insisted, whether in our April article or in this Appendix.

The determinist reasoning, when analysed, will be found to consist of two propositions.

Prop. 1st. "Every man's desire at any given moment is infallibly determined by circumstances (1) internal and (2) external ; i.e., (1) by the intrinsic constitution and tendency of his mind, and (2) by the external influences which at the moment act on it."

Prop. 2nd. "Every man's will at any given moment is infallibly determined, as to its action, by the *desire* which prevails in his mind at that moment."

From these two propositions taken together, the deterministic conclusion obviously follows ; viz. that every man's will is infallibly determined by circumstances internal and external, as to its action at any given moment.

Moreover—not only this is *in fact* the reasoning of a determinist—but there is no other reasoning on which he can *possibly* rely. It is most obvious, that circumstances cannot *determine* a man's will to some action, except by *disposing* it thereto ; or in other words that they cannot determine his *action*, except by determining his *desire*. His desire indeed in many cases may be negative and not positive ; or, in other words, he may desire some course of action not as being in itself attractive, but as being less *unattractive* than any practicable alternative. Then again, when we speak of "desire," we by no means refer exclusively to what is sometimes called "conscious" desire. There are very many active impulses, which lead so immediately to action, that they cannot be reflected on, as distinct from the action to which they spontaneously and irresistibly lead. We include all these impulses under the general name "desire." And all this being understood, it is most evident that the determinist reasoning must consist of the two propositions above recited. If a man's *action* is infallibly determined by circumstances, this can only be because (1) his *desire* is infallibly determined by them, and because (2) his action is infallibly determined by his desire.

With the former of the two propositions, we are entirely disposed to concur. Not only so, but we are disposed to concur with it in the particular shape in which Mr. Mill and Dr.

Bain maintain it. Subject to the explanations they give of their own meaning, we are quite disposed to agree with them, that what determines a man's desire at any given moment, is the balance of pleasure contemplated by him at that moment. As we observed in our April article, we think that that constant gravitation towards immediate pleasure, which observation testifies as characteristic of humanity, gives these writers a thoroughly solid foundation for this part of their doctrine.

It has been then against the *second* proposition of determinists, that our whole argument has been directed. We most confidently deny, that at every given moment every man's action is infallibly determined by the desire which prevails in him at that moment. No doubt (1) there are very many instances, in which a man *does* act in harmony with his prevailing desire. There are (2) other (we are confident) and very numerous instances, in which anti-impulsive effort is really put forth and anti-impulsive action follows,—but in which this circumstance does not so force itself on an observer's notice, but that determinists may plausibly doubt it. But our main purpose throughout has been to show (3) that there are other instances, in which it is seen with clearest evidence—in which no one not flagrantly uncandid can possibly doubt—that a man acts in *opposition* to his present prevailing desire. Indeed with one particular class of men, viz. devout Theists, the phenomena of anti-impulsive effort are among the commonest and most unmistakable phenomena in the whole world. But even if, instead of this vast multitude, there were but *one* such phenomenon on absolutely certain record, that one phenomenon would suffice to overthrow the deterministic doctrine. If Mr. Mill admitted that one single man on one single occasion resisted his prevalent desire, that philosopher could not maintain it to be an invariable law of human nature, that men's actions are infallibly *determined* by their desires.

We are the last to deny, that indubitable truths are often encountered by objections of real force, nay of very great force. It may happen from time to time, we quite admit, that some conclusion is established with absolute certainty, insomuch that any one would act unreasonably (and perhaps with grave culpability) if he failed to yield it the most absolute and unreserved assent;—while at the same time objections remain unsolved, which, if they stood alone, would tend to make this very conclusion more or less improbable. Here is one of the intellectual trials to which God—doubtless for wisest purposes of probation—exposes speculative thinkers. As we proceed indeed with our present series of articles, we shall come across more than one such truth as we have just

described. But what we here wish to point out is, that there is nothing of this kind as regards the objections brought by Mr. Mill or Dr. Bain against indeterminism. Let any one rightly understand what such writers affirm; and let him then proceed to look at the most obvious and every-day facts of life;—he will be able to discern with the clearest evidence, that their pretentious theory is a mere sham and delusion.

ART. IX.—PLAIN-CHANT.

(COMMUNICATED.)

[We need hardly explain, that when we insert an article as “communicated,” we by no means identify ourselves with the propositions contained in it: we only imply our humble opinion, that those propositions are such as any Catholic has full right to hold, and that their publication may lead to serviceable discussion.]

Graduale de Tempore et de Sanctis, juxta Ritum Sacro-Sanctæ Romanæ Ecclesiæ, cum Cantu Pauli V. Pont. Max. jussu reformato. Cui addita sunt officia postea approbata sub auspiciis S. S. Domini Nostri Pii P. P. IX. Curante Sac. Rituum Congregatione. Cum privilegio. Ratisbonæ, Neo-Eboraci et Cincinnati, sumptibus, chartis et typis Frederici Pustet, S. Sedis Apost. et Sac. Rituum Congregatione Typographi. 1872.

S. PIUS, the fifth of the name, who, according to the Collect for his feast, was raised up by God not only “to crush the enemies of the Church” but “to restore the Divine Worship,” is known in history, among other things, as issuing the celebrated Bull (affixed to the Roman Missal) whereby all Liturgies not enjoying a prescription of 200 years were abolished. This was in 1568. In 1614 the celebrated edition of the Gradual, “cum Cantu jussu Pauli V. reformato,” appeared. It has been reserved to another Pius, the ninth of the name, to effectuate the decree of his sainted predecessor; and it is among the consolations of the present Pontificate that the Roman Liturgy has been made obligatory in the archdiocese of Paris since the great national humiliation. But the music of this one Liturgy of the West has hitherto been in even greater confusion than the Liturgy itself was before S. Pius’s reform; and I cannot but think that it will be

reckoned hereafter among the glories of the reign of the present Pius to have inaugurated another reform, cognate with the former. I say cognate, as it would hardly be incorrect to say that the musical notation of the sacred words of the Church's offices, and especially of the Missal, form an integral part of each. At any rate, the Roman Church has spoken in the decree affixed to the first volume of the folio edition of the Gradual which was last year completed by Pustet of Ratisbon, in very strong terms, of how much "uniformity even in the Chant of the S. Liturgy is to be desired": for such is the expression employed by the S. Congregation of Rites:—"Ut exoptata uniformitas in Sacra Liturgia etiam in Cantu obtineri valeat."

This decree is so important that, before entering into the particular circumstances attending the new edition, I will call attention to its statements; as, unless the strong way in which the Church has lately spoken in favour of the Plain-Chant be kept in mind, some of these remarks may seem exaggerated.

The decree, which was given in full in a former number of the DUBLIN, asserts several things.

1. That the Roman Church has always retained the Chant which S. Gregory introduced into the Liturgy:—"Cantum Gregorianum, quem semper Ecclesia Romana retinuit" "quem in Sacram Liturgiam Summus Pontifex S. Gregorius Magnus invenerat."

2. That the celebrated Medicean edition of 1615, put forth by Paul V. "with the Chant reformed by his order," which has now been reprinted at Ratisbon, "may be considered by tradition most conformable to that which S. Gregory introduced":—"Proindeque ex traditione conformior haberi potest illi, quem in S. Liturgiam, &c."

3. That this edition contains that Chant:—"et continet Cantum Gregorianum quem semper Ecclesia Romana retinuit."

4. That this edition has been brought out under the special direction of the S. Congregation of Rites:—"Directa fuit singulari diligentia a Commissione peculiari ab eadem S. Rituum Congregatione deputata."

5. The Congregation commends it to the Bishops for their adoption:—"Ideo eadem S. Rituum Congregatio Reverendissimis Ordinariis præfatam editionem summopere commendat; ut eam in suis diocesisibus adoptantes, &c."

6. And this in order to obtain the much-desired uniformity even in the Chant:—"Ut exoptata uniformitas in S. Liturgia, etiam in Cantu obtineri valeat."

Such is the decree. Before going further, let me add that the Holy Father has not only, in consequence of the appear-

ance of the first volume folio, decorated the publisher, who has undertaken this magnificent series of Liturgical works at his own expense, with the Cross of the Knights of Pius IX., but has also sent the editor a Brief bearing his Holiness's signature to be prefixed to the Gradual, which is now completed by the appearance of the second volume. I now proceed with my remarks, which I will divide into distinct portions, under the following heads :—

I. An account of the celebrated "*Editio Medicea*," and of the circumstances which led to its being reprinted at Ratisbon in the year, 1871.

II. The authority which the Ratisbon Gradual possesses compared with other editions.

III. The authoritative sanction of the Church which the Gregorian Chant has always enjoyed, and which the Roman Church at the present day by its official acts still continues to give it.

IV. Various testimonies to the worth and effects of the Plain-Chant, compared with modern music.

V. Objections drawn from the actual state of Church music, especially in Italy, answered.

VI. Music in its moral aspect, tendency, and effects.

I. *An account of the celebrated Editio Medicea and of the circumstances which led to it being reprinted at Ratisbon in 1871.*

It is remarkable that from S. Pius V. to Pius IX. the restoration of the ritual music has gone hand in hand with Liturgical reform. S. Pius not only issues in 1568 his celebrated Bull *Quod a nobis*, restoring the Roman Breviary to its legitimate supremacy, and in 1570 the equally memorable one *Quo primum*, accompanying the new edition of the Missal, but in the former he speaks also of the Chant :—" *Conveniens et congruum est unum esse in Ecclesia Dei psallendi modum.*"

Clement VIII., who in 1602 reissued the Breviary from the Vatican press, also revised the *Antiphonarium* and *Gradual*. Urban VIII. in 1631 made the final alterations and emendations especially in the hymns, for the music as revised by Palestrina in 1589 was set to them ; and the last century and the present have followed these latest corrections.

Liturgical restoration and reintegration of the Gregorian Chant have culminated together in Pius IX.

But it was Paul V. who undertook the greatest work in the way of musical restoration. A standard was wanted which should remain invested with the highest authority : consequently he charged the celebrated Giovanelli with the reform.

This was in 1608, and no less than seven years were spent in the work. For though it has been erroneously stated that it was commenced in 1614 and finished in 1615, yet the “*nonum prematur in annum*” may much more justly be applied here. A privilege was granted to the Medicean press in Rome, and the “*Graduale cum Cantu Pauli V. Pont. Max. jussu reformato*,” appeared in 1615.

I will just add that Baini, the editor of Palestrina, whose pupil Giovanelli was, and whom he succeeded at the Papal Chapel, praises the ability he has displayed in the elimination of the notes which encumbered the Chant, while he makes the exception, “*Se non che tal volta vi apparisce troppo chiara l’arte, e sentesi subito il sapor del moderno*”—“Unless perhaps at times the art that has been employed in the process appears too manifestly, and the modern taste as well.”

However this may be, this “*Editio Medicea*” has remained the standard of the Roman Church from that day to this. Not only in S. John Lateran, S. Peter’s, S. Mary Major, but in the Apollinare, S. Lorenzo in Damaso, in the College of the Propaganda, it is the only Gradual used; while in the suburban churches of Palestina, Frascati, and in Tivoli, Velletri, and Viterbo it has ever been in use. And this is the edition which has not only enjoyed an authoritative supremacy in Rome, but has also been the standard of the Venetian; and about the latest attempt to improve and rehabilitate the *Cantus Firmus* (we refer to the Mechlin edition) acknowledges in the preface its pre-eminence.

It is well known that in 1856 it was announced that it was the intention of the Congregation of Rites to compare this, which contained the traditional form of the Gregorian Chant, with the MSS. of the Vatican; but the terms of the circular which was issued did not hold out much hope that any very great deviation from the already acknowledged standard would be permitted. It is interesting to know that the programme contained the following choir books as to be re-published “*cum cantu reformato*”:—

1°. *Graduale Romanum de Tempore et de Sanctis.* 2°. *Antiphonarium Romanum de Tempore et de Sanctis.* 3°. *Psalterium Romanum expositum per hebdomadam, et hymnarium.* 4°. *Manuale Chorale ad formam Breviarii Romani.* 5°. *Directorium Chori ad usum Ecclesiarum.*

It was not however till 1868 that a publisher could be found willing to undertake the expense. Herr Pustet’s connection with the work happened accidentally. In the same year Signor Jacovacci, rector of the Propaganda, well known to visitors of the college on the annual Epiphany exhibition in

the various languages spoken within its walls, as the enthusiastic trainer of his own choir, and actual conductor of the pieces then sung, addressed a letter to the Bishops of the whole world, asking their criticism of certain suggestions with reference to the state of Ecclesiastical music; and among other things the wish was expressed that the "*Editio Medicea*" should be re-edited and adopted wherever the Roman Liturgy was used. About the same time a rumour got abroad that the S. Congregation of Rites was going to publish the *Graduale* and *Antiphonarium* from a MS. of the notation corrected by Mgr. Alfieri, of musical repute. So far from this being the case, the Congregation had already examined his work in the way of reform, and declared it impracticable. Herr Pustet made inquiries by means of a friend on the spot, and understanding thus accidentally what the S. Congregation really intended, asked the terms they would offer to a publisher; and he received for answer—that he must engage—(1) to bring out the "*Editio Medicea*" in an equally magnificent type; (2) that he must set the Gregorian Chant to all the new feasts from 1615 to the present date; (3) that every sheet should be corrected, and either accepted or rejected by a special commission appointed by the Holy Father; and (4) that he should undertake this at his own expense.

For this a *privilegium* of thirty years was to be granted, which is thus expressed in the Brief of 1st October, 1868:—"Sanctitas Sua mandavit ut S. eadem Congregatio per lapsum triginta annorum nullam similem editionem edere permittat ab ipsâ revisam et approbatam." The *recension* of the text is thus expressed:—"Itemque ut non solum quæ facienda sunt additamenta a Commissione virorum in Cantu Gregoriano præstantium jam hic in urbe statuta examinentur, sed etiam quod nec unicum ejusdem editionis folium evulgetur quod in suo originali revisorum vel revisoris, necnon ejusdem S. Congregationis Secretarii approbatione et subscriptionibus non sit munitum."

I will just add that the expense of the undertaking having been found to be enormous, the publisher applied for and obtained permission to bring out the same Gradual in the manual form; and this, in the event, appeared before the first volume of the folio edition.

Let me here call attention to two or three facts:—

1. The immense importance of having an edition of the Gradual with every single feast up to the present time completely set to music,—and that too to music which, though new, is written in the ancient modes, every note of which has passed

the criticism and received the sanction of the commission appointed by the Holy Father. I can add that a private letter received from Ratisbon states that though the adoption of the new (or rather the *old*) Gradual provoked much criticism and some opposition, yet the new offices when sung in the cathedral have given universal satisfaction.

2. The gain in the way of settling disputes about editions is also very considerable. At last the Church, after a lapse of two centuries and a half, has re-issued what she then made her standard of Plain-Chant: and, to say the least, respect for authority should secure it a favourable reception, and lead in time to its adoption.

3. The thirty years' privilege is fair both ways—to the publisher who has undertaken so costly a labour, and to archaeological musicians: the one ought to be able to cover his expenses in that time, the others can take it as a challenge to spend that time in coming to some practical conclusion, if they can, about the further emendations and restorations of the *Cantus Gregorianus*, which no doubt the Holy See wishes to promote.

And I say this because a complaint has been made by the *savants* that the re-ordering of what they are pleased to call the chaotic state of the Plain-Chant has, by Rome's putting forth a reprint of its standard, been stopped, and any attempt at improving the music by means of scientific research been crushed.

Now, in the first place, even if we possessed MSS. with S. Gregory's notation, it is not very likely that we should be able to understand it, unless some Rosetta stone fortunately turned up to give us the clue.

Then, no two of these mere *connoisseurs* are, or would be, agreed as to the principles they were to go on, and much less as to conclusions.

Besides, they have full liberty to work out, singly or together, something better, by the time that Pustet's thirty years' privilege expires.

But are these critics wiser than the authority which at last has settled the question practically for the present? And are they likely to have more success than a great man with the advantage of having lived three hundred years ago, met with? He was to revise the Gradual.

"Palestrina," says Baini, "applied himself with the zeal of one who had deeply at heart the majesty of the Divine worship. But having completed the first part, *De Tempore*, his pen fell from his hands, and, more wearied than Atlas under the weight of the heavens, he abandoned the attempt,

and nothing was found at his death but the incomplete MS. . . . And thus we see the greatest man ever known in the art and science of figured music become less than a baby when he wished to lay a profane hand on the Fathers and Doctors of the Holy Roman Church. . . . And how wise at last was he, after having fruitlessly attempted in so many ways to correct this Divine song according to human ideas, to abandon the enterprise for ever, and to conceal up to his death the useless result of his labours, which he himself acknowledged to be unworthy of being made public." (*Mem. Sta.*, vol. ii. p. 123.) Indeed, as Baini adds, "it may be said that Heaven formed the Plain-Chant, through the early Fathers, and then broke up the mould."

Then on the attempts made to alter, to correct, or re-model the traditional form of the Plain-Chant, he remarks:—"In *some* of the editions, corrections and shortening of passages have been made, founded on MSS.; and these are not to be regretted, because the savour and essence of the old song has been retained. Of all these editions, the one I most prize is that made by order of Paul V. in 1614. . . . In other editions, of Venice, Rome, France, Spain, &c., the corrections are so capricious, that little or nothing remains of the antique: in one case nothing but a skeleton remains; in another a monstrous abortion; in a third, a coat of a hundred pieces; in a fourth, a song without music."

Let us now see the authority on which this edition comes to us.

II. *The authority which the Ratisbon Gradual possesses compared with other Editions.*

We have already seen the origin of this edition of the choral books; that it is not a mere private undertaking, no diocesan or national work, but the carrying out of a long-conceived design of the S. Congregation. The question is, what obligation does this lay us under of using it; I mean in those parts of the S. Liturgy where Gregorian music is used, and at those times of the year, e.g. Passiontide and Advent, when, according to the *Cæremoniale Episcoporum*, "the cantors do not use figured music, but the Gregorian Chant"—"*Cantores non utuntur cantu figurato, sed Gregoriano*" (lib. ii. c. xx. § 4. Cf. lib. i. c. xxviii. § 13).

This question is answered by referring to the standard edition of 1615, for the reprint of 1871 enjoys the same authority;—it pretends to nothing more; it accepts nothing less. Now that edition contains the latest reforms the Church has admitted, which she has just re-affirmed by reprinting it.

No wonder, then, that the S. Congregation should "greatly recommend the same to the Most Reverend the Ordinaries, that by their adopting it in their dioceses, the wished-for uniformity in the S. Liturgy may be obtained even in the chant."

But are those dioceses which have hitherto been using another version, perhaps their own, as Cambrai, Rheims, Dijon, Malines, &c., now, strictly speaking, obliged to give them up and adopt this instead? This is a question which I reverently decline answering. They have enjoyed privileges hitherto, no doubt; but, in the first place, in not one of these cases was the privilege given by the S. Congregation, as in this: besides, they were granted when it was impossible to procure copies of the Roman version. What is certain is that the Church now wishes the Bishops—not as formerly she commanded them to give up their peculiar Liturgies, but she wishes to perfect that uniformity which has thus been obtained by an adoption of the Roman chant. And this is a home question too; and we must not comfort ourselves as the old-fashioned Catholic English gentleman did when annoyed with the idea of the Vatican Council saying and doing things which would set things to rights, he remarked to his friend:—"But we may be easy on that score, for the decrees, whatever they may be, will not reach these shores." As early as 1852, our Bishops in the First Synod of the province of Westminster spoke in the same sense as the decree of the S. Congregation does. In the decree for colleges and seminaries they order: "Let the students be exercised in the Ecclesiastical Chant, after they have learnt it theoretically. And that uniformity may be introduced, we will that everywhere, and especially in colleges, whenever in the Mass and Offices the Plain or Gregorian Chant is used, *only the Roman Chant* shall be employed"—"*Cantus Romanus solus adhibeatur*," (c. xxvi. 5).

The Church in England then seems already these twenty years pledged to the adoption of this work of the Congregation. It is for others to determine whether the book in use among us, the Mechlin, can be any longer said to satisfy whatever obligation both the S. Congregation and our own Synod lay us under. The preface itself of the Mechlin edition plainly declares that the most prominent part of the Mass, the "*Ordinarium Missæ*," is not Roman, but Antwerpian. For after praising the editio Medicea, for intrinsic as well as extrinsic reasons, and after professing to reprint it, with many corrections however, because the editors found therein "many things which were foreign to the genuine Church song"

(pp. 7-8), they boldly discard it when it comes to the Kyries, Glorias, Sanctus', Credos, &c., and take Plautin's Antwerp edition of 1599, and adopt it, not, however, without many corrections, as they confess that "the editors of it had committed many faults against the tones, against the quantity of the syllables, and even against the meaning of words and sentences" (p. 9).

It seems very strange and not very respectful to the authority of the Holy Roman Church, that when the Pope had determined on and executed the correction and editing of the Gradual in 1615, "*juxta ritum Sacro-Sanctæ Romanæ Ecclesiæ, cum cantu Pauli V. Pont. Max. jussu reformato*," that editors in 1848 should pass such a work by, they bearing witness to its *extrinsic* authority and to its *intrinsic* worth (p. 8) and substitute as their model one that appeared only sixteen years before, and which consequently came under the reform. The reason, however, which they give for this adoption is not without weight, though it looks like the weakness reproved by Benedict XIII. in the Roman Council of 1725, "*Cum non quod fit, sed quod fieri debet, sit attendendum*"—"Since we are not to heed what is done, but what ought to be done"; for they say that this local edition was so much in use in Belgium, "that it could not be changed without creating great trouble" (p. 9).

I have noticed the Mechlin edition because it is better known in England than any other; but it is France that has contributed more than any other, indeed more than all other countries, to the work of re-establishing the Liturgical Chant. Already there exist four modern diocesan editions, put forth with more or less authority, though that authority is local, not to mention the result of the labours of Père Lambillotte, S. J., who indefatigably collected the MSS. of the Chartreux, of Cambrai, Lyons, Avignon, Montpellier, Munich, Trèves, of S. Gall, and Oxford; and produced a work which very laudably went on the principle of reducing the Chant to its original sobriety. The other versions which have been elaborated in France are that of Cambrai, which simply reproduced an ancient MS.,—those of Montpellier, of Dijon, Digue, and Rennes. All this was very praiseworthy action in a good cause; the only thing is that they were good attempts of individuals, whether Bishops or *savants*, to meet an evil and supply a want. It has been found that the more the case was studied the more hopeless it appeared that the learned would arrive at *unity*, much less at that "uniformity in the Chant" which the Congregation says "is to be desired." The Roman Church acted in a different way. She announced that some-

thing needed being done; determined that something should be done; invited the co-operation of the learned; saw they did nothing but dispute, *because they could* do nothing else: she therefore determined, after having thus given the thing a fair trial, to reprint her old standard version, which she now declares to be more conformable to the original Gregorian than anything else. At least that was tangible and serviceable for the present need. And I leave it to others to judge between this and mere national and diocesan editions. At least this is clear, that the Roman Church now knows of no other edition that is official; she pledges herself to a printer for the next thirty years, who shall bring out this and no other: she does not say that she does not still tolerate those other editions under certain circumstances; but this she recommends to the 900 or 1,000 bishops in communion with the Holy See.

However people may view this question, two *facts* come from the best of sources about it. 1st. That even in France, where no less than five different versions on different principles have appeared since the beginning of this century, and where the Plain-Chant has not only been maintained universally, but has assumed with the Gallican Liturgy a national phase; not only are those dioceses which had not as yet adopted any one of these local versions, accepting the Gradual of the Congregation, but others which had done so, are going to give them up in its favour. 2nd. When the first sheets of the folio edition were ready, the Holy Father arranged to receive them from the hand of the publisher at an audience. Herr Pustet and his musical fellow-worker Herr Haberl (then director of the choir at the German Church in Rome) were introduced by Mgr. Bartolini, secretary of the S. Congregation, when His Holiness, taking the magnificent sheets into his hand, began singing, as he can and does sing, the "Asperges me," and then expressed his great satisfaction "that nothing had been altered in it." After he had given his blessing to the work, he used these words: "Quest' opera può divenir utile per la santa Chiesa"—"This work may become useful to the Holy Church."

III. *The authoritative sanction of the Church which the Plain-Chant has always enjoyed, and which the Roman Church at the present day by its official acts still continues to give it.*

It would be enough to quote the words of the Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, which accompanies the folio edition of the Roman Gradual, to be able to make the above statement; for it says that this edition "contains the Gre-

gorian Chant which the Roman Church has always retained." But a collection, or rather a selection, out of the authorities which might be quoted, shall be added by way of illustration.

Let us bear in mind the fact that up to the fifteenth century the Plain-Chant was the only music authoritatively employed by the Church : whatever then of eulogium any writer up to that time expresses of sacred music must be meant exclusively of the Gregorian. And when we consider what a flood of music has poured into the Church since then, it is almost of the nature of a miracle that not a note of it has ever been substituted for the old Chant in any of the Liturgical books. Neither Missal nor Antiphonary, nor any other of her choir books, have altered their tone in consequence. The old severe song of Preface and Litany has ridden safe like the ark on the waters, and though I would not suggest the reason of this, one of those who contributed most to that deluge shall. No less a person than Mozart has said that "he would give all his glory as a composer in such an age for that of having been the writer of a single Preface." Now not to mention that S. Paul exhorts "the Saints" of Ephesus and Colossæ, to the edifying use of "psalms and hymns and spiritual canticles," and that S. James teaches that spiritual joy is best manifested in that way; history exhibits S. Ignatius M. saluting not only "Sanctum Presbyterium," but also the "lectores" and "cantores," and S. Cyprian exhorting the faithful not only "to sing the Psalms" but with "melodious voice." S. Basil the Great witnesses for the East, that the people of Neo-Cæsarea blamed the Chant because they could not sing it. Another doctor, the Great S. Athanasius, so regulates the singing of Alexandria that the *sense* rather than the *sounds* might fall upon the ear; while the great soul of an Augustine was exceedingly moved, as he tells us in his Confessions, at hearing the melodies of the Alexandrian Church. Two others, doctors of the West, Ambrose and Gregory, worked up the Greek modes into an elaborate system of Church music. And if we are to believe those who were most deeply read in the history as well as skilful in the practice of music, we shall hear Padre Martini and Mgr. Alfieri telling us that it was the Holy Apostles who introduced the strains of the old Hebrew worship into the Christian Churches, and that these have remained without much alteration in use till now. To any one not bearing facts in mind, it might seem almost ridiculous that Mr. Formby, for instance, should have written in 1849, "The Divine idea of sacred song could not have been known to us without a revelation, *the very gift itself being; from its nature, the companion of a revelation*"; but he is not singular

in this : the learned *Gerbert* writes of S. Gregory : “ Gregory when he prayed to the Lord to inspire him with the musical tone in sacred songs, the Holy Ghost descended upon him in the form of a dove, and enlightened his heart, and then he broke forth into the strain : *Ad te levavi, Alleluia.*” And far earlier the same assertion was made at Cluny. “ One thing is certain, that this kind of music, having been divinely taught to S. Gregory, rests not on human authority only, but also on divine.” It is not to be wondered at that the same Pontiff should have required a knowledge of psalmody in all those whom he made Bishops. Of one John he writes in his letters : “ Nor have we dared to consecrate the Presbyter John, as being ignorant of the singing of the Psalms ; since this one thing shows that he has no zeal for his office.” Later on, the Councils are not less severe. The eighth of Toledo e. g. has this canon : “ We decree that for the future no one shall be raised to any dignity, who does not know the whole Psalter and the ordinary canticles and hymns perfectly.” The difference of time between this Council and the latest doctor of the Church is great ; but there is no difference in their actions. We read in S. Alphonso’s life : “ The election of the chaplains of S. Agatha was made by the Bishop : in order to be free from this office, and to promote the greater good of the Church, Alphonso decreed that their situations for the time to come should be the reward of particular merit. As their office is to chant in the choir, he established meetings for chanting : and therefore all the clerics, in hope of becoming chaplains, applied themselves to the Gregorian Plain-Chant, and the choir was thus greatly improved. Among the candidates for the first vacancy, were a priest of sixty years of age, another of forty ; and a seminarist of sixteen. The examiners gave it in favour of the youth, in spite of the claim of seniority in the others. ‘ Well,’ said S. Alphonso, ‘ let us act without minding the appearance of doing wrong ’ : and he nominated the young man.” In the third century the singing of the Psalms had become so indigenous that the Council of Antioch, in its condemnation of the notorious Paul of Samosata, among other things, censures him for having excluded the singing of the Psalms by the introduction of chants of his own composing. A century later S. Melchisedes, Pope, condemned the Donatists for the same abuse, while S. Athanasius reproaches the Meletians for accompanying the Psalms with instruments. Indeed the abuse of the musical faculty has always been one of the sores which the Church has suffered from. In 1322, Pope John XXII. put forth the Bull, *Docta Sanctorum*, in which he laboured to

restore ecclesiastical chant, accusing composers of despising the Gradual and Antiphonary and adapting profane airs to the Liturgy. Figured music he condemned altogether, and only admitted harmony of the Plain-Chant on condition that its character was strictly maintained. His vigorous exertions in favour of the ritual music however were not successful: the evil only increased up to the time of the Council of Trent. The story about the music then is well known: but as some have doubted the truth of some points in it, we will give it in the words of Benedict XIV. in his memorable letter to the Bishops of the Ecclesiastical States—"Pope Marcellus II." says he "deliberated about excluding figured music altogether from the Church, and reducing all that was sung to the Plain-Chant: but Palestrina produced some music for the Holy Mass, so excellent and apt to fill the mind with devotion and piety, that on hearing it the Sovereign Pontiff desisted from his purpose," and he quotes S. Antoninus, who, though admitting the use of harmony and even of the organ and other instruments, says of the former "it seems, however, to be more fitted to tickle the ear than to excite devotion." He then refers to the decrees of Alexander VII. as excluding from Divine worship "everything foreign to the ecclesiastical rite, as being an offence to the Divine Majesty, a scandal to the faithful, and a hindrance to devotion"; and states that these injunctions were renewed by the Ven. Innocent XI. in 1678, and by Innocent XII. in 1692; and he quotes an Italian bishop, whom he calls "*Magnus Episcopus*" with approbation, as complaining that "at present musicians do not inflame the minds of their hearers to devotion and heavenly desires, but, on the contrary, turn them away from such feelings" ("*avocant, avertunt, alienant.*")

Now, all this suspicion on the part of the Church, of the modern style of music, speaks in favour of that which the Church trusts entirely and never feels any fear about. Not only did S. Pius V. in his Bull *Quod a nobis*, say "it is fitting and becoming that there should be one uniform way of singing in the Church"; but the same Benedict XIV. who has said so much in favour of figured and instrumental music, in the Bull *Annus qui* says that the Gregorian is preferred: "Which, if it only be rightly and becomingly chanted, is more acceptable to pious minds and is preferred to figured music."

I may observe in passing that I have a right to the most that such testimonies are worth, as I heartily admit the *use* (to the exclusion of the *abuse*) of the richest figured music, if only, which is rarely the case, it be subservient to the sacred purposes which it is supposed to serve.

But suppose it conceded that the severe music prevailed in the early and mediæval times and had then the most unqualified sanction of the Church,—what people set against this is that the modern Church takes quite a different line. Supposing then that what is meant by the modern Church to date from the Council of Trent, let us see what legislative action the Church has taken in the matter of music. And first it is safe to say that hardly any provincial synod of any importance has been held since which has not renewed the canon of that Council in favour of strictly ecclesiastical music. That decree ran thus: “The Bishops shall take care to banish from the churches all music, whether vocal or instrumental, with which anything impure or lascivious is mixed up”: and in the decree for seminaries, “Cantus” is to be learned from the first entering into the seminary: and S. Charles, the best exponent of those decrees, in his “*Institutiones Seminarii*,” orders for Milan: “Let all attend daily the class of singing which is called *Cantus firmus* and let one of the more advanced be deputed to instruct the beginners; and let all understand that for the future, those who are to receive Holy Orders will have to be examined as to their proficiency in the Chant.”

In the Constitutions of the Provincial Synod of Naples in 1699, it is ordered that the students of the seminary “be instructed in grammar, and the higher subjects, not however in figured music, but only in the Gregorian” (“non autem in figurato, sed tantum in Gregoriano”).

The Synod of Beneventum in 1693 made a decree that “it was incumbent on the Bishop to see that within a reasonable time the canons and those attached to the choir should have learnt the Gregorian Chant” — “*Cantum addiscant Gregorianum*.”

The above Synod of Naples alleges the authority of the S. Congregation of Rites for forbidding figured music to nuns — “Ex decreto Sac. Congregationis non permittatur Monialibus cantus figuratus, sed tantum Gregorianus.”

But some one may say: “Yes! but this has always been left a dead letter.” We admit that this may be the case, but we deny that the Church ever intended it to be so. Her saints are her natural exponents: and see what S. Alphonsus did in the very same part of Italy.

“Figured music, though forbidden to Religious by several decrees at Rome, was quite in fashion in a convent in the diocese of S. Agatha. Alphonsus forbade its use in that convent as well as in the others, and prescribed the sole use of the Gregorian Chant. “The Church is not a theatre” said he,

“and religious are not opera singers.” He forbade anthems on festivals with still greater severity, and wished that if they were ever anxious to sing something extra, it should never be a solo. These regulations however were transgressed. One evening when a nun was singing the Litany of the B. Virgin to figured music, his lordship suddenly entered the church; she perceived him, and directly began singing a Gregorian chant. Alphonsus did not take any notice of it at first, but when he went to the grille he said, laughingly—“You wished to deceive me just now, but that was not right; I forbade it because I did not think it proper. Light music is a decoy to young libertines, who do not go to hear it through devotion, but to hear the nun who sings, and who does not see that thus she is the cause of a number of irregularities and sins.”

But to bring this to an end where it ought to end, viz. with the present Pontificate. The present Pope founded the *Seminario Pio* in Rome, for a select number of students of all the dioceses of Italy, to give some of each diocese the advantages of a Roman education. One of its statutes written by himself is “*Cantus Gregorianus, omni alio rejecto, tradetur*”—“The Gregorian Chant shall be taught, and every other kind of music excluded.” This wonderfully fruitful though seemingly disastrous Pontificate, has been illustrated by a revival of the ecclesiastical spirit in localities where there seemed but little hope. And this has not only been shown by, but caused in a great measure by, certain provincial synods which have been held within the last twenty years. And in each of these the Gregorian music is spoken of in the highest terms and enforced not only in the seminaries but as the rule for the dioceses.

I will select Germany, Holland, and America: adding lastly our own country.

In 1860 the great Provincial Synod of Cologne met, under the Cardinal Archbishop, whom Pius IX. used to look to as the hope of Germany, as he looked to our late Cardinal as the hope of England.

Cap. V., “*On Cathedral Chapters*,” provides that as “Cathedral churches in the Divine office, and especially in the ecclesiastical chant, should be the model to the rest of the diocese, the Bishops shall amplify the choral schools where they exist, and establish them where they do not, to the end that, both in the Divine office and in the Mass the Gregorian Chant may be as soon as possible put in practice according to the general laws of the Church, and these our decrees.”

Cap. XX., *De Cantu Ecclesiastico*, begins by stating that the Church “not only permits but also most assiduously

promotes the study of music as one of those things which are most useful to excite people to piety," at the same time, pointing out how "in this matter the sacred and profane, as it were, touch, and are easily mistaken for each other."

After citing the Council of Trent, it proceeds thus: "After many abuses have been introduced into sacred music, there is no one that will doubt that the ancient chant which goes by the name of Gregorian is the real ecclesiastical music and the fountain of all other, whose place can be supplied by none: for, those versed in music do not deny that the Gregorian Chant breathes something holier and more sublime than those modes which in later years have come into use, and constitute profane music. We therefore decree and command, that this Gregorian Chant be restored to its just rights, and be more and more cultivated, and that those who are engaged in composing new melodies shall not use the chromatic, but rather the diatonic scale, in order to exclude everything that is soft. And since this is a thing which cannot be treated superficially, and unless a person is thoroughly acquainted with the laws of ecclesiastical discipline, or, to express ourselves more correctly, thoroughly initiated into the mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven, he will not be able to make progress in sacred music or promote it and teach it." On these grounds the Bishops "order the establishment of choral schools, not only in the cathedral and collegiate churches, but, also in others as far as is possible." And they conclude with a hope that "the tradition of the sacred chant which has, alas, for so long a time been broken, may again revive, and that in time through all the churches of the dioceses its true and holy principles, and the right way of executing it, may be propagated."

Moreover they decree "that the Gregorian Chant shall be used through the greater part of the year, but are far from excluding harmony so long as it retains an ecclesiastical character, and they exhort the rectors of churches to return to the school of Palestrina." They also provide "not only that no new compositions for the Mass shall be used without an express permission obtained from the Bishop, but also that all those (with the exception of the Gregorian) hitherto in use shall be submitted to the judgment of examiners appointed by the Bishop."

Still more, "a list of feast days is to be proposed to the Ordinary who shall prescribe when the Plain-Chant and when the harmonized music is to be used, lest that which should be the law become the exception, and on the other hand the exception take the place of the law."

Thus far the Synod of Cologne: and that no one may sup-

pose that this is the naturally severe German character that is expressing its own idiosyncrasy, let us bear in mind that Italy has said the same almost at the same time. The Church of the Fathers of the Missions in Rome is the recognized authority for liturgical correctness to the Roman clergy; all the secular *ordinandi*, with some few exceptions, must have made their exercises under the directions of these Fathers of S. Vincent of Paul. Now, in a work on "Plain-Chant, according to the practice of the Roman Church," written by one of the Fathers, and "dedicated to the General of the same Congregation," we find the following:—"We are not however to suppose that the use of even the moderate and devout figured music, such as the Church now permits, is to be extended to all churches and to all seasons; still less are we to suppose that it is left to any one's individual choice; still less even that there is any obligation to use it at all. On the other hand, the Plain-Chant is prescribed by the Church's sacred laws indifferently to all churches and for all seasons. There remains then no excuse for any ecclesiastic to exempt himself from the obligation of learning the Plain-Chant, since each and all of them, by the very requirements of their sacred ministry, are obliged to the office and the singing of the Divine praises."

Nor is this the only voice from Italy. The *Civiltà Cattolica* is the recognized organ in Italy of those who "think with the Church," according to the expression of S. Ignatius, and it is directed by the Jesuits. Its authority, then, is incontestable. In 1856 it had an article on "Religious Music": it entered into the philosophy of music as connected naturally with man's moral constitution, and also supernaturally with his spiritual development. The writer began by remarking that the present century would be remarkable in history for the many victories gained by the Church over her foes of the two last disastrous centuries; and among others will be the restoration of the Roman Liturgy in France. "These facts (continues the writer) show that the spirit of Catholic unity has become more vigorous, and import many advantages gained thereby to the Church. And one of these appears to us to be the zeal with which many Catholics, and especially that most edifying clergy, the clergy of France, are animated for the restoration of the Gregorian Chant itself, following that of the Liturgy, which, as it fell with the Liturgy, seems now destined to rise with its restoration. And as this is owing to the awakened spirit of veneration towards the Apostolic See, it is natural that the love of the ancient chant should also revive. And it is not too much to expect the same of Italy,

as the Catholic spirit grows more fervent, being, as it is at present, combated by the Voltairian spirit, which takes either the form of open war to the knife, or the hypocritical garb of humanitarian tolerance."

Let us come now nearer home. The Provincial Synod of Holland was held at Utrecht in 1865. It forbade the use of female voices, or female organists even; "figured music, when used, was to adhere strictly to the rules of Christian art, and always bear the character of the Ecclesiastical Chant." What that character is the Bishops go on to say:—"The Gregorian Chant is what is most truly called ecclesiastical, and therefore this Synod earnestly desires that its use should be cherished and promoted. Moreover, we seriously admonish all clerics of their obligation to take great pains in learning it, lest they be found incapable of singing those parts of the Sacred Liturgy of the Divine Mysteries, which are to be solemnly sung by the priest; which if the priest does not perform well, the faithful suffer scandal, and the worship of God dishonour. In a thing, therefore, so necessary to the sacred ministers, the Bishops shall provide, by all means in their power, for the encouragement and increase of schools of Gregorian Chant in the seminaries, and also require that they be assiduously frequented by the students." These speak for the old world; Baltimore shall speak in the name of the new. In a former synod, the Bishops had decreed "that in order that everything might be done in order, and that the solemn rites of the Church might be observed intact, all rectors of churches were to employ all possible vigour and care in eliminating the abuses which had long prevailed in those parts in the ecclesiastical music."

In the Plenary Council of Baltimore, in 1866, which bears on its title-page "*Et a Sede Apostolica Recognita*," not only did the Bishops order the Gregorian Chant (no other is even hinted at) to be taught in all seminaries of the province, but decreed that "the Vespers shall be sung entire on Sundays and festivals in all churches after the manner of the Roman Church, as far as can be. Nor are the Vespers ever to be omitted for the sake of other religious exercises; inasmuch as the solemn worship of the Church, approved of by the Sovereign Pontiffs, and which has lasted so many ages in the Church, is to be considered more pleasing to God than any other." Such is the order; the desire expressed is in harmony with it; and perhaps the practical American spirit will convince some among us who would not listen even to Germany or to Holland. "It is very much to be desired," say the Fathers of Baltimore, "that the rudiments of the

Gregorian Chant should be taught and practised in our parochial schools, in order that as the number of those who can sing the Psalms well increases by degrees, at least the greater part of the people may learn to sing the Vespers and other parts of the service with the ministers and choir, after the manner of the Primitive Church, and as is practised still in certain countries."

And so far back as 1852, before Cologne, or Utrecht, or Baltimore had held their synods, the "*penitus toto divisi orbe Britannii*" had in this been in harmony with the whole Church; for our Bishops laid down for seminaries and colleges:—"Let the students be practised in the Ecclesiastical Chant after they have learnt the theory of it. And that uniformity may be obtained, we wish that *everywhere*, but especially in colleges, wherever in the Mass and Offices the Gregorian or Plain-Chant is used, the Roman Chant alone shall be employed."

IV. *Various testimonies to the worth and effects of the Plain Chant compared with modern music.*

I cannot but confess to a sense of pain at having to plead for that which not only the saints from S. Ambrose's day to this have sung, but which saints and doctors of the Church were the authors of, and of which the whole line of Sovereign Pontiffs have been the defenders. It argues badly for the spirit of faith among us. "On the Sundays," we read in the life of S. Frances of Chantal in 1593, at the age of twenty-one, just after her marriage, "she took them all [her servants] to the parish Mass, and in order that they might help to sing the *Credo* more solemnly, she practised herself those who had good voices in singing it. It happened sometimes, while thus employed, practising the chant in the kitchen or in some farm-building, she was not able to restrain her enthusiasm; but would cry out—'Oh! how happy we should be were it given us to shed our blood for the faith: but we are not worthy of it: let us humble ourselves very much because of that.'"

This is edifying. And even heretics and indifferent persons have been found to appreciate what we unfortunately through a bad education and a worldly taste too often despise.

Among other things, it is a fact that Luther saw the value and the beauty of the old Gregorian song. He is putting forth a book of popular devotions, and in his preface we read—"Besides I have taken the beautiful music or song which belongs to Masses for the dead, funerals, &c., and have printed it in this book of music, and mean in time to take more. Of course I have put other words to it. . . . The song and

the notes are very valuable; it were a shame that they should be lost."

Even the infamous Rousseau in his *Lexicon Musicum*, article "Plain Chant," says, "It is a name that is given in the Roman Church at this day to the ecclesiastical song. There remains to it enough of its former charms to be far preferable, even in the state in which it is now [he is speaking of the falsified editions of it] for the use to which it is destined, to the effeminate and theatrical, frothy and flat, pieces of music which are substituted for it in many churches, devoid of all gravity, taste, and propriety, without a spark of respect for the place they dare thus to profane."

Again (*Dict. de Musique*) he says, "So far from modifying the Plain Chant by our modern music, I am persuaded that we should gain by transporting the old Gregorian modes into our modern compositions: but great taste and still greater science would be needed to do it."

It has been remarked before this that several modern composers have done so with success; e. g. Méhul, in his opera of "Joseph"; Meyerbeer in the "Huguenots"; and Gounod at least in one of his operas.

Baini in his *Mem. Stor.* singularly enough speaks of "certain learned Englishmen" who at that time had paid a visit to Rome; and he describes them as men "whose ears had not been altered by fashion, and made obtuse by habit," and that they had been more than once heard to say "that they felt themselves more moved by the Gregorian Chant than by all the noisy performances of our theatres."

It will be remembered that the Gregorian music was chosen in preference to the figured for the obsequies of our late Cardinal. The *Times* of Friday, February 24th, 1865, thus wrote on that occasion:—

"The solemn *Requiem* Mass for the dead was chanted: and here the Church of Rome, by solemn music and state ceremonial, made that powerful appeal to the religious feelings, the senses, and imagination of her audience which she so seldom makes in vain."

"A *Requiem* Pontifical Mass is, as our readers will readily believe, one of the most solemn and impressive services of the Roman Church. Unlike other ordinary masses, it lacks the magnificent music of the *Credo* and *Gloria*, nor has it even those exquisitely touching lamentations with which even very rigid Protestants are familiar as forming part of the beautiful service called *Tenebræ*. Nevertheless, in spite of these great omissions, a *Requiem* Mass is one of the grandest services of the Roman Church, and abounds in chants and hymns of such

deep solemn pathos in their music, of such a mournful melod of woe, as no description can convey.

"The first of these sad choral efforts was the Gregorian Chant of the *Kyrie eleison*. This was delivered alternately in solo and chorus with an effect that was really wonderful. The most breathless silence was observed as the long wailing cadence of the chant died softly away in a kind of moan that none could listen to unmoved. After this magnificent funeral chant the Collect and Epistle were recited."

Of the *Dies Iræ* the writer remarks, "The magnificent chorale of this great song of fear and entreaty was given in such a way . . . that there was a positive murmur among the congregation as its long sad, wailing chorus closed at last in intervals of melancholy sounds."

And later still the *Echo* in its notice of the Marquis of Bute's marriage at the Oratory appreciated indeed the "Gregorian tones" as "rugged," but missed them from their proper place; and contrasted them with "the somewhat sensuous music of Gounod"; remarking that "the change from a past age was noticeable." "*Fas est ab hoste doceri*," we may well say after this.

I take the following from Mr. Formby, so well known for his pictorial aids to a knowledge of the faith, who deserves to be more known and better appreciated in his zeal to restore, and attempts to vindicate the Ritual music. In his work published in 1849, "The Roman Ritual and its Canto Fermo," he relates the following incident: "It was proposed that the Requiem Mass which took place in the Champs Elysées, after the terrible day of June, 1848, should be sung in figured music: but the Republican authorities, in conjunction with the Bishops, forbade it, and the Plain Chant was ordered instead. Tens of thousands joined in singing the *Dies Iræ*, and their voices seemed to rend the heavens."

It has always been a wonder to me how that lightest of all people, the French, should have nevertheless kept up the singing of the Plain Chant better than any other Catholic people, and that in spite of Gallicanism, Jansenism, and revolution it still prevails from one end of France to the other.

Again, Wagner, the celebrated court-musician at Munich, has expressed his opinion on the existing abuses in Church music. Such a critic must be free from any predilection for bad music.

"The human voice, which is the proper renderer of the sacred text, and not instrumental ornamentation, or I should say, that trivial fiddling which enters into most of our present Church music, should take the lead in the Church; and if

ecclesiastical music is ever to be restored to its original purity, vocal music must oust the instrumental and occupy the place it has usurped."

And well might the once Protestant Herder exclaim "Let a man go through the Ritual of the Greek and Roman Churches: he will find them vast edifices, nay, labyrinths of the musical and poetic spirit."

V. *Objections drawn from the actual state of Church music, especially in Italy, answered.*

But now an objection is sure to be made, as it has been made over and over again. And as it is a very fair one, I will not only *admit* it, but *put* it, and that strongly, in the words of even cardinals of the Holy Roman Church. It is then often asked: But if these things be so, how is it that the greatest abuses in music have existed or do exist in Rome itself?

In the first place, we answer that in Rome, as everywhere else, many things are done in spite of authoritative protest. Thus the present Cardinal Vicar of Rome, Patrizi, in 1842 issued the following order: "The pieces of music which are permitted in churches with the sole intention of keeping alive the faith of believers, *as they now are serve only to distract their thoughts, and to profane the temple of God.* Far from preserving a gravity becoming the majesty that is due to the praises of the Most High, they have, on the contrary, either from the admission of noisy instruments hitherto unused, or *from the profane character of the music, degenerated into scandalous theatrical productions.*"

Thus far the fullest admission of the scandal in the Roman Church made by one of its princes and its *acting* Bishop. He proceeds: "Desiring to discharge our own duty, and to establish the better observance of the decrees in this matter, we issue the following orders:—

"1. The pieces of music styled *alla Capella* are *alone* permitted in churches.

"2. It is required that a grave and serious character be impressed on the singing, avoiding all that may suggest a recollection of the theatre, or savour of anything profane."

Another prince of the Church shall be cited as admitting the same disease "in the head," which the French Bishops have admitted "in the members." And when it is our late Cardinal who speaks, men will know that it is not only an ecclesiastic who is giving his judgment, but a really scientific musical critic. In his "Lectures on the Offices and Ceremonies of Holy Week, &c.," he thus remarks on the subject:—

"Corruptions early crept into sacred music. The Roman

Church had, however, always adhered to the plain song, though greatly debased, till the return of Gregory XI. from Avignon in 1377, when he brought with him his French choir, which he united with that of Rome. They introduced harmonized music of the most dangerous character, full of tricks, divisions, and meretricious ornament, which soon degraded church music from a science into a mere profane exhibition. Time brought no improvement;” and we may add from another writer, neither did papal bulls. “Pope John XXII. had in 1322 put forth his celebrated Bull *Docta Sanctorum*, in which he admits of harmonizing the Plain-Chant, but complains of the musicians despising the Gradual and Antiphonary, and of adapting profane airs to sacred pieces. But even this did not arrest the mad course of those who, lost to all moral sense, even worked up profane and obscene airs into their musical compositions. Baini tells us that among MSS. of the period he has found a *Sanctus* set to a popular love song, beginning *Baise-moi, ma mie—Kiss me, my angel*; an *Incarnatus* to *Las bel amy—Thère, my beautiful friend*; *Accours dans ma nacelle—Step into my wherry*.* No wonder, then, that the Council of Trent seriously deliberated on the abolition of all music but the Gregorian Chant from the Church.”—(M. Félix Clément, “*Histoire Générale de la Musique Religieuse*,” p. 45; Cf. p. 63.)

But to resume. The Cardinal continues: “By the sixteenth century the evil seemed beyond the hope of any cure except the most desperate. The papal choir was almost exclusively in the hands of foreigners—Spaniards, French, but chiefly Flemings. There was actually an idea that the Italians had no musical talent or power; the strangers made a complete monopoly of the pontifical chapel, engaged fellow-countrymen who could not sing a note, and jealously excluded all natives; so that at one time the number of effective performers was reduced to nine. But the corruption of sacred music became more decided than its decline, and consisted in two points. First, in the confusion of the words. Instead of all the parts being applied to the same words, they were often singing phrases that did not belong in the least to the office, but were either texts of Scripture or fanciful compositions. Thus in an old *Kyrie Eleison*, preserved in the archives of the papal choir, the tenor sings, ‘I am risen and still am with you. Alleluia.’ In another entitled of the B. Virgin the same voice sings

* This was as if Rowland Hill’s spirit ruled in church music: “he did not see why the devil should have all the good tunes to himself.” When at an evening party a young lady played a waltz which pleased the eccentric preacher, he asked her for the air for his chapel.

through the *Kyrie*, *Gloria*, and *Credo* a hymn in her praise. The confusion was such that no words at all could be distinguished, but all was jarring confusion, most unbecoming religious worship. When Nicholas V. asked Cardinal Domenico Capranica what he thought of his choir, he boldly answered, with a comparison not as elegant as it is expressive, that it seemed to him 'like a sack full of young swine, for he heard a dreadful noise, but could distinguish nothing articulate.' In 1549 Cirillo Franchi wrote to Ugolino Gualteruzzi and the singers of his day: 'It is their greatest happiness to contrive that while one is saying *Sanctus*, the other should say *Sabaoth*, and a third *gloria tua* with certain howls, bellowings, and guttural sounds; so that they more resemble cats in January than flowers in May.' "

The second and the worse corruption was from the selection of the melodies. These we have noticed from Baini:—

"When these two abuses had reached their *height of crying abomination*, it might have been said with truth—

' Forse è nato
Chi l' un e l' altro cacerà del nido.'

For amidst the corruption of the age arose the genius of Palestrina, pure as if angels had breathed into him their harmony, capable at once of conceiving, effecting, and maturing the perfection of music, whose spirit seems ever since to have watched in guardianship over the choir which he taught" (pp. 43-45).

But this is of bygone times.

It might be thought that the following statement about the music actually in vogue in Rome was only one of those ill-natured and ignorant criticisms of "things of Rome" which Frenchmen are particularly given to make. Félix Clément thus writes: "The whole of Italy, not even excepting the Eternal City, has set an example of the greatest tolerance of abuses. There is not a church in which a style of music so little religious in character is not performed, but that one could very easily substitute for the sacred words of the Liturgy the *libretto* of an opera. And how can this but be in a country where the writer of twenty-five operas has been chosen as choir-master of S. Peter's" (p. 365). We might have taken this to be the language of prejudice, or to be said of abuses which had long ago disappeared. But what did the Cardinal Vicar Patrizi say in November, 1856:—

"Although in the notification we issued in August, 1842, we raised our voice against the divers abuses introduced into the music of the churches, which make it a subject of scandal

to the faithful, rather than of edification, whether on account of the style, *which is theatrical rather than religious*, or of the *profane kind of singing*, or of the description of the instruments used, or of the interminable length of the execution; and although, in order to obviate these improprieties, we then prescribed rules to which both choir-masters and superiors of churches, who were charged with the execution of these orders were to submit; nevertheless, we have observed to our great displeasure, that those regulations have been quite forgotten, *and that the former disorders still exist*, and such transgressions are the less excusable, as implying a neglect and heedlessness of authority.

“Wishing, therefore, to put in force the punctual execution of the said edicts, *and having previously consulted our Holy Father, the Pope, who has clearly shown by a recent act what is his wish concerning ecclesiastical music, and by express command of his Holiness*, we order as follows.”

Whether the act of the Holy Fathers referred to was of a more public character than the one I am going to cite I do not know; but in the previous year, 1855, “while congratulating” a certain Roman composer on his success, “he *bitterly laments* the use in these days of *an uncanonical style of music in the temples dedicated to God*.” His words are:—“It was with no little pleasure that we listened to your pieces, which you have composed with due regard to the rules of gravity and piety, so that they are worthy of the house of God, and the august ceremony therein performed. And they were all the more acceptable to us, inasmuch as we have deeply to lament that in the temple of God very often a kind of music is used which has not only been constantly proscribed by the canons and the laws of our predecessors, but which is manifestly profane, similar to the music used in theatres, and not only by employing a seducing modulation, accustoms the ear to a sweetness which is deadly, but for the most part even corrupts the mind” (“*quæ plane profana veluti in theatris fieri solet, illecebrosa modulatione ac lethalium suavitatum consuetudine non solum aures demulcet verum etiam animos plerumque depravat*”). Is it then to be wondered at that when, in 1853, the same Pius IX. established the Seminario Pio, he ordered that the students should be taught the Gregorian Chant, to the exclusion of any other kind of singing?—“*Cantus Gregorianus, omni alio rejecto, tradetur*” (tit. 5, de Studior. Ratione).

Another thing that clears our Holy Father from any complicity with a departure from the Church's tradition is the fact that Rossini made an application to the present Pontiff for

permission to include females in church choirs, and was refused.

The argument, then, of those who either justify their own conduct and taste by an appeal to the acknowledged bad practice in Rome itself, or who for the purpose of having a hit at the Supreme Power which resides there, attribute such-like abuses to its connivance, argue like the Puritans who attributed the fire of London to gluttony, because it began in Pudding Lane and ended in Pie Corner.

People can decide for themselves which is really Roman; the Roman authorities, or the Roman abuses. We have seen that the authorities are on the right side, and the Roman musicians on the wrong. When people, against all evidence, attribute such things to the Pope or the Roman Curia, we suspect them of one or other of two things: of either wishing to cover their predilection for what is bad by an appeal to Rome, or of wishing to conceal the secret disrespect they have for its authority. Neither course is in the end successful; both are dishonest.

V. *Music in its Moral Aspect, Tendency, and Effect.*

And now, though these remarks are coming to an end, that for which they are worth anything is only just beginning; that is the moral tendency of music. Let me insist on this. I disclaim all interest in this question, whether as antiquarian or musical. I disdain to degrade that which is sacred to the level of the secular. "Major sum et ad majora natus."

The beauty of the thing, or the matter of taste whether this is more scientific than that, whether S. Gregory teaching the boys, the embryo of the ever since existing and ever since celebrated papal choir in the Lateran, from his bed, and being not a little severe in his use of the rod when they did not sing right, had any knowledge of music compared with Beethoven, is not worth our while to discuss.

"Major sum et ad majora natus" replies that music which the Church, whatever it is, has perseveringly used, and that for definite reasons for so many ages. What Goethe said of woman, all ought to say of church music—

"A woman's fairest jewel is her womanhood."

It must be religious, religiously cultivated, religiously rendered, or all is in vain. This is what throughout I have been aiming at.

It is matter for astonishment that there is so little idea and appreciation of the danger morally and spiritually of music as one form and means of *excitement*. Christianity consists, as

F. Newman has truly said somewhere, in the quiet and even fulfilment of a range of simple duties, for the most part the same one day as another; not done on natural motives, much less by the aid of some natural stimulus constantly whipping a laggard nature up to the mark. But the opposite to this is the spirit and the practice of the world. People live now in excitement; and F. Faber's expression for the modern activity was to the point:—"We resemble the swallow, which lives by flying"; for thereby it catches flies. And living thus in excitement, they can only see positive evil in any excitement which is connected with something bad, or which is itself intrinsically bad. Thus the excitement of indulging in drink is of course bad, betting also, because both lead to such misery; but what would even our religious public say if they were told that the purest intellectual excitement may become most fearfully immoral, if merely indulged for its own sake, or for some merely temporal end, and not moderated by the fear and directed to the glory of God.* And yet this is simply axiomatic to a Christian moralist. How un-Christian also and how dangerous to the very existence of the Christian spirit in individual souls, and in all classes of Christian society nowadays, is that all-pervading relish and thirst for the *sensational*! a thirst which meets with no difficulty and no delay in being supplied with what it desires, as did happen at the well of Samaria; for here the well is not "deep," and the waters are not "living." Two conditions, e.g. need only characterize the literature or dramas called sensational, in order to insure them success; that they be *shallow* and *deadly*. What a father of the Church has said of others is true of us:—"Citius currunt martyres diaboli ad mortem quam martyres Christi ad vitam." If we translated their own word "*sensational*" into true English, they might be astonished, though probably not shocked, and certainly not converted. But *sensual* is its equivalent; and most *apropos* did Mgr. Parisis, one of the late ornaments, intellectually as pastorally, of the French Episcopate, assert in a pastoral for the Lent of 1846, "External to the Ritual Song, that is to say, the Gregorian or Plain-Chant, little else is now known except the works of modern music, that is to say, a music essentially favouring what people have agreed to call *sensualism*" [sic]. "It is this," he continues, "almost exclusively this, which under the austere title of sacred music, is sought to be introduced into

* It is said that Whately promised himself unlimited indulgence of his intellectual faculties as his heaven, which to him would consist in a perpetual success in the way of discoveries of all kinds. This was really another version of the Mahomedan paradise.

our sacred offices. Worldly music agitates, and seeks to agitate, because the world seeks its pleasures in stir and change. The Church, on the contrary, seeks for melodies that pray and incline to prayer. . . . In vain will it be said that this or that is the work of one of the greatest masters, that it is scientific and a sublime composition; it may be all this for the world, it is nothing at all of this for the Church. And especially when this worldly music, by its thrilling cadences or impassioned character, leads directly to light ideas, sensual satisfactions, and dangerous recollections, it is not only a contradiction in the house of God, but a formal scandal."

Now philosophers observe when treating of the five senses, that the sense of hearing has more power to excite the feelings than all the rest.† M. Félix Clément remarks: "Poetry, architecture, sculpture, and painting only exist as the expressions of some thought or other. Music has an advantage over them which arises from its incapability to express anything but emotions."

There is an anecdote told by S. Basil, who attributes it to Pythagoras, which at any rate illustrates what I mean. A musician named Damon seeing one day a set of youths who had drunk too much making all sorts of extravagant and ridiculous gestures around a flute-player who was using the Phrygian (or martial) mode suggested to him to change it for the Dorian (a solemn). No sooner was the air changed than all calmed down, and, recollecting their folly, returned home ashamed of themselves. This may seem rather too antique: but do we not remember M. Thiers in his "*Histoire de la Révolution Française*" describing graphically the part the *Marseillaise* and other popular revolutionary tunes, played when it was necessary to excite that people to some more than ordinary effort, political or warlike? It is remarkable also that Goethe represents Faust as in the very act of swallowing poison, to escape from the miseries of life, when the song of an Easter hymn, sung in procession, falls upon his ear, and charms away the thought of suicide.

Still more, it is observable that there are two aspects in which music appears in the Old Testament. First, the mysterious influence it had over the evil spirit in Saul; and, secondly, its intimate connection with prophetic inspiration. The company of prophets whom Saul met coming down from the hill of God had a psaltery, a tabret, a pipe, and a harp before them, and Saul smitten with the same spirit prophesied

* "Pollet auditus præ ceteris (sensibus) ad concitandos affectus." (P. Liberatore.)

among them (1 Kings x. 5-10). In the case of Eliseus, it was not till the minstrel has, at the prophet's desire, played on the psaltery, that the hand of the Lord comes upon him (iv. Kings iii. 15).

Would the most enthusiastic advocate of Mozart and Haydn dare to attribute the like effects to No. XII. of the one and No. XVI. of the other? Indeed if the following summary of effects of really sacred music is true, must we not regret so much spiritual loss by the presence of that which causes it? S. Basil writes: "Psalmody is the calm of the soul, the umpire of peace, that sets at rest the storm and upheaving of the thoughts. It quiets the turbulence of the mind, tempers its excess, is the bond of friendship, the union of the separated, the reconciler of those at variance: for who can count him any longer an enemy with whom he has but once lifted up his voice to God? Psalmody putteth evil spirits to flight, calleth for the help of angels, is a defence from terrors by night, a rest from troubles by day, is the safety of children, the glory of young men, the comfort of the old, the fairest ornament of women. Psalmody calleth forth a tear from a heart of stone, is the work of angels, the government of Heaven, the incense of the spirit."

This was said in the fourth century, and of that and the foregoing centuries: what would he have said of the nineteenth? Very much the same as John of Salisbury said of his, the twelfth.

"Music nowadays corrupts (incestat) the worship of God, because in His very presence, in the holy place itself, with lascivious voice, and display of self, men with effeminate tones seek only to render soft the weak minds of those who admire them. For when you hear the excessively soft tones of those who sing in all sorts of unnatural ways [we despair of giving the force of the words "*præcinentium et succinentium, canentium, et decinentium, intercinentium et occinentium,*"] you might well fancy yourself listening to the enchantments of the Syrens, not to the voices of men, and you are astonished at that wonderful facility of voice which neither nightingale nor parrot or any still louder screeching bird can hope to come up to." . . . For evident reasons I do not translate the concluding sentence: it is this, "*Quùm hæc quidem modum excesserint, lumborum pruriginem quam mentis devotionem poterunt citius excitare.*" (*Policraticus*, cap. vi.)

And now compare this account of the twelfth with the following description of the present century. Rev. P. F. de Voght, Professor and director of music in the Archiepiscopal Seminary of Mechlin, the well-known editor of the Mechlin

Graduale and *Vesperale* says, "We are well aware that the music of the world is not always the expression of extreme excitement, nor of extreme levity. It can speak also a language singularly adapted to imitate those interior sensations so dear to the flesh : it is then that the melody softly decks itself in phrases the most tender and delightful : you can see it then show off like the voluptuous gondola, as with its perfumed garlands it is gently wafted over the still lake, the base with its varied ways of breaking up the harmony by arpeggios, making you actually feel the most charming undulations ; while the violin twitters aloft, amid a thousand murmurs with which the zephyrs fill the air, one can find in these accompaniments other images and sensations still more enchanting ; any one may have his own fancy about the character of this music, if only he does not pretend that it is not a great means of producing softness and voluptuous feeling. We can imagine that such music does very likely give great satisfaction to hearts which are already evaporated and given up to the world ; but what we cannot conceive is how people can adapt the soft effusions of souls sick in love to the holy words of Christian prayer. What more scandalous then thus to pronounce, and that with an accent the most telling, the language of the passions the most sensual, in the temple of God, that last asylum where men take refuge from the miseries of the soul ? And then, bear in mind, that in stating the case thus, *we have only just touched the surface of the abuses.*"

M. Danjon, organist of the cathedral of Notre Dame, who was sent at the expense of the French government some years ago to travel for musical purposes, describes the following scene at the jubilee of Liege : "There were twelve Bishops and a numerous body of clergy on their knees before the altar : there was a vast multitude of the faithful in the church : nothing would have produced an effect similar to the magnificent Plain Chant of the *Lauda Sion*, sung by 300 voices. Instead of this there were fiddles, violoncellos, clarionets, voices out of tune, unnatural shouts, clattering of cymbals, and in the midst of the din, a young lady performing vocal *roulades* on the sacred words *ecce panis angelorum*. I abstain from all remark on so afflicting a fact."

The following grand passage from F. Newman's Lectures on "The Scope and Nature of University Education," Disc. III., expresses well the danger of modern music, and how the Church must always be on her guard against, while she uses nature's best gifts :—

Music and Architecture are more ideal than Painting ; and their respective

archetypes, even if not supernatural, at least are abstract and unearthly; and yet what I have observed about Painting holds, I suppose, analogously in the marvellous development which Musical Science has undergone in the last century. Doubtless here too the highest genius may be made subservient to Religion; here too, still more simply than in the case of Painting, the science has a field of its own, perfectly innocent, into which Religion does not and need not enter; and on the other hand, here also, it is certain that Religion must be alive and on the defensive, for if its servants sleep, a potent enchantment will steal over it. Here lies the advantage of music in its more rudimental state . . . of what is called Gregorian Music, that this, as all inchoate sciences, has so little innate vigour and life, that it is in no danger of going out of its place, and giving the law to Religion. Music, I suppose, has an object of its own; as mathematical science also, it is the expression of ideas greater and more profound than any in the visible world, ideas which centre in Him whom Catholicity manifests, who is the seat of all beauty, order, and perfection whatever; still ideas after all, not those on which Revealed Religion directly and principally fixes our gaze. If, then, a great master in this mysterious science throws himself on his own gift, trusts its inspirations, and absorbs himself in those thoughts which, though they came to him in the way of nature, belong to things above nature, it is obvious he will neglect everything else. Rising in his strength, he will break through the trammels of words; he will scatter human voices, even the sweetest, to the winds; he will be borne upon nothing less than the fullest flood of sounds which art has enabled him to draw from mechanical contrivances; he will go forth as a giant, as far as ever his instruments can reach, starting from their secret depths fresh and fresh elements of beauty and grandeur as he goes, and pouring them together into still more marvellous and rapturous combinations—and well indeed and lawfully while he keeps to that line which is his own; but should he happen to be attracted, as he well may, by the sublimity so congenial to him of the Catholic doctrine and ritual; should he engage on sacred themes; should he resolve to do honour to the Mass or the Divine office—he cannot have a more pious, a better purpose, and Religion will gracefully accept what he gracefully offers; but—is it not certain, from the circumstances of the case, that *he will rather use Religion than minister to it, unless Religion is strong on its own ground*, and reminds him that if he would do honour to the highest of subjects, he must make himself its scholar, must humbly follow the thoughts given him, and must aim at the glory not of his gift, but of the Great Giver?

And what Dr. Newman has thus pointed out as possible and likely, a German critic has asserted as fully realized by Beethoven in his Grand Mass:—

Beethoven, the most original of all the pupils of Haydn, brought the modern style of religious music to its ultimate perfection. He makes use, with the hand of a master, of all the means which the kingdom of sounds can offer; his power knows no limits but those which nature has established; he literally reigns here with a wisdom and a tact which are unequalled.

Such this formidable Titan appears in his *Missa Solemnis*, where he handles at will with his powerful hand his hosts of sounds, vocal and instrumental, dividing them, marshalling them, and then bringing them back to the unity which nature requires. *Unhappily his power becomes audacity, his knowledge almost Satanic*; he seems to be heaping up voices, like the massing of troops, to take heaven by storm, instead of ascending thither calmly and by degrees. This is particularly the character of the *Kyrie*; while the Christian idea has completely left him in the *Gloria*, where there bursts forth *not the pure and heavenly melody of a hymn of praise and peace, but the shout of victory raised by the human passions* triumphing over a conquered enemy. This work, so grand and so perfect that nothing can be compared to it, can only be called religious music because it happens to be sung in a church. The Christian idea is one of reconciliation and of peace: where this is wanting, a work, however artistic it may be, is not religious.

The modern idea of Christian exultation having been derived from such sources, no one can be surprised to hear a modern writer remark that "Plain-Chant breaks down totally when applied to a Gloria in Excelsis." All know something about both the beginning and the end of the great man who "got to himself singing men and singing women," and all that could please the ear, and delight the eye, but found "it all vanity and vexation of spirit," and who seemed to anticipate the abuse of this when he laid down the rule at least for others. Dr. Newman remarks that Solomon fell because he never suffered; and we know the fate of one who "fared sumptuously every day." I will only suggest that nature is nature, whether it is the palate or the ear that is the sense in question; and that there are as many ways of imitating Dives, as there are cravings of nature to be indulged.

And now these remarks must perhaps end rather abruptly, as they have been already too long: the moral importance of the subject must be the excuse.

Let me but express my conviction that the state of things with regard to music, is not so much owing to wilfulness as to ignorance, and to ignorance which is twofold. First, of what the mind and will of the Church is on the subject; and, second, the real power of that music which, to say the least, she gives the preference to, and in some cases the exclusive preference to.

All admit that until the Plain-Chant is better sung the prejudice must continue to prevail. It is sung perfunctorily by hired singers in some cases, in others those who are hired to sing figured music will not sing at all, or will only sing as badly as they can, music which they take no interest in. The prejudice is fostered by, as it was born of, the practice.

The hope is the seminaries, the cathedrals, the collegiate and monastic churches. We have seen from the synods quoted, that the evil is radical: it is not merely worldly taste in the laity that is at fault; this has been participated in by those who should have taught them better to appreciate what the Church holds sacred. And this hope is not merely in the future, it has already begun to be realized. The fact is that in Belgium, Holland, and Germany, if not everywhere, yet in certain centres, the seminarists are in thorough order, while at Mainz a grand edition of the old *Cantus firmus* of the Rhine country has been brought out by a countryman of ours.

I will only add that at least a reverent attitude towards this, which, if not an essential, is *a* part of the Church's ritual, is the duty of all who would wish not merely to submit to her where there is a question of sin, but who sincerely wish to think and feel with her in everything which comes within the sphere of her authority.

SACERDOS.

Notices of Books.

Ultramontaniam and Christianity. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. ("Contemporary Review" for June, 1874.) London: Strahan.

On some Popular Errors concerning Politics and Religion. By Lord ROBERT MONTAGU, M.P. London: Burns & Oates.

WE had hoped to have written an article for our present number on Lord Montagu's book, taken in connection with the Archbishop's final paper of reply to Mr. Fitzjames Stephen. Cæsarism, which is assailed by the Archbishop, and politico-ecclesiastical liberalism, which is assailed by Lord Robert Montagu, are the two opposite poles of error, in regard to the relation of Church and State. Cæsarism would permit the State to encroach grievously on the Church's province; while liberalism would exempt the statesman, as such, from his bounden duty of co-operating with and ministering to the Church. It is becoming more and more the case, that loyally-intentioned Catholics are free from both these errors. All such Catholics, we need hardly say, repudiate indignantly the tyranny now exercised by the State within the ecclesiastical sphere, throughout almost the whole of continental Europe. But this is not all. Those who were some time since more or less entangled in modern notions, condemned by the Church, as to the propriety of a divorce between Church and State,—have been brought by the logic of facts to see the utter hollowness and irreligiousness of such notions. Every loyal Catholic uses his utmost political influence—not his influence only as an individual, but his influence as a politician and public man—towards promotion of the Church's well-being; nay, he makes that end the very centre and turning-point of his political action.

Nothing can be more orthodox and solid than the general drift of Lord Robert Montagu's volume; yet we must confess that we are not satisfied by it in point of execution. Not to mention other particulars,—we cannot sympathize with the author's *tone*, in denouncing liberty of worship (p. 316) and liberty of the press (p. 332). It seems to us that he by no means takes sufficient pains, to conciliate the prejudices which his position must necessarily excite, or to confront in their fulness those very anxious and delicate questions which that position suggests. Even as a matter of *doctrine* (if we rightly understand him), he places at a very far lower

point than we should ourselves do, the claim for religious freedom, which may justly, rightfully, and legitimately be put forth by those, who have been trained from childhood in non-Catholic religious belief.

Comparing the two writers as a whole, it seems to us that the Archbishop keeps far more constantly before his mind, than does Lord Robert Montagu, existing facts in their integrity and complexity. Lord Robert writes, we think, too much, as though facts could be dealt with by the mere manipulation of logical formulæ.

We are confident that very important service indeed has been done to the Church in England, by the controversy now brought to a conclusion between the Archbishop and Mr. Fitzjames Stephen. If the latter gentleman had intended to do everything in his power towards increasing the Archbishop's influence, he could not probably have written in a way more conducive to that end. This is a just retribution for his violence and contemptuousness of language.

Mr. Fitzjames Stephen and Cardinal Bellarmine. By WILLIAM HUMPHREY, O.S.C. London : H. S. King.

THIS pamphlet came to hand at the last moment. It will be found extremely useful by those, who wish to understand (and to do so requires some careful attention) what is the Church's precise doctrine on infants who die unbaptized. With characteristic perspicuity and completeness, F. Humphrey sets forth those particulars on which Catholics are bound to agreement, and those, on the other hand, whereon opinion is perfectly free.

As to the doctrine ascribed by Mr. Stephen to Bellarmine, it is no more Bellarmine's than it is Mr. Stephen's : on the contrary (p. 30), Bellarmine would have agreed with F. Humphrey and with Mr. Stephen, that a being, who could have so acted as Bellarmine is accused by Mr. Stephen of accounting God to act, would be "intolerably stupid and cruel."

On various other points F. Humphrey powerfully exposes those reckless and impetuous mis-statements, which are too common with Mr. Stephen, and for which he is deservedly getting a bad name.

At the same time, in p. 9 and elsewhere, the author does not (in our opinion) sufficiently guard his language against a misconception, which he would, of course, heartily regret. His language may be understood by some to import, that all those doctrines, which the Catholic is not required to hold as "of faith," are therefore, as a matter of course, to be regarded as open questions.

Mary Queen of Scots and her Accusers ; embracing a Narrative of Events from the Death of James V. in 1543 until the death of Queen Mary in 1567. By JOHN HOSACK, Barrister-at-Law. Second edition, much enlarged. In two volumes. Vol. II. 8vo. Edinburgh and London. 1874.

THE second volume of Mr. Hosack's masterly survey of the many historical controversies regarding the life and times of the ill-fated Queen of Scots has long been looked for, and will be eagerly welcomed, by all students of Scottish and English history.

We are compelled by circumstances to postpone the detailed examination which this important volume well deserves ; but we purpose in our October number to devote a special article to a review of the new evidences bearing on the last years of Queen Mary, which have been collected by Mr. Hosack, Father Morris, and other critics of her latest historians, Mr. Burton and Mr. Froude.

Meanwhile the reader who bears in mind the masterly résumé which Mr. Hosack has given in his first volume of the controversy, as to the genuineness of the Casket Letters, and as to their true bearing on the history of the Scottish Queen, will be interested by a very curious discovery regarding these celebrated papers, of which Mr. Hosack gives an account in the preface of the present volume, and which, while it opens to view another act in this dark and mysterious drama of guilt and treachery, confirms very remarkably the argument of the spuriousness of the Casket papers, which Mr. Hosack has drawn out with consummate ingenuity and force in the volume already in the hands of the public.

It will be recollected that the first occasion on which these letters were exhibited by the Earl of Murray was at the meeting at York, in 1568, of the commissioners of Mary, six in number, with three commissioners—the Duke of Norfolk, the Earl of Sussex, and Sir Ralph Sadler—appointed by Queen Elizabeth. How fatally this whole procedure was tainted with suspicion has been shown in detail on a former occasion.* Our only present concern is with the report made regarding the letters to Elizabeth by her commissioners at York. This report, which is dated October 11, 1568, is still extant among the Cotton MSS. in the British Museum,† and has been familiarly referred to in the discussion. In the text of the dispatch, as it has been hitherto cited, the commissioners refrain from expressing any opinion as to the genuineness of the letters and other papers put forward by Mary's accusers in evidence of her guilt ; while they declare that, "in their opinions and consciences, if the said letters be written with her own hand," the conclusion that they "are sufficient to convince her of the detestable crime of the murder of her husband, is very hard to be avoided." But although this reading of the dispatch has hitherto been accepted with-

* Supra, vol. iii. p. 114, n.s.

† Cotton MSS., Calig. c. 1, fol. 198.

out inquiry and without observation, Mr. Hosack has discovered that in the original document there are several erasures and alterations; and he prints this important paper for the first time, distinguishing the passages which have been erased and those which were substituted for them before it was sent off. Now, it is plain from these erasures and substitutions, (all of which we ourselves have carefully examined in the original paper,) that the commissioners had in the first instance expressed a decided opinion that the letters were "indeed in the Queen's own handwriting," but that, before despatching the report to their royal mistress, they carefully expunged every clause and every expression by which such opinion could be conveyed, and confined themselves to a simple statement that the letters were *alleged to be* Mary's; that "these men here do constantly affirm the said lres and other writings which they produce of her owne hand to be of her owne hand indede," and that "if they be indeed written with her own hand, the conclusion as to her guilt is very hard to be avoided." Mr. Hosack has printed the letter in his appendix, indicating the substitutions by interlineations, and the erased portions by italics and marks of erasure. We shall transcribe the most important of them.

"After the devise of the murder was determined, as it seemed by the sequeale, *it appearethe unto us by* [they inferred upon] a lre of her owne hand, that there was another meane of a more cleanly conveyance devised to kill the Kinge."

"The said lres and ballades do discover such inordinate *and filthie* love between her and Bothaill, her loothesomnes and abhorrence of her husband that was murdered, *and the conspiracie of his deathe*, in such sorte as every good and godlie man cannot but detest and abhor the same."

"Theis men here do constantly affirme the said lres and other writings w^{ch} they produce, of her owne hand, to be of her owne hand indede; and do offer to sweare and take their oathe thereupon, as indede the matter containyd in them being suche as coulde hardly be invented or devised by other than her selfe; for that they discourse of some things which weare unknowen to anie other then to her selfe and Bothaill, *dothe the rather persuade us to believe that they be indede of her owne hand writinge.*"

"In a paper here enclosed we have noted to your Ma^{tie} the chief and speciall pointis of the said lres, written as they saye with her owne hand, to the intent it may please your Ma^{tie} to consider of them, and to judge wheither the same be sufficient to convince her of the detestable crime of the murder of her husband; w^{ch} in our opinions and consciences, if the said lres be written with her owne hand, *as we beleive they be*, is very *plaine and manifest* [hard to be avoided]." ("Mary Queen of Scots and her Accusers," pp. 497—501.)

We regard this curious discovery as a very strong evidence of the forgery of the Casket Letters. The plain inference from this withdrawal of an expression of opinion so decided as that conveyed in the first draft of the dispatch seems to us to be that the commissioners, subsequently to their first inspection of the letters, which, as has been shown in former articles, was in the last degree unsatisfactory and open to manifold suspicion of fraud, had found reason to modify, if not absolutely to reverse, the first hasty judgment which they had formed, and had come to recognize these letters as spurious, or at least as open to doubt and suspicion.

It may perhaps be said that in receding from the strong expression of opinion originally tendered, the commissioners were influenced, not by any change of judgment as to the letters, but merely by a prudent desire to hold themselves negatively, and to avoid being committed to either side of a controversy, which involved consequences so vital and momentous. We have no direct evidence as to the motives of their change. But the motive suggested is purely conjectural at best, and there is the strongest presumption to the contrary. A letter was written to Cecil by one of their number, the Earl of Sussex,* a few days after the dispatch of their report (October 22, 1578), which shows not only that it was with reluctance they receded from their first view, but also that it was because they believed that the genuineness of the letters produced by Mary's accusers could not be sustained. Sussex distinctly professes his belief that, for the interests of his own royal mistress, Elizabeth, the most advantageous result would be "if Murray should produce such matter that the Queen's Majesty may, by virtue of her superiority over Scotland, find judicially the Scottish Queen guilty of the murder of her husband, and therewith detain her in England at the charges of Scotland." But, with equal frankness, he confesses that he thinks this "will hardly be attempted;" because "if her adverse party accuse her of the murder by producing of her letters, she will deny them, and accuse the most of them with manifest consent to the murder hardly to be denied; so that upon the trial on both sides *her proofs will judicially fall best out, as it is thought.*"† And in the end of the same letter he repeats his belief that it will not fall out sufficiently to determine judicially, if she denies the letters.‡ Now from a reluctant partisan like Sussex, such an avowal, in direct contravention of the interests of the Queen whom he represented, has a special significance, and must be allowed to possess a double weight. And construed in the light of this avowal, the retraction which these curious erasures plainly import, appears to us to complete the chain of the evidence by which the fraudulent fabrication of the Casket Letters is brought home to the enemies of the Scottish Queen, and to destroy, morally as well as judicially, every shred of authority for the purposes of history which these letters could be supposed to possess.

The Letter-Books of Sir Amias Poulet, Keeper of Mary Queen of Scots.
 Edited by JOHN MORRIS, Priest of the Society of Jesus. 8vo.
 London. 1874.

WE are compelled, by unavoidable necessity, to postpone till our October number our intended review of Father Morris's volume,—by far the most interesting and original contribution to the later history of the Scottish Queen since the publication of the memorable seventh volume

* Hosack, vol. i. pp. 517—21. † Ibid. p. 517. ‡ Ibid. p. 520.
 VOL. XXIII. — NO. XLV. [New Series.] P

of Tytler's History of Scotland. Father Morris's book deals, it is true, with but a brief space in Queen Mary's eventful life—the closing months of her imprisonment at Tutbury, Chartley, Fotheringay; but the events of these months are full of the most painful interest, and Father Morris's materials are not only in great part unknown, but both in themselves and in the searching and skilful use of them, are of a nature to cast an entirely new light on the most secret proceedings of the principal actors in the dark tragedy which came to an end at Fotheringay.

We propose to devote a portion of our pages in October to the last of the great controversies in the history of Mary Queen of Scots,—her alleged complicity in the Babington conspiracy. It is scarcely necessary to say that this event occupies a prominent place in the pages of Father Morris, as well as of Mr. Hosack; and both writers have kept in view, throughout, the account which Mr. Froude has given of Mary's proceedings in relation to the conspirators, and have bestowed great pains on the examination of the materials on which he professes to found his narrative. It might almost seem, nevertheless, that each of Mr. Froude's critics had, as if by concert, taken to himself a distinct branch of the case, and that they not only consider his narrative from different points of view, but have brought to the examination of his conclusions, each an almost entirely independent body of evidence.

Father Morris's volume consists in the main, as the title implies, of the letters of Sir Amias Poulet, who, as is well known, was the custodian of the Queen of Scots during the last period of her imprisonment, which terminated on the scaffold of Fotheringay. The chief portion of it is derived from the Letter-books—the clerk's copies of Sir Amias Poulet's letters, entered day by day, as the letters were written. They are each in a different hand, one having been written at Tutbury, the second at Chartley, and the third at Fotheringay; and of the letters which they contain, no fewer than thirty-eight, besides fragments, are new to the public.

But hardly inferior in historical value to these unpublished historical documents, while it is far more attractive in literary interest, is the commentary with which Father Morris has interwoven the correspondence, and by which he at once illustrates its purport, and connects it into an intelligible narrative. It is in this illustrative commentary on the Letter-book that Father Morris deals with Mr. Froude. He follows him, point by point, through the complicated story; and there is hardly a question of interest in the entire controversy on which he has not thrown new light, by his skilful and judicious comparison of the complicated details of evidence, old and new, printed and manuscript.

We must reserve the details for our October number.

The Works of Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. A new translation. Edited by the Rev. MARCUS DODS, D.D. Vol. IX. *On Christian Doctrine; The Enchiridion; on Catechising; and on Faith and the Creed.* Vol. X. *Lectures or Tractates on the Gospel according to S. John.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

THESE two new volumes of Messrs. Clark's translation of S. Augustine we can recommend to our readers as earnestly as we have already recommended former volumes. The gentlemen to whom the task has been committed, of rendering into English the greatest of the Latin Fathers, have, so far, executed their work with skill and fidelity. It is evident, that if the translation was to be of any use whatever, it must be, before all things, faithful; and, although it is of course possible to pick out an error here and there, we gladly testify that the mistakes do not arise from prejudice or unfairness. In one of the present volumes there is a passage which is translated in a way that comes as near a theological misrepresentation as any we have met with. It occurs in the "Enchiridion," chap. xxx. (Eng. translation, p. 197). The whole passage is a vehement assertion of the impotence to good of lost man's freewill. It requires great delicacy to render it, without making it mean more than S. Augustine meant. For that very reason, the word "reparari," which occurs in the title, should not have been translated "saved," but "redeemed." It sounds too much to say, "men are not *saved* by the free determination of their own will." And when S. Augustine says, that by the evil use of freewill, man "et se perdidit et ipsum," the translation ought to be "he *ruined* both himself and it," not "he *destroyed* both himself and it." This may seem a mere verbal distinction, but it is not so. S. Augustine means that man's will, after the fall, was, of itself, smitten with feebleness; it was wrecked or ruined; but it was not utterly *lost*. The word "perdo" is used to express, not an absolute loss, but a *quoad hoc* destruction. A Catholic theologian would have understood the distinction, and expressed it; just as he would have seen that salvation is generally used of individuals, redemption being presupposed, whilst redemption itself is applied to the race. There is another error, or awkwardness, towards the end of his volume, arising, like the former, from a want of acquaintance with theological tradition. In the ninth chapter of the treatise "On the Creed and Faith," which is in reality the discourse delivered by S. Augustine to the assembled Fathers of the Synod of Hippo, in 393, he is speaking of certain phrases in the New Testament, which seem to imply that our Lord was a mere man; and he says that such expressions were used partly "propter administrationem suscepti hominis." The translator, the Rev. S. D. Salmond, renders this phrase, "with a view to that administration of His human nature, in accordance with which, &c."; and as it evidently remained a puzzle to him, even after he had translated it, he adds the Latin words within brackets. Has Mr. Salmond never heard of the technical word *oikonomia*? The use of "administratio" in this passage, like

"dispensatio" a few lines above, is simply a literal translation of a term which was as well understood, in its Greek or Latin form respectively, by Greek or Latin Bishops of the early centuries, as the word Trinity itself. The more common Latin equivalent is, no doubt, "dispensatio." S. Augustine had his own reasons, most likely, for using a less technical form. He never allowed either technicalities or grammar to interfere with plain speaking; though, in the present instance, "administratio" is probably the more classical expression. Whilst on this subject, we may quote a passage from Professor Shaw's translation of the "Christian Doctrine," with the double object of illustrating the style of the translation, and of giving S. Augustine's ideas as to how far a Christian preacher or teacher should aim at "elegance of speech."

"Good teachers have, or ought to have, so great an anxiety about teaching, that they will employ a word (which cannot be made pure Latin without becoming obscure or ambiguous, but which, when used according to the vulgar idiom, in neither ambiguous nor obscure), not in the way the learned, but rather in the way the unlearned employ it. . . . Why should a teacher of godliness, who is addressing an unlearned audience, shrink from using *ossum* instead of *os*, if he fear that the latter might be taken not as the singular of *ossa*, but as the singular of *ora*, seeing that African ears have no quick perception of the shortness or length of vowels? And what advantage is there in purity of speech which does not lead to understanding in the hearer, seeing that there is no use at all in speaking, if they do not understand us for whose sake we speak? He, therefore, who teaches will avoid all words that do not teach; and if instead of them he can find words at once pure and intelligible, he will take these by preference; if, however, he cannot, either because there are no such words, or because they do not at the time occur to him, he will use words that are not quite pure, if only the substance of his thought be conveyed and apprehended in its integrity." (Vol. ix., on "Christian Doctrine," p. 137.)

The treatise "De Doctrinâ Christianâ," which is the most considerable of the works translated in the ninth volume, might be called *Prolegomena* to Biblical interpretation, with an appendix on Preaching. The greater part of it was written in the year 397, soon after he was made Bishop. It was finished, and the fourth book, on Preaching, added, in 426 or 427. The first book contains a scientific and philosophical introduction to the matters treated of in the Holy Scriptures. It contains a guide to the supernaturalness and spirituality of the Scripture, and is evidently intended to prevent Catechists from treating Scripture as a mere history or collection of profane treatises. The second and third books deal more immediately with the interpretation of the Scripture. The second treats of the Canon, enumerating, in chapter viii., the exact list of sacred books which is laid down in the Council of Trent. It also treats of the necessity of learning the languages in which the Scriptures are written. S. Augustine recommends strongly the Septuagint version of the Old Testament, and the Old Vulgate, called the *Vetus Itala*. He plainly inclines to agree with what he calls the best tradition, that the Septuagint translators were inspired; and he relates, without dissent, the story given by Clement of Alexandria and S. Irenæus, and repeated by S. Cyril of Jerusalem and S. Hilary, about each translator being shut up in a separate cell. He

intimates that where the Septuagint differs from the Hebrew, he would prefer the version given by the Septuagint. S. Augustine was not one of those who wanted the Holy Scriptures to be any plainer than they are. He rejoices when "hasty and careless readers" (*qui temere legunt*) are led into error or benighted in darkness.

"I do not doubt that all this was divinely arranged for the purpose of subduing pride by toil, and of preventing a feeling of satiety in the intellect, which generally holds in small esteem what is discovered without difficulty" (p. 37).

He considers that the plainest truth is infinitely sweeter to the mind when it is presented wrapped up in a Scriptural allegory. If you tell him that there are holy men whom God raises up to tear souls from the vanities of the world, and to lead them to the cleansing font of baptism, he does not find it half so impressive as if you were to draw the same meaning from that passage in the Canticles, where it is said of the Church, when she is praised under the figure of a beautiful woman: "Thy teeth are like a flock of sheep that are shorn, which come up from the washing, whereof every one bears twins, and none is barren among them." "I don't know why," he says, "but I feel greater pleasure in contemplating holy men when I view them as the teeth of the Church, tearing men away from their errors, and bringing them into the Church's body with all their hardness softened, just as if they had been torn off and masticated by the teeth."

In the third book, S. Augustine treats of the figurative interpretation of Scripture, and explains how considerations of time, place, person, and dispensation must be used to modify our interpretation and practical application of the matters we read in the Bible. The chapters contain, of course, nothing but what has been written over and over again, in one shape or another, since S. Augustine wrote them here; but it is interesting to trace streams to their sources, and to mark the first formularization of authoritative tradition.

The fourth book, on Preaching, is to most readers the most practical of the four. Rules for preaching have that sort of fascination about them which all rules have that are capable of being strikingly expressed, and express things very hard to do. S. Augustine had been a celebrated and most successful teacher of rhetoric. In writing, therefore, to the clergy, on the subject of Christian rhetoric, he had to overcome a strong temptation to undervalue rhetoric altogether, as a worldly and diabolical art. I was the tone of the great Bishops of the early centuries to disparage the rhetoric of the schools. They did so, not merely because it was full of glitter and pomp of words, and unsuitable to the simplicity of the Gospel, but because the main and avowed object of Pagan rhetorical teaching was to help men to make the "worse appear the better reason,"—to give currency to falsehood and victory to a bad cause. S. Augustine, therefore, who knew the schools and detested their practice, must have felt strongly urged, when addressing Christian teachers, to speak against the art of Rhetoric. And he does, in some places, speak very strongly of the art which he himself had taught. But at the very outset of this fourth

book he lays down the true and solid principles which distinguish real art from the abuse of art.

"The art of rhetoric being available for the enforcing either of truth or of falsehood, who will dare to say that truth, in the person of its defenders, is to take its stand unarmed against falsehood? For example, that those who are trying to persuade men of what is false are to know how to introduce their subject, so as to put the hearer into a friendly or attentive or teachable frame of mind, while the defenders of the truth shall be ignorant of that art? That the former are to tell their falsehoods briefly, clearly, and plausibly, while the latter shall tell the truth in such a way that it is tedious to listen to, hard to understand, and in fine (*sic*) not easy to believe it? That the former are to oppose the truth, and defend falsehood with spiritual arguments, while the latter shall be unable either to defend what is true or refute what is false? That the former, while embuing the minds of their hearers with erroneous opinions, are, by their power of speech, to awe, to melt, to enliven, and to rouse them; while the latter shall, in defence of the truth, be sluggish and frigid and somnolent? Who is such a fool as to think *this* wisdom?" (Chap. ii.)

Of the volume of the Tractates on S. John it is sufficient to say, that it is well and readably translated by the Rev. John Gibb, from whose pen we are promised the second volume, as part of the second issue of the present year.

It is exceedingly doubtful, we think, whether this translation of S. Augustine will be extensively taken up and read. But if it comes to be at all generally used, it cannot fail to be the means of giving the British public one or two new ideas. The notion of the Church as a living power distinct from the mere collection of the people, and the notion of Sacramental Grace, will be among the things which English and Scotch readers will find in S. Augustine, and from him they will perhaps come to understand that they are among the things which they have too much ignored.

Faith and Free Thought: A second Course of Lectures, delivered at the request of the Christian Evidence Society. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

THE lectures contained in this volume fall under three divisions, Natural Theology, Biblical Criticism, and the extra-biblical argument for Christianity. In the first division we have three lectures on the arguments for the existence of God. The first of these, which is by Canon Mozley, expounds a form of what has been called the "metaphysical" argument; the second, by Mr. Brooke, one of the consulting surgeons of the Westminster Hospital, treats of the argument from design, with especial and appropriate reference to difficulties rising out of recent speculations as to natural selection; and the third, by Canon Birks, whose "Scripture Doctrine of Creation" we noticed some time ago, brings forward the argument from conscience, under the title "The Philosophy

of Human Responsibility." The second division consists of likewise three lectures, of which the first is on the "scientific," and the second on the moral difficulties of the Bible, while the third, leaving the subject of difficulties, presents us with some samples of "The Corroborative Evidence of Old Testament History from the Egyptian and Assyrian Monuments." This lecture, which, like that which precedes it, is exceptionally able, is by Mr. Cooper, the Secretary of the Society of Biblical Archaeology. The third division consists of five lectures. The first of these, on the argument for the supernatural character of Christianity, from its place in the world and in history, puts many excellent points, and is grounded on the conception of Christianity as a world-historical religion. Sir Bartle Frere then brings his large experience to bear on the refutation of the theory—sufficiently refuted by the history of the Catholic Church—that "Christianity is a Semitic variety of religion, suited to Syria and to a people of Jewish or Arab origin, but little adapted to men of other races and of other climates"; and to show that "experience proves Christianity to be a religion perfectly adapted to mankind of the most various races, and in every stage of civilization, from the lowest to the highest." The position taken up by Dean Merivale, on the contrast between Pagan and Christian society, is, to say the least, a most extraordinary one. It is that Christianity has destroyed sacrifice, and substituted for it self-sacrifice; and that this victory over an instinctive tendency of human nature so widely shown and so deeply seated, is part of the proof of the divinity of the Christian religion. We cannot congratulate the lecturer on the fruitfulness of his studies, either of Christianity or of Paganism. The last two lectures are on "The force imparted to the evidence of Christianity from the manner in which distinct lines of proof converge in a common centre," and on "Man a witness for Christianity," respectively. The first of these, which is by a barrister, Mr. Shaw, is good as far as it goes, but does not go far enough into the subject; the second would have been better omitted from the volume.

Dr. Mozley's lecture does not strike us as at all satisfactory as to the treatment, either of the argument or of opinions concerning it; but the concluding paragraph is worthy of notice, on account of the way in which it connects the formation of an ideal with the moral sense:—

"An ideal is contained in the moral nature of man; and we have to account for its being there. It is evident that the very character or construction, as we may call it, of the conscience and the moral sense is such, that the very instrument it works by is a kind of restlessness and discontent with all fact in us, and a desire to be something which we are not. The condition of goodness is not that of attaining a definite sufficient end; it is not that of reaching a resting-place. That is counter to the law of our being. St. Paul has given an exposition of conscience, which plainly and vividly describes it as insatiable, swallowing, like some unfathomable abyss, all the duty, sacrifice, and effort that is thrown into it, and still demanding more. [What is this but, in other words] the existence of an ideal in man, the spontaneous erection of his own heart, which dwarfs every act of his, and reduces his whole life to failure and

imperfection? Moral beauty, goodness, rises up before him in his conscience, in a form and height which has no embodiment in fact; he sees there a whole, while all experience only shows what is fragmentary" (pp. 47, 48).

Taking for granted the falsehood of the utilitarian theory of conscience, it appears to us that this line of argument, which is one naturally suggested by the facts, satisfactorily explains the tendency in human nature to form and follow an ideal. It will be interesting to our readers to compare with the quotation given above the following observations (true and solid as far as they go) by Dr. Thomas Brown, on the virtue of humility:—

"Pride . . . is not the prevailing cast of mind of those who are formed for genuine excellence. He who is formed for genuine excellence has before him an ideal perfection—that *semper melius aliquid*—which makes excellence itself, however admirable to those who measure it only with their weaker powers, seem to his own mind, as compared with what he has ever in his own mental vision, a sort of failure. He thinks less of what he has done than of what it seems possible to do; and he is not so much proud of merit attained, as desirous of merit that has not yet been attained by him.

"It is in this way, that the very religion which ennobles man, leads him not to pride, but to humility. It elevates him above the smoke and dust of earth, but it elevates him above the darkness, that he may see better the great heights that are above him. It shows him not the mere excellence of a few frail creatures, as fallible as himself, but excellence, the very conception of which is the highest effort that can be made by man; exhibiting thus constantly what it will be the only honour worthy of his nature to imitate, however faintly, and checking his momentary pride, at every step of his glorious progress, by the brightness and the vastness of what is still before him.

"May I not add to these remarks, that it is in this way we are to account for that humility which is so peculiarly a part of the Christian character, as contrasted with the general pride which other systems either recommend or allow? The Christian religion is, indeed, as has been often sarcastically said by those who revile it, the religion of the humble in heart; but it is the religion of the humble, only because it presents to our contemplation a higher excellence than was ever before exhibited to man. The proud look down upon the earth, and see nothing that creeps upon its surface more noble than themselves. The humble look upward to their God."—(Lect. LXII.)

It is impossible for us to criticise the subject matter of these lectures one by one, diverse as they are in topics and manner of treatment. As might be anticipated, they are of very different degrees of excellence, and we scarcely think it was worth while to republish the whole of them in a collected form. It would have been a pity, however, to have lost the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth: and Canon Birks' lecture on Human Responsibility, though not well built up, contains some striking and almost eloquent passages. We see with pleasure that a fair proportion of Birks' laymen have made their appearance on the platform of the Christian Evidence Society; and it is with still greater pleasure that we see the name of Sir Bartle Frere among their number.

he Church and the Empires : Historical Periods. By HENRY WILLIAM WILBERFORCE. Preceded by a Memoir of the Author, by J. H. Newman, D.D., of the Oratory. London : Henry King & Co. 1874.

THE name of Wilberforce has ever possessed such power to stir up the enthusiasm of all who would stand by the wronged and oppressed, that the career of his sons seemed from the first to be marked out and watched with no ordinary interest. Of those among them who had the happiness of being reconciled to the Church, Henry Wilberforce was the best known and most widely loved from his consistent life of cheerful self-sacrifice after that momentous change, which among all classes of converts to the faith, the most deeply affects such as had once taken Anglican orders. His contributions also to the DUBLIN REVIEW, again, specially endeared him to all connected with it, and it is with feelings of peculiar, though mournful pleasure, that we notice the volume before us, and F. Newman's exquisite little Memoir prefixed to the essays it contains. Perhaps even the pregnant and luminous sentences of this great writer have never been made to comprehend so much in a few words as in the too brief pages of this Memoir.

"Henry William Wilberforce, the subject of this Memoir, was the youngest son of William Wilberforce, well known as the friend of Pitt, and member of Parliament for Yorkshire, and still more distinguished for his persevering and successful resistance in Parliament to the slave trade and slavery, and for his high Christian character in a time of general religious declension." (P. 1.)

Born in 1807, Mr. Wilberforce was sent to a private tutor's at nine years old, the Reverend John Sargent, rector of Graffham, in Sussex, whose daughter he afterwards married. At fifteen he was sent to the Reverend Mr. Spragge, at Tunbridge Wells, and was thence entered at Oriel College, Oxford, where he went to reside in 1826.

"I well recollect my first sight of him, on his presenting himself before the tutors of his college, when the lectures had to be arranged for the term, and his place in them, as a freshman, determined. He was small and timid, shrinking from notice, with a bright face and intelligent eyes. Partly from his name, partly from his appearance, I was at once drawn towards him ; and, as he subsequently told me, he felt a corresponding desire to know me ; and, in a little time, though I was not formally his college tutor, and only had relations with him as with other undergraduates in my lecture-room, we became very intimate. He read with me, as his private tutor, during a portion of four long vacations,—at Hampstead in 1827, at Nuneham in 1828, at Horsepath in 1829, and in Oriel in 1830. . . . In 1830 he went up for his B.A. examination, and was placed by the examiners in the first class in classics, and in the second in mathematics." (P. 2.)

His chief associates at Oriel were men of like pursuits with himself, and in general whose names have become known to the world. His own brother Robert ; Mr. Frederic Rogers, now Lord Blachford ; Hurrell an

William Froude; Mr. Wood, brother to Lord Halifax; Mr. George Ryder; and Mr. Thomas Mozley. Archbishop Manning and Sir Thomas Acland—neither of them Oriel men—were also among his Oxford friends, and his society was cultivated by a large circle of acquaintance.

“His talents were of a character to insure distinction, whether in a university or in a public career. He had a singularly clear apprehension, a clear head, a largeness and sobriety of mind, a readiness in speech, and that sense of humour and power of repartee which makes a man brilliant in conversation and formidable to opponents. But he chose for himself another course. His tastes and habits, his affectionateness, his tenderness of conscience, his love of quiet and the country, his dislike of pomp and display, of routine toil, and of tyrannous obligations, turned him towards a domestic life and the pastoral charge. He liked to be master of his own time and movements; and though never idle, whether in mind or body, he had no wish to work under the lash. He used to tell me that it was my doing that he took orders instead of following the law. Perhaps it was; we are blind to the future, and are forced to decide, whether for ourselves or for others, according to what seems best for the time being. . . . It may reasonably be doubted whether, humanly speaking, he would ever have been a Catholic but for his clerical profession, which, in the studies and inquiries to which it introduced him, served to place his mind and affections in the direction of the Catholic Church. And, anyhow, he made an excellent parish minister, with a heart devoted to his Divine Master and to the cure of souls: and his love for his work was ennobled by the prompt obedience with which he gave it up when his Master called upon him for that great sacrifice.” (Pp. 3-5.)

After filling two perpetual cures, Mr. Wilberforce was preferred, in 1843, to the excellent living—heretofore held by his brother Robert—of East Farleigh, in Kent.

“His parsonage in its domestic order, its frugality, its bountiful alms, and its atmosphere of religious reverence and peace, was, as it ought to be, the mainspring and centre of that influence which he exercised upon the people committed to him. To them and to their needs, temporal and spiritual, he gave himself wholly. He had an almost overpowering sense of the responsibilities which lay upon him as the pastor of a parish; and and his general self-neglect, all in one way or other spoke of that simplicity of mind and humility which I recognized in him when he was a youth at Oxford.” (Pp. 5, 6.)

During all the years of his Anglican ministry, Mr. Wilberforce achieved much improvement in his various cures beyond that of souls. He ascertained the lost glebe at Walmer, and recovered both it and the house built upon it as a parsonage. He began the church at Lower Walmer, gave two hundred guineas to that at Burley, near his first curacy of Bransgore, and built a good school-house at Farleigh. In all these good works, when he was unreasonably opposed, he sustained his unassuming meekness with plain, outspoken words and thorough determination.

“It was his confidence in his own ecclesiastical position and claims which alone supported him on such occasions, and the time came when that confidence was shaken.” Mr. Wilberforce began to have misgivings as to the Divine authority and mission of the Anglican Church, and

in 1849 these misgivings ripened into convictions. It so happened that cholera broke out that year among the hop-pickers in his parish, and as the priest from Tunbridge Wells was not able to attend to the multitude of cases, several Fathers of the London Oratory and two Good Shepherd nuns from Hammersmith went down to Farleigh. Mr. Wilberforce, without hesitation, took them into the parsonage, and supplied their patients with everything they required; and the reward of his heroic and fearless charity was that "on the day year on which he had received Our Lord's servants into his house, he and his, through Our Lord's mercy, were received into the everlasting home of the Catholic Church." This was in 1850.

It is indeed true, as F. Newman says, that "time brought no relief" to the life-long burthen of this great sacrifice, cheerfully made for Christ's sake. The law of England refused to look upon him as a layman, while of course he was, as he had all along been, a layman in the eyes of the Church. The occupations of laymen were therefore denied him in the full vigour of his life and talents, even had they been to his taste, while his family ties excluded him from the priesthood. No words can express what it is to one whose whole service has hitherto been in God's ministry to give up that, while substituting nothing of the same kind in its place; and probably those who are born Catholics can never appreciate the fulness of the sacrifice or the depth of the loss. But though deprived of his work, his home, and the countless interests, with the happiness he found in them, at one blow, Mr. Wilberforce never for one instant looked back with regret, or gave himself up to the forlorn emptiness of an objectless life. Whatever there was still to do, he did it with his might. After a time of necessary quiet and of the life of a disciple, he accepted the secretaryship of the Catholic Defence Association, and remained in Ireland for two or three years. From 1854 to 1863 he edited the *Catholic Standard* (*Weekly Register*), and persistently toiled through many obstacles for the advancement of religion. In 1869 Mr. Wilberforce took his family to Rome, and on his being attacked with Roman fever, the Pope gave him a special blessing for his recovery. He always attributed his recovery to the apostolic blessing. Mr. Wilberforce went again to Rome in 1862, and afterwards freed himself from any obligatory occupation. He then contributed the seven essays, forming the present volume, to the DUBLIN REVIEW; but these represent a very small portion of what he wrote in our pages. In 1871 he was advised to make a voyage to Jamaica for his health, and on leaving his wife, "who for so long a spell of years had made him so bright a home, he wrote to her from Malvern these beautiful words, 'May God keep His arm over you for good, and unite us hereafter in his kingdom! Coming here, and feeling how much older I am, makes me feel 'the time is short.' The generations of men are like 'the leaves,' as the Greek poet says; but our Lord Jesus is the resurrection and the life.'"

Accompanied by his youngest daughter, Mr. Wilberforce was received "like a brother" by the hospitable Chief Justice, Sir John Lucie Smith, and for a winter among the hills by Judge Ker. It had always been one

of the dreams of his life to behold the tropics, and the bewildering beauty of its colouring and foliage enchanted him, and for a while seemed to revive the springs of life. A friend who knew him there was deeply struck with the growing perfection of his unearthly character, and afterwards wrote that he looked upon him as one of the holiest of men.

"He returned home in July, 1872, to suffer a gradual but visible decay all through the following winter; and when Easter came, eternity was close upon him. . . . In these last months his very life was prayer and meditation. No one did I ever know who more intimately realized the awfulness of the dark future than he. His sole trust, hope, and consolation lay in his clear, untroubled faith. All was dark except the great truths of the Catholic religion; but though they did not lighten the darkness, they bridged over for him the abyss. He calmly spoke to me of the solemn, unimaginable wonders which he was soon to see. Now he sees them. Each of us in his own turn will see them soon. May we be prepared to see them as he was!

"With his wife and children round him, and taking their part by turns at his bedside in a perpetual round of prayers, he died, emphatically, in peace, on Wednesday morning, April 23, aged 65. . . . The two last masses, when he was in his bed, he heard from his own son, of the Order of S. Dominic, who also gave him the viaticum, on his second reception of it, on his last morning. He had received extreme unction three days before. He died in the Dominican habit." (Pp. 14, 15.)

Little can be added in words to the touching narrative of one who so knew and loved him, and whose deep affectionateness, full to overflowing, was shown at the funeral sermon of his early pupil and friend. But the full beauty of Mr. Wilberforce's character could only be felt, never described. While full of manliness and steadfast determination, it had that special charm of sweetness and hidden variety which delights us in cultivated womanhood, and never showed its best except to those whom he loved. His intimate friends can all fill up the record with volumes of their own.

He was a gifted writer, and we could have often wished that the years spent in the editorship of the *Weekly Register* had been given to one or two great works, of which he was thoroughly capable. It is doubtful perhaps whether it is consistent with ordinary usage to praise writings which appeared in this REVIEW. We will say briefly, however, that of his seven present essays, "The Formation of Christendom" (a review of Mr. Allies' valuable book), "Champagny's Roman Empire," "Champagny's Cæsars of the Third Century," and "The Gallican Assembly of 1682," are full of historical interest, and are marked not only by the delicate refinement of thorough cultivation, but also by the keenest discernment and an abundant variety of critical knowledge; while two, on "The Church and Napoleon I.," and "Pius VII. at Savona and Fontainebleau," probably contain the best exposition obtainable in so short a compass of the Napoleonic Cæsarism and its failure when in conflict with the Apostolic See.

Blessed Margaret Mary Alacoque. By the Rev. CHARLES B. GARSIDE, M.A. London: Burns & Oates. 1874.

EVER since the wide-spread devotion to the Sacred Heart has manifested itself in so remarkable a way by pilgrimages to Paray, we have been wishing for just such a book as the one which Mr. Garside has now given us. It is well calculated to satisfy the curiosity of Protestants, to stimulate the attention of careless Catholics, and to increase the fervour of those who, while ignorant of the origin of the devotion, have been drawn to it by a supernatural instinct, as the purest expression and interchange of mutual love between God and man. Notwithstanding its very restricted limits, it is a real compendium of the whole subject. Margaret Mary's preparation for her future life is traced from her earliest childhood, as evinced by her "peculiar dread of sin, even before she had any definite idea of its real nature," her lisping entreaties "to be taught how to pray," her infantine delight in kneeling before the Blessed Sacrament, "her thirst for conformity to Christ" in His sufferings, and her consecration of herself to our Lord when only four years old by a vow of chastity. For, as Mr. Garside explains, "the Holy Ghost may imprint on a soul the rudimentary lines of a particular virtue, which the soul itself does not intellectually comprehend;" and thus she "was drawn into the sacred circle of a vow of chastity when she was unable to do more than feel and correspond to a yearning, which she afterwards saw to be the realization of what she would have desired consciously to embrace, had she been capable of then understanding the nature of the promise made by her lips." After a long struggle between her interior vocation and the strong attractions, which her family home and innocent worldly pleasures offered to her joyous, effusive, and intelligent nature, she entered the Convent of the Visitation at Paray in 1671, when she was twenty-three years of age. Henceforth her life was "one amazing series of supernatural cravings on her part, and of internal communications and providential interventions on the part of her Divine Master." Though each vision had its own distinct character and purpose, yet all "were united in one grand spiritual expression," "preparatory to the unfolding of one ineffable mystery—the incomprehensible adorableness, power, mercy, and attraction of the Victim-Heart of God Incarnate." Wonderful and supernatural as were the revelations vouchsafed by our Lord to Margaret Mary, they are even less wonderful and supernatural than the history of the devotion to the Sacred Heart, which, originating with a despised nun amid the contempt and reproaches of her community in an obscure convent in a small country town, has spread without any adequate visible instrument throughout the whole world, thus affording a most striking and irrefragable proof of the indwelling and operation of the Holy Spirit in the Church. Mr. Garside has treated the subject so as to make it practically useful to his readers, and we cannot too strongly recommend his little book to both Catholics and Protestants.

Helpers of the Holy Souls. By CHARLES B. GARSIDE, M.A. London: Burns & Oates. 1874.

IT is consolatory and encouraging to notice, that while monarchs and their anti-Christian counsellors are standing up and raging against the Church, point after point of Christian doctrine and practice are brought forth more prominently, either through their attacks or the supernatural course of Providence, so as to strengthen and purify the faith and devotion of Catholics. Thus it came to pass that about forty years ago, as a child, Eugenie Marie Joseph Smet, was chasing butterflies with her companions in a field at Lille, there was sown in her heart an extraordinary compassion for the souls in Purgatory, which, growing and ripening with her growth in years and grace, brought forth its fruit in 1856 by the foundation in Paris of the Order of the Helpers of the Holy Souls. The members of this community bind themselves, in addition to the three usual religious vows, by a fourth, in which is included what is known as the "heroic vow," "to pray, suffer, and labour for the souls in Purgatory, and offer up in their favour the satisfactory part of their works of mercy, their vows and prayers, and also the indulgences applicable to themselves both during their life and after death." To their constant prayers they add the visiting and tending of the sick poor, and in this labour of love and the spirit of the Cross, which is the banner of their Order, they find ample opportunities for suffering. Affiliated to them are Lady Associates who, though living in their homes, are formally consecrated and join the nuns, as far as is practicable, in their devotions and works of charity, the heroic vow being left optional to them, though its spirit must necessarily manifest itself in the character of their lives. There are also Honorary Members of both sexes, whose only obligations are to say a few short prayers, and contribute at least a small sum to the charitable works of the community. The special object of Mr. Garside's little book, is to bring to the notice of English Catholics a house of the Order lately established at 23, Queen Anne-street, Cavendish-square, and thus to awaken a more general sympathy towards the suffering dead, and give a more practical form to the sorrow of bereaved relatives. It contains a brief life of the Foundress of the Order, which is both interesting and instructive. The Curé d'Ars was the first to encourage her and predict her success. Monseigneur Sibour, Archbishop of Paris, granted the first community many privileges only a few days before the hand of an assassin placed him among the Souls for whom it was praying, working, and suffering. Père Olivaint assisted the Foundress in her agony during the siege of Paris shortly before his own martyrdom. Father Faber, on his deathbed, "eulogized the Order as a powerful means for 'promoting the glory of God;' and Bishop Grant yearned, prayed, and laboured for its introduction into his diocese, that by this means 'a perpetual reparation might radiate from London over the whole of England.'" An appeal, associated with such holy and much-

loved names, on behalf of the apostolate of mercy which, standing between two worlds, offers consolation to the sufferers in both, can scarcely fail to meet with a generous response; and Catholics owe much gratitude to Mr. Garside for his labour of love.

The Dialogues of S. Gregory the Great. An old English Version. Edited by HENRY JAMES COLERIDGE, of the Society of Jesus. Burns & Oates. 1874.

IN the Editor's valuable Preface—which had previously appeared in the *Month* [vol. xviii., p. 321] as one of the series of "Reviews of Famous Books"—there is, besides the account of and criticism on the "Dialogues," an excellent summary of S. Gregory's character and office. His share in the conversion of the Lombards and English alone would have given him a right to the title of Great, and when to that is added his influence in protecting Rome and Italy under the vanishing shadow of the Empire, his theological and literary eminence, and the general nobleness and weight, even of his secular position, his writings must command the diligent study and respect of all ages of the Church. There are few Catholics who, when visiting Rome, have not turned their steps with special veneration and love towards the Cœlian, to wander in the old mosaic-incrusted cloisters with reverent delight, recalling the various incidents of the reception by our own country of the Faith. Standing or kneeling before the marble effigy of this great Pope, we accompany him in spirit to the Forum, when pitifully looking at the golden-haired captive Angles, and resolving on the conversion of the wave-beaten far-off island which he had never seen. We hear him discoursing of England with the monks, and gradually choosing out this one and that for the new missionary labour. We see him entertaining his twelve poor men, and then, on one eventful day, welcoming also that mysterious thirteenth, who seems to come and go as he will, and not to be discerned by the other guests; or we watch him with his troop of bright-eyed boys in choir, instructing and restraining till the grave, sweet austereness of the chant satisfies his devout ear. And once again, there comes before us a more solemn vision; when the vast procession ordered by S. Gregory during the great pestilence seems to enfold the holy city in its interceding embrace, and a majestic figure allows itself to become visible for a little space, sheathing his sword on the great fortress thereafter named from the angelic apparition. And in whatever office or occupation we view him, S. Gregory seems to impress us at once with those attributes of power, magnanimity, and command, which throughout the world's story have combined to compel the title of "Great."

As a writer we must quote F. Coleridge's words of him.

"Almost every one of the literary works of the great Pope has retained its hold upon the Christian mind. His 'Pastoral,' which our own King

Alfred translated, has always been a text-book for the formation of members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy His 'Morals on Job' were almost learnt by heart by such saints as S. Thomas Aquinas and S. Bernard, and, in later days, were the favourite reading of S. Teresa. His 'Homilies on Ezechiel' and on the 'Gospels,' are scarcely less known. And yet for a perfect study of the mind of this great Saint, as well as for a complete picture of the position and work of the Roman Pontiff in his time, we must turn to the fourteen books of his 'Epistles,' in number as many as eight hundred and forty-four : . . . it would hardly be possible to exaggerate their historical value as illustrating the points which we have just mentioned."—(Preface ix.)

The writer goes on to say that if the "Dialogues" were to appear for the first time in our day, they would be greeted with shouts of execration or derision in France, Germany, and England. And there is no doubt that this is perfectly true, and we might add further, that the author would be branded at once as a madman, whose diseased condition of mind needed no further proof than the book he had written. Nor are there now wanting men among ourselves, who are apt to cast some slur upon the publication of miracles and miraculous narratives ; who feel uncomfortable about them ; and would rather that the superhuman and supernatural world was decently veiled and removed out of sight. Far from craving any insight into the realities undreamt of by our philosophy, they would put them aside as visions of the night, unfit for the aspect of broad open day. In all this we must take into account the influence of race, of habits and surroundings, and of intense daily practical labour, absorbing the best energies of life. But all such tendencies should be carefully watched by us, lest the higher and finer elements of the mind should dwindle and wither, and the balance of material and physical life preponderate.

The "Dialogues" consist of four books ; the first treating of sundry miracles occurring to bishops, monks, and other holy persons ; the second, of the life and miracles of S. Bennet or Benedict ; the third, of miracles occurring at an earlier period than those of the first book ; the fourth, of various interesting problems of the soul.

"The character of this last book naturally suggests the mention of the purpose for which S. Gregory employed it after its completion, if that purpose did not actually influence him at the time of its composition. We are told that S. Gregory sent the work to Queen Theodilinda, the Catholic wife of Agilulf, the King of the Lombards, who was still an Arian, and that the book aided powerfully in the conversion both of the king and of his subjects. . . . There was a special reason why, not for the benefit of the Lombards only, a collection of well-authenticated facts should be put forward in relation to the doctrine of the resurrection and the immortality of the soul. The prevalent Arianism, even in countries which had before been Catholic, was, perhaps, far more of a return to heathenism than we are apt to suppose ; and it is certain that the old doctrine of the Sadducees, who 'say there is no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit,' was received by the Arians. S. Gregory, when Nuncio at the Imperial Court, had to hold a controversy with Eutychius himself, the Patriarch of Constantinople, on the kindred question of the reality of the body after resurrection, of which controversy he gives an account in his 'Morals on Job.'"—(Preface xv. xvi.)

The "Dialogues" are supposed to take place between S. Gregory and Peter the deacon, whom he "loved most entirely," and used as his "companion in the study of Sacred Scripture." According to his "Introduction," S. Gregory was one day sitting sadly, grieving over the loss to his soul of his usual repose and contemplation by being immersed in the cares and temporal business of the monastery, when Peter came to ask him if he had heard any bad news. Then, after discoursing at some length on the decay of virtue brought about by material concerns, S. Gregory proposes to give an account of the contemplative men with whose lives he had become acquainted, and the wonders they had wrought, which he proceeds to do through about a dozen chapters, out of which a selection for children or conventual reading might be well made.

The second book, however, is to our mind, by far the most absorbing section of these miraculous stories; for to this portion is attached the intense interest lying about the life and work of the great founder of the Benedictines. Men who pay reverence—and reverence is largely due—to ancient dynasties, long-established forms of government, and antique greatness adorned with illustrious deeds and names, may well delight in the life of S. Bennet, the founder of a dynasty and a constitutional rule spreading unchanged over near upon fourteen hundred years. In fact, the history of this magnificent stream of intellectual contemplatives embraces incidentally, from the fifth century, the history of Christendom; and as we touch upon the stories of the abbots in charge of the great Benedictine Abbeys throughout Europe, we find that underlying kingdom gathering within itself the chief secular events, and thus forming a modern history of its own. In the "Dialogues," we are, of course, only at the source of this vast stream, and the thirty-eight chapters contain the miracles of S. Bennet's own life. Passing over the thirty-eight chapters also composing the third book, in which are various beautiful examples of miraculous intervention, the fourth book claims our notice by the great interest of its answers to various spiritual questions. Such as that there are three kinds of spirits with life; one without bodies, as angels; one with bodies, but not dying with them, as men; one whom the spirit dies with the body, as animals; and other subjects on death and the soul. This latter portion of the "Dialogues" is full of curious matter, and the whole book yields the most abundant proof—if more proof were needed—that not only in doctrine, which, however freshly-developed and expounded, must remain always unchangeable, but also in minute details of tone and feeling, the Church of Gregory the Great is the Church of Pius IX.

Bioplasm: a Contribution to the Physiology of Life. By LIONEL S. BEALE, M.B., F.R.S., &c. London: J. & A. Churchill.

IN this most valuable work Dr. Beale gives an organized recapitulation of some of the principal results of those well known investigations of his on the nature of vital phenomena and the constitution of living bodies, by which he has to all appearances opened a new era for Biological science. "Bioplasm" is cast into the form of twelve lectures and divided into numbered paragraphs, a list of microscopical preparations illustrating the subject or subjects treated of being given at the end of each lecture. These lists, taken together with the numerous wood-engravings by which the text is accompanied, will afford valuable indications to any one desirous of preparing a collection of analogous specimens.

In an organized body we may select for consideration either that more massive structure which ordinary descriptive anatomy has for its subject matter, or the manner in which this massive structure is built up by the cells or ultimate organized parts of which it is seen by microscopical observation to be composed. It is this latter part of the subject that is treated of in "Bioplasm."

The typical cell is a minute closed bag, bounded externally by the cell wall or pavenchyma, which is an extremely thin and structureless membrane, of greater or less consistency, and permeable, more or less slowly, by liquids. At the centre of the cell, or it may be at some point near or close to its surface, is the nucleus or cytoblast, a spherical or ovoid solid or semisolid body, within which an inner nucleus or nucleolus may sometimes be detected. The substances—liquid, solid, or semisolid, as the case may be—which occupy the space intervening between the pavenchyma and the cytoblast may be distinguished into three sorts: firstly, nutritive matter in solution which has filtered through the cell wall, but has not been as yet made use of; secondly, effete matter which has not yet departed; and thirdly, the living matter itself, which is nourished by the first and produces the second (which is therefore called "formed matter") as the result of those changes which constitute its life,—the germinal matter, sarcode, protoplasm, which has of late become so famous, and of which the nucleus appears to be but a more distinct central accumulation. This protoplasm is what Dr. Beale calls bioplasm, and a single piece of bioplasm, such as is found in the interior of a living cell, he denominates a bioplast. The following passages will give a fair introductory idea of the opinions which in these lectures he propounds regarding it:—

"I shall have to direct attention to some facts which have led me to conclude that certain phenomena manifested by part of the material substance of which all living things are composed, are peculiar to the living world; that between the *living* state of matter and its *non-living* state there is an absolute and irreconcilable difference; that, so far from our being able to demonstrate that the *non-living* passes by gradations into, or gradually assumes the state or condition of, the *living*, the transition is

sudden and abrupt; and that matter already in the living state may pass into the non-living condition in the same sudden and complete manner; that, while in all living things chemical and physical actions occur, there are other actions, as essential as they are peculiar to life, which, so far from being of this nature, are opposed to, and are capable of overcoming, physical and chemical attractions. And I think the evidence which I shall adduce will prove conclusively that the *non-living matter* is the seat of the physical and chemical phenomena occurring in living beings, but that the *vital* actions occur in the living matter only. Moreover, we shall see that this living matter, which exists in every living thing in nature, can be easily distinguished from matter in the non-living state. . . .

"Even man and the higher animals, as well as every other living thing, begins its life as a minute spherical particle, hardly to be distinguished from those minute particles of simple living matter suspended in the air. The particle consists of colourless transparent semifluid matter capable of moving in every part and in all directions. Man and animals, plants, fungi, monads, thus exhibit the same appearances, and the matter of which they consist exhibits similar characters. Each primitive particle was derived from matter like it which existed before it. It was simply detached from a parent mass.

"I hope to convince you that all form, colour, structure, mechanism, observed at a later period in the life-history of living beings, result from changes in this primary structureless, colourless material. This primary matter of living beings which looks like mere jelly or a little clear gum or syrup, exhibits actions and undergoes changes unlike those occurring in every other kind of matter known to us. . . . This wonderful matter to which I shall have frequently to refer in every part of this volume, *moves* and *grows*. Everything else in nature may be *moved* and *caused to increase* by aggregation—by particles being added to those already collected; but this alone of all matter in the world moves towards lifeless matter, incorporates it with itself, and communicates to it in some way we do not in the least understand, its own transcendently wonderful properties. . . . It may be correctly called *living* or *forming* matter, for by its agency every kind of living thing is made. . . . As the *germ* of every living thing consists of matter having the wonderful properties already mentioned, I have called it germinal matter; but the most convenient and least objectionable name for it is living *plasma* or *bioplasm* (*βίος*, life; *πλάσμα*, plasm, that which is capable of being fashioned). Bioplasm is found in every tissue in every part of the living body as long as life lasts.

"The matter which I have termed *forming*, *living*, or *germinal matter*, to which I have more recently given the name *bioplasm*, has been lately spoken of by others as *protoplasm*. And it has been hinted, though not definitely stated in print, that in my memoirs I had simply altered the name of matter which had been previously described by others. But such is not the fact, as the most influential of my opponents well know. The word *protoplasm* would have been used by me had the term been restricted to the matter of the tissues which I termed living or germinal matter, and which I showed, in my lectures at the College of Physicians in 1861, underwent conversion into formed matters, and was concerned in forming all tissues. But under the term *protoplasm* has been included the contractile tissue of muscle, the axis cylinder of the nerve fibres, processes of nerve cells, and many other textures which undoubtedly consist of *formed* material, and are undoubtedly destitute of the properties which invariably belong to my 'germinal matter,' or *bioplasm*."—"Bioplasm," pp. 3-9.

Dr. Beale here subjoins in a note some criticisms, which will be read with interest, on Mr. Huxley's use of the word *protoplasm*.

All cells are not typical cells; and this living or germinal matter, bioplasm, or, if protoplasm be taken as having the same denotation as bioplasm, protoplasm is now believed to be the essential element of the cell. An investing membrane is generally found to surround the bioplasm, which in some cases, however, is naked, and from more exact investigation of the growth of cells it appears that the cell wall is formed round itself by the included protoplasm, and is the result either of its vital activity or of the death of its outer portion on account of cold, dryness, &c.: the coating thus produced helping to protect the living bioplasm remaining within. In many cases, moreover, as in mucus, the substance which the bioplast accumulates round itself cannot with propriety be called membrane at all. The nucleus, also, is, it appears, necessary neither to the existence nor even to the division of the cell. In some cells, as in those of *Chara*, an aquatic plant of low organization, it is absent altogether; and, as has been already said, it may when present be regarded as a central accumulation of the germinal matter. Its presence appears to be necessary to the manifestation of a high but not of a low form of vital activity.

"The nucleus," says Dr. Beale, "may be regarded as a new centre which has arisen in a pre-existing centre. In many masses of matter there are, indeed, two or three series of centres, one within the other. No one centre (nucleus) there may be a vast number of new centres (nucleoli). . . . The vital power or force, whatsoever its nature may be, always manifests itself in a direction *from* centres,—particles of living matter move invariably in this direction, and as they move farther and farther away from the centre, their *vital* power diminishes, but new centres possessing increased vital power make their appearance. These new centres seem to acquire new power while they remain apparently quiescent. The process of acquiring vital power, the development of nuclei with high vital endowments, and the process of taking up a large quantity of pabulum, the rapid increase and multiplication of germinal matter, are opposed to each other."

Thus, eliminating nucleus and investing membrane, and eliminating also all other kinds of matter which the bioplast produces, and all pabulum or nutritive matter by which it is nourished, there is left only bioplasm itself, as the fundamental basis from which all organisms, whether of plants or of animals, are built up. This bioplasm is a substance of very complex chemical constitution, as may be gathered from the circumstance that it is an albuminoid substance or "proteid," and that an albumen molecule is itself composed, according to the modern chemical theory, of no less than four hundred molecules of carbon, six hundred and twenty of hydrogen, two hundred and forty of oxygen, fifty of nitrogen, one or two of sulphur, and, according to some, a little phosphorus. The mathematical theory of permutations will give some idea of the infinity of ways in which these molecules might be arranged. The resulting bioplasm is a colloid substance, glue or jelly-like, colourless, transparent, generally containing a number of small granules which are suspended in it as dust in water, and presenting no other indication of structure or make than that under the highest powers of the microscope it appears as if composed of a multitude of minute spheres. A colloid body, as distinguished from a crystalloid, is

a body incapable of being crystallized, passing, when dissolved, through membranes with difficulty, and generally of unstable equilibrium. We do not, however, here use the expression unstable equilibrium precisely as it is used in physics, but in the sense in which it may be found employed in books on chemistry, in which a substance is said to be unstable, or of unstable equilibrium, when, like chloride of nitrogen or water at its boiling point, it is readily decomposed, or readily passes from one state to another. A bioplast is pre-eminently in a state of unstable equilibrium in this sense of the word. It has not, as crystallizable matter has, any tendency to assume a form bounded by straight lines, but, like water and other fluids, tends, when small in size, to assume a form which is spheroidal. It does not, when alive pass through the substance, although it may pass through the interstices of membranes; but, after it dies, the matter of which it was composed may pass through the cell-wall, leaving in the place where it was a free space or vacuole filled by gaseous or watery matter.

The perpetual drain on the bioplasts which arises from the changes of which the production of effete matter is the result, needs to be compensated by some supply from without. Living matter, if placed under certain conditions as regards light, heat, and moisture, and at the same time in contact with fluid holding in solution certain compounds, increases in amount, while presenting the same appearance qualitatively. The matter which is added and becomes part of the bioplast cannot after its incorporation be distinguished from the rest. In other words, the living matter takes up non-living and converts it into living matter. This is nutrition; and non-living matter capable of being thus taken up, or, as the word is, assimilated, is called pabulum or nutritive matter. Where the bioplast is surrounded by formed matter, it either protrudes in order to take up pabulum, or draws its nourishment through the formed matter which encircles it. If the waste is in excess of the accretion through nutrition, it shrinks until the balance is re-established, or until it dies for want of nourishment. If, on the contrary, the accretion is in excess of the waste, it divides, after it has reached a certain size, into two or more parts, each of which is now a distinct bioplast. Sometimes, however, the amount of division is out of all proportion to the increase in size. Reproduction, in the sense in which the term may be used of a bioplast, is the production by a bioplast of another bioplast like itself; and if the division of a nerve-bioplast or a muscle-bioplast is not a reproduction of the organism, it is none the less a reproduction of the kind of bioplasts concerned.

Certain movements observable in living protoplasm appear to stand in close connection with these processes. At any point of the protoplast protrusions may arise and be retracted; its shape alters from minute to minute, so that it may remind the observer of a piece of putty moved from within by some living creature contained in it, or moulded from without by an invisible hand. "One part of the bioplasm," says Dr. Beale, "could be seen to move in advance of another part, or over it, as it were, or through it, just as if the mass of living matter consisted of colourless fluid, every part of which had the capacity of movement, and at the same time. One part could be seen to move, as it were, into or through another

part, in one case blending partially or completely, in another remaining apparently distinct from the rest." These strange movements (which may be well seen in some vegetable organisms and in the white blood corpuscles of the frog), whatever their cause may be, have obviously the effect of bringing to the surface of the protoplasmic mass different portions of its substance in succession, thus facilitating the reception of pabulum on the one hand, and the removal of effete matter on the other.

This effete matter is probably sometimes the result of the death of a portion of the germinal matter by which it was produced, and sometimes a kind of secretion, the result of the continual waste which the bioplast by the act of living suffers. If it is readily soluble, or the bioplast in free contact with surrounding fluids, it may be carried away as fast as produced. This is the case in some animals of low type, which are simply bits of this animated jelly. They have no limbs or organs of sense, skin, stomach, nervous system, or other organs; they are simply transparent pieces of bioplasm, in which a larger or smaller number of granules are suspended. A clear space or spaces is also visible for the most part, and in some species the largest of these spaces is seen to appear and quite or almost quite disappear with tolerable regularity. When one of these creatures moves apart—any part—of its substance bulges out, and after extending itself to a longer or shorter distance, contracts, drawing the rest of the creature after it. Any part of it torn or cut off sets up for itself and becomes a separate animal. When it meets any animal or vegetable substance in the course of the curious creeping, rolling, flowing movements which it executes, it stretches itself over and finally surrounds it, thus forming a sort of extemporized stomach of what immediately before was its outer surface. The residue appears at any part of the surface, and is carried away by the surrounding fluid, or detached by the subsequent movements of the little bioplast. But in cases where the effete matter is entirely or partially insoluble, or the bioplast confined within a restricted space, the effete matter may accumulate in the substance or round the exterior of the living matter which formed it; it is then called formed matter or formed material. Thus, for instance, the starch in the cells of plants gathers together in little grains within the bioplasts by which it was formed, and destroys it by its accumulation, so that we may have cells which in the end contain nothing but starch. Or the formed material may be heaped round the bioplast. It may aggregate on the interior surface of the cell wall, and destroy the life of the little bioplast within by cutting it off from its sources of nourishment, or, as some adipose tissue, may simply push it to one side. If no cell wall exists, the formed material will simply accumulate round the bioplasts, pushing them farther and farther apart, as is the case in cartilage and bone.

As a consequence of these processes there exists in all but the humblest and most minute living beings, in which the protoplasmic surface is everywhere freely bathed by the circumambient liquid, a relatively large proportion of formed material. In this way some of the cells of plants become filled with the matter which gives to leaves their colour; in others oil, sugar, starch, or other compounds accumulate; others come to contain the

peculiar principles, the essential oils or the "alkaloids" which give to particular plants their odour or medicinal properties, or their value as bread-making materials, or those physical qualities of hardness, elasticity, &c., which make them useful in other ways to man. The formed material is retained within the organism because it happens to be of a nature which resists decomposition, and because there does not happen to be any way of getting rid of it. In some of these cases, moreover, the formed material may be of no advantage to the plant itself. Its formation may be the simple consequence of the life of certain kinds of bioplasts which uniformly exist in that species of plant, or the necessary concomitant of the formation of some other kind of formed material which it is necessary or advantageous to it to possess; and it would thus be analogous to the waste of a chemical factory or the slag of an iron furnace. In other cases, however, the "formed material" is useful to the organism, either as giving it the necessary consistency (as with the woody fibre of plants, and the bony or cartilaginous matter of animals), or (as in the case of animal fats and oils) as constituting a reservoir of food to be drawn upon in case of necessity, or as material to be used up in chemical or other processes, or as in some other way ministering to the general welfare. No difference to speak of can be detected between the bioplasin which produces one kind of formed material and the bioplasm which produces another. The characteristic differences between the various tissues,—as woody tissue, muscle, nerve, horn, adipose tissue, bone, &c.,—are due, not to any perceptible differences in the bioplasm which produces them and is found in them all alike, but to the different qualities of the formed material which they respectively produce. From this it may be gathered how immense is the proportion of formed material in *e.g.* the human organism.

We are now in a position fully to understand the opinions propounded by Dr. Beale. The formally vital phenomena presented by any living being are according to him entirely confined to its bioplasm, and the phenomena of nutrition, of the formation of formed material, movement, and subdivision, which living bioplasm exhibits, are formally vital phenomena. They cannot be produced by any chemical, electrical, or quasi-electrical agency, but must be attributed to something above and beyond, which for the sake of giving it a name may be called vital power, residing in the bioplasts. The changes, on the other hand, which take place in the formed material are of an exclusively physical or chemical character.

These conclusions, Dr. Beale considers, naturally grow out of the latest and most accurate researches on the tissues; and by their assistance he endeavours in these lectures to explain, *i.e.*, to bring under general laws, what has been observed by himself and others. Thus the growth of a root is explained to be caused by the progress of a bioplast through soil containing nutrient matter. It leaves a train of formed material, which is the root-filament, behind it. A hair is in like manner formed material produced by a bioplast in the hair-follicle from which it issues. Muscular tissue is formed material, bioplasts passing along the interior of the fibrils and leaving in their wake filaments of contractile or muscular tissue, the waste consequent on repeated contractions being repaired by this means.

We must now take leave of Dr. Beale's extremely interesting book ; and in conclusion shall remark only that the *synergy* of the bioplasts, their co-ordination into an organism, appears to us to furnish a far more striking proof of the action of a "vital power" than do the phenomena exhibited by the individual bioplasts.

Darwinism and Design ; or, Creation by Evolution. By GEORGE ST. CLAIR, F.G.S., M.A.I., &c. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1873. [12mo., pp. i-xii, 1-253.]

THE Darwinian theory undoubtedly offers to an infidel many temptations to believe in it independently of its truth or falsehood ; nor is it surprising if those who set aside the account of the origination of the world given in revelation, should look for a substitute in the physical theory of evolution. It is, however, a very considerable advantage, in the interest both of fairness and of Christianity, that Darwinism numbers among its supporters very many who cannot be charged with any ill-feeling to religion. It thus gains a fairer hearing from religious men, and the credit of the infidel interpretation of it is diminished. Those Darwinians who deny the truths of Christianity do not like to press the theory too much into their service, for fear of alienating other and perhaps powerful supporters of it ; and on the other hand, Christian apologists who are opposed to Darwinism are, to the undeniable benefit of religion, restrained from making haphazard accusations against it, by the feeling that if these accusations were really founded in fact, So-and-So or So-and-So would have ceased to maintain it. Mr. St. Clair is a Darwinian, and the purpose of his Essay is, as he tells us in its opening chapter, "to illustrate the Wisdom and Beneficence of the Almighty in the evolution of living things." He sets out by attacking the opinion of Herbert Spencer and others, that God is Unknowable (pp. 1-14) ; and after giving a popular account of the heads of evidence in favour of evolutionism (pp. 15-106), concludes by examining its religious bearings (pp. 107-253).

An evolution theory—*i.e.* a theory which excludes the action of unconditioned Will from the universe—may, according to the basis from which it starts and the nature of the evolution-process which it supposes, be either *metaphysical* (as the systems of Schelling and Hegel), or physical. The *physical* theory of evolution (which assumes as the basis of the evolution a nebula, and as the laws of the process the laws of matter and force) naturally divides itself into three parts, answering to the three great divisions of the known universe—inorganic nature, life, and mind,—which have to be evolved. The physical theory of inorganic evolution has to explain how, by the operation of known laws of nature, inorganic nature may have been formed from a primeval nebula, and has also to explain how this primeval nebula came to be in such a condition that inorganic nature could have been evolved from it. The theory of vital evolution, in the first

place, supposes that life originated in a few simple forms by Spontaneous Generation, which is thus an essential part of the evolution-theory. It then offers explanations as to how the entire vegetable and animal kingdoms may have been derived from these primitive living beings; and in this it has two things to do. Firstly, it has to supply evidence that the higher and more complex species may have been formed from the lower and more simple (evidence of transmutation). Secondly, it has to point out some agency by which this transmutation may have been effected (evidence of natural selection, or whatever it may be). It is at this point, we may observe, that Darwinism comes in: Darwinism, the theory that transmutation is effected chiefly by natural selection, being one of several theories as to the agency effecting transmutation. The theory of vital evolution, let us suppose, will account for life in all its forms, including the body of man, and excluding only whatever of mind is bound up with life in its higher manifestations. This gap is filled up by the theory of mental evolution, the third great division of the evolution theory, of which it is the function, firstly, to explain how mind* first originated in its most rudimentary shape in the lower animals, and secondly, to show how the higher forms of intelligence, and among them the human mind itself, may have been evolved, by the action of (psychical) natural and mental selection and correlation of (psychical) growth, from such a mental germ as is thus postulated. With the conclusions of these three divisions of evolutionism may be worked in a theory of human evolution, devoting itself to the specially interesting subject of the evolution of man both as to his body and as to his mind, of the different races of mankind with their respective physical and mental characteristics, of languages, customs, society, arts, sciences, from the most remote and least civilized periods of which recent historical investigations give us any knowledge, down to the present day. Portions of this part of the theory are treated of in such works as, *e.g.*, Sir John Lubbock's "Prehistoric Man."

The theological difficulties (to call them by no stronger name) which have arisen out of evolutionism are connected with either its general principle, or the results of the application of that general principle as a key to unlock the secrets of this or that department of the universe. The exclusion of unconditioned will from the universe annihilates, not only free-will on the one hand and miracles on the other, but, if strictly carried out, any divine interposition even in the original constitution of the universe itself; and therefore in a physical theory of evolution leaves no ground wherefrom to prove the existence or the attributes of the Deity, and in a metaphysical theory of evolution allows of no more than Pantheism. The theories of inorganic, of vital, and of mental evolution, which are the logical results of the application of this principle, are, like the ethical system and the ideal of attainment consequent on their acceptance, charged with special difficulties more or less urgent.

Under these circumstances, leaving almost untouched the theories of

* The words "mind," "mental," are here used *lato sensu*, for the sake of consistently explaining the theory.

inorganic and of mental evolution,* Mr. St. Clair has selected for the subject of his Essay the bearings of the transmutation theory of the origin of species (which is what he means by Darwinism, although there are other transmutation theories besides that of Mr. Darwin), on the physico-theological argument for the existence of God, which is chiefly drawn from the existence of ends in nature.† Against this argument three objections have recently been brought prominently forward. Of these the first is directed against the manner in which it employs that important logical instrument, the hypothesis: but of this objection and the reply to it Mr. St. Clair does not treat, perhaps because evolutionism leaves both objection and reply precisely where it found them.‡ A second objection is, that the

* The theory of inorganic evolution is briefly sketched in pp. 15—34; and the concluding chapter, pp. 232—253, expounds, from an evolutionist point of view, some of the moral bearings of evolution.

† The existence of order and regularity in nature evidently strengthens the argument derived from the existence of ends. Especial and unmerited reliance has, however, been of late placed in this country on a particular set of instances of such regularity,—the existence of types or plans of structure on which entire subkingdoms of the vegetable and animal kingdoms have been constructed; and it is alleged that the resultant phenomena of organization can be explained only by supposing that these types existed as archetypal ideas in the Divine mind. This, the homological portion of the physicotheological argument, is of comparatively recent origin (its pretty wide dissemination being chiefly due to the high reputation of Professor Owen, who propounded it), and is considered by many Theists to be not at all satisfactory. It is ably criticised by Herbert Spencer in his “Principles of Biology,” and is briefly noticed on pp. 140—142 of Mr. St. Clair’s Essay, which is, therefore, almost exclusively occupied by the teleological portion of the argument.

‡ An hypothesis being a supposition made to account for observed phenomena, what is supposed may be that the phenomena in question are due either to a known cause acting according to an unknown law (*hypothesis de lege*), or to an unknown cause acting according to a known law (*hypothesis de causâ*). The Newtonian hypothesis as to the law of decrease of the attraction of gravitation is an example of an hypothesis of the first kind; the atomic theory of modern chemistry, the dynamical theory of heat, the theory that the sensations and sense-percepts which we attribute to the action of our fellow-creatures are really to be explained by supposing that other conscious beings besides ourselves actually exist, the Cartesian theory of vortices, the undulatory theory of light, are examples of hypotheses of the second kind. Of whichever kind they are, hypotheses have to be proved or *verified* by showing, not only that the supposition made will account for the phenomena, but also that *no other supposition will do so*; and in regard of the second of these points a considerable difficulty exists as to the verification of *hypotheses de causâ*. This difficulty is that there may conceivably be in the universe any number of causes about which we know nothing. Say that we are acquainted with a ten-thousandth part of the existing causes, and that among those with which we are acquainted there is only one, *i.e.* undulations, which will produce the phenomena of light. The undulatory hypothesis would in that case be the only hypothesis which we should be competent to make. But it would not for that reason be objectively true: for among the unknown causes there might be ten thousand from the action of any one

mechanical laws of nature are competent of themselves to have produced those adaptations of means and ends which we observe in nature, so that it is no longer admissible to call in the now superfluous principle of conscious design to account for them. In this objection the nebular theory as far as inorganic nature is concerned, and natural and sexual selection as to the worlds of life and mind, are pitted against design. The nebular theory may be used to answer De Morgan's argument;* and to any one who carefully considers the nature of natural and sexual selection it will become obvious that if these causes of organic change could be proved to have acted in any given case, they would of themselves produce at least many of the adaptations of means to ends which it might present.† Hence arises the difficulty. Let a teleologist argue for design from, for instance, the white colour of Arctic or Antarctic animals, which, by increasing the difficulty of getting sight of them, is both a protection from their natural enemies and an advantage to them in catching their prey: the evolutionist will reply that there is no reason whatever to suppose that there was any design in the matter, since what really happened simply was that animals which were of any other colour than white were at a disadvantage in the struggle for life, and were consequently killed off by natural selection. In other cases analogous replies, which the reader will be able without difficulty to imagine for himself, would be given; and an ingenious comparison has been made, to fill the imagination with the idea that self-adjusting natural causes, such as natural and sexual selection are, may produce results which have every appearance of having been designed.‡

of which the phenomena of light might result. Now the design argument is essentially an hypothesis *de causâ*—an hypothesis that the adaptations of means and ends which we observe in nature were produced—not by known causes (matter and force) acting according to unknown laws imagined for the occasion, but by an unknown cause (a powerful, wise, and good being) acting according to the laws according to which, in so far as we can see, such a Being would have acted in the formation of the universe. It is, therefore, open to the objection, "How do you know that there are in the universe no other causes capable of producing the effects which you attribute to conscious design?" But the entire rejection of hypotheses *de causâ* would involve denial of the existence, not only of God but of every other conscious being—except the denier himself.

* De Morgan, "On Probabilities," pp. 25—28.

† Cf. DUBLIN REVIEW, April, 1874, pp. 476, 477.

‡ "Let us suppose a person totally ignorant of modern geology to study carefully a great river system. He finds in the lower part a deep broad channel filled to the brim, flowing slowly through a flat country, and carrying out to the sea a quantity of fine sediment. Higher up it branches into a number of smaller channels, flowing alternately through flat valleys and between high banks; sometimes he finds a deep rocky bed with perpendicular walls carrying the water through a chain of hills; where the stream is narrow he finds it deep, where wide, shallow. Further up still he comes to a mountainous region with hundreds of streams and rivulets, each with its temporary rills and gulleys collecting the water from every square mile of surface, and every channel adapted to the water that it has to carry. He finds that the bed of every branch, and stream, and rivulet

In reply to this second objection, two lines of argument may be taken. In the first place it may be answered that there are adaptations and marks of design which natural and sexual selection cannot account for. Take for instance the instinctive movements of sucking in the young of mammalian animals, the secretion of milk by their mothers, and their instinctive love for their young. What became of them during those long ages in which the love of their parents for them, the secretion of milk, and their own instinctive propensity to suck, was being slowly developed from infinitesimal beginnings by natural selection? This line of argument, which is that which in the Darwinian controversy is usually called the teleological argument, cannot, however, be taken by a Darwinian. For the thoroughgoing disciple of Mr. Darwin there is, nevertheless, a second line of argument, which is, that sexual and natural selection are not in reality subversive of teleology rightly understood; but, on the other hand, are the natural foundation for a much deeper and more effective teleology than the ordinary way of looking at the subject can supply. The design argument, in its older form, insists on the wisdom and foresight necessary to fashion separately, and by distinct acts, each species of plants and animals. But how immensely greater (a Christian transmutationist might say) must have been the wisdom and foresight necessary by one single *fiat* so to fashion a nebula composed of but a few constituents and governed by a few simple laws, that from it should be evolved, each in its place, and all when complete forming one great harmonious whole, those unnumbered species, in all their multiplicity, variety, and beauty, and each with its marks of individual care, the world they were to inhabit, the sun to give them warmth and light, the inorganic substances necessary to minister to their wants. This is, of course, the ground taken by Mr. St. Clair, who insists that "the primary design must be credited with the

has a steeper and steeper slope as it approaches its source, and is thus enabled to carry off the water from heavy rains, and to bear away the stones, and pebbles, and gravel that would otherwise block up its course. In every part of this system he would see exact adaptation of means to an end. He would say that this system of channels must have been designed, it answers its purpose so effectually. Nothing but a mind could have so exactly adapted the slopes of the channels, their capacity and frequency, to the nature of the soil and the quantity of the rainfall. Again, he would see special adaptation to the wants of man in broad, quiet navigable rivers through fertile alluvial plains that would support a large population, while the rocky streams and mountain torrents were confined to those sterile regions suitable only to a small population of shepherds and herdsmen. He would listen with incredulity to the geologist who assured him that the adaptation and adjustment he so admired was an inevitable result of general laws. That the rains and rivers, aided by subterranean forces, had formed the hills and valleys, had scooped out the river-beds and levelled the plains; and it would be only after much patient observation and study . . . that he could be made to understand that the surface of the earth, however beautiful and harmonious it may appear, is strictly due in every detail to the action of forces which are demonstrably self-adjusting."—A. W. Wallace, "Creation by Law," in "Quarterly Journal of Science," October, 1867.

whole of the final issue"; that "whatever can be said of the appearances of design in things as they exist, can be said of the conditions which were their necessary prelude, the means of their production"; and, following a Quarterly Reviewer, that it is impossible to suppose that the creator of the rudimental germ could, after myriads of ages, awake out of sleep and be astonished at the result.* This, he tells us, is that wider teleology which as science deepens and expands, will take the place of the ancient and mediæval teleology which is decaying before our eyes.†

The new teleology, however, is not without its difficulties. When we think of the way in which natural selection acts, it does not seem so obvious that "the primary design is to be credited with the whole of the final issue." It may be objected that the reason why mere chance has been judged insufficient to account for the appearances of design in organic nature is that, granting that if chance ruled there would be lucky chances which once in a way might look as if design had been at work, there would also be unlucky chances, which would mar the effect of the happy ones and even destroy them; but that if a mechanically-acting agency existed which would kill off the unhappy chances as fast as they occurred, but separate and preserve the happy ones (which would thus accumulate from age to age), all the effect of design would be at last produced by chance; and that in natural and sexual selection such an agency has actually been discovered. Even so, however, we admire machines which do what we had thought could not be done by mere machinery; and surely wisdom and forethought were needed to think of an automatic principle such as natural selection, and capable of doing what it is asserted to do. But there is more than this. Natural selection (and the same must be said of sexual selection, while one or other of these two principles must move first before the principle of correlation of growth can stir an inch) is a mere sieve to sift variations, to separate the useful from the useless; if the variations do not occur, it can do nothing; it has no power to produce variations; and the extent and character of the progress made by its action is therefore absolutely and utterly dependent on the accidental occurrence of appropriate variations, over the occurrence of which it has at the same time no manner of control. But these so-called accidental variations are not, of course, accidental in the sense that they are uncaused. Nor is the truth fully expressed by saying simply that they may or may not occur; for in mechanically-acting forces there is no *may*, there is only *will* and *will not*. Moreover, the cause of a variation is, in every case, something external to the organism which varies, and this something must, according to evolutionism, have had its determining cause in the constitution of the primordial nebula. Thus

* "Quart. Rev.," July, 1869; art. "The Argument of Design."

† "It is necessary to remember that there is a wider teleology, which is not touched by the doctrine of evolution, but is actually based on the fundamental proposition of evolution."—Prof. Huxley, "Academy," 1869.

the secret spring which sets in motion that complex machinery of laws and forces by which, according to transmutationism, species move onward, is, not natural selection, but the occurrence of variations each of which was, according to the evolution theory, determined by the collocation of causes in the primordial nebula which also determined that constitution of external nature in virtue of which the variation was useful or useless, rejected or selected by natural selection. On such collocation of causes the "wider teleology" is founded.

The first of the three objections against the teleological argument endeavours, as we have seen, to undermine that argument by a plea that no positive proof can be offered that the design hypothesis is the only-supposition which is objectively possible; the second, as we have also seen, seeks to overthrow it by pitting against it another hypothesis (that of natural selection), which it is asserted will explain everything that can be explained by design; and the third objection, which we have now to consider, is intended to complete its destruction by bringing forward a multitude of phenomena which naturally fall in with evolution, but are, it is foolishly asserted, irreconcilable with design. If these three objections could be sustained, it is evident that the argument from design, considered as a separate and independent argument for the existence of God, would have to be abandoned as possessing neither of the qualifications (indicated in a previous note) of a sound hypothesis.

The arguments made use of in the third objection may be divided into two classes, the first class being grounded on instances which are not specially connected with evolutionism, but have been pressed into the service of "dysteleology" by evolutionists who happened to be opposed to teleology. Of this nature are the arguments against design drawn from the existence of death, disease, and pain, and the physical or biological occasions of moral evil; from the existence of poisonous and otherwise useless plants, of stinging and venomous animals, of the carnivora, of parasites, and the like. These and similar arguments, however, generally lead up to the question of the permission of evil, with which (the writer of this notice believes) the argument from design has nothing whatever to do; for it seems to be the function of that great initial argument to prove simply the existence of a Designer, leaving creation properly so called, and the infinity and moral attributes of God, to be proved in other ways.* These objections, therefore, are not in reality objections against the design argument, and, if they were, evolutionism could scarcely be held responsible for them, inasmuch as they were both propounded and replied to, much in the same way as now, before ever evolutionism was heard of.† It

* Cf. Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics," i. 32, 33. Design producing happiness, and design producing pain, have both to be explained, as to their moral bearing, by the moral argument.

† This class of objections is treated separately on pp. 197-205, after which (pp. 205-231) come sections proving that the divine beneficence is directly shown in the mechanism of transmutation:—in heredity, variability, correlation, sexual selection, &c. What we have called the second objection is, imperfectly, answered on pp. 125-136; and pp. 136-195

may even be suggested that evolutionism supplies a means of breaking the force of such objections which the theory of special creations does not possess: for while according to the theory of special creation, *e.g.* each species of parasites was carefully designed of set purpose, according to the theory of evolution they were the result of general laws which may be conceived to have been set in motion because they would work well on the whole, although a certain amount of incidental evil might accidentally and temporarily be mixed up with the result. And thus in regard of this incidental evil there does not arise the question, "Why was it deliberately inflicted?" but only the far less urgent question, "Why was not this deduction from the general good somehow or other avoided?" P. 200.

The difficulties of the second class are drawn from regions which transmutationists have made peculiarly their own; their solution is more difficult, because they so strongly suggest the evolutionist interpretation that they have been taken as part of the proof of the theory of vital evolution; and it is more urgent, since, being difficulties not pressed into their service from without, but spontaneously rising out of their theory, they are principally relied on by evolutionists. To explain. There exists, in almost complete independence of all discussions as to any agency by which transmutation may have been effected, a body of evidence offered to show that it has been effected somehow. This body of evidence is composed of arguments drawn from the classification of living beings, from their distribution in space, from their distribution in time, and from structural peculiarities which they present in some part of their organization or at some period of their history. To take the last of these four heads of evidence. It often happens that the embryos of animals temporarily present peculiarities which are permanent in other species, from the like of which they may be imagined to have been descended: thus, for instance, the human embryo has at one time branchial arches like a fish, and foetal guinea-pigs have teeth which are shed before they are born. Now why, if the teeth are never to be used, should they generation after generation be produced? It is obvious that facts of this description (and more or less analogous facts may be collected in abundance from the phenomena of classification and distribution in time and space) are at least at first sight opposed to the theory of special creation, and that not, like the cases of the first class, for general reasons merely, but in a pointed and especial manner. They are explained by evolutionists on the striking and perhaps somewhat strained hypothesis that the peculiarities in question were at first present, because of inheritance from remote ancestors, but that they afterwards atrophied or aborted, because of contrary inheritance from more recent ancestors. But "Nothing," it is objected, "Nothing could be more unworthy of a Supreme Intelligence than this inability to construct an organism at once, without previously making several tentative efforts, undoing to-day what was so carefully done yesterday, and repeating for centuries the same tentatives and the same corrections in the same order."

are occupied by a somewhat confused mixture of biological and theological statement and argument.

Here, as our readers will have anticipated, Mr. St. Clair has recourse to the "wider Teleology." He concedes that on the special-creation theory such phenomena as those appear to show waste of time and energy, and want of power to effect a purpose in the directest way. We know too little, however, of the real causes of embryological phenomena to go farther than a mere *appear*; and where this is the case, even an *appear* is not justified. But he maintains that the difficulties vanish on the hypothesis of evolution; for if that hypothesis be accepted, these phenomena are not separately designed, but are incidental and almost indifferent results of a general plan. It can be no disadvantage, or at most it must be only a very minute disadvantage to guinea-pigs that in the foetal condition they have teeth which they shed before they are born; and if the actual system of nature was selected by the Creator as one fitted for the purpose which He had in view in creation, it is scarcely reasonable to suppose that it ought to have been rejected because of such relatively insignificant results of the working of its general laws.

We must now take an unwilling leave of Mr. St. Clair's interesting and suggestive book, in which the reader will find not only an excellent popular statement of the transmutation theory, but many most ingenious solutions of difficulties in natural theology.

Fallacies of Darwinism. An Exposition of Fallacies in the Hypothesis of Mr. Darwin. By C. R. BREE, M.D., F.Z.S., Senior Physician to the Essex and Colchester Hospital: Author of "Species not Transmutable nor the Result of Natural Selection," "The Birds of Europe not observed in the British Isles," "Popular Illustrations of the Lower Forms of Life," &c. London: Longmans, Green, & Co.

DR. BREE was apparently determined to write his "Fallacies of Darwinism" by the publication of Mr. Darwin's "Descent of Man." The plan of the work is thus given by the author:—

"I propose to treat [the subject] in a spirit of pure scientific investigation under the following heads:—

"1. *The Physical Argument.*—Darwinism as it is presumed to derive support or otherwise from the assumed correlation of the physical and vital forces.

"2. *The Physico-Psychical Argument.*—Darwinism as it is presumed to derive support or otherwise from the doctrine of evolution as formulated by Mr. Herbert Spencer.

"3. *The Variation and Natural Selection Argument.*—Darwinism as set forth by Mr. Darwin himself and his principal supporters.

"4. *The Derivative Argument.*

"5. *Mr. Darwin's Line of Descent.*

"6. *The Teleological Argument.*

"7. *Evolution and Theology.*"—"Fallacies of Darwinism," pp. 13-14.

The volume is not free from inaccuracies in matters of fact, and shows, in occasional breaks of continuity and hastily constructed sentences, marks of rapid composition.* But at the same time, allowance being made for these and similar imperfections, it will doubtless prove very useful to any one who wishes to take up the question of the "Origin of Species." The books and articles which have appeared on the controversy are abundantly referred to, and not only is a selection of the arguments used in them presented, but Dr. Bree has also added some original observations of his own.

In the first of the seven sections into which his work is divided, Dr. Bree sets himself to refute the physical theory of life, which it is, he says, "of great importance for the disciple of Darwin to establish." His refutation consists of quotations and arguments from Dr. Stirling and Professor Beale, to which are added some very strong remarks made three years ago by Professor Tait, of Edinburgh, in his Address as President of the Mathematical and Physical Science section of the British Association :—

"One herd of ignorant people. . . . refuse to admit that all the phenomena even of ordinary dead matter are strictly and exclusively in the domain of physical science. On the other hand, there is a numerous group, not in the slightest degree entitled to rank as physicists—though in general they assume the proud title of philosophers—who assert that not merely life, but even volition and consciousness, are mere physical manifestations. These opposite errors, into neither of which is it possible for a

* Thus, for instance, at p. 88, we read : "Pigs, I am willing to admit, have descended from *Sus Scrofa*, the wild boar. Whether a second and unknown origin may be admitted, on the authority of Nathusius, is, I think, very probable, for the osteological changes which he himself tells us may be produced by feeding and the disuse of organs, is quite sufficient to account for his 'unknown ancestor.'" At p. 55, in proof that at an early stage of development the human is distinguished from the brute embryo, we are told that "the 'neurad' is backward in man, and upward in beasts; the 'haemad' forward in man, and downward in beasts." Yes; but backward, upward, forward, downward, in reference to what? Not to anything at the time existing in the embryo, but to the position assumed by the animal in walking. On the frontispiece the facial angle of an Australian savage is marked 85°, and contrasted with a gorilla, whose facial angle is, rightly, marked 40°. But 85° is more than the average facial angle of European skulls, and cannot possibly be that of an Australian savage. In the first and introductory chapter Dr. Hooker is represented to have said, in his 1868 Address as President of the British Association, that natural selection is "an accepted doctrine with every philosophic naturalist"; and is chastised for making such a mistake. What Dr. Hooker did say was, "with almost every philosophic naturalist." —(British Association Report for 1868, p. lxxii.) A few lines lower down we are informed that since that address was delivered, natural selection has rather gone down in the world, for, "Mr. Darwin has discovered that he had pushed it too far, and Mr. St. George Mivart has proved that it has not a basis of truth." Mr. Darwin, however, from the first ("Origin of Species," first edition [1859], Introduction) expressed his belief that natural selection has not been the only agency concerned in bringing about changes of species.

genuine scientific man to fall—so long, at least, as he retains his reason—are easily seen to be very closely allied. They are both to be attributed to that credulity which is characteristic of ignorance and of incapacity. . . . Alike condemned and contemned we leave them to their proper fate—oblivion.—“Fallacies of Darwinism,” pp. 35–36.

As to the controversy on variation and natural selection, Dr. Bree is a thorough anti-transmutationist.* He reminds us of Mr. Darwin's bear, who by swimming about with his mouth open and catching flies, came, ultimately, closely to resemble a whale,† and of Mr. Darwin's fish,‡ in which a change equally surprising, though different in character, took place; nor (turning to Mr. Darwin's supporters) does he omit to place before his readers Mr. Wallace's investigations into the education of birds of tender age.§ The most important discussion of principle entered into in this part of the “Fallacies of Darwinism” is the discussion as to what

* The discussion on natural (pp. 71–186) and sexual (pp. 187–241) selection, as propounded by Mr. Darwin and by his supporters, Mr. Wallace (pp. 242–267), Mr. Huxley (pp. 268–288), and Sir Charles Lyell (pp. 289–303), naturally occupies the greater part of the book.

† Of this bear nothing is said in the later editions of the “Origin of Species.” It would therefore appear that the unfortunate animal, whether from want of power to adapt himself to the novel conditions of his existence, or from the precarious and unsubstantial character of his diet, ceased to exist soon after the publication of the first edition.

‡ Of the fish Von Baer speaks thus:—“A fish, swimming towards the shore, desires to take a walk, but finds his fins useless. They diminish in breadth for want of use, and at the same time elongate. This goes on with children and grandchildren for a few millions of years, and at last who can be astonished that the fins become feet? It is still more natural that the fish in the meadow, finding no water, should gasp after air, thereby, in a like period of time, developing lungs; the only difficulty being that in the meantime a few generations must manage to exist without breathing at all.” (“Fallacies of Darwinism,” p. 79.) Cf. Spencer, “Principles of Biology,” i. 272. Von Baer, we are informed by F. Valroger (“Gén. des Esp.,” p. 226), who gives as a reference the “Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie,” vii. 169, formerly admitted transmutation within narrow limits; but the study of Mr. Darwin's “Origin of Species,” instead of confirming him in his opinion, made him more and more inclined to renounce it.

§ “Fallacies of Darwinism,” p. 265. Mr. Wallace says:—“During the time they are learning to fly, returning often to the nest [a false fact in natural history, as every schoolboy knows—birds seldom or never return into a nest they have once left], they must be able to examine it inside and out [as if they were going to pass through a competitive examination], and as their daily search for food invariably leads them among the materials of which it is composed [another awful blunder in natural history], and among places similar to that in which it is placed [another awful blunder], is it so very wonderful that, when they want one themselves, they should make one like it?” For the observations between brackets Dr. Bree is responsible. While he was about it, he might also have taken note of the excellence of memory which enables these remarkable birds so accurately to remember the construction of the nest in which they first saw the light, and the humility and docility of disposition which makes them shrink from deviating in any way from the example set them by their honoured parents.

is the proper test or criterion to be used in determining what is a species and what a mere variety. The reply ordinarily given to this question is that no fixed and determinate characteristics, difference in which indicates difference in species, can be pointed out, but that while very unimportant differences may be passed over, or held to constitute mere races or varieties, a somewhat greater amount of difference will constitute a specific, and a greater still a generic distinction; that at the same time the question is one of general likeness or unlikeness, to be decided by common sense informed by a knowledge as to what points are important and what are not; and that the answer to be given to it is to a certain extent dependent on taste, predilection, the idiosyncrasy of the naturalist, as a certain room has to be left for individual opinion. Now is this a satisfactory way of dealing with the matter? Certainly it does not work well. Some botanists arrange flowering plants under as many as 150,000, others under as few as 80,000 species: a fact of itself sufficient to show how difficult it is in such a way practically to discriminate species from varieties. Now Dr. Bree contends that this is so because determination of species in the above fashion is an unsound and artificial method. It leads to the erection of mere varieties and races into distinct species.*

"Now, the great error which is committed by M. Gaudry, by Sir C. Lyell, by Mr. Darwin, and by others of the school, is this—they have made no difference between the species defined by man and those which are defined by Nature. In classification, as pursued by man, every little alteration in external character or habit is deemed sufficient to constitute a species; but Nature has nowhere created two organic beings exactly alike, and we frequently witness variations or sports which make her productions still more unlike each other. She has, however, instituted a grand law, which Flourens† has tersely expressed: 'Continued fecundity marks the species, but limited fecundity the genus.'

"Mr. Darwin has not been able to disprove this axiom, and therefore he is, according to Mr. Huxley even, altogether out of court.

"But how absurd it is to take the bones of a series of monkeys, or other animals, in a fossil state, and attempt to prove the theory of transmutation from their real or assumed difference from fossil forms!

"Let me illustrate this. Suppose we take the members of the British Association who will meet together next year, and measure the length, breadth, width, and circumference, and calculated brain-capacity of each member; let us carefully measure the length of each member's nose, arms, hands, fingers, legs, feet, and toes; let us note down the colour of their hair and its consistency, of their eyes, skin, and the hirsute condition of

* For instance, following the ordinary method, Professor Haeckel, of Jena, has divided the human race into ten species, which he believes to have the same value as ordinary natural history species.

† In an appendix (pp. 395, sqq.), Dr. Bree has reproduced a part of M. Flourens' "Examen du Livre de M. Darwin sur l'Origine des Espèces." M. Flourens, the perpetual secretary of the Academy of Sciences, is, like M. Quatrefages, who proposed Mr. Darwin as a member of that body, an opponent of the Darwinian theory. Mr. Darwin was rejected, on the ground that his reputation had been gained chiefly by speculations of an uncertain character.

the latter. Why, with these data, we shall find at least fifty different species formed, according to the plan pursued by M. Gaudry and Sir C. Lyell in determining the different specific characters of the Miocene and existing monkeys; and yet no one doubts the members of the British Association being one species.

"Again, let us imagine that the whole inhabitants of the world were to be destroyed except the British Association, and that these learned savans were permitted to enjoy a millenium of scientific research. How many species would they make out of the human fossilized race at the end of their millenium?"

"And suppose that these savans, during their millenium, were to be altered slightly by variation, as we see the Americans alter from the English; would they not with triumph produce a paper proving that they were descended from the fossilized species of men, but that they showed distinct signs of transmutation—for one series of fossils had longer legs or arms, or broader or longer skulls than their living prototypes? And yet this is exactly the argument assumed by Sir C. Lyell, on the authority of M. Gaudry, to prove the transmutation of apes." ("Fallacies of Darwinism," pp. 294, 295.)

Dr. Bree, then, contends that that the natural test of what is a species or genus is fecundity; and, of course, while difficulty *as to the results of its application* would injure it as a test, on the other hand, if it is in truth the natural test, difficulty *in applying it* will at most compel us to confess our ignorance, but will not warrant us in substituting a bad test and pretending that it is a good one. Thus if two plants or animals produce fertile offspring, and this fertile offspring again produces fertile offspring (without being crossed with either the maternal or the paternal stock), and so on *ad infinitum*, the plants or animals belong to the same species. If they cannot be made to produce hybrids, they do not even belong to the same genus. If they can be made to produce hybrids, but these hybrids are not fertile, or are fertile only with the maternal or paternal stock, but not among themselves, they belong to the same genus, but not to the same species. Tried by this test, for instance, the horse and the cow belong to different genera, because they will not interbreed at all; the different sorts of pigeons, dogs, &c., which will interbreed and produce continuously fertile offspring, belong to the same species; while the horse and the ass belong to the same genus but not to the same species, inasmuch as mules, although sometimes fertile with horses and asses, are not continuously fertile with each other.

This criterion, however, is by no means easy to apply in practice. The animals which it is proposed to test by it may refuse to pair, and wild species or varieties, which have been accustomed to associate only with their like in a state of nature, generally refuse to do so, while domesticated animals pair freely, inasmuch as they have become accustomed in captivity to association with other species. Moreover, even if the animals pair, one or both of them may accidentally be sterile, and the criterion may fail for this reason; so that it appears better calculated to furnish an *inclusive* than an *exclusive* test; that is, it would seem to be safer to say that living beings which will produce continuously fertile off-

spring belong to the same species, than to say that those which cannot be made to do so, do not.

But if the assertion that continuous fecundity is the test of specific identity can be substantiated, a severe blow will be struck thereby at the transmutation theory. The argument based on the asserted fact that species glide into each other (as it were), and the argument based on the phenomena of domestication, will fall to the ground; and they will carry with them in their fall many of the speculations built on correlation and natural and sexual selection. Judged by a structural criterion, it will be said, it may or may not be true that species are continuous with each other; and this may be important as showing the provisional character of classifications resting on purely structural considerations. But it is nothing to our purpose, as far as a real classification is concerned, whether this is or is not the case, for the structural criterion is not a sound criterion. It is sufficient for us to know that, judged by the genetic criterion (as it may be called) species do not glide into each other. And if the structural and the genetic criterion do not always work together, if plants which structurally seem to be of the same species occasionally turn out to be of different species when tried by the genetic test, which reveals some hidden but deeply-seated difference in their organization, and if, *vice versa*, organisms structurally different prove genetically identical, this is no more than might have been expected: for an unsound criterion cannot be expected always to give the same results as a sound one.

Again, take the domestication argument. Where, asked Lamarck, shall we find in nature a plant at all resembling our cultivated wheat? Where shall we find our cabbages, lettuces, &c., in the state in which they appear in our gardens? The differences which separate them from their wild congeners are often so great that if naturalists found them in the woods they would conclude them to belong not to different species merely, but to different genera; and if art in a comparatively short period of time has been able to bring about changes so great, shall not nature, which has operated for periods immeasurably longer, which acts everywhere, unintermittingly, and on every part of the organism at once, have been able to effect much more? To this (passing over the circumstance that the differences are *structural*) it will be sufficient to reply that the case of domestic varieties and the case of wild species are not analogous but contrasted. For the domesticated animals and the cultivated plants interbreed with their feral originals; but different wild species, though sometimes much more nearly resembling each other structurally, will not do so. Nor does the matter end here. The changes which correlation and natural and sexual selection can produce, touch, it will be said, only as it were the externals, only certain in reality accidental features of the organism,—the length of the arm or forearm, the colour of the hide, the length of the snout, and the like. If, as Mr. Darwin imagines, it were by such things as these that specific distinctions ought to be judged of, then indeed his theory might go on swimmingly. But if these things are merely accidental, and the true test of species is something quite dif-

ferent, it does not seem at all obvious that it will work by any means so well.

Besides the question of principle there is, of course, a multitude of questions of fact into which Dr. Bree enters. Here, however we must of necessity abstain from following him in this place.

The Microscope and Microscopical Technology. A Text-book for Physicians and Students. By D. HEINRICH FREY, Professor of Medicine in Zurich, Switzerland. Translated from the German and edited by George R. Cutter, M.D., Clinical Assistant to the New York Eye and Ear Infirmary. From the Fourth and Last German Edition. London: Sampson Low & Co.

THIS (setting on one side, as belonging to a different class, Dr. Beale's "How to Work with the Microscope") is incomparably the best book on the subject of which it treats, and ought to be in the hands of every one who makes it his business or amusement microscopically to study animal tissues. The directions given, for mounting and for fresh examination, as a rule, relate immediately to the investigation of tissues and structures of the human body, and will consequently (no doubt) be chiefly useful to the scientific medical man; but they are applicable to the examination of other vertebrate animals, and as a rule, *mutatis mutandis*, to the examination of the *Invertebrata* also; so that the work has a much more extensive usefulness than is at first sight apparent from its title-page.

The first ten sections (pp. 1-228) give a general description of microscopical technology, five of them being occupied with the microscope and five with the preparation and mounting of objects for that instrument; while the remaining sections, which are twelve in number, describe (pp. 228-614) the appearances presented by the different tissues and structures, and the methods of preparation and mounting which are most suitable for them respectively; thus supplying a great desideratum, as the observer not unfrequently finds that general directions fail in the application. The general arrangement is that the more easily-prepared objects are treated first, those which present greater difficulty being treated of towards the end of the book, which is thus a kind of course of microscopical observation. The work, a handsome octavo volume, is copiously illustrated by wood-engravings intercalated with the text, which is clearly printed in large type.

The Government of the National Defence, from the 30th of June to the 30th of October, 1870. By M. JULES FAVRE, de l'Académie Française. Translated by H. CLARK. London : Henry S. King & Co. 1873.

IT is needless to remark that, as an historical document, this volume, by the Foreign Minister of the Government of National Defence during the most important part of the late struggle, must be of great value. Much of it of course is already familiar to the public, but the political student will be glad to possess, not only authentic and finally revised reports of the conferences of M. Favre with Bismarck at Ferrières, and of M. Thiers with Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, but the narratives of such convulsive movements as that of September 4th, 1870, and the defence of Paris by General Trochu, from one of the foremost of the men who actually shared in them. Whatever opinion we may form of their actions, M. Favre's account is attractive by its earnestness as well as freedom from exaggerations. There are certain weak points of which he appears conscious, and which he takes considerable pains to defend. One of these is the conduct of the Government of National Defence in dethroning Napoleon III., the responsibility of which he endeavours to show did not really belong to it, all its procedure being simply the recognition of what had already taken place by the mere force of events. Louis Philippe is reported to have said, of the Revolution of 1830, "I found a crown rolling in the gutter, and I stooped to pick it up." M. Jules Favre might say : "We found a crown rolling in the gutter, and we pitched it out of sight." It seems curious that M. Favre should take so much trouble to explain away what, after all, practically took place. The moment the news of Sedan reached Paris, crowds demanded the fall of the government. "Some were armed. There was no more time for illusions ; the insurrection had begun ; the government had virtually fallen ; not a moment was to be lost in constituting a new one." M. Favre and his friends proposed the deposition of the Emperor. M. Schneider, President of the Assembly, feebly objected, in hopes of retaining the Regent and Prince Imperial ; efforts were made by the Cabinet to evade the question by declaring M. de Palikao General-Lieutenant ; the proposition accepted was that of M. Thiers, and forty-seven other members, implying, but not verbally expressing the *déchéance*, when it said, that, "considering the circumstances, the Chamber names a Commission of Government and of National Defence." M. Favre asks the impartial reader, in the face of these documents, what just judge will dare to accuse the men of the 4th of September with having overthrown the Empire ? All, he says, recognized and proclaimed that the Empire existed no longer. The same afternoon, amid the cries of the mob at the Hôtel de Ville, the Republic was proclaimed, and General Trochu, Picard, Gambetta, Favre, and others, seized the reins of government. We admit that, happen what may, government must be carried on, and impartial judges will not be too ready to condemn what is done in a moment of national agony. Still, the great plague-spot of France is

that there seems no idea left, able to make itself practically felt, of law and of loyalty. Let Napoleon III.'s political criminality have been ever so great, still he was the French sovereign, to whom, at the time, they were all sworn, and who was as yet undeposed by the power which unfortunately he recognized as his creator. The Government of Defence therefore, in proclaiming a republic, acted treasonably by him, and treasonably too by the French nation, so far as it had sovereign rights. We wonder it has never occurred to public writers to contrast the conduct of the French, furiously turning against their sovereign when unfortunate, with that proud chapter in the history of old Rome, when the Senate went out to meet their beaten and blameworthy general after the battle of Cannæ. There was a lesson of generous forbearance and of high courage, of which the French seem never to have thought, going rather for their patterns to the base days of the Roman commonalty in the corruption of the Empire.

Another point, difficult indeed to be got over, is the justification of the French in the reckless act of the *déchéance*, when they themselves, as the world generally believes, were as thoroughly parties to the declaration of war as it is possible for a nation to be. M. Favre endeavours to show the contrary of this. He contends, which no doubt is true, that a sober minority were always against it, that the *Corps Législatif* were under the despotic influence of the Emperor, that the mob which clamoured for war in the streets of Paris were his hirelings, and that in short, the Emperor and his dynastic interests alone were to blame. It is easy to say this, but if ever an event in history has printed itself on the mind of Europe in traces so deep as to be their own evidence of truth, it is that the voice at least of Paris was for war, which, however, by no means excuses the blindness of the Emperor and his advisers, and of the *Corps Législatif*. But with whomsoever the blame rests, France took the aggressive, and the hard terms dictated by the conqueror were but natural, and to have been expected, deeply as every generous mind must commiserate even the just punishment of heavy national crime. Among the errors as well as offences of the Government of Defence, must be reckoned their tame acquiescence in the wrong done to the Holy See. M. Favre tells us that M. Nigra, the Italian Minister, pressed him to give his consent to the passage of the frontier of the Papal States, to which he replied that he had neither the power *nor the wish* to oppose the action of his government, but that in their painful position he could not interfere with the Pope nor grieve his Catholic compatriots, that he should oppose neither, and that Italy could go to Rome on her own responsibility (p. 84).

M. Favre heavily, though in moderate language, blames the indifference of England and Russia to the terrible crisis of France after the battle of Sedan, and speaks ominously of the results that may be dreaded from the colossal power that has been allowed to raise itself in the midst of Europe. Perhaps we are still too near the question which has now been decided, to judge completely of the wisdom or unwisdom of the policy; those, however, who so fully admit the madness of commencing the war ought to be ready to excuse the prudence which refused to be dragged into it when it

was part and parcel of the existence of a government sprung from revolution and treason, like that of September, 1870.

No one can read M. Favre's unadorned account of the defence of Paris without deep sympathy for the exertions put forth, the ingenuity, the uncomplaining self-denial displayed by the citizens on the whole. The siege of Paris may certainly take rank in point of interest with some of the greatest events of that class in history.

One of the most remarkable pages in the volume is that describing Bismarck; we will condense it a little, adhering, however, closely to M. Favre's words:—

“It was at a ruined farm-house near the village of Montry that M. Favre had his first interview with this renowned personage. He was tall, wearing a white helmet bordered with a lace of yellow silk. Though fifty-eight years old, he appeared in full vigour, with powerful head, strongly-marked features, and aspect both imposing and severe, yet he tempered this with a natural simplicity amounting to good nature. His manners were courteous and grave, free from stiffness or affectation. M. Favre modestly says that Bismarck certainly regarded him as a negotiator unworthy of him, but was so polite as not to let this be seen. He immediately struck the French envoy with the clearness of his ideas, his vigorous good sense, originality of mind, and freedom from all pretension. He took account only of what *is*, and was indifferent to everything not leading directly to a useful end. He was not haughty, but convinced of the worth of his talents; and if to accomplish his work he had to go further than he desired, he resigned himself to do so. He was, however, impressionable and nervous, exhibiting repulsions and indulgences, to M. Favre inexplicable. His severity and exactions often wounded and even revolted M. Favre, who admits, nevertheless, that in everything he always found him upright and correct.”

It must be admitted that this description, from an enemy and a Frenchman, evidences a high degree of candour. M. Favre shows by his feelings, particularly his readiness to shed tears under great excitement, that he himself is French all over; yet, in this passage (p. 119), of which we have given the substance, there is a calmness and firmness that is often claimed as characteristic of the English nation. The description gives one an idea of intellectual ascendancy exercised by Bismarck, yet it must be remembered he was in possession of the vantage-ground, with his sword in the balance, and it was easy to say to the representative of the beleaguered enemy at his mercy *væ victis!* Whilst not disguising the power that makes such a man only the more dangerous, it is above all necessary not to yield to its fascination—a weakness which indefinitely increases its means of mischief against those whom it assails.

Twelve Tales for the Young. Second Series. MRS. PARSONS. Burns & Oates.

Dame Dolores, or the Wise Nun of Eastonmere; and other Stories. By the Author of "Tyborne," "Irish Hearts and Irish Hands," &c. Burns & Oates.

STORIES for children and young people are so urgently required among us, that we welcome all that have no evil or frivolous tendency; and certainly those at the head of our notice are worthy of far better commendation than the negative one of being harmless. Mrs. Parsons always writes vigorously and eminently to the purpose, and some of these tales, such as "Don't Go In," "Yes and No," and "This Once," are admirable examples of maxim-stories, which are capable of far greater development than Mrs. Parsons has allowed herself. In fact, the distinctive characters and clear definiteness of plan in these little stories would have filled out two or three long, complete tales of great value.

"Dame Dolores" and "Known Too Late," though far more ambitious and of vivid interest as stories, do not possess the same character of general usefulness and practical teaching as Mrs. Parsons' modest little tales. Stories written for one class, and especially such subjects as the temptations and dangers of girls in London, are exceedingly difficult to handle and embody in stories, which are liable to fall into hands for which they were never intended and are most unfit. The best portion of the book to our taste is the little tale of "True to the End," in which an admirable example of magnanimous self-sacrifice is beautifully told.

The Jesuits, and other Essays. By WILLIAM NEVIN. Washbourne. 1874.

ALTHOUGH it is difficult to imagine why Mr. Nevin's object is "always to make enemies"—we quote his own words from his preface—we do not doubt that he will partially succeed in his purpose by the republication of his vigorous tracts. Mr. Nevin's facts and the deductions he makes from them, are well chosen and not to be refuted, but we cannot conceive that they are made more telling by being urged club in hand. The same facts, put with the same vigour, without declamation or roughness, would surely be more acceptable even to the lower orders of mind. The faults of taste and style in this little volume are the more to be regretted, because Mr. Nevin has in his hands a weapon of sound reasoning and thoroughly English brevity of apt illustration which recalls Cobbett.

"Europe is now a mine charged with revolution and a false Democracy; little, very little, is required to fire that mine, and then—it is not Roman

Catholics only who will suffer, but every believer in God, every man who is respectable, *every man who has a five-pound note in a bank*, will be as obnoxious as the Jesuits."

We heartily agree with Mr. Nevin in his appreciation of the usefulness of tracts, and in his opinion that there is a certain insensibility on this head among Catholics.

A Few Words from Lady Mildred's Housekeeper. Washbourne. 1874.

WE wish all success to this excellent little lecture to young servants. Every word of it is true, and is evidently the result of practical experience. We shall hope that it is one of a series which may afterwards be bound up for useful reading.

Catholicity and Pantheism. An Essay by the Rev. J. DE CONCILIO, of the Propaganda College, Professor of Dogmatic and Moral Theology, and Pastor of St. Michael's Church, Jersey City. London: W. Burns, Oates, & Co. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Company. 1874.

THIS book attacks a great problem, and, as it seems to us, attacks it with a very fair amount of success. Its motive is explained in the following passage:—

"Pantheism has been the universal error in time and space. In India, Persia, China, Greece, Rome, Pantheism flourished; now under a religious, then under a philosophical form. After the Christian era it was the religion or system of those who did not understand the Christian dogmas as taught by the Church; and the Fathers of the first centuries, in battling against Gnosticism, Eclecticism, and Neoplatonism, were struggling with this old error of the world—Pantheism. Depressed for a while by the efforts of the doctors of the Church, it arose with fiercer energy under the forms of all those heresies which attacked the dogma of the Incarnation of the Word.

"In the Middle Ages there were many philosophers who held Pantheism; and in modern times, since the dawn of the Reformation, it has become the prevalent, the absorbing error of the world. Always the same as to substance, it assumes every variety of form: now you see it in a logical dress, as in the doctrine of the German school; again it takes a psychological garb, as in that of the French school, with Cousin at its head; or it assumes a social and political form, as in the Pantheism of Fourier, Leroux, Saint Simon, and all the progressists of every colour or shade; and, finally, it puts on a ghostly shroud, as taught by the American spiritualists. Under whatever garb it may appear, it penetrates and fills all, and attempts to explain all. It penetrates philosophy, natural science, history, literature, the fine

arts, the family, society and the body politic, and religion. It holds its sway over all, and exhibits itself as having the secret of good and evil" (pp. 14, 15).

Pantheism, therefore, appears to our author to be the final and supreme error of the human intelligence, an error which is destined to swallow up all other errors, and can be adequately met only by a full and connected exposition of the truth. It might indeed appear that Pantheism had lost its power. The Philosophy of the Absolute would seem to have spent itself in Germany; the feeble and incoherent echo which it found in France, has been proved by time to have been only a temporary aberration of the French intellect; revolutionary political theories in the present decade attach themselves to materialistic rather than to pantheistic theories of the universe; spiritualism is a fancy which is not likely to spread; and in this country, which at present gives to a large extent the tone to human thought, the danger of the future would seem to lie in results obtained from physical, not from metaphysical speculation. On a closer view, however, it may be doubted whether this estimate of the heterodox intellectual movements of this latter half of the nineteenth century is correct. On account of the elevated position to which it raises humanity, while at the same time it still seems to provide for the order and development of the universe, on account of its false sublimity and spurious glory, on account of its completeness as a theory, Pantheism will always possess a charm for many minds; and this general attractiveness must not be left out of account in forecasting its chances in the future. And, besides these, there are other and more special reasons why we should not too readily allow ourselves to despise this old enemy. The metaphysical theories of Schelling and Hegel were, and are now, felt to have been, unverifiable hypotheses; but they have continued the tradition of the grandeur of Pantheism, and have kept Germany ready to embrace it should the opportunity occur. No intellectual glory of its own shines through the corruption of the heterodoxy of France; it decks infidelity out in a gaudy costume; it pours on the poisonous draught the wine of human passion; it adapts, simplifies, explains, formulizes; but it does not originate: and as it has done in the past, so will it in the future, submit itself to follow the lead of Germany and England. Among ourselves Kantism, where it exists, is to a very large extent an intellectual affectation, without any real hold; the philosophy of the Scottish school is fundamentally orthodox, and might easily be brought into synthesis with the essence of the scholastic philosophy in so far as the latter is a religious and not a physical philosophy; and the darkest clouds in the metaphysical heavens are the systems of Mr. Mill and Mr. Herbert Spencer. But the philosophical speculations of John Stuart Mill seem more likely to continue rather as criticisms generally injurious to other philosophical systems, damaging their credit and impeding unhesitating adhesion to them, than as constituting a system by themselves; they are too incomplete to suit the generalizing spirit of the present age; they are too little in accord with physical and biological science; they drop the threads of great problems just as we expect to be guided to the centre of the labyrinth. Mr. Mill, as Dr. McCosh anticipates,

will probably be superseded by "the more comprehensive system and the bolder speculative grasp" of Herbert Spencer, or, if not of Herbert Spencer (who has always seemed to the present writer to write as if he were too much in other people's hands to be a really great thinker of the first class), at least of that school of which, after Professor Huxley, he is one of the principal representatives. And although the speculations of the school are at present tinged by materialism, its materialism will not be permanent if it is to assume a place among the great heterodox systems of the world. The old materialism—the materialism which said that thoughts were movements in the brain—has happily become altogether impossible. Materialism can neither solve nor eliminate the great problems which confront the human intelligence: it simply whitewashes them over. It will never be the system of men who think out their thoughts. It is a philosophy for second-rate intellects—for imitators, men of pleasure, feuilletonists, and persons who are infidels, but occupy their minds not with their infidelity but in other ways, and have therefore simply accepted that infidel system which to understand gave them least intellectual trouble. The new materialism—the materialism which is based on the preposterous doctrine of the relativity of knowledge—is separated from Pantheism only by an artificial boundary; and the philosophy of Herbert Spencer does not merely tend to Pantheism but contains it. And some such system as that of Herbert Spencer, apparently resting on the conclusions of modern science, and uniting them into a higher synthesis, and at the same time apparently satisfying the religious cravings of humanity, by proposing to man, as the proper object of his religious feelings, an Infinite Force of which all things are but manifestations—will probably be the heterodox philosophy of the future. For let not the physical and biological sciences think to assume this position. They may each explain this or that portion of the universe taken by itself, but they will never be able to explain the universe taken as a whole. They may decipher the sibylline leaves taken one by one, but they will never be able to arrange them consecutively in a volume. To do this they must be taken up and unified by some higher philosophy—either by a Christian or by a Pantheistic system.

And now, to return to our author, what is the secret of the power and prevalence of Pantheism?—

"How is this to be explained? If the falsehood of Pantheism be so evident, whence is it that it is the universal error in time and space, and has made such ravages in man's intelligence? . . . How are we to explain the prevalence of so mighty an error? By the fact that it is a system which by its generality seems to satisfy a supreme tendency of our mind, and to appease one of the most imperative cravings of our souls.

"Man's intelligence has a natural tendency to synthesize, that is, to bring everything into unity. . . . In this, so far as we can see, lies [as far as the intelligence is concerned] the reason of the universal dominion of Pantheism. Because it proposes to explain the whole question of human knowledge, [because] it takes it up in all its universality, and [because] the solution which it sets forth has all the appearance of satisfying the most imperative tendency of our mind. To be enabled to explain the numberless multiplicity of realities, no matter how, and, at the same time, to bring them into a compact and perfect whole, strikes to the

quick the very essence of man's intelligence and allures it with its charms. . . .

"What Pantheism proposes to do for the mind, it also promises to do for the soul.

"There is, in man's heart or soul, impressed in indelible characters, a tendency after the infinite, a craving almost infinite in its energy, such is the violence with which it impels the soul to seek and yearn after its object. To prove such a tendency were useless. That void, that feeling of satiety and sadness, which overwhelms the soul, even after the enjoyment of the most exquisite pleasure, either sensible or sentimental; the phenomenon of solitaries in all times and countries; the very fact of the existence of religion in all ages and among all peoples; the enthusiasm, the recklessness and barbarity which characterize the wars undertaken for religion's sake; the love of the marvellous and the mysterious exhibited by the multitude; that sense of terror and reverence, that feeling of our own nothingness, which steals into our souls in contemplating the wide ocean in a still or stormy night, or in contemplating a wilderness, a mountain, or a mighty chasm, all are evident proofs of that imperious, delicious, violent craving of our souls after the infinite. How otherwise explain all this? Why do we feel a void, a sadness, a kind of pain, after having enjoyed the most stirring delights? Because the infinite is the weight of the soul—the centre of gravity of the heart—because created pleasures, however delightful or exquisite, can never quiet that craving, can never fill up that chasm placed between us and God.

"The pretended sages of mankind have never been able to exterminate religion, because they could never root out of the soul of man that tendency. I say pretended sages, because all true geniuses have, with very few exceptions, been religious; for in them that tendency is more keenly and more imperiously felt.

"This is the second reason of the prevalence of Pantheism. To promise the actual and immediate possession of the infinite, nay, the transformation into the infinite, is to, entice the very best of human aspirations, is to touch the deepest and most sensitive chord of the human heart" (pp. 15–20).

We do not believe that Pantheism will ever become the predominant religious error of this country; but it may very probably become sufficiently prominent, and gain such a hold over the imagination where it does not gain it over the reason, as may make it advisable to bring into the foreground of theological and quasi-theological discussion the contrast between it and the Catholic religion. There is no contrast as to things entirely disparate. As to the end of man, Catholicism and Pantheism both affirm that it is union with the infinite; and the contrast is found in the different ways in which they interpret this union, which is, according to Pantheism, a unity of substance; and, according to Catholicism, the union in the Beatific Vision. As to the speculative part of religion, Catholicism and Pantheism both affirm that the universe is a synthesis, and in this they differ from all other systems, while they differ from each other as to the manner in which they interpret this synthesis, which is, according to Pantheism, a unity of substance with a multiplicity of manifestations occurring in an order determined by laws of evolution; and, according to Catholicism, a synthesis of God and creatures. The position of the Pantheist, in face of the Catholic religion, therefore is, that in regard of the general and speculative synthesis of the universe (*i.e.*

of all that is, of God and creatures), Pantheism gives a complete and satisfactory, Catholicism an incomplete and illogical intellectual theory ; and that in regard of the special and practical synthesis of man and the infinite, Pantheism does, and Catholicism does not, satisfy the religious cravings of humanity. To overthrow the Pantheist position thus understood, and to establish the converse Catholic position, is the aim of "Catholicity and Pantheism."

We have endeavoured to explain the motive and the aim of this book ; two other things remain to be noticed. In the first place, how does the author carry out his purpose in detail? What arguments does he use? In what way does he use them? For this we must refer our readers to the book itself ; and without expecting that they will by any means agree with everything in it, we fully anticipate that they will find it abundantly to repay the cost of buying and the trouble of perusal. The general course of the argument is as follows:—Firstly, the author contrasts the Pantheistic infinite with the Catholic God (pp. 26–81). He then (pp. 82–113) treats of that thorny subject, the mystery of the Blessed Trinity, following the Scholastics pretty closely. Passing on to finite beings, he now proceeds to discuss the possibility and the motive of creation (pp. 114–164), and having now before him the two terms of the synthesis, God and creatures, examines "how this duality, so marked and so distinct, the terms of which are so infinitely apart, can be harmonized and brought together into unity." Need we say that he finds in the Incarnation (which could not have been treated of had not the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity been previously considered) the answer to this question? In the person of Jesus Christ is the radical and central synthesis of the finite and the infinite (pp. 164–194), and on this are grounded the other syntheses of finite beings with the infinite or with each other (pp. 195–229), which are treated of under the heads of grace (pp. 230–271), the relation of grace to creation (pp. 272–300), the sacraments (pp. 301–338), and the Church (pp. 339–376). Pantheism is contrasted with Catholicism throughout.

From this analysis the reader will see both what subjects are dealt with and what space is given to them ; he will also perceive that the present volume does not complete the work. It is, in fact, only the first part of a larger work (to complete which we trust the author will receive sufficient encouragement) on the same subject. We must give F. De Concilio our hearty thanks for a valuable contribution to Catholic literature. His terminology, it is true, is at first somewhat forbidding ; but the point of view in which Catholic doctrines are placed by contrasting them with Pantheism is eminently instructive.

Finally, it may be asked whether and how those who are neither Catholics nor Pantheists are concerned by the contrast between Catholicism and Pantheism. F. De Concilio answers that this contrast exhibits the whole body of Catholic truths in all their universality, unity, grandeur, and beauty. And here he brings out, perhaps with some exaggeration, a point of great importance:—

"We are firmly convinced, with all the thinking minds of the century

that the form of controversy . . . must be thoroughly changed. Hitherto we have endeavoured to lead men's minds to Catholic truth by external evidence; we must now change our tactics, and convince them by internal evidence. . . . External evidence was [formerly] as it were a home-argument to him [a non-Catholic], because it chimed in and agreed with the bent of his mind. But now that he does not believe in, nor has a true idea of God, who rejects scornfully all possibility of anything supernatural and superintelligible, it is impossible for us to follow the beaten track, but [we] must find a new way of presenting the Catholic truths to him; that is, to lay them out before him in all the internal evidence of which they are capable: internal evidence, which results not only from reasons, with which each particular truth may be supported, but that which emanates from the link by which all truths hang upon each other, by the bearing which they have on all the fundamental problems raised by the human mind, and from the relations they possess with all the orders of human knowledge" (pp. 7-9).

If this means that we are to lay more stress than hitherto on internal evidence it is sound and good advice; but it would be madness to rely on internal evidence altogether. Without external evidence, which is as an anchor of the mind, truth evaporates, and is lost in endless speculation and disputation.

The Three Kings, and other Poems. By EMILY BOWLES. London: Burns & Oates.

IT is some time now since Germany got through the "Sturm und Drang" period of her literary life, but we in England are more behindhand, and, as far as contemporary poetry goes, are (with a few notable exceptions) in the very midst of it. The chief object of most of our modern verse-writers appears to be, to take a given number of problems of the world we live in, the world beyond us, the mysteries of our moral being, and any others that come to hand, and having stripped them of everything which might facilitate their solution, to present them to their readers, and to say, "Existence is chaos, and everything we believe, or love, or hope for is a dream or a delusion, and do not flatter yourselves that here or elsewhere we can ever arrive at a greater certainty than we have at present."

It is a relief to turn from these hazy pessimists, who yet appear to derive considerable enjoyment from their fogs, to such a volume as Miss Bowles has given us. She, too, recognizes the mysteries that hem us in; she, too, tells in most pathetic words of the deep heart-sorrows that are so terribly near to our deepest joys; she, too, knows full well the empty homes, and the broken ties, and the lost loves that are the daily bread of life to many; but through it all she recognizes "No spirit dread, but God my

Lord." Through all the failures and sins and sorrows, through the valley of death itself, she sees that, as she tells us in her beautiful poem of Hyacinthus:—

"So life still swallows death, and while we weep
Our 'Ai! Ai! Hyacinthus slain!'
We find him, glorious, in new life again."

The longest poem, and the one which gives its name to the book, is a dramatic sketch of the appearance of the star to the Wise Men, and their following up of the quest. It is full of beauties which deserve more particular attention than can here be given to them, though we cannot forbear to notice the delicate and subtle delineation of the three principal characters Balthazar's soliloquy, with which the poem opens, and Mary's address to the Kings when the quest is achieved.

Amongst the lesser poems we especially admire the "Greene Turfe," in which the pathetic beauty of the ideas is enhanced by the quaint old English in which they are rendered; and that little knot of poems in which several of the Greek myths are so gracefully presented as embodying a Christian truth. "Eurydice" and "Hyacinthus," and the beautiful "Compline" hymn, in which our Lady is invoked as the "'Mighty Mother' of the Greeks"; as "Thou from the mind of God Athené leaping, arm'd for the deathless strife"; and as "Demeter, when she seeks her child among the doomful holds"; "Mother of harvests, sheaves of souls still reaping." Indeed, throughout the book, the author's ardent love of nature, and keen perception of its varied moods and tenderest lights and shades, are mingled most happily with her classic lore and all the subtler thoughts and images which are only present when to the poetic afflatus is joined high and careful cultivation. Our want of space compels us to leave unmentioned many poems equally deserving of notice, but we must not pass over one called "With the Bluebells," one of those beautiful wild-flower lessons which come perhaps to all who love spring, and the country, and flowers, but which few can put into words like these; the hymn, "If it be Thou," which expresses in forcible words the desolation of the Christian, tried all but beyond her strength; the poems about children, written some, of those who are still the light and joy of their homes,—others, of those who are, alas! but tender and holy memories; and the touching poem called "In Memoriam," the concluding lines of which are perhaps among the strongest and most beautiful in the volume.

Proposed Offering to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, in commemoration of the Pilgrimage made by English and Scotch Catholics to Paray-le-Monial, September, 1873. 1874.

A CIRCULAR has been put out by Lady Petre, containing an appeal for a Night Home for Poor Girls above thirteen years old and upwards, unmarried, in London. It is proposed to build class-rooms, a

refectory, dormitories, and a chapel, for the use of a most destitute class of girls, who may thus be permanently rescued from every evil of a vagabond life. The cause pleaded in this circular is pre-eminently the cause of the poor, and the singular success of the House of the Sisters of Charity in Bulstrode-street is a guarantee that this further appeal will not be made in vain. Probably the minor details are not as yet immoveably arranged ; and—unless there are reasons, unknown to us, for the arrangement—the bias of our own judgment would be that the obligation of the applicants being known to the priests of their parish, the Sisters, or ladies interested in the work, would be better away. There must be many girls, almost children, in London, on the brink of ruin, whose lives and very existence are unknown, except to Almighty God, to whom the angels of these literally lost sheep are crying day and night for rescue.

Glory and Sorrow, or the Consequences of Ambition ; and Selim, the Pasha of Salonica. Translated from the French by P. S., a Graduate of S. Joseph's, Emenittsburg. New York: The Catholic Publication Society, Warren-street. 1874.

THESE are two very pretty little French tales, nicely translated, and put forth to the world by our active American neighbours, whose labours for the Catholic Church are beginning to bring their literature prominently before their brethren of the old world. The second tale, *Selim*, is really beautiful and full of interest, and the description of F. Mariel Auge paints in vivid colours, that most heavenly and perfect of characters, the French Religious. This little book will be an attractive addition to our lending libraries.

INDEX.

ACTA ET DECRETA variorum Conciliorum recentiorum Collectio Lacensis, *noticed*, 231.

AMERICAN POETS, 302-325 : national character of American poetry, 302 ; its obligations to Indian traditions and to American scenery, 303 ; graphic description of a swamp, 304 ; truthfulness of American poets in their pictures of scenery, 306 ; extracts from Longfellow's and Emerson's poems, 308 ; the early efforts of American poets, 309 ; Mrs. Sigourney and William Cullen Bryant, 310 ; the religious feeling in Bryant's poems, 311 ; Longfellow's "Hiawatha," 312 ; its high purpose, 313 ; popularity of his "Evangeline" in spite of its metre, 315 ; its Catholic aspect, 316 ; his success in translation, 317 ; Bayard Taylor's poems, 317 ; the dramatic beauty of his "Lars," 318 ; his feeling dedication of that poem to Whittier, 319 ; his successful translation of the Iliad, 319 ; specimens of American Catholic poetry, 320 ; the poems of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 321 ; their pathos, 322 ; extracts from them, 324 ; their good common sense, 324.

Anglican Orders : a few Remarks in the form of a Conversation, *noticed*, 262.

ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER (THE) ON THE SACRED HEART, 146-161 : a new era in ecclesiastical history, 146 ; F. Newman on the preaching of Christ, 146 ; the Catholic's sure weapon, 148 ; cause of the fresh burst throughout Europe of devotion to the Sacred Heart, 149 ; the Archbishop's Sermon on the Pilgrimage, 150 ; Dr. Nicholson's attack upon the Archbishop, 150 ; adoration due to the Sacred Humanity and the Sacred Heart, 151 ; the able rejoinder of "Catholicus" to Dr. Nicholson, 151 ; the term, "Deification," 154 ; patristic examples of the use of the word "deified," 154 ; objections raised by the *Guardian*, 155 ; reply to them, 156 ; objections raised by Dr. Nicholson, 158 ; difficulty in understanding of what he accuses the Archbishop, 158 ; proof of Anglican heterodoxy on the Incarnation derivable from the controversy, 160 ; Lord Shaftesbury's sympathy with Roman Catholics, 161.

Arguments of the Emperor Julian against the Christians, *noticed*, 503.

BAIN (Dr. A.), The Emotions and the Will, *reviewed*, 326.

Bellasis (Mr. E.), Cherubini : Memorials illustrative of his Life, *noticed*, 497.

Blunt (Mr. J. H.), Dictionary of Sects, Heresies, Ecclesiastical Parties, and Schools of Religious Thought, *noticed*, 501.

Bowles (Miss E.), Eagle and Dove, *noticed*, 262.

CÆSARISM AND ULTRAMONTANISM—MR. FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 402-423 : the liberalistic theory on toleration, 402 ; Cæsarism a reaction against this, 403 ; increasing oppression of the Church, 403 ; Mr. Frederick Harrison on the Falck laws, 404 ; excuses for their tyrannical nature, 406 ; defence of them by English Protestants, 407 ; the Archbishop's Essay, 409 ; his defence of the Church against Cæsarism, 410 ; contrast between Pagan and Christian Cæsarism, 411 ; he does not deny to the State supreme power in civil matters, 411 ; ignorance of civil rulers of the Church's divine authority, 412 ; Mr. Stephen's work, "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity," 413 ; its interesting character, 413 ; his doctrine on a supreme being, 414 ; its repulsiveness to Catholics, 415 ; his idolatry of mere power, 416 ; his doctrine on morality, 416 ; his remarks on the sanction of morality, 417 ; intrinsic moral excellence inconsistent with his utilitarianism, 419 ; summary of his moral system, 420 ; congeniality of his general doctrines with his Cæsarism, 420 ; apparent success of his theories, 421 ; the Archbishop's reply to Mr. Stephen, 421 ; continuation of a discussion of the subject promised, 422 ; letter of F. Humphreys on Mr. Stephen's work, 423.

Carlyle (Mr. T.), Shooting Niagara, and After, *reviewed*, 450.

Carpenter (Dr.), Principles of Modern Physiology, *noticed*, 496.

CATHOLIC HIGHER STUDIES IN ENGLAND, 187-204 : increased development of Higher Studies, 187 ; the Archbishop's Circular, 187 ; sanction given to the opinion consistently advocated in the DUBLIN REVIEW, 188 ; advantage of a scheme having been actually set on foot, 189 ; the purposes which such a scheme may promote, 190 ; laxity in religious matters among non-Catholics, 191 ; momentous services which may be rendered by an institution for Higher Studies, 192 ; the special work of higher education, 193 ; the particular proposal put forth, 196 ; formation of a Catholic higher college under Mgr. Capel, 197 ; the connection with the London University, 198 ; two advantages from the connection, 199 ; objections to the London examinations, 200 ; difference between Catholic and non-Catholic philosophy, 202 ; need for the Philosophical professor to supplement the instruction derivable from treatises, 203.

CHURCH ARCHITECTURE, 210-227 : recapitulation of the arguments in the two former papers on the subject, 211 ; the requirements of a style of architecture really suited for a Christian church, 213 ; the Gothic fulfils the majority of them, 214 ; the Italian is better at least in one respect, 215 ; serious objections to both styles, 218 ; necessity for a new style combining the advantages of both, 220 ; suggestions for the new style, 223 ; hopes of a style which will satisfy the requirements of all parties, 226.

Coleridge (Rev. F.), Sowers and Reapers, *noticed*, 492.

Consolation for the Sick and Afflicted, *noticed*, 502.

Contemporary Review for March, 1874 : Art. I., "Caesarism and Ultramontanism," *reviewed*, 402.

Correspondence : F. Newman on the Spiritual Advantages of Higher Education, 265.

DORNER (Dr. J. A.), History of Protestant Theology, particularly in Germany, *noticed*, 244.

EBBA, *noticed*, 498.

Embassy in Ireland of Mgr. G. B. Rinuccini, Archbishop of Fermo, *reviewed*, 424.

Essays on Religion and Literature, *noticed*, 464.

FAIRPLAY (Mr. J.), Notes on the Wandering Jew, *noticed*, 503.

FALL (THE) OF MR. GLADSTONE'S GOVERNMENT, 450-461 : causes of the loss of authority in the Government, 450 ; the principle of religious education the chief cause of the reaction, 451 ; the inefficiency of some of the ministers another, 451 ; the reconstruction in August, 452 ; the dissolution, 452 ; unexpected result of the elections, 454 ; Mr. Disraeli's position, 455 ; his future policy, 456 ; the Education question and the new Parliament, 456 ; the Irish elections, 457 ; the diversified elements resulting from them, 457 ; ingratitude of the Irish electors, 458 ; notably at Limerick and Louth, 459 ; Mr. Gladstone's position, 460 ; Mr. Disraeli's government of Ireland, 460.

Fitzpatrick (Mr. Walter), The Great Condé and the Period of the Fronde, *noticed*, 264.

Fortescue (Right Hon. C. P.), Five Speeches on Irish Questions, *reviewed* 450.

Funk (Dr. F. X.), Zins und Wucher, *reviewed*, 69.

GLADSTONE (Right Hon. W. E.), Address to the Electors of Greenwich, *reviewed*, 450.

God our Father, *noticed*, 495.

Goldie (Rev. F.), Life of the Blessed John Berchmans, *noticed*, 483.

HANS BREITMANN'S BALLADS, *reviewed*, 302.

Hedley (Right Rev. Bishop), Who is Jesus Christ ? *noticed*, 473.

Hewlett (Mr. H. G.), Autobiography, Memoir, and Letters of Henry Fothergill Chorley, *noticed*, 259.

Histoire de la Campagne de 1866, rédigée par la Section du Corps Royal d'Etat Major, sous la direction de S. E. le Général Moltke, *reviewed*, 267.

Hoey (Mrs. Cashel), Nazareth, *noticed*, 502.

Holmes (Mr. O. W.), The Poet at the Breakfast Table, *reviewed*, 302.

Holy Places, *noticed*, 502.

Humphrey (Rev. F. W.), Mary Magnifying God, *noticed*, 468.

JERVIS (MR.), ON THE CHURCH OF FRANCE, 100-145 : general character of Mr. Jervis's work, 100 ; his contradictions and false history, 100 ; the patriarchal authority of the early Popes over the whole Church, 101 ; Mr. Jervis's charge of usurpation against the Popes, 104 ; Philip the Fair's attacks upon the liberties of the Church, 105 ; the Popes at Avignon, 106 ; commencement of the Great Schism, 106 ; the Councils of Constance and Bâle, 107 ; end of the schism and election of Martin V., 107 ; decline of the power of the clerical order in France, 108 ; the Pragmatic Sanction, 109 ; the Concordat of Francis I., 110 ; rise of Calvinism in France, 110 ; attempts to suppress it, 111 ; scandalous behaviour of Francis I. in clerical matters, 112 ; plots of the Huguenots, 113 ; meeting of the States-General at Orleans, 114 ; the Ordonnance d'Orleans, 114 ; the Colloquy of Passey, 116 ; the Cardinal of Lorraine at Trent, 117 ; opposition by the Court of France to the proceedings of the Council, 118 ; alarming state of religion in France, 119 ; rising of the Huguenots, 120 ; terrible excesses in the religious wars, 121 ; death of the Duke of Guise, 122 ; the Pacification of Amboise, 122 ; the second and third Wars of Religion, 123 ; the Massacre of S. Bartholomew, 123 ; failure of the policy of Catherine de' Medici, 124 ; the League, 124 ; hypocritical conduct of Henry III., 126 ; he murders the Duke of Guise and his brother, 127 ; assassination of Henry III., 128 ; Catholics and Protestants on tyrannicide, 128 ; accession of Henry IV., 130 ; overtures of Mayenne to Philip II. of Spain, 130 ; spirited conduct of Sixtus V., 131 ; abjuration of Henry IV., 132 ; revolt of the Huguenots, 134 ; deplorable state of Catholicity in France at this time, 135 ; its revival, 136 ; Cardinal de Perron and S. Francis de Sales, 137 ; S. Jane Frances de Chantal, 138 ; Madame d'Acarie, 139 ; S. Vincent de Paul founds the Congregation of Missions, 140 ; the high estimation in which he was held, 141 ; foundation of Seminaries by M. Olier, 144 ; their successful progress, 144 ; remarkable religious revival in France at the present day, 145.

JERVIS (MR.), ON THE JANSENISTIC AND GALRICAN MOVEMENT, 362-401 : prejudice of Mr. Jervis against the Jesuits, 362 ; difference between Catholic principles of government and Cæsarism, 362 ; burning of Pope Gregory's Bull by the Politicians in 1591, 363 ; banishment of the Jesuits from France, 363 ; opposition of the French Parliament to the Jesuits, 363 ; Richelieu becomes minister, 364 ; his conduct on the whole inimical to Catholic interests, 364 ; Richelieu and the Church in antagonism, 365 ; short-lived rupture between France and Rome, 366 ; Jansenius and S. Cyran found a new school of theology, 366 ; Angélique Arnauld, the Abbess of Port Royal, 367 ; her great influence, 368 ; S. Cyran appointed Director of Port Royal, 368 ; he is imprisoned in Vincennes, 369 ; death of Jansenius, 369 ; posthumous publication of his "Augustinus," 369 ; it is condemned by the Holy See, 370 ; death of S. Cyran, 370 ; Arnauld's book "De la fréquente Communion," 371 ; condemnation by Innocent X. of seven propositions drawn from Jansenius's "Augustinus," 372 ; Pascal's "Provincial Letters," 372 ; desecration of Port Royal, 373 ; comparison between the Jansenists and

the Catholic Confessors, 374 ; condemnation of the Jansenists by Alexander VII., 374 ; opposition of the Port Royal nuns to agree to the condemnation, 374 ; closing of the Port Royal schools, 375 ; judicial proceedings against the Jansenists, 376 ; absolute despotism of Louis XIV., 377 ; it was one of the results of the times, 378 ; the Church the only independent power in the realm, 378 ; fracas in Rome between the French ambassador's retinue and the Pope's guard, 379 ; harsh proceedings of Louis XIV. in consequence, 379 ; conflict between the Parliament and the Faculty of the Sorbonne, 380 ; encroachments of the King upon the Church, 382 ; further differences between France and Rome, 384 ; secularization of the convent of Narbonne, 385 ; the Assembly of Clergy in 1682, 386 ; its uncanonical character and composition, 387 ; Bossuet's opening sermon, 388 ; differences among the members of the Assembly, 389 ; signing of the Declaration, 390 ; reviving feeling of the Clergy in favour of Rome, 391 ; the Declaration repudiated by the Bishops and King, 393 ; injury to the Church by the forced conversion of the Calvinists, 395 ; the rise of Cartesianism, 395 ; Margaret Mary Alacoque, 396 ; the Devotion to the Sacred Heart, 397 ; death of Louis XIV., 398 ; licentious state of society after his death, 399 ; the expulsion and suppression of the Jesuits, 400 ; persecution of the priests in the Reign of Terror, 401.

Jervis (W. H., M.A.), History of the Church of France, from the Concordat of Bologna, A.D. 1516, to the Revolution, *reviewed*, 100, 362.

Jesuits in Conflict, *noticed*, 243.

LA MARMORA (General A.), Un po' più di Luce sugli Eventi Politici e Militari dell' Anno 1866, *reviewed*, 267.

Lancicius (Ven. F. Nicholas), Meditations, *noticed*, 490.

Landriot (Mgr.), Promenades autour de mon Jardin : Conférences aux Dames du Monde, *reviewed*, 162.

Lecky (W. E. H.), History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe, *reviewed*, 69.

Lepidi (Rev. F. Alberto), Examen Philosophico-theologicum de Ontologismo, *noticed*, 228.

Letters to and from Rome in the years A.D. 61, 62, and 63, *noticed*, 242.

Lettre de M. le Comte de Chambord à M. de Chesnelong, *reviewed*, 204.

Life of S. Philip Benizi, *noticed*, 487.

Life of the Blessed Peter Favre, of the Society of Jesus, first Companion of S. Ignatius Loyala, *noticed*, 483.

Littledale (Dr. R. F.), The Religious Education of Women, *reviewed*, 162.

Lowell (J. R.), The Biglow Papers, *reviewed*, 302.

MACMILLAN'S MAGAZINE, December, 1873 : Art. I., " Galileo and Papa Infallibility," *noticed*, 230.

Madame Swetchine, sa Vie et ses Œuvres, *reviewed*, 162.

Madonne (M. l'Abbé de), Ignace Spencer et la Renaissance du Catholicisme en Angleterre, *noticed*, 491.

Meditations for the Use of the Clergy for every Day in the Year, on the Gospel for the Sundays, *noticed*, 496.

Miles (G. H.), The Truce of God, *noticed*, 504.

Mill (J. Stuart), An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, *reviewed*, 1, 326.

—————, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, *reviewed*, 1, 326.

—————, Autobiography, *reviewed*, 1.

MILL'S (MR.) DENIAL OF FREE WILL, 326–361 : Mr. Mill the ablest champion of Determinism, 326 ; primary necessity in controversy of understanding your opponent's position, 327 ; Mr. Mill's theory stated in detail, 327 ; the spontaneous impulse of the will affected, the Determinists say, by motives, 334 ; our denial of that fact, which is the exact point at issue, 334 ; discussion of various questions of terminology, 335 ; on anti-impulsive action, 336 ; Determinism opposed to observed facts, 337 ; the power to follow reason when it conflicts with passion, 340 ; such power more frequently exercised than Determinists admit, 340 ; facts in proof of the preceding, 341 ; the capriciousness of human emotion, 343 ; the Determinist theory daily proved to be false, 344 ; the motives which actuate a man when he resists his will's spontaneous impulse, 346 ; Determinism and fatalism, 347 ; answers to objections against indeterminism, 347 ; the first objection that no analysis has been alleged of resistance to the will, 348 ; the second, that no man acts against his strongest motive, 349 ; the third, that any change of will is effected by the agency of motives, 350 ; Mr. Mill's objections to man's consciousness of freedom, 351 ; reply to one of his objections, 352 ; Mr. Bailey on Determinism, 353 ; comments on his remarks, 354 ; Mr. Mill alleges that Determinism is shown to be probable in certain cases, 354 ; in the abstract we agree with him in those cases, 355 ; on the connection between Freewill and moral responsibility, 359 ; statement of two further objections, 360.

MILL'S (MR.), PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION, 1–38 : Mr. Mill's Autobiography, 1 ; his ideal of good, 6 ; his strange pertinacity in a belief in atheism, 8 ; the Catholic's position in an argument against such belief, 9 ; Mr. Mill's irreligion due to personal sin, 9 ; the abstruse nature of his early studies, 10 ; his ignorance of elementary Christian doctrines, 12 ; such ignorance is shared by other antitheistic philosophers, 14 ; on the necessary character of mathematical axioms, 15 ; Mr. Mill's aggressive and affirmative philosophical position, 16 ; his position examined on mathematical axioms and the rule of certitude, 17 ; our general argument stated, 18 ; Mr. Mill on the early acquisition of geometrical truths, 19 ; reply to his argument, 20 ; we maintain that what each man's existent faculties actually testify is known to him as certainly true, 24 ; Mr. Mill contends that man can only be certain of present facts, 24 ; continuation of the argument, 26 ; his attempted distinction between two kinds of complex ideas, 27 ; summary of the preceding argument, 29 ; other propositions concerning necessary truth, 30 ; can the uniformity of nature be proved by experience ? 32 ; Mr. Mill's reply to the DUBLIN

REVIEW on this question, 33; Mr. Mill's reply to Dr. Ward upon Miracles, 35; failure of his attempt to build a philosophy on the basis of experience, 38.

Miller (Sr. Joaquin), Songs of the Sierras, *reviewed*, 302.

Mivart (Mr. St. George), Man and Apes, *noticed*, 475.

NEWMAN (Dr. J. H.), Miscellanies from the Oxford Sermons and other Writings, *noticed*, 232.

—————, Tracts, Theological and Ecclesiastical, *noticed*, 494.

Nicholson (Dr.), Accusation of the Archbishop of Westminster, *reviewed*, 146.

OXFORD UNDERGRADUATE (The) of Twenty Years ago, *noticed*, 466.

PERIN (M. Charles), L'Usure et la Loi de 1807, *reviewed*, 69.

Potter (Rev. F.), Rupert Aubrey of Aubrey Chase, *noticed*, 503.

Prospectus of S. Joseph's Theological Library, *noticed*, 464.

PRUSSIAN AND ITALIAN DIPLOMACY IN 1866, 267-301: no moral improvement in modern diplomacy, 267; the influence which public opinion has upon it, 268; striking contrast between La Marmora and Bismarck, 268; difference in principles of the Berlin and Turin Cabinets, 269; mission of La Marmora to the Prussian Court, 270; its success, 270; La Marmora forms a cabinet at Florence, 271; proposes to purchase Venetia from Austria, 273; Prussia bids for the alliance of Italy against Austria, and concludes a commercial treaty with Italy, 273; General Govone is sent to Berlin, 274; crafty dealing of Bismarck, 275; he proposes a treaty binding Italy to support Prussia, 278; approaching rupture between Austria and Prussia, 279; attitude of France, 280; pacific protestations of Austria, 281; Count Benedetti's opinion of Bismarck, 283; Bismarck's double dealing, 283; treaty between Prussia and Italy, 285; pretended disarmament of Austria and Prussia, 286; preparations of Prussia for war, 288; uncertainty as to France in the approaching war, 289; anxiety of Bismarck that Italy should strike the first blow, 290; the dispatches of La Marmora, 290; anger of Bismarck at their publication, 292; his similarity to Napoleon I., 292; stormy scene in the German Parliament, 294; Bismarck's animosity to La Marmora, 296; his policy towards the German Catholics, 297; comments of the *Spectator* upon it, 298; possible danger to the German Empire from such policy, 299; hostile attitude in Parliament of the Alsace and Lorraine deputies, 300; grievances of the two annexed provinces, 300; arbitrary treatment of those provinces, 301.

Purbrick (Rev. F.), May Papers; or Thoughts on the Litanies of Loreto, *noticed*, 470.

RAMSAY (Miss Grace), Thomas Grant, first Bishop of Southwark, *noticed*, 471.

Ratisbonne (Abbé T.), Manuel de la Mère Chrétienne, *reviewed*, 162.

Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, *noticed*, 244.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION OF WOMEN (THE), 162-187 ; on the necessity of keeping up with the progress of the age in education, 162 ; Dr. Little-dale's paper on the religious education of women, 163 ; his arguments on personality, 164 ; their sophisticated character, 165 ; his view of the "repressive system of education," 168 ; the subjective position of women, 169 ; less under Christianity than in ancient times, 170 ; estrangement in religious matters between men and women, 171 ; caused, Dr. Little-dale thinks, by the imperfect religious teaching of women, 172 ; but more, we consider, by the different temperaments of the sexes, 175 ; chief aim of a religious education, 176 ; modern Catholic women of talent, 177 ; Dr. Littledale on the conventual system, 178 ; his suggestions on the education of women, 180 ; actual state of Catholic female religious education, 181 ; on the necessity of a sound educational literature, 183 ; education in France, 185 ; Mgr. Landriot on the spiritual life, 186.

Revival of Priestly Life in the Seventeenth Century in France, *noticed*, 240.

RINUCCINI'S IRISH NUNCIATURE, 424-449 : historical neglect of Rinuccini, 424 ; his high character and freedom from ambition, 425 ; appointed Nuncio to the Irish Confederated Catholics, 425 ; Pope Innocent's instructions to him, 426 ; fear of the Pope lest the Confederates should aim at national independence, 426 ; the Pope's opinion of the Marquis of Ormond, 427 ; difficulties of the Nuncio's task, 427 ; Queen Henrietta Maria's fear of his mission, 429 ; difficulties thrown in his way by Mazarin, 430 ; his arrival in Ireland, 430 ; fresh negotiations between King Charles and the Confederates through Ormond, and also through the Earl of Glamorgan, 432 ; troubles of the Nuncio through the quarrels of the Confederate leaders, 433 ; he enlists the clergy on his side, 434 ; he opposes the Ormond treaty, but supports that of Glamorgan, 435 ; Sir Kenelm Digby's negotiation, 436 ; disavowal of Glamorgan by the King, 436 ; the puzzle Ormond was to the Nuncio, 437 ; victory of Benburb, 438 ; ratification of the Ormond treaty, 438 ; the Nuncio's faith in Glamorgan, 439 ; becomes President of the new Confederation of Kilkenny, 440 ; his justification of that act, 441 ; strange contradictions in his letters to Rome, 441 ; increasing difficulties of his position, 442 ; meeting of the General Assembly, 443 ; desire for a foreign Protector, 443 ; Rinuccini's interdict, 444 ; its consequences, 445 ; inaction of O'Neill, 446 ; triumph of Ormond, 447 ; the Nuncio's departure from Ireland, 447 ; estimate of his nunciature, 448 ; his early death, 449.

Rivieres (Rev. F. Philpin de), Holy Places, their Sanctity and Authenticity, *noticed*, 493.

SIMPLE TALES, *noticed*, 504.

SITUATION IN FRANCE (THE), 204-210 : effect of the Comte de Chambord's letter to M. de Chesnelong, 204 ; regret on reading it, 205 ; the letter viewed as an index to the character of the Prince, 206 ; the question of the Flag, 207 ; the result of the letter was to put a veto on the restoration, 208 ; wise decision of the Assembly, 208 ; present state of parties,

- 209 ; duty of all of them to support the Government of Marshal Mac Mahon, 209 ; suspension of the *Univers*, 210.
- Southern Poems of the War, *reviewed*, 302.
- Spalding (J. L.), Life of the Most Rev. M. J. Spalding, D.D., Archbishop of Baltimore, *noticed*, 236.
- Spencer (Herbert), First Principles, *noticed*, 251.
- Stephen (J. Fitzjames, Q.C.), Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, *reviewed*, 402.
- Sweeney (Very Rev. J. L.), The Pope and the Emperor, *noticed*, 495.

TAINÉ (H. A.), History of English Literature, *reviewed*, 39.

TAINÉ'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE, 39-68 : the literature of a nation the reflex of its feelings, 39 ; periods of a nation's literature, 41 ; general character of M. Taine's work, 42 ; its favourable reception in England, 42 ; yet, in our opinion, the book is a failure, 43 ; M. Taine on the reconstruction of the past, 44 ; his view of Protestantism, 46 ; his philosophical view of English history contradicted by the religious attitude of England, 47 ; the anti-Catholic tone of the work, 48 ; origin of religious systems, 48 ; one fatal error of M. Taine's philosophical system, 50 ; M. Taine on the Anglo-Saxon character, 51 ; on the Normans, 53 ; his unfair preference for early Saxon hymns over those of the Middle Ages, 54 ; his want of appreciation of Chaucer and his contemporaries, 55 ; his contempt of the Schoolmen, 57 ; his views of the Renaissance in England, 58 ; a thorough mis-reading of history, 59 ; the age of inventions and the debt it owes to the Church, 60 ; the Renaissance period in poetry, 61 ; its truthful love of nature, 63 ; Mr. Carlyle's remarks upon Shakespeare, 65 ; M. Taine on Milton's position in English literature, 66 ; final summary, 67.

Taylor (Bayard), Lars, *reviewed*, 302.

USURY AND THE CANON LAW, 66-99 : recapitulation of our former argument, 69 ; commercial and necessitous loans, 70 ; on the ecclesiastical prohibition of *lucrum ex mutuo*, 71 ; need of treating the question historically, 72 ; economical situation in the Middle Ages, 73 ; immense difference between loans in the Middle Ages and at the present day, 74 ; interpretation of the Scriptures, the Fathers, and the Councils regarding usury, 75 ; correspondence of the Church to successive changes in the economical situation, 76 ; early decisions of the Holy See, 77 ; recent decisions, 80 ; recognition by the Holy See of commercial loans, 81 ; views of M. Perin and M. l'Abbé Mastrofini examined, 82 ; the theory of *tituli ab usura excusantes* and *titulus legis* examined, 84 ; doctrine of the sterility of coin, 86 ; instability of the argument, 87 ; transference of the right of property by loans, 87 ; Dr. Funk's remarks on that doctrine, 88 ; statements of Bentham and of Mr. Lecky, 90 ; ignorance of the latter of Catholic modern works on usury, 91 ; summary, 92 ; M. l'Abbé Morel's work "*Du Prêt à Intérêt*," 94 ; his strange proposals, 96 ; his false views, 97 ; painful impression from reading his book, 99.

VALROGER (Rev. F. H. de), *La Genèse des Espèces*, *noticed*, 498.
" *Vitis Mystica* "; or, the True Vine, *noticed*, 488.

WESTMINSTER (The Archbishop of), *Cæsarism and Ultramontanism*, *noticed*, 228 ; *reviewed*, 402.

—————, *Circular on College of Higher Studies*, *reviewed*, 187.

—————, *Sin and its Consequences*, *noticed*, 462.

—————, *The Divine Glory of the Sacred Heart*, *reviewed*, 146.

Whitman (Walt), *Poems by*, *reviewed*, 302.

Whittier (J. G.), *Pennsylvania Pilgrimage, and other Poems*, *reviewed*, 302.

—————, *Poetical Works*, *reviewed*, 302.

Wilson (Rev. R. F.), *Life of S. Vincent de Paul*, *noticed*, 501.

THE
DUBLIN REVIEW

OCTOBER, 1874.

ART. I. THE SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN STATES
—THE COUNT DE CHAMBORD AND THE POPE'S
CIVIL PRINCEDOM.

On some Popular Errors concerning Politics and Religion. By Lord ROBERT MONTAGU, M.P. London : Burns & Oates.

Les Principes de '89 et la Doctrine Catholique. Par M. l'Abbé GODARD. Edition corrigée et augmentée. Paris : Lecoffre.

IN our recent articles on the state of France we have implied a theoretical position, which requires to be expressed and defended. We have given a confident opinion, that by far the most happy and hopeful practical issue of the crisis would have been, that the Count de Chambord should have been called by the Assembly to reign as constitutional monarch, in conformity with what we understood to be the pledges and sanctions conveyed in his various letters and manifestoes.* No other practicable solution seemed nearly so favourable as this, towards obtaining for the Church and Holy See that permanent influence over French politics, which is the only trustworthy guarantee for order and stability. In addition to this primary and indispensable qualification, were to be considered the Count's great personal virtues, which extort admiration even from his strongest political foes; and the singular and unapproachable efficacy of his name, whether as a rallying point for the friends of order, or as a bulwark, both against anarchy on one hand and a disastrous revival of the Empire on the other.

To our great grief however, as time went on, it became more and more manifest, that the Count de Chambord declines to accept the position we had hoped might be his; that he will not recognize the de facto Government of France as legitimate, and accept a constitutional monarchate at its hands; that he claims the throne, as his by some kind of right, not only (as

* Especially those cited in the article "Marshal MacMahon's Government of France."—(DUBLIN REVIEW, No. 42, October, 1873.)

theologians might say) a right of congruity, but intrinsic, infeasible, and inalienable. We are well aware that many most excellent Catholics sympathize warmly with his claim; and (if they honour us by reading our pages) we will pay all possible attention to whatever they may urge against us. But to us (we are bound to state frankly) any such claim on the Count's part seems not only destitute of all foundation, but, if carried to its legitimate results, extremely mischievous in tendency. We think we ought not to take up a position, which will be felt as painful by many of those whom we most respect, without stating expressly the grounds on which it rests. We will begin our article then, by setting forth that doctrine, on the origin and authority of civil government, which we understand to be the true and Catholic doctrine; we will next argue that, consistently with this doctrine, the Count de Chambord has no claim of right (so to speak) whatsoever to the throne of France, whether as absolute or constitutional King; and lastly, we will consider various particulars in regard to the Holy Father's civil principedom, which will be found to have an intimate connection with the earlier part of our article.

We have written before now on what may be called the theology of civil government, but it has been on a different *portion* of that theology. Thus in the first number of our New Series we considered "the intrinsic end of civil government"; and we arrived at the conclusion that, although security of person and property is its sole *primary* end, yet the civil governor acts more laudably and more acceptably to God, in proportion as, under due conditions,* he labours both for the spiritual and the temporal well-being of the people. In writing that article, we avowedly abstained from considering the indirect temporal power possessed by the Holy See over Christian sovereigns. We abstained from this consideration—not because we ourselves disbelieved the existence of that power—but because we did not see clearly that we should at that period act opportunely by starting the discussion. From the time however when Pius IX. denounced the 24th proposition of the Syllabus as among "the principal errors of our age," it became evident that the Holy See desired the matter to be discussed, though of course with all care and circumspection. Accordingly in April, 1872, when we found that no less eminent a writer than F. Liberatore set forth plainly the Church's full doctrine on the subject, we felt ourselves safe under the shadow of his name, in exhibiting that

* By the term "under due conditions," we mean to express that his efforts for their *spiritual* well-being ought to be from first to last conducted under the Church's guidance.

doctrine as clearly as we could and dwelling on its great importance.

We are now however to consider the theology of civil government in a different point of view and one which logically takes precedence of the other two. We are to inquire who *is* the civil governor: we are to examine the principles which determine (1) in whom at any given moment is vested the sovereignty of any given state; and (2) by what *right* such sovereignty is so vested. At the present time—when political revolutions are so rife, and anarchical principles so widely prevalent,—there are few speculative questions which possess greater practical importance.

As it might possibly be supposed that our disparagement of the Count de Chambord's claims implies some tendency towards the principles of sedition and revolution, it will be better perhaps at starting to guard against any such misconception. We will venture to say there is no man living, who more utterly detests the anarchical spirit, or who holds a stronger doctrine on the obedience due from citizens to their legitimate sovereign, than we do. As a testimony of our loyalty on this head—and also for the instruction and edification of our readers—we will give textually Gregory XVI.'s definition of Catholic doctrine on the subject in the "*Mirari Vos*," supplementing it by a similar definition of Pius IX. These definitions indeed, we may also add, will bear a not unimportant part in our argument. But we will make one preliminary observation. There is no Catholic writer of any school who doubts, that the very same submission and obedience which is due to a sovereign monarch, is also due to a sovereign body, be it aristocratical or democratical; that a Russian e. g. owes no greater obedience to his Emperor, than a citizen of the United States owes to President and Congress when acting in accordance with the Constitution.* We shall therefore commonly adopt the word "*sovereign*," as our translation of the Pontifical word "*princeps*"; intending to include under that word,

* "*Triplex potest esse regimen reipublicæ humanæ: monarchicum, unius principis supremi qui sit una singularis persona; aristocraticum, unius supremi concilii seu tribunalis ex pluribus optimatibus coacti; et democratia, per totius populi suffragia; qui tres modi simplices sunt: ex illis autem possunt alii componi, qui vel duos illorum vel etiam omnes participant, quæ gubernationes mixtæ solent appellari. Potest igitur principatus politicus vel per se et præcisè considerari ut potestas quædam suprema regendi civiliter rempublicam, . . . vel prout determinatus ad aliquam regiminis speciem ex his quas numeravimus.*" — Suarez's "*Defensio*," l. 3, c. ii. p. 4.

not only sovereign *persons*, but sovereign *bodies*. And in placing before our readers Gregory XVI.'s pronouncement, we will beg them to remember (what we have often pointed out) his unequivocal declaration in the "*Singulari nos*," that the words we are to quote contain an *ex cathedrâ* definition, on "the subjection due to the" civil "powers." In other words, the general doctrine which follows claims to be received by every Catholic with absolute and unreserved assent, as infallibly defined by the Holy See.

But whereas (pronounces Greg. XVI.) we have heard that in popularly distributed writings certain doctrines are promulgated, whereby due fidelity and submission to sovereigns are overthrown, and the fire of rebellion everywhere kindled, especial care must be taken lest peoples thereby deceived be led from the path of right. Let all observe that (according to the Apostle's admonition) "there is no power except from God; and existent powers are ordained by God. Therefore he who resists the power resists God's ordinance, and those who resist incur damnation." Wherefore both divine and human laws cry out against those, who labour by the basest machinations of revolt and sedition to set at nought their fidelity to their sovereigns and precipitate them from power.

And it was evidently for this very reason—viz. lest they should pollute themselves by such foul sin (*tantâ turpitudine*)—that the early Christians, even while persecution was raging, are known to have conferred great service both on the Emperors and on the security of the Empire. And they most clearly proved this—not only by fidelity in accurately and promptly performing all things commanded of them which were not contrary to their religion, but by bravery also and by shedding their blood in battle. "Christian soldiers," says Augustine, "obeyed the unbelieving Emperor; but when it came to the cause of Christ, they acknowledged no Emperor except Him who is in heaven. They distinguished between their Eternal and their temporal Lord; and at the same time for the sake of their Eternal Lord they subjected themselves to their temporal." These maxims the unconquered martyr Maurice, the chief of the Theban legion, had placed before his eyes, when (as S. Eusebius relates) he thus answered the Emperor: "We are your soldiers, oh Emperor, but also (as we freely confess) the slaves of God: and now not even the supreme necessity of life has driven us into rebellion. We have our arms in our hands; and yet we resist not, because we have thought it better to die than to slay." Which fidelity of the ancient Christians towards their sovereigns shines forth more brightly, if we consider with Tertullian that the Christians of that time "were not deficient in numbers or strength, had they chosen to play the part of declared enemies. . . . We are of yesterday," he says, "and we have filled your whole land; your cities, islands, fortresses, municipalities, your very camp, your tribes, decuries, palaces, senate, forum. To what war should we have been unequal or unready, even had we been unequal in force, we who so willingly encounter death, were it not that according to our rule of life it is more lawful to be slain than to slay? If so great a multitude of men as we are had

broken away from you into some remote corner of the earth, the loss of so many citizens (of whatever kind you may account them), would have shamed your Empire and punished it by the very loss of numbers. Beyond doubt you would have been shocked at your solitude ; you would have sought for subjects to govern ; there would have remained to you more enemies than citizens ; whereas now you have fewer, on account of the multitude of Christians."

These bright examples of immovable subjection to sovereigns, which come necessarily from the most holy precepts of the Christian religion, condemn the detestable insolence and wickedness of those who, heated with reckless and unbridled desire of lawless liberty, labour to overthrow and eradicate all the rights of sovereignties ; and who assuredly will introduce real slavery among peoples, under the pretext of liberty. To this point tended the most wicked ravings and machinations of Valdenses, Beguards, Wickliffites, and other such children of Belial, who were the filth and ignominy of mankind, and were on that account deservedly anathematized by this Apostolic See. For no other end indeed do these miscreants exert all their strength, except that they may with Luther congratulate themselves on being "free from every restraint" ; and for the sake of more easily and quickly attaining this end, they most audaciously perpetrate every enormity.

Pius IX. has more than once laid down the same doctrine. Thus in his inaugural Encyclical :—

Labour to inculcate on the Christian people due obedience and subjection to sovereigns and powers : teaching (according to the Apostle's admonition) "that there is no power except from God ; that those who resist the power, resist God's ordinance and so incur damnation" ; and therefore that the precept of obeying the [civil] power can by no one be violated without sin [*citra piaculum*], unless anything be haply commanded which is opposed to the Laws of God and the Church.

In several other of his Acts the same doctrine is set forth ; and its contradictory is condemned in the Sixty-third Proposition of the Syllabus.

These Pontifical declarations cannot be too constantly in the mind of Catholic citizens. There are various external marks, by which a good Catholic is known. He is known by being a good son, husband, father, friend ; he is known by being just and upright in his commercial and social relations ; he is known again by his loyal devotion and obedience to the Church and to the Holy See, both in matters primarily spiritual, and in matters indirectly spiritual though primarily within the temporal sphere. But no less characteristically is he known, by his profound obedience to his legitimate civil sovereign, wherever that sovereign's commands are consistent with God's Law ; by his stern disapproval of every attempt to bring the sovereign into discredit, except indeed when such discredit is

necessary for a due appreciation of the prerogatives of Christ and His Church; by the utter detestation with which he regards every machination tending to promote sedition and revolt. He wages an irreconcilable warfare against anarchists and revolutionists, regarding them as among the basest, the most odious, the most contemptible of mankind.

But in proportion as this deference is strictly due to every civil sovereign as to God's minister on earth,—in that very proportion it is important that such obedience be paid to its true object; that it should be offered to the legitimate, and not to some putative sovereign. There have been occasions doubtless, in which it is a matter of much difficulty to decide where the legitimate authority is vested; but it seems to us, that throughout far the greater part of Europe at this moment there is no difficulty whatever in the matter, if we do but bear in mind admitted theological principles. It is well known that, on all those matters which concern the origin and rights of civil sovereignty, Suarez represents the large majority of theologians; but it is often alleged that Bossuet teaches a fundamentally different doctrine. For ourselves however we cannot find any substantial difference whatever between Bossuet and Suarez; though no doubt they sometimes delineate the same doctrine with very different colouring. At all events we are quite certain that there is no argument on which we are going to rest our case, which would not commend itself to one of these theologians as fully as to the other.

We begin then with setting forth, as the basis of our reasoning, what we apprehend to be in substance the one Catholic doctrine, on the origin and rights of civil sovereignty. We shall set forth this doctrine in the shape which Suarez gives to it: corroborating our statements in foot-notes, as we proceed, by passages from that theologian; and supplementing those passages by one or two extracts from Bossuet. We begin as follows:—

In every country there is no inconsiderable number of disorderly inhabitants, who detest restraint and detest the civil ruler for imposing it; while the far larger population consists of law-abiding men, who look up to the institution of civil government with warmest gratitude and attachment, as guarding them from external violence and protecting their persons and property. In Suarez's time whoever looked round the civilized world would have seen, that in almost every country there was one and one only supreme authority, directly exercising this function; one and one only supreme authority, to which the orderly looked for protection, and which the disorderly as such hated and resisted. He would have said that this authority—be it indi-

vidual king, or aristocratic, or democratic, or mixed body—was known by the very fact we mention to be legitimate sovereign.*

How would he *reason* in defence of this thesis?

Firstly, that civil government in itself has been instituted by God and has His authority, is sufficiently proved by the circumstance, that without civil government men would have to remain in a permanent and irremediable state of barbarism and anarchy; and that such a state is more fearfully disastrous—more profoundly injurious to man's highest religious and temporal interests—than words can adequately describe.† That which human nature absolutely and peremptorily requires, must have been intended and must be sanctioned by the Author of human nature.

Secondly, nothing is more easily supposable, than that God should have directly vested the sovereignty over some given nation in some person or some aristocratic or democratical body, directly designated by Himself; just as He has so vested the *spiritual* sovereignty over the *Church*. But if any writers wish to maintain that He has done this—we never heard of any such writers—they would of course have to adduce some historical proof of their allegation. We need

* There is only one case (as far as we can see) in which Suarez would deny that sovereigns, acting as such and accepted by the people as such, are known by that fact to be legitimate. He imposes very stringent conditions, in order that he who has been legitimate sovereign can be rightly regarded as a tyrant and rightfully be resisted. Suppose then that some people (however unanimously) resisted their legitimate sovereign on insufficient grounds and expelled him by force,—no one, under such circumstances, whom (however unanimously) they might place on the seat of power, would on that account become their legitimate sovereign. It is admitted however by Bossuet himself, that *in the course of time*—after due length of peaceful possession—the new government may become legitimate. “On voit par là que, pour le bien de la paix et pour la stabilité des choses humaines, les royaumes, fondés d'abord sur la rébellion, dans la suite sont regardés comme devenus légitimes; ou *par la longue possession*, ou par les traités et la reconnaissance des rois précédens” (“Politique tirée de l'Ecriture,” liv. ix. prop. iv. exemple iv.). We may as well however explain, that we have little or no concern with this question in our present article.

† “Non potest communitas hominum sine justitiâ et pace conservari; neque justitia et pax, sine gubernatore qui potestatem præcipiendi et coercendi habeat, servari possunt: ergo in humanâ civitate necessarius est princeps politicus, qui illam in officio contineat.”—“Defensio,” l. 3, c. i. n. 3.

“Omnia quæ sunt de jure naturæ sunt a Deo ut Auctore naturæ: sed principaturs politicus est de jure naturæ; ergo est a Deo ut Auctore naturæ. . . . Et cum sit necessarius ad conservationem humanæ societatis quam ipsa humana natura appetit, etiam hoc titulo est *ex jure naturali talem potentiam exigente*. Igitur sicut Deus, qui est Auctor naturæ, est etiam Auctor juris naturalis, ita etiam est Auctor hujus primatûs et potestatis” (ib. n. 6).

hardly say that (putting aside the case of ancient Judaism) there is no vestige nor even pretence of such proof.*

It remains therefore, thirdly, that God has placed the sovereignty provisionally in the hands of the people, to be by them vested in such supreme authority as they may choose.† Consider then such an established and accepted government, as that above mentioned : that person or organized body, which is de facto accepted by the people, and which peaceably exercises supreme authority, is the legitimate sovereign. It rested with the people to vest that authority where they might please, and they have vested it *there*. We have already sufficiently explained that, when we thus speak, we are by no means including any case in which a legitimate sovereign exists, who has been expelled from power on insufficient ground ; but we are considering only those immeasurably more frequent cases, in which there is no such rival claimant of sovereignty.‡

* "Si necessaria esset [ad legitimam politicam potestatem] specialis Dei donatio et concessio non connexa cum naturâ, non posset solâ ratione naturali de illâ constare, sed opus esset ut per revelationem hominibus manifestetur ut de illâ certi esse possent : quod tamen falsum est" (l. 3, c. ii. n. 5).

† On this turning-point of the argument, we give Suarez's words at somewhat greater length, italicizing a clause here and there :—"Atque hinc etiam evidens est. . . potestatem hanc præcisè spectatam, ut est ab Auctore naturæ quasi per naturalem consecutionem, non esse in unâ personâ neque in aliquâ peculiari communitate sive optimatum sive quorumcunque ex populo, quia ex naturâ rei *solum est hæc potestas in communitate* quatenus ad illius conservationem necessarium est, et quatenus per dictamen rationis naturalis ostendi potest. Sed ratio naturalis solum ostendit esse necessarium *in totâ communitate* et non in unâ personâ vel senatu. Ergo, *prout est immediatè à Deo*, solum intelligitur esse *in totâ communitate* non in aliquâ parte ejus.

. . . Et ratio est manifesta : quia ex vi rationis naturalis non potest excogitari ratio, cur hæc potestas determinetur ad unam personam vel ad certum numerum personarum infra totam communitatem, magis quam ad alium : ergo ex vi naturalis concessionis solum est immediatè in communitate. . . . Quod usus ipse confirmat : nam propterea *diversæ provinciæ vel nationes diversos etiam gubernationis modos elegerunt* ; et nulla illarum contra rationem naturalem aut contra immediatam Dei institutionem operatur. . . .

"Ex quibus tandem concluditur, *nullum regem vel monarchiam habere vel habuisse* (secundum ordinariam legem) immediatè à Deo vel ex divinâ institutione. Hoc est 'egregium theologiæ axioma,' non per irrisionem, ut Rex protulit, sed verè ; quia rectè intellectum verissimum est, et ad intelligendos fines et limites civilis potestatis *maxime necessarium*" (c. ii. nn. 7, 10).

Bossuet is not less explicit. "Civile imperium generatim tantum traditum est [à Deo] ; et *hominum arbitrio forma relicta*, sive illa monarchica, sive aristocratica, sive popularis foret."—"Defensio Declarationis," l. 1, c. 3.

‡ "Sæpius contingit occupari regnum aliquod per bellum injustum ; quo ferè modo clariora orbis imperia amplificata fuere. Et tunc quidem in principio non acquiritur regnum nec vera potestas, cum titulus justitiæ desit : successu verò temporis contingit, ut *populus liberè consentiat*, vel ut a successoribus regnum bonâ fide præscribatur ; et tunc cessabit tyrannis, et incipiet verum dominium et regia potestas" (l. 3, c. ii. n. 20).

Now, in these days of anarchy and revolution, there is an objection, which will at once be earnestly urged by many right-minded persons against the apparent bearing of this doctrine. It is simply a sanction, they will say, of rebellion and resistance; it represents the sovereign as a mere delegate of the people; and if he is their delegate, they may at their will revoke such delegation. Here is that very tenet about the rights of man and the lawfulness of rebellion, which has been denounced by the Holy See with such singular and deserved severity of language.

Suarez expressly replies to this objection; which had been raised indeed by James I. of England, against whom he was writing. Doubtless, had he lived in such times as these, he would have coloured his answer much more vividly, and developed it at far greater length; but, as a matter of argument, it is abundantly sufficient. The people have not *delegated* power over themselves to their sovereign; they have *transferred* it to him.* Now there cannot be imagined a proposition more monstrous and subversive of all order, than that rights once conceded can be revoked at the pleasure of the conceder. Suarez instances (c. ii. n. 14) the case of *property*. No one will allege that, ordinarily speaking, it is God Himself who has immediately conferred this or that possession on this or that person; but neither will any Catholic on that account dream of denying that the rights of property are sacred and inviolable. And what would be said by any sane man of the principle, that every one, who has conferred on another a gift, may for ever afterwards at pleasure revoke it? The doctrine of theologians is denounced, forsooth, because it is alleged to issue legitimately in an anarchical and revolutionary conclusion. Yet at last all which can be said is, that if you *combine* their doctrine with a certain monstrous and detestable premiss, the two taken together issue in a certain monstrous and detestable conclusion. We need hardly say, that the monstrous and detestable conclusion is due, not to Suarez's minor, but to the monstrous and detestable major.

It may be asked indeed by way of rejoinder, how it can be *shown* that the people have transferred, and not merely delegated, power over themselves to their sovereign. Suarez does not directly answer this question; but he has given abundant materials for answering it. What reason does he give for his thesis, that the people have a right of nominating their sovereign? On the one hand—so he argues—unless sovereign

* c. iii. n. 2. We shall presently have a little question to ask on the propriety of this word "transferred."

authority somewhere exist, the people are inevitably a prey to the direst spiritual and temporal calamities : God therefore, in creating them, must have also instituted civil sovereignty ; because that which human nature indispensably and peremptorily requires, must be instituted by the Author of nature. On the other hand, He has not by direct and cognizable intervention vested that authority in any given man or organized body of men ; and He must therefore have authorized and commanded the people to provide for their own necessities. They have not only the right therefore, but are under the obligation, of accepting and submitting themselves to some sovereign authority. Now let this obvious remark be carefully considered. That very need, on which Suarez's whole argument is based, would remain *utterly unsupplied*, if there only existed a temporal and provisional sovereignty, revocable at any moment by popular tumult and insurrection. The spiritual and temporal evils endured by the people would hardly be less grievous under this purely temporary and provisional sovereignty, than they would be were there no sovereignty at all. In real truth, the people at no time *possess* the sovereignty ; because it is a contradiction in idea, that an unorganized body can exercise sovereign power. What they do possess in their primitive condition, is the right of *appointing* (and the consequent duty of *submitting themselves to*) a sovereign.

For this reason we would with very great deference suggest a question, whether Suarez is entirely correct in the following remark : " A difference," he says (c. ii. n. 8), " is greatly to be observed " between democracy on the one hand and all other forms of government on the other, " because monarchy and aristocracy could not have been introduced without some positive institution, whether divine or human. . . . But democracy *could exist without any positive institution*. . . . because natural reason itself declares that supreme political power is derived (sequi) naturally from the perfect human community ; and because, by force of the same reason, supreme power *belongs to the whole community*, unless by a new institution it be transferred to some other " sovereign. Now we cannot ourselves see, that democracy is in any sense more immediately from God, than monarchy or aristocracy. Take the most extreme form of democratical government which is even imaginable : suppose there to be a state so small, that all the adult citizens (male and female) can assemble in one time and place ; and then further suppose that, when thus assembled, they exercise sovereignty by a majority of votes. Yet at last the majority of votes is not " the whole community." What reason is there for thinking, that God has immediately conferred on every

majority a right of binding the minority? Surely none whatever. We do not understand how anyone can even intelligibly say that in any given case a Government is appointed by "the whole community," except either in the sense that the said Government is in peaceful possession, or else that it has been nominated by so vast a majority of all classes as shall suffice to represent morally the whole community.* But monarchies and aristocracies may be in peaceful possession, or may be nominated by what is morally the whole community, no less than democracies themselves; and it cannot therefore be said (so we would submit) that democracies possess any kind of divine right, which is not equally possessed by other forms of government.

And for the same reason, we have some difficulty in Suarez's word "transfer." We do not see how the people can be said to have "transferred" sovereignty; because we do not see how they can be said, even in their ideally primitive state, ever to have possessed it.

Now if this little qualification be made in Suarez's doctrine—and it does seem to us an undeniably legitimate qualification—we cannot find (as we said before) any substantial difference whatever between his view and Bossuet's. In the passage we shall now proceed to quote, Bossuet is assailing Jurieu, the Protestant minister, who seems to have claimed for the people a permanent right of insurrection. We will italicize a few passages: and one particularly, in which we understand Bossuet to be expressly stating his substantial agreement with such writers as Suarez.

M. Jurieu has imagined that the people are naturally sovereign; or (as he expresses it) that they naturally possess the sovereignty, because they give it to whom they please. Now this is to go wrong at the very foundation, and mistake the meaning of words. For if you look at men as they are by nature and previously to established government, you will find nothing but anarchy; or, in other words, you find in all men a barbarous and savage liberty, in which every man can claim everything and also dispute everything; in which all men are constantly on their guard, and therefore in continual war, against all men; where reason has no power, because every one

* We do not maintain (be it observed) that every government, which is in peaceful possession, is legitimate sovereign; because (as we have explained) there may be a legitimate adverse claimant. We do however say, that any government, which is in peaceful possession, is thereby shown to be authorized by "the whole community." But then we would add, that when the whole community has authorized one sovereign, it has lost its right for a time (unless there be exception in some very extreme instances) of authorising another. Nor indeed is this the only way in which it may lose its right of appointing its own sovereign; it may lose that right, e.g., by being conquered in a war, which on its adversary's part was a just one. This is expressly dwelt on both by Suarez and by Bossuet.

calls his momentary passions by the *name* of reason ; where natural law itself is without force, because reason is without force ; where, consequently, there is neither property, nor dominion, nor happiness, nor even assured rest, nor in fact any right except that of the strongest : nay, it is not even known who *is* the strongest, because every one in turn may become strongest, in proportion as a larger or smaller number of men are impelled by their passions to combine on one side or the other. . . *Now to imagine with M. Jurieu that the people in such a state possess sovereignty, is to imagine a government antecedent to all government, and to contradict one's self in terms.* So far from the people in that state being sovereign, those who are in that state cannot be called a people at all. In such a state there may be *families*, though badly governed and badly protected ; there may be a crowd, an unformed mass of individuals, a confused multitude. But there can be no people : because the idea of a people supposes some uniting influence ; some regulated conduct ; some established right : whereas this can never be the case with men, until they begin to move from that miserable condition, from anarchy.

And yet it is from the bosom of that anarchy that all the different forms of government have arisen ; monarchy, aristocracy, popular government, and the rest. *And this is what has been meant by those who have said that all kinds of legitimate power came originally from the multitude or from the people.* But it cannot be inferred from this, as M. Jurieu infers, that the people as sovereign have distributed powers to each one [who possesses them] : for in order that this should be so, it would be necessary that a sovereign and organized people should already exist ; which, as we have seen, was not the fact. Neither must we imagine that sovereignty or public power is, *as it were, an existing thing, which a person must have before he can give it.* No : it is formed and results from the *cession of individuals* ; whence it comes to pass that, wearied by a state of things in which all the world is master and yet no one is master, they have allowed themselves to be persuaded to renounce, *in favour of some government on whose appointment they can agree* (un gouvernement dont on convient), that right of theirs * which puts everything into confusion, and that liberty of theirs which is a terror to all the world. If M. Jurieu likes to call by the name of "sovereignty" that savage liberty which they abandon in yielding to the law and the magistrate, he cannot be prevented from doing so. But to use such language is simply to confuse the whole subject ; for it is to confound with *sovereignty* the liberty which exists in a state of *anarchy*. Now such liberty not only *is not* sovereignty—it is the very thing which *destroys* sovereignty. Where all the world is independent, sovereignty is non-existent. (Cinquième avertissement sur M. Jurieu, n. 49.)

This seems to us a truly noble passage ; and we are sure our readers will not complain of its length. They will see that (as

* We do not think Bossuet would allow, and certainly we should not, that individuals have any "right" to remain in a state of anarchy, if they can obtain a moderately good sovereign which the community will accept.

we have said) there is no substantial difference of doctrine whatever, between Bossuet and Suarez, on the origin and fundamental right of sovereignty ; nor is there (we may add), to the best of our knowledge, between any one Catholic theologian and any other. Bossuet indeed lays down in so many words, as a truth which "*no one denies*," that "the power of kings is not in such sense derived from God, but that it is also derived from the consent of peoples."* And thus Lord R. Montagu, in the volume which we have named at the head of our article, speaks of ours as the one admitted Catholic doctrine. "*Catholics say that the designation of the person or persons who are to rule depends upon some precedent human act ; but that God then confers authority on that person. . . . There is therefore a divine authority in every form of legitimate rule or government*" (p. 374). Again : "When a society is first formed, the authority is soon seen to be in that man who is able, whether by valour, by intellect, or by strength, to benefit the society the most. Not that the ability is itself the authority, nor does it give the right to command ; but it is the reason why the people are sure, by acclamation, to recognize that man as formed to be their leader" (p. 363). Once more : "Every power is of God. It is no matter how the power has come into the hands of the ruler ; it is always the delegation of God's authority" (p. 398). This last sentence is, we must admit, somewhat too broadly expressed ; but it states what we understand to be substantially the one true and accepted Catholic doctrine.

There is no doubt one important difference between the two Catholic schools, as represented respectively by Suarez and Bossuet ; viz., in respect of a *tyrant*, and the right of resisting him by force, which the former affirms to reside in the people. But we need not pursue this point of difference, as it does not at all affect the argument of our present article. There are two particulars however of Suarez's doctrine on tyranny, which do require our express mention. In the first place, whereas he holds that in certain most rare and extreme cases he who was once sovereign may lose his sovereign rights by tyranny, yet Suarez does not base this upon the principle, that the people can withdraw any right which they have once given. What he says is, that they never *intended* to give a right, which should extend to such extreme cases.† Secondly,

* "Defensio Declarationis," l. 4, c. xxi. We are indebted for this quotation to the Abbé Godard (p. 95). These are Bossuet's words : "Nihil moramur in id quod capite iv Anonymus urget multis, regum potestatem non ita esse à Deo quin sit à populorum consensu : quæ nemo negaverit."

† "Si rex legitimus tyrannicè gubernet et regno nullum aliud subsit remedium ad se defendendum nisi regem expellere et deponere, poterit respublica

Suarez distinguishes (as of course all theologians do) between "a tyrant in title"—that is, one who was never legitimate sovereign at all, and has possessed himself of the kingdom by sheer wrongful force—and "a tyrant merely in administration." To this we add, on our own part, that a tyrant in title, if at the time of his unjust aggression he was a member of the body politic, must of necessity, by the very force of terms, be a rebel as well as a tyrant: because he has resisted by force of arms the legitimate sovereign placed over him.

One further remark in completing this part of our subject. The whole theory we have set forth implies of course, that God, when He so pleases, can confer the sovereignty by direct and cognizable intervention on some person or organized body; as he did in fact on Saul. Instances of this kind are adduced by Bossuet ("Politique," &c., l. 7, a. 6, prop. 2). We need hardly add that, in such a case, the sovereign derives his (or its) legitimate authority exclusively from God, and in no way from popular assent. We will call these "divine" sovereignties, because they are established by God's direct and cognizable intervention; whereas "human" *de jure* sovereignties—though they possess of course God's emphatic sanction,—nevertheless immediately derive their existence from the people. And so,—if God by direct and cognizable intervention established some hereditary sovereignty,—each successive monarch of the line would enjoy a "divine" sovereignty, in no way emanating from the people or dependent on their choice.

These are what we take to be the fundamental principles of Catholic doctrine, in regard to civil government generally; and we are now able to explain the point of our present argument. We have already more than once mentioned, that the sovereignty need not be vested in a person; on the contrary, that it may be vested in some body of men, acting together according to those fixed mutual relations which are called a political constitution. This is not only a matter of the plainest and most elementary common sense, but is taught expressly by theologians of every school. Now, in this nineteenth century, the large majority of civilized nations *are* so governed; they are governed, we say, not by an absolute monarch, but by some body organized according to some definite constitution. Take Great Britain e.g. It would be talking like a baby, to say in serious argument, that the Monarch is sovereign: no; the

tota, publico et communi consilio civitatum et procerum, regem deponere: tum ex vi juris naturalis, quo licet vim vi repellere; tum quia semper hic casus, ad propriam reipublicæ conservationem necessarius, *intelligitur exceptus* in primo illo fœdere quo respublica potestatem suam in regem transtulit" (l. 6, c. iv. n. 15).

sovereignty is manifestly vested in Monarch, Lords, and Commons, acting on those fixed mutual relations, which are established by the British Constitution.* In popular language no doubt the Queen is often called Sovereign; but to press this fact in argument, would be to build science on a pun. Suppose some one gravely argued thus: "In the House of Commons, the Speaker is sole arbiter of order: but at this particular period in the debate, Mr. Gladstone is the speaker; and therefore, at this particular period in the debate, Mr. Gladstone is the sole arbiter of order." Not less absurd would be the argument: "Queen Victoria is Sovereign; therefore Englishmen are bound to obey her behests, without considering whether those behests have been sanctioned by Lords and Commons." Of course the fallacy will never exhibit itself in so obvious a shape as this; because Queen Victoria, than whom a more constitutional monarch never sat upon a throne, does not dream of issuing such behests. But in a subtler shape this fallacy is not only often enough admitted, but has caused a very great deal of most mischievous confusion.†

In order to set forth more clearly what we mean—we will make a supposition, which might possibly be thought disrespectful to a living august personage, were it not so grotesquely in opposition to existent facts. We will suppose that—things otherwise being much as they are—some Prince of Wales were to grow up, with intense sympathy for absolute

* The Government of Great Britain is evidently one of those mentioned by Suarez, in a quotation already given, which contains monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements, mixed in a certain manner; and in which therefore the sovereignty is possessed—not by the monarch alone, any more than by an aristocratic or democratic assembly alone—but by a certain definitely fixed union of the three. So in another paragraph Suarez says: "*Hæc regia potestas non est æqualis in omnibus regibus. . . . In quibusdam enim potestas est simpliciter monarchiæ; in aliis verò cum mistione aristocratice seu cum dependentiâ ab aliquo senatu etiam quoad suffragia decisiva; et interdum tantum in certis casibus, interdum in omnibus gravioribus,*" &c., &c. (l. 3, c. ii. n. 18). Suarez then recognized the existence of monarchies, in which the monarch was not by himself sovereign, but to a greater or less extent shared the sovereignty with others.

† "People say for instance that in England the sovereignty is limited. Nothing is more false: it is *royalty* which is limited in that famous country. Now royalty does not make up the entire sovereignty, at least in theory" (still less, surely, in practice). "But when the three powers, *which in England constitute the sovereignty*, are in agreement—what can they do? Everything. What can legally be done against them? Nothing."—De Maistre, "Du Pape," l. 2, c. 3.

De Maistre's three chapters on "sovereignty" (l. 2, c. 1-3) are well worth studying as a whole.

The Monarch has far less power in the English Constitution, than the President in that of the United States. Suppose the latter were called "King," but no other change ensued, would he become *Sovereign* of the United States?

power and intense hatred of constitutions. To do this imaginary prince every justice, we will suppose his conviction to be very deep, that the people's true welfare would be far better promoted by absolutism than by constitutionalism. He conceals his principles however, and in due time ascends the throne. Established thereon, he takes his measures in silence and secrecy, until he thinks himself able to throw off the mask. He then openly appeals to the army for support; declares his intention of imposing taxes and enacting laws by his own authority; and proceeds in regular form to decree a final dissolution of the Houses of Parliament. Every one must see, how unspeakably absurd it would be, to speak of this man as a mere tyrant *in administration*. He is not exercising tyrannically a power which he possesses, but usurping a power which he never had at all. He never was Sovereign; he was only one constituent part of that Sovereign Body, which was composed (as we have said) of King, Lords and Commons, acting together in accordance with the British Constitution. By his violent usurpation therefore, he has rendered himself a tyrant *in title*; and (as all tyrants in title who are members of the body politic must necessarily be) a rebel against the Sovereign Authority.* In other words—and it is to this that we would draw special attention—he has revolted against the authority set over him by God, and committed that sin of rebellion which successive Pontiffs have denounced with such unsparing severity. He is as simply a rebel, as any noble or plebeian might be, who should attempt to subvert the sovereign authority; and whatever penalties might be justly inflicted on him, would be inflicted on him for the crime (not of tyranny—of course not—but) of rebellion and treason.

Yet at last there is one salient point of distinction, between the rebellion of a constitutional king and the rebellion of a noble or plebeian. Let us even imagine, that some distinguished member of the Upper or Lower House organized a sedition: still the *sovereignty* would remain intact. But when so important a member of the sovereign body as the Monarch—one possessing privileges so peculiarly his own—breaks off by his own crime from further connection with that body, the sovereignty itself becomes for a brief period in abeyance. The situation in fact would be very similar to that which existed in Great Britain, when George III. was first known to be insane. Doubtless the Lords and Commons would—as they did in the

* We suppose he would not rightly be called a "tyrant" at all, unless he effected his usurpation; but he would rightly be called a "rebel" for attempting it.

parallel case—provide by their authority for the emergency, and speedily call a new monarch to the throne. The people's acceptance would render this new sovereign body legitimate; and it would have a right therefore given it by God—as to exercise other prerogatives of sovereignty—so inclusively to inflict condign punishment on the rebellious ex-king.*

One explanation further. No writer of any school has ever doubted, that a constitutional government in itself may constitute a perfectly legitimate sovereignty, and one to which the obedience of citizens is rigorously and obligatorily due. Now plainly there is no other way by which a constitutional government can be introduced so peaceably and after so orderly a fashion, as by direct appointment of the previously existent sovereign.† Some absolute monarch e.g. comes to the conviction that, all things considered,—the people's needs, the people's wishes, the people's acquired power of self-government—some constitutional form will be more conducive to their well-being, than the existent absolutism. By some charter then, or in some other formal way, he establishes some newly-organized body, which in future is to exercise supreme power. What is he doing by this act? He is abdicating the sovereignty, and vesting it in this organized body; of which however he is himself doubtless to be a very prominent member. In the strict sense of words, he is individually no longer sovereign but subject. Nor, supposing him to have vested in this body supreme power, can you maintain that he retains the power of revoking what he has given; unless you advocate the revolutionary and monstrous principle (denounced, as we have seen, by Suarez), that rights once conceded are revocable at the pleasure of the giver. Nay, even if this revolutionary principle *were* admitted, the legitimate inference from it would be, that the right of cancelling this constitution resides—not in the ex-absolute King—but in the people themselves. No doubt the authority of the existent government was derived immediately from that of the ex-absolute king; but then *his* authority was derived immediately from that of the people. If therefore it were true that he may revoke the authority of the new constitutional government,—it would be equally true, that the people may revoke *his*, and take the matter into their own hands; and we should

* If a not inconsiderable portion of the people supported the ex-king—his act would none the less have been one of rebellion, as is manifest; but some time of anarchy and civil war might have to elapse, before a new legitimate sovereign could be appointed by the community.

† "*Potestas regia . . . successu temporum poterit mutari aut minui, prout ad bonum commune expediens fuerit, per eum qui ad hoc habuerit potestatem.*"—"Defensio," l. 3, c. iii. last paragraph.

thus have the fundamental doctrine of anarchy, lawlessness, and sedition, raised into a sacred principle.*

Let us now proceed from theory to fact. Let us consider what reasonable claim can be rightly put forth by the Count de Chambord, binding on the conscience of French Catholics, to any *de jure* share in sovereignty over the French nation. And we will begin with conceding for argument's sake, what certainly we could not otherwise concede. We will concede for argument's sake, that Louis XVIII. at some given time before he took possession of his throne in 1814—say e.g. in 1812—possessed (what undoubtedly he claimed) a *de jure* sovereignty over France.† Yet, in the very moment of entering on its exercise, he abdicated it; and retained no higher position, than that of the most prominent member in the Sovereign Body. These were his Chancellor's words, spoken in the King's presence and the King's name. "In full possession of his hereditary rights over this noble kingdom, the King has no wish save to exercise the authority which he has received from God and his fathers, by himself *placing limits to his power*. He has no wish but to be the supreme chief of the great family, of which he is the father. It is he himself who is about to *give to the French* a Constitutional Charter, suited at once to their desires and their wants and to the respective situation of men and things." This statement is taken from Sir A. Alison; ‡ who proceeds to say, that by this Charter "the legislative body was made the depository of nearly the whole public authority." When Louis XVIII. then professed in so many words to "place limits to his own power," and "to give the French a Constitutional Charter" which made the legislative body depository of nearly the

* Lord Robert Montagu says (p. 398), that "a modern constitutional king is the mandatory of the people"; that "the authority which he exercises is regarded as . . . belonging inalienably to the people, so that it may be taken from him at any moment, if he should fail to exercise it in accordance with the wishes of the people"; that accordingly "modern constitutions have put themselves in direct antagonism to the Catholic religion." He gives no reason whatever for these extraordinary statements, nor can we see the vestige of a reason for them.

† We do not understand how any Catholic can possibly consider Louis XVIII. to have been the legitimate King, when Pius VII. consented to crown Napoleon; and we quite fail to see at what subsequent period he could have recovered the sovereignty, before he was recalled by the voice of the people. He was not absolute King then in 1814, unless he was *recalled* as such; which is certainly not true. We do not know however that the question has any practical importance.—See "Alison's History," vol. xiii. p. 228.

In a latter part of our article, we consider the significance of that important fact, Napoleon's coronation by Pius VII.

‡ "Alison's History," vol. viii p. 517.

whole public authority—he ipso facto abandoned the position of absolute king, or in other words of sovereign. All the world agrees, that the new French Constitution was built on the English model. If then—as De Maistre points out to be the case—the English sovereignty is vested in Monarch, Lords and Commons, the same must hold as to the French Constitution inaugurated in 1814. In truth what was the amount of power thereafter possessed by Louis XVIII.? Even as to those functions which were nominally in his hands—e.g. commanding the army, declaring war, and the like,—he could not fulfil them, except under the controlling advice of a ministry, which was rigidly responsible to the Chambers for such advice. And all this was certainly intended; because the King had the example of England before his eyes, and was imitating it. Never surely was there a stranger nomenclature, than the calling a king, so strictly limited in power, by the name of “sovereign.” The sovereignty became vested in a newly-organized Body, of which the King however was undoubtedly the most prominent member. And accordingly the oath of allegiance was no longer exclusively to the King, but ran as follows: “I swear *fidelity* to the King of France, *obedience* to the Constitutional Charter and the Laws of the Kingdom.”* Fidelity is sworn to the monarch, but *obedience* is reserved for the Charter and the Laws. We repeat our affirmation. At all events from the moment when the Charter took effect, the sovereignty of France no longer appertained to Louis XVIII.; but to a newly-constituted organization, appointed by him, and of which he was the chief member.†

Louis XVIII. bore loyal allegiance during his lifetime to the Government which he had called into existence, and died peacefully on the throne. But what is to be said of Charles X.? It is plain that he was never Sovereign of France at all, but only (after his accession) the most prominent member of the

* We have not at hand a direct authentication of this statement. Our immediate authority for it (which is quite decisive) is a Brief of Pius VIII. on the accession of Louis Philippe, which we shall presently quote.

† It is much to be observed how carefully Pius IX., when giving large political privileges to his temporal subjects, preserved however the temporal *sovereignty* entirely in his own hands. If we remember rightly, this fact was dwelt on by some writers at the time. Nothing can be more express at all events, than the testimony borne by Pius IX. himself, in his Allocution “Quibus quantisque” of April 20, 1849. “Et quoniam eorum opinio impune jam invaluerat, eâ institutione [sc. Statûs Consultationis] et Pontificii regiminis indolem ac naturam immutari, et Nostram auctoritatem Consultorum iudicio subijci, idcirco eo ipso die quo illa Statûs Consultatio inaugurata fuit, haud omisimus turbulentos quosdam viros qui consultores comitabantur gravibus severisque verbis serio monere, eisque *verum hujus institutionis finem clarè apertèque manifestare.*”

Sovereign Body ; and he was as obligatorily bound by the Constitution and Laws, as was the humblest French peasant. He judged his own position differently. We would not speak otherwise than with profound personal respect for his character and intentions ; but we are looking here at his acts in a purely abstract and impersonal way, as a matter of dry argument. And what he did was this. Not merely he enacted (so-called) laws by his own authority, while the Chamber was not sitting ;* but he even changed the constitution of the Sovereign Body itself (so far as a worthless piece of paper could *effect* such a change), by altering the franchise as we should say in England, or in other words by changing the method of electing the Lower Chamber. Some of his defenders have urged, that these were comparatively insignificant actions : but surely they were of the gravest possible import ; as implying, that he had a right of legislation apart from the Chambers, or in other words that he was Sovereign and absolute Monarch of France. Now considering that he had never been Sovereign of France at all,—we must maintain, as an obvious and elementary proposition, that his act was one of pure rebellion. We repeat, we are as far as possible from ascribing to him a treasonable and rebellious *intention* : on the contrary, he evidently regarded himself *bonâ fide* as true Sovereign, and as having right therefore in the last resort to revoke any constitutional concessions which his Predecessor had made. In fact it was this very circumstance, which constituted the extreme gravity and peril of the situation. And we must maintain,—according to the principles advocated in the earlier part of our article,—that he was no mere tyrant in administration, but a rebel against the authority placed over him by God.

Now as this is the turning-point of our whole argument, we will repeat what we have said, putting it in a different shape. Suarez speaks thus (l. 3 c. iii. n. 10) : If King James claims to have received sovereignty directly from God, “let him show when it was, that God by some peculiar revelation or notable miracle, elected either him or one of his ancestors to be King of Britain.” In like manner, if any persons allege that Charles X. received sovereignty directly from God, let them show when it was that God, by some peculiar revelation or notable miracle, elected either him or one of his ancestors to be King of France.

* We need hardly point out that this was a fundamentally different procedure from what sometimes takes place in England when Parliament is in vacation. Some sudden crisis ensues, and the Cabinet issues some “Act in Council” which is rendered necessary by such crisis. The ordinance is admitted by them to be illegal, and they ask an indemnity for issuing it as soon as Parliament meets.

Nothing of the kind is even pretended ; and Charles X.'s alleged right therefore rested exclusively on the fact, that one of his ancestors many centuries ago had been accepted by the community of Frenchmen, as, not only their sovereign, but as having a right of succession vested in his heirs. It is plain indeed that no one can fix the exact time, when the people vested hereditary sovereignty in some ancestor of Charles X.'s ; but it is equally plain that this in no way affects the principles of the case. We will say therefore, that in the year Z the French people vested hereditary sovereignty in King A ; and that Charles X. claimed the sovereignty, as heir of King A. We are very far indeed from wishing to undervalue the legitimacy in itself of a claim so founded ; for on the contrary we would contend to the death in favour of such legitimacy : we only say that such sovereignty may be rightfully lost, according to the very same principles on which it was rightfully gained. And what we mean by this will be perhaps best explained, in the form of a dialogue, between Charles X. and an adverse interrogator, which we may suppose to have been held soon after the former's deposition. We abandon of course all notion of dramatic propriety, and aim merely at making clear to our readers what it is which we wish to urge.

Interrogator. By what right did you transgress the provisions of the Constitutional Charter, nay and claim to modify it in an important particular ?

Charles X. Because from the fact that the King had given that Charter, I inferred that the King might revoke it.

I. But was it not the people, who gave hereditary sovereignty to King A ?

C. On Bossuet's principles that must be admitted.

I. After that concession—after they had received B as their undoubted King in virtue of his being A's eldest son—had they the right of withdrawing allegiance from B ?

C. Certainly not ; because, as Bossuet points out, as soon as the people have accepted their sovereign, they are by divine law his subjects and owe him obedience.

I. In fact,—though it had been but five years ago that they established the sovereignty as hereditary,—yet even if the whole community as one man had afterwards withdrawn their allegiance from B, they would have been revolting against the authority placed over them by God and perpetrating the foul sin of rebellion ?

C. Most undoubtedly they would.

I. You abandon your maxim then, that the mere fact of X having conferred some right, proves that the same X has the power of revoking it ? Because you admit, that the people gave B a right, which they had no power whatever to revoke.

C. Of course, as a general principle, the maxim which you mention is violently communistic and revolutionary: but I spoke of the particular case of sovereignty.

I. And I also speak of that particular case. The people, in the year Z, conferred legitimate sovereignty on a series of men, one of whom was Louis XVIII.: and Louis XVIII. in the year 1814 transferred the legitimate sovereignty into other hands.*

C. But what can you mean by saying that Louis XVIII. transferred the legitimate sovereignty? Did he not remain Sovereign to the day of his death?

I. Plainly not; unless indeed you are perpetrating a kind of equivocation on the word "sovereign." He who does not possess supreme legislative power—he who can exercise no official function whatever except under sanction of a minister responsible to a given external body—is assuredly not Sovereign. Louis XVIII. abdicated the sovereignty (if he possessed it) and vested sovereignty in a new organized body; of which however doubtless he was the most prominent member.

C. Well perhaps at last my poor brother was bound by his own act. But how could he take away my hereditary rights?

I. Precisely on the same principle on which you acquired them. In the year Z the people vested hereditary sovereignty in King A. Two centuries afterwards, King C was on the hereditary throne. You will admit that he had no right whatever to that throne, except from the cession made by the people in the year Z?

C. Such certainly was Bossuet's doctrine.

I. But what right had those who lived in the year Z to bind their posterity who lived two centuries later?

C. Because the sovereignty once given can never afterwards, so long as it exists, be resisted (within its proper sphere) without grave sin. There is an exception indeed to this, when a sovereign is conquered in some war wherein justice is on the conquering side. And many theologians think that there is also an exception, when some king is tyrannical in administration; but our House has never admitted this last exception, and never will.

I. I have no wish whatever that you should admit it; for my argument is entirely independent of that particular question. Nor need we say more about the rights given by war. Putting aside these two cases, you say that sovereignty once legitimately conferred can never, so long as it exists, be resisted without grave sin within its proper sphere.

* We here assume, what of course Charles X. would have maintained, that in the beginning of 1814 Louis XVIII. was *de jure* Sovereign of France.

C. This is emphatically the doctrine of us Bourbons, and indeed of all good Legitimists.

I. On the contrary, it seems to me that in recent times you Bourbons have been among the chief offenders against it. As for you in particular, you have acted in direct opposition to it.

C. I was never more startled by any statement in my life.

I. Why you have admitted, that the sovereignty resided in the new organized Body appointed by Louis XVIII. So long therefore as it existed, it could not be resisted within its proper sphere without grave sin. If (in virtue of this indefeasible right of sovereignty) those Frenchmen who lived in the year Z had power to bind their descendants who lived two centuries later,—much more had Louis XVIII. (when he created a new sovereignty over France) the power of binding *you*. To that body you owed allegiance; it was the authority placed over you in the civil order by your Creator: and you thought right to rebel against it.

Such is our view on the true state of the argument. It seems to us in fact that nothing but bewildering confusion has arisen, or could have been expected to arise, from the extraordinary habit (protested against by De Maistre) of calling every monarch, even where the monarchy is most stringently limited, by the name of “sovereign.”*

Let us see now what light is thrown on Charles X.’s position, by the demeanour of the Holy See; for it is to the Holy See of course that the eyes of a Catholic naturally turn, where there is a critical and pervasive question of morals to be solved. We will give the details a page or two further on; but speaking briefly Pius VIII., as soon as Louis Philippe ascended the throne, issued a Brief, directing the Bishops of France to have no scruple in swearing an oath of fidelity to that monarch, and in praying after Mass for the new Government. Now let us suppose for a moment that Charles X. had been—say in the year 1829—the legitimate Sovereign of France, and not merely a prominent member of the Sovereign Body. Surely it is no better than childish to say, that he ever became a tyrant *in administration*. A tyrant in administration, says Suarez (“*Defensio*,” l. 6, c. iv. n. 1), is one “who either directs everything to his own advantage despising the public weal, or unjustly afflicts his subjects by despoiling them, slaying them, perverting them [to heresy], or by publicly and frequently perpetrating those or the like” enormities. Imagine any one saying of Charles X., that it was his habit

* We have already quoted one passage to this effect from De Maistre. Here is another: “Il ne s’agit pas de *monarchie* dans cette question, mais de *souveraineté*: ce qui est tout différent” (ib.).

to despoil and slay his subjects and pervert them to heresy ! But we go much further. Once grant that he was legitimate Sovereign, and not a mere member of the Sovereign Body,—it seems to us that he committed no fault at all, nay that he acted very laudably. The Ordinances, which he purported to enact, in our humble opinion would (had they been sanctioned by the Legislature) have much promoted the interests of France ;* and at all events no one can doubt, that such was his own firm conviction. On the hypothesis which we are combating—it was he exclusively who was responsible to God (putting aside the Pope's legitimate power over him, which is not here in point) for the welfare of France ; because the Chambers (on this extraordinary hypothesis) had no share in the sovereignty, and could have none therefore in the responsibility. Again (on this hypothesis) he had the fullest right to issue the Ordinances in question ; for they were most manifestly within the sphere of civil sovereignty. We will not ask then how he could be blamed for issuing those Ordinances, but will rather ask how he could have been excused had he *failed* to issue them.

A reply to this statement may not improbably be based on his coronation oath : “I swear to govern conformably with the Laws of the Kingdom, and with the Constitutional Charter, which I swear to observe faithfully.” Let us consider then the value of such a reply. In the first place we do not understand how the legitimate Sovereign could be justified in taking such an oath at all ; but to pursue this inquiry would lead us quite too far. Let us suppose then the oath taken. And in order to estimate its obligation, let us consider a parallel case ; one out of ten thousand, which might easily be suggested. I am intrusted by some shipowner with the entire command of his vessel. At the same time, as he a little distrusts my capacity in cases of very intricate seamanship, he exacts of me an oath, that in those particular cases I will be guided entirely by the counsels of a certain experienced mariner, who sails on board ; who knows however nothing about my oath.† For my own part, as I share the shipowner's confidence in this mariner, I willingly take the oath : but before I have sailed a week, I arrive at the clearest and most certain conviction, that the said mariner is quite incompetent, and that I understand such matters ten times as well as he does. Soon afterwards a crisis occurs ; and I see that, if I follow his advice, the ship will assuredly be wrecked. There is no moralist on earth who doubts—we do

* They consisted in certain restrictions on liberty of the press, and a change as to the mode of electing members of the Lower Chamber.

† We add this clause, to show that this mariner is not intrusted by the shipowner with any share whatever of authority.

not say that I am *permitted* to violate my oath—but that I am under the strictest *obligation* of so doing. And Charles X.'s case would have been still stronger (had he really possessed sovereignty), in proportion as the interests committed to his charge were immeasurably greater, and his authority more immediately derived from God.

Suppose then Charles X. had been Sovereign,—no movement recorded in history would ever have been more outrageously and detestably rebellious, than his deposition; and Louis Philippe would have been for the moment the one most prominent representative on earth of anarchy and treason. All lovers of order and subordination throughout France should have been eager to express their abhorrence of his name, and of the foul rebellion with which that name was associated. It was under these circumstances that Pius VIII., on September 29th, 1830, addressed a Brief to the Archbishop of Paris, of which the principal portion runs as follows:—

We have received your deferential letter and at the same time many others from different Bishops of France: and all these letters have affected our heart with more sentiment than one. In fact the cruel grief which already oppressed us because of that Kingdom's recent calamities, because of the sufferings of our Venerable Brethren, and because of your own griefs in particular, has been increased by the too often repeated recital of such things. But at the same time a great consolation has been afforded us by that admirable zeal in defending religion and maintaining [ecclesiastical] discipline, with which we have observed the whole French clergy to be animated; and by that wise resolution, whereby you and many other Bishops have hastened to refer to the Holy See according to ancient usage, on certain grave doubts which have arisen, and to seek her direction. Nor has it been to us a small matter of congratulation, to find in some of those letters, that our most dear son in Jesus Christ the new King Louis Philippe is animated by the most kindly sentiments towards the Bishops and Clergy, and that he makes every effort to preserve tranquillity. Already, in our answer to the letter he wrote us, we have recommended him to protect with all his power the Catholic religion and its holy ministers. And such, in his relations with His Majesty, shall be the object of our Venerable Brother, whom we have confirmed in his functions of Nuncio of the Holy See to the new King.

Now as regards the doubts of which we just now made mention, concerning the oath of fidelity and the prayers to be offered in Church for the new King. On the first point we were asked, whether it is lawful to swear an oath of fidelity to the King of the French in these terms: "I swear fidelity to the King of the French, obedience to the Constitutional Charter and to the Laws of the Kingdom." This form of oath is not new in France. You remember, Venerable Brother, that from the very time when Louis XVIII. began to reign, there were persons who refused to take it in an indefinite shape; nor did Pius VII. our Predecessor of glorious memory hold it as

lawful, until the same King Louis XVIII. had explained the formula, so as to take away from it all suspicion of an unorthodox sense.* . . . Now since there is nothing to suggest that the Declaration then made [by Louis XVIII.] to explain the sense of the oath has been now revoked, the inference is that the faithful who (in consequence of that Declaration) lawfully employed the form, will be able in the same terms to swear fidelity to the new King of the French, who (now that tranquillity is restored) occupies the throne of France.

After what has been said, you will easily understand that it is equally lawful to offer up in church the customary prayers in the recognized formula "Domine salvum fac"; and that in all other matters . . . the Bishops can lawfully do now all that they did *before* these recent events, in conformity with the Church's discipline [&c.].†

The whole tone of this letter, in its bearing on our present theme, is surely most remarkable, if we consider what has already been pointed out; if we consider that, according to the theory we are opposing, Charles X., the legitimate Sovereign of France, had just before been violently expelled from the throne, for no other offence than that of simply doing his duty; and that Louis Philippe—on the same hypothesis—was at that moment the most prominent visible representative of the detestable principle of anarchy and rebellion. The Pope refers e. g. to the difficulty felt by many Bishops as to taking an oath of fidelity to Louis Philippe; but he does not allude ever so distantly to any *other* difficulty in the matter, except one which would quite equally be felt were the oath taken to Charles X. He does not raise a moment's question about any rights of Charles X. or his grandson; while he dilates with complacency on the good dispositions of his "most dear son, the new King of the French."

At last however the general tone of the letter is but an impalpable fact, on which we cannot insist in the way of definitely expressed argument, though it will be felt and appreciated by loyal Catholics. Let us look then at the Pontiff's definite and explicit pronouncement. By the fact of directing Catholics to take the new oath of allegiance, he declared—we may almost say, in so many words—that the new Government was the *de jure* Sovereign of France; the Sovereign to which all Frenchmen were bound to pay allegiance, under penalty of incurring

* The question raised had been, whether the oath were consistent with due protection being given to the Church. Louis XVIII.'s letter of explanation will be found in Bercastel's "History of the Church," vol. xiii. p. 50.

† Bercastel's "History of the Church," vol. xiii. p. 724. The historian recounts in detail (pp. 714—722) the various discussions at Rome, which preceded this definite decision. It is observable that not one of them turned ever so distantly on any supposed rights of Charles X.

the severe sentence pronounced by Scripture and the Church on those who rebel against existing powers.

Now there are only two doctrines we can think of, with which this declaration can in any way be understood to harmonize. The first of these possible doctrines may be thus expressed: "Even in those cases where the legitimate sovereign is treated with the most monstrous injustice and extruded for no other offence than that of doing his duty—even in these cases, as soon as peace is restored and a new Government in peaceful possession, that Government becomes the *de jure* Government; and the rights of the expelled sovereign cease, or at all events are suspended." Now we should be fully prepared of course to accept this doctrine, were it proposed on sufficient authority. But (1) it is a doctrine entirely unheard of among theologians; (2) it does not harmonize with other acts of the Holy See; and (3) it does not even tend to explain the Pontiff's gracious language towards Louis Philippe, who (as we have so often said) was on this hypothesis the very embodiment and representative of the spirit of revolt against lawful authority.

The only other doctrine (as far as we can see) with which Pius VIII.'s declaration can harmonize, is that which we hold ourselves, and which we have already set forth at fully sufficient length. We do not think then we go too far, in claiming the Pope's Brief as weighing with singular force in our favour. It may be worth while however to add, that the *other* doctrine, which we have imagined as possibly that of Pius VIII., is no less fatal than our own to the Count de Chambord's present claim. If Louis Philippe's Government was then in peaceful possession, still more so now is that of the Marshal and Assembly. If therefore Charles X.'s rights were either extinguished or at least suspended, so also now are the Count's.

To the argument drawn from this decision of the Holy See it has sometimes been replied, that Pius VIII. recognized the new Government, not as the *de jure* but as the *de facto* Government: but for our own part we entirely fail to see, what can be the *meaning* of such a distinction. No one e. g. doubts that the Italian Government is sovereign *de facto* over the Roman States: but would Pius IX. direct the Bishops and Catholics of those States, to swear fidelity to Victor Emmanuel? By the force of terms, that Government is *de jure* which has the *right* of being obeyed, within the proper sphere of civil sovereignty. Now right and obligation are correlatives: that Government has the *right* of being obeyed, which the people are under an *obligation* of obeying. But the Pope, in directing Catholics to take the new oath, declared that they were under the obli-

gation of allegiance to the new Government; or in other words declared that that Government was Sovereign *de jure*.

One objection indeed has been raised to this inference, grounded on an old Declaration of Clement V. at the Council of Vienne. But how completely irrelevant is this Declaration will at once be seen, if we textually quote it, as it has been shown us by a learned friend.

Si Summus Pontifex scienter etiam excommunicato participet literis, verbo vel osculo, seu alio quovis modo,—ipsum per hoc absolvere nullo modo tenetur, nisi se velle forsitan exprimat illum ex hoc pro absoluto haberi. Similiter quoque si quem *sub titulo cujuslibet dignitatis*, ex certâ etiam scientiâ, verbo, constitutione, vel literis moneat honoret seu quovis alio modo tractet, per hoc in *dignitate illâ ipsum approbare non intelligitur*, aut quicquam ei tribuere novi juris.

Certainly, if we had based any argument on the circumstance that Pius VIII. called Louis Philippe “King of the French,” Clement V.’s Declaration would have tended to invalidate that argument. In like manner, when Pius VI. accorded to the Cardinal of York that royal title which the latter claimed, he pronounced nothing whatever in favour of the Cardinal’s pretensions to the British Throne. Our argument however is not based directly or indirectly on the *appellation* given to Louis Philippe, but (as we have so often said) on the Pope’s enjoining, that the oath of allegiance should be taken to that Monarch and his Legislature.

And now as to the Count de Chambord’s implied allegation, that he possesses some *de jure* claim to the throne of France, whether as absolute or as constitutional monarch. We will consider in order both these alternatives; though we cannot ourselves doubt, that the *former* is what he really means. This is most plain to us (as we shall explain a few pages further on) by the kind of argument to which he and his more consistent supporters appeal; but it is made no less clear by his recent declarations. No doubt he is far too pious a man, to enkindle without strong reason the terrible fires of civil war within his country; and he is content therefore to waive his claims, until France shall be prepared to accept them. Moreover, he has the fullest intention, should he come to the throne, of strengthening himself in popular support by the co-operation of legislative bodies; but then these legislative institutions are to be regarded as acting in strict subordination to him, and as revocable at his pleasure.*

* This was pointed out in our July article. “As for compacts, constitutional rights, the parliamentary system, ministerial responsibility, and so

He claims in fact to ascend the throne, as fettered by no control, and as having been for forty-four years *de jure* Sovereign. We have nowhere seen so much as one sentence of his quoted, which unmistakably takes up any other ground. The large majority of those who so earnestly supported him last year, failed at that time to understand the true nature of his position. We, for our own parts, failed to understand it.* But now, unspeakably to his honour, he has made the nature of that position clear to everyone who will read his manifestoes with due care. And with all our opposition to the doctrine with which he is identified,—with all our conviction of its falsehood and mischievousness,—we cannot forbear from expressing our hearty admiration—we may even say reverence—for his upright and noble character. Rare indeed in high places is this devotion to principle, united with such simple disregard to the suggestions of self-interest and ambition.

However, the question before us does not concern his character, but his claims. And in this matter, as we have said, we will consider both alternatives; we will consider his allegation of a *de jure* claim to the throne (1) as absolute and (2) as constitutional monarch. The former claim rests of course on his hereditary succession from King A, on whom in the year Z the French people conferred hereditary sovereignty: while the latter claim can only be based on the hereditary right of non-sovereign monarchy, bestowed on the Bourbon line by the Charter of 1814. In refutation of both claims, we will simply reaffirm what to our mind evidently follows, from the Catholic doctrine on the origin and rights of civil sovereignty. The Count maintains, that Louis XVIII. was *de jure* sovereign of France, when he first mounted the throne in 1814; and as it is with *him* that we are now arguing, we will concede this assumption for argument's sake. Louis XVIII. then at that time transferred the sovereignty into other hands; reserving however in the Bourbon line (as we have said) a monarchate which, though very far from sovereign, was a prominent portion of the new Sovereign Body. The hereditary sovereignty of the Bourbons then was indisputably

forth—why the king out of his gracious good will would make every necessary concession to the age. His hands were full of liberties, which he would only be too glad to bestow upon his people; but he would not submit beforehand to any condition whatever.” “As to any compact with the nation, his hand was full of liberties, but he would not bind himself beforehand to any solemn engagement. He must be accepted on his own conditions and no others” (pp. 141, 148).

* We did not even understand him as claiming *of right* even a constitutional monarchate, but as prepared to accept it from the Sovereign Assembly.

brought to a close by this act; and we thus dispose of the Count's claim as of right to the absolute monarchate. Next as to the Government founded in 1814. This was brought to a violent end in 1830, by Charles X.'s revolt; and on this event, the people re-entered into their original rights. In exercise of those rights, they conferred the sovereignty on a Body, consisting of Louis Philippe and his Chambers; and thus terminated the connection of the elder Bourbonic branch with the monarchy (even the non-sovereign monarchy) of France.

We have now given our reasons for holding that, according to the doctrine whether of Suarez or Bossuet—in fact according to what we apprehend to be the one Catholic doctrine on the subject—there is not so much as the vestige of a foundation, for any such claim as the Count puts forth. The *de jure* sovereignty of France resides with the Marshal and Assembly; and the Count has no right whatever of ascending the throne, except that which they may be pleased to confer. As we said at starting, if those who think otherwise will honour us by the perusal of our pages and will express their ground of objection,—we will examine that ground as candidly as we can, and frankly express any retractation which they may show to be reasonable.

But, as far as we can judge, those who support the Count's claim commonly rest their opinion on a doctrine fundamentally different from that of Suarez and Bossuet; a doctrine which they call "legitimism." They maintain that absolute kings, who succeed to power in the way of hereditary succession dating back many generations, possess a certain special legitimacy and sacredness; of which other sovereign persons or bodies are destitute. Nor are they here speaking of what we have called "divine" sovereignties; of those which owe their position to God's direct and cognizable intervention: they are referring, on the contrary, to such humanly founded hereditary lines as those of Bourbon or Stuart. The name these thinkers give themselves—"legitimists"—assumes the truth of their doctrine, and we cannot therefore accept it. Let us call their doctrine then "hereditism" and themselves "hereditists:" for if the appellation is not euphonious, they will admit nevertheless that it is entirely neutral; that in no respect does it beg the question at issue.

Coming to a more important matter—the *doctrine* held by these so-called "legitimists"—it is by no means easy to apprehend that doctrine as a whole; and there is no doubt much subordinate difference among them. All of them however seem to agree, that while one of their favourite monarchs is on the throne, he wields a more legitimate and sacred authority than

any other sovereign person or body: that the Emperor of Russia e.g. possesses a more legitimate and sacred authority, than the President and Congress of the United States; that Louis XV. possessed a legitimacy and sacredness, denied to Napoleon I. Nor is this sacredness, in their estimation, derived from the grace given at Catholic coronation; for Napoleon I. had such coronation, and the Count de Chambord has not had it. Then further they certainly imply in their doctrine, that their favourite monarch must be an absolute king. Doubtless he may establish representative institutions and the like: but then (as we pointed out in regard to the Count de Chambord) such institutions must be revocable at his will; for otherwise—instead of belonging to the most legitimate and sacred class of sovereigns—he would not belong to the class of sovereigns *at all*. And Charles X. felt it accordingly to be a matter of course, that if the existing Constitution did not work in a way which he considered beneficial, he had ipso facto power to change it.

So far then consistent hereditists of necessity are mutually agreed. But now do they admit the Pope's power of *deposing* Catholic sovereigns for just cause? The Bourbons, who may be taken as the special favourites and representatives of Catholic hereditism,—in consistency with their Gallican principles—denied it. Do all Catholic hereditists deny it? If so, this ought to be distinctly stated, with a view to the theological estimate of their position. If some of them admit it—do these consider that, under such circumstances, the Pope is bound to place on the vacant throne the prince next in hereditary succession? or how far do they consider the Pontifical power to extend? This ought to be made clear.

Then considerable difference of opinion among hereditists seems to emerge, as to the case of a "legitimate" monarch unjustly expelled from his throne; such as they consider to have been the case of Charles X. Some seem to think that neither he nor his heirs lose their right to the throne, except by personal voluntary surrender; insomuch that, though the Count de Chambord were expressly to cede every right he supposes himself to possess, his great-grandson's great-grandson might nevertheless, whenever he pleased, claim the *de jure* sovereignty of France. Others, on the contrary, seem to think that an individual circumstanced like Charles X., can *de jure* surrender, not his own rights only, but those of his heirs. The former view is startling enough: yet it is surely the more consistent; for if a banished king can bind his heirs to abdication, why cannot a regnant king bind his heirs to a representative constitution and limited royal power? If the Count de Chambord possesses the

power of binding all his hereditary successors to abdicate—why had not Louis XVIII. the power of binding Charles X. to obey the new Sovereign Body which the former monarch called into existence?

Notwithstanding these varieties however, we may treat the hereditistic doctrine as a whole, by confining our attention to those points on which all hereditists seem to agree. These are (1) that absolute kings, who succeed to power in the way of hereditary succession dating back many generations, have a certain special legitimacy and sacredness of their own, as compared with other sovereign persons and bodies,* and (2) that if any of these kings be dethroned *de facto*, he and his heirs still retain for ever a right to the sovereignty unless there be on their part a voluntary surrender. But before we enter on the discussion, we may take this opportunity (in default of a better) for making one explanation. No one can feel more strongly than we do, that rebellion against a legitimate government—apart from its being so gravely sinful—is most injurious also to the general tone of a community, and engenders a truly pestilential spirit of insubordination and sedition. It was in many respects a singular blessing to the French, that the Bourbon sovereignty remained intact for so many years; and it has been a great blessing to Englishmen, that for nearly two centuries the sovereignty of Monarch Lords and Commons has been so consistently and universally recognized. It must not be understood then, that our protest against hereditism implies any kind of insensibility to the special blessing conferred on a country, by a sovereignty which has the inestimable advantage

* To us the expression seems simply unmeaning, that one legitimate sovereign is more legitimate than another: it is like saying that one straight line is straighter than another. The "legitimate" or "*de jure*" sovereign, in some given time and country, is simply that person or organized body, to whom or to which the inhabitants of that country owe by God's Law civil obedience; and we do not see how this attribute admits a "greater" or "less." Of course one sovereign may be more *certainly* legitimate than another, because in this or that case there may be reasonable doubt which is the legitimate sovereign.

On the other hand, we quite understand that one sovereignty may be more "sacred" than another. The most sacred of all civil sovereignties, we should say, is the Supreme Pontiff's; because, as Pius IX. has defined, it may be called "spiritual" from its intimate connection with spirituals. Then again what we have called "divine" sovereignties, such as Saul's, have a special sacredness of their own. Lastly, when a sovereign monarch has received Catholic coronation, his sovereignty has acquired a certain sacredness which it did not possess before. What hereditists (among other things) have to prove is, that Louis XV. e.g. before his coronation, possessed a more sacred sovereignty, than was afterwards possessed by Louis Philippe's Government, and than is now possessed by the President and Congress of the United States, or the Marshal and Assembly of France.

of long prescription. Even great improvements in a constitution, enacted by the legitimate sovereign, require much caution, lest due reverence to authority be in some degree impaired.

Reverting to hereditism, the first remark we have to make on this theory has already been implied: we believe there is no theologian past or present, of any school whatever, who has given so much as a *hint* in its favour. It is of course too bold a step confidently to assert a negative: but we have never seen any such writer cited or even mentioned; and to Bossuet—surely the most monarchical of theologians—the very notion apparently never occurred. He says (“Politique tirée de l’Écriture,” l. 2, a. l., prop. 8) that monarchy “is the most natural, and therefore the most durable and strongest, form of government;” that “hereditary monarchy is the best of all” (prop. 9); that great benefit arises from the dignity which accrues to the Royal House by means of its hereditary privilege (prop. 10); and in particular (ib.) that the people thus contract a special veneration and attachment to the Royal House. But as to hereditary monarchy being a more legitimate and sacred government than others,—he does not deny it, because apparently he never thought of any one affirming it. In one place indeed he lays down a thesis, which at first sight may seem in some degree to favour hereditism; viz: “It is God who appoints kings and establishes reigning houses” (“Politique,” l. 7, a. 6, prop. 1). But those who look at his *exposition* of the thesis will see, that he speaks of monarchies, not as *contrasted* with other forms, but as *representing* government in general. “God gives to all kingdoms of the universe masters, such as He may please: ‘It is I,’ says God, ‘Who have made the earth with its men and animals, and I place them in the hands of whom I please.’” Nor should it be forgotten, that, as we have already pointed out, he lays down as a truth which “no one denies,” that the power of kings is not in such sense derived from God, but that it is also derived from the consent of the peoples.

Then again it is remarkable in this negative way, that Gregory XVI., when defining *ex cathedrâ* the duty of subjects towards the civil power, and when confirming his definition by ecclesiastical precedents, takes all his examples of legitimate sovereignty, not from hereditary Christian kings, but from the heathen Emperors.

But in truth the Church has by her action emphatically *condemned* hereditism. In saying this, we do not refer only to the case of Louis Philippe, on which we have already commented at such length; but still more to Pius VII.’s coronation of Napoleon I. We do not see how by any means, short of an *ex cathedrâ* definition, the Pope could have more emphati-

cally declared the Emperor's *de jure* sovereignty, than by consenting publicly to crown him. But if Napoleon was *de jure* sovereign, then Louis XVIII., who was at that very moment clamorously asserting his supposed hereditary rights, was in truth destitute of such rights. We do not of course maintain (God forbid!) that Louis XVI. had been justly deposed by the miscreants of the Revolution. But we understand the Pope as emphatically sanctioning, by his coronation of Napoleon, the principle which we have more than once mentioned, and which Bossuet himself heartily admits; viz., that a legitimate sovereign, unjustly kept from his rights, may lose those rights, when a *de facto* government has been in peaceful possession for a certain length of time.*

There is really however no need of positive arguments on the other side; for hereditism is one of those theories, which are sufficiently disproved by the complete *absence* of proof. Suppose I entertained a very strong conviction, that there are flowers in the moon shaped like Staunton's chessmen. I defy you to adduce one single argument in way of disproof; and yet you none the less suspect me of incipient insanity. But suppose I built an elaborate argument on this premiss, and brought this argument importantly to bear on the practical conduct of my life: you would certainly beg my relations to apply for a writ "*de lunatico*." Now—so far as we can discover or imagine—there is not one tittle more of evidence from reason or revelation for the thesis, that hereditary royalty has a supe-

* Louis XVIII. took occasion of Napoleon's coronation to proclaim, even more emphatically than he had done before, his continued rights as *de jure* sovereign of France. (See Alison's History, vol. vi. pp. 348, 354.) We do not think that under his circumstances any truly loyal Catholic would have considered his own claim to be still well-founded. But what shall we say about a Catholic *publicly proclaiming to the world* that the Vicar of Christ had engaged to crown solemnly one who was no legitimate monarch at all? that all Frenchmen were under an obligation of renouncing allegiance to the very person who was crowned by the Supreme Pontiff, and of rising against that person if occasion were given?

We trust no one will suspect us of any tenderness towards the memory of Napoleon I. He is one of the few men, as it seems to us, who has contrived to unite two qualities apparently irreconcilable, by being at once detestable and contemptible. Louis XVIII. was indubitably a far better man than Napoleon; but it does not therefore follow that he, rather than Napoleon, was at a particular period the legitimate sovereign of France.

What are those principles which determine the period that must elapse, in order that the title of an unjustly deposed sovereign may become obsolete through the peaceful possession of some rival? We submit this question to theologians; though at last perhaps no general answer can be given. We suppose the period would be much longer in the case of such time-honoured sovereignties as the Bourbon Dynasty or again the British Constitution, than of such ephemeral governments as e. g. the French one of 1830.

riority of legitimacy and sacredness over other governments,—than there is for the thesis, that some lunar flowers are shaped like chessmen.

We heartily repudiate then the notion, that hereditary sovereigns have as such any special sacredness; but in doing so we trust we need not again express our strong conviction, on the sacredness of civil government in all its shapes. The civil sovereign—be the sovereignty vested in one or more than one—is ever to be venerated (while acting within his proper sphere) as God's vicegerent and minister on earth, for purposes of momentous importance whether to men's spiritual or temporal welfare. God forbid we should say a syllable in disparagement of this great verity! Particularly in these miserable days of anarchy and license and popular pride and contempt of authority—hearty and humble allegiance to the civil government, and a due veneration of its sacred character, are among the most prominently needed of Christian virtues.

We may be asked, why in that case we are so keen against hereditism? Surely—it may be argued—hereditism is a more serviceable principle than any other, against the prevailing anarchy. We answer in the first place that, even were this the case, no one has a right to propagate a false doctrine, for the sake of some good which he expects thence to result. But we say secondly, that, even if this doctrine were generally held, it would not be found nearly so serviceable a bulwark against anarchy, as is the Catholic doctrine. We hold this proposition, if for no other reason, at all events for this: that there is hardly a government in Europe at this moment, which can be regarded by consistent hereditists as strictly legitimate; and that (as is very plain) the prevalence of hereditism could do nothing but harm to those governments, which the doctrine stigmatizes as non-legitimate. Except Russia, what country can be named, which is governed by an hereditary absolute monarch? So much is clear; but in truth we go further. We say that under some circumstances hereditism, so far from being a bulwark against the spirit of anarchy, has one or two significant points of contact and sympathy with that detestable principle. Of this we will proceed to give a characteristic instance.

The Count de Chambord (as we have already said) is far too good a man to plunge his country in the fearful calamity of civil war, by claiming inopportunately what he accounts his right; but his kinsmen have not always been equally scrupulous. Consider the proclamations of Louis XVIII., to which we have referred in a recent note. His direct purpose in issuing them was to induce as many Frenchmen as he could to hold the opinion, that the Monarch under whom they were

living, from whom they received protection of person and property, and who had been solemnly crowned as Emperor by the Vicar of Christ—that this Monarch was no legitimate ruler; that he had no claim whatever on their allegiance; that they should grudgingly obey his magistrates and other officers, just as far as force compelled them and no further. Suppose a considerable number had come to that conviction. These would, in general, have felt no kind of respect (not to speak of *reverence*) towards the Government under which they lived, but, in fact, very much the contrary; while they had no scope or opportunity for paying allegiance and obedience to the Pretender. The result must have been that, speaking generally, their respect for *law* would have been crushed out of them; that they would have been almost as anarchical in spirit, as any disciple of Marat or Danton. A comparatively small number might have been saved from this, by the kind of chivalrous loyalty towards him whom they believe their legitimate king, which characterizes the more high-minded hereditists: but these exceptions would have been very few, and the general tendency would have been what we describe.* That this result did not perceptibly ensue even in the slightest degree, was due to the fact, that Louis XVIII.'s influence over those whom he accounted his subjects was at the very lowest point.† But look at the Stuart Pretenders, who *had* much influence at home. Every reader of history will have observed, what a constant tendency there was in the humbler Stuart agents to consort and fraternize with any low ruffian, who was opposed to William III.'s Government simply because he revolted against the very principle of law. Not entirely without reason a late Anglican divine used to point out, that between Jacobitism and Jacobinism there is but the difference of one letter. And, turning from past times to present, we think that those sarcasms and bitter

* It may be perhaps objected, that a similar result must ensue from Pius IX. warning his subjects against allegiance to the Italian Monarchy. But the cases differ from each other in two particulars, so important as to destroy all parallelism. First, the Italian Monarchy visibly and palpably represents the principle, that legitimate governments may be overthrown without the *pretence* of a just cause; so that attachment to that Monarchy not only does not *protect* a person against the anarchical spirit, but even *imbues* him with it. Secondly, those *de jure* subjects of the Pope, who are disaffected against the Italian monarchy under which they live, are filled with zeal for Pius IX. as their spiritual no less than their civil sovereign; which spirit, as being distinctly religious, is the best of all possible protections against the anarchical: whereas Louis XVIII., in stimulating Frenchmen against a Monarch whom the Pope had crowned, did his best to stir them up against their religious as well as civil allegiance.

† So well aware was Napoleon of this, that he printed one of Louis XVIII.'s proclamations in the "Moniteur." (Alison, vol. vi. p. 348.)

invectives against Marshal MacMahon, in which some of the "legitimists" indulge, must greatly tend to foment a spirit of disloyalty to constituted authority. We do not mean that these persons *intend* this or would not deplore it, but we think that the result must inevitably ensue.

However, that dislike of constitutional government, which seems growing up among some few Catholics, may have one foundation to rest on, in no possible respect un-Catholic. A very large number of Catholic theologians, as a matter of opinion, consider absolute monarchy the most perfect form of government. Even Suarez says that this is "perhaps" the case; and Bossuet of course speaks with far greater strength and confidence. Without at all alleging then that there is any special legitimacy or sacredness in hereditary monarchy, Catholics of the present day may nevertheless, without any kind of reproach, echo the traditions of the past; they may regret the growth of constitutional government, as presenting no adequate barrier to the anarchy of the day; and they may labour to diffuse this opinion as widely as they can. They may argue that absolutism is the most effective barrier—nay perhaps the only effective barrier—against the fury of those elements, which have been let loose in our time.

No question can be more open than this, or more simply left to the private judgment of individual Catholics; and though our own opinion is entirely opposite to that above recited, we do not care to enter here on the discussion ever so slightly.* But there is one allegation sometimes made, on which it does seem very important to speak expressly. It is sometimes said

* There is one circumstance connected with absolute monarchies, which the course of our theoretical argument did not (as it happened) lead us to mention, but which it will be less inconvenient to insert here than to omit altogether. In most absolute monarchies there are certain fundamental laws of the Kingdom, in regard to which it is generally understood that the King has no power to violate them, and that no so-called law which he might issue in opposition to them would bind his subjects' conscience. We think that Suarez implies a certain view, on the theory of those fundamental laws, which is (we are convinced) the true one. The very fact of these fundamental laws being traditionally recognized as such by the people, shows that the community did not originally appoint the King to sovereignty within that particular sphere. Here are Suarez's words, which (as we have said) seem more or less clearly to imply the theory we have mentioned: "*Si populus transtulit potestatem in Regem, reservando eam sibi pro aliquis gravioribus causis aut negotiis, in eis licite poterit illâ uti et jus suum conservare. Oportebit autem ut, de tali jure, vel antiquis et certis instrumentis vel immemorabili consuetudine sufficienter constet*" (l. 3, c. iii. n. 3).

It will be seen however that, although the sphere of monarchical sovereignty is narrowed by these fundamental laws—just as it is also narrowed by the rights of the Church, of family, &c. &c.—yet *within* that sphere the King is absolute, and is rightly therefore called "sovereign." On the other

that the Pope's civil principedom, and the *ex cathedrâ* declarations concerning it, constitute a strong reason, why *Catholics* at least should account absolute monarchy preferable to every other form. If absolute monarchies were on the whole more productive of evil than constitutional governments, it would follow (say these reasoners) that *the Pope's* civil monarchy inclusively is productive of more evil, than a different form of government would be. To this we reply briefly, that the unapproachable excellence of the Pope's civil administration arises, not at all from the fact that his dominions are governed by *an absolute monarch*, but exclusively from the fact that they are governed by *the Pope*: though the Pope of course could not take part in government, *except* as absolute monarch. It is of much importance however to make clear our meaning on this head; for it would be a very serious evil, if the sacred cause of the Pope's temporal sovereignty were identified with dynastical considerations of any kind whatever. We will enter therefore at some little length on the suggested inquiry; even though, by doing so, we must not only damage the symmetry of our article, but extend it also to a most undesirable length. And it will be understood of course that in this, as in the earlier part of our article, we write as Catholics addressing Catholics.

In regard to the Pope's civil principedom, there are two importantly different questions to be considered: (1) its relation to the interest of the Church, and (2) its relation to his temporal subjects. The latter is our present theme; but it will be better to preface our remarks by a very brief reference to the former. Pius IX. has taught *ex cathedrâ*, that his civil principedom was ordered by Divine Providence, in order that the Pope might have that liberty which is "required" for his spiritual office; which is necessary for the flock's salvation; that this principedom "has a spiritual character from its relation to the Church's good"; that the aggressive acts of its assailants are "plainly null and void"; that Victor Emmanuel's former "spoliation" of the Roman territory was "nefarious and sacrilegious." In agreement with these Definitions, we hold the doctrine advocated by Mgre. Patterson, in his very remarkable paper on "Exiled Popes," which we have elsewhere noticed. We hold "that the independent sovereignty of Christ's Vicar is, in God's present providence, necessary to the exercise of his

hand a constitutional monarch cannot enact a law of any kind, within any sphere however narrow, without consent of his legislative body; and he is therefore no sovereign at all.

In our humble opinion, the greater the number of these fundamental laws in any given country, so much the less will be the evils of absolute monarchy, as compared with constitutional government.

supreme spiritual power, and an integrating part of his office." "To this," adds Monsignore Patterson, "by the Will of God he ever tended from the first; to this he has ever adhered, when once it was achieved; and to this, now that for a space he is once more deprived of it, he will once more return."

With this doctrine before us,—previously to arriving at the precise issue which we are principally to treat,—we will make one or two preliminary remarks, connected with what we have said in the earlier part of our article. And we will throughout, for brevity's sake, use the word "Romans," to denote, not the inhabitants of Rome alone, but all the Pope's *de jure* subjects.

I. The doctrine above recited does not (of course) give the remotest sanction to those opinions, which are called by their upholders "legitimism," and to which we have given the name "hereditism."

II. Nor does the doctrine add any even apparent strength to the opinion, that hereditary absolute monarchy is the most perfect form of civil government; for the Pope's Monarchy is *not* hereditary.

III. It is certain, according to the doctrine derived from theologians in the earlier part of this article, that the Pope was *de jure* civil sovereign of the Roman States. Never was there a government, originally conferred by the people with greater unanimity and enthusiasm. On the other hand, to say that those wars, which by degrees have despoiled him of his territory, were *just* wars,—would be an extravagance (we are writing to Catholics) too violent to bear refutation; while to allege that he has shown himself "a tyrant in administration," would be so puerile, that not even the wildest revolutionist would venture on the assertion.

Another objection however may be made to the legitimacy of the Pope's temporal sovereignty, which requires a little more careful consideration. We have maintained, following in the wake of all theologians, that a sovereignty, founded on rebellion, may become legitimate by a certain period of peaceful possession. May it not be said then, that the Italian Government has by this time acquired legitimacy? We reply, that if the present state of things were to last for a thousand years, the Italian Government would not thereby acquire legitimate sovereignty over the Roman States; seeing that not for one moment has it had peaceful possession. It has had strength enough indeed to prevent armed resistance; but the whole body of loyal Catholics, headed by their bishops and priests, have kept up a continual protest against the Government's authority.

Non-Catholics will probably reply, that this resistance has simply been originated and fomented by "the dethroned sove-

reign" himself. But, even from a non-Catholic view, this position seems to us untenable as any kind of reply to our argument. Certain Romans—considerable in number and yielding to no other class in the importance and prominence of their position—think that the Pope's dispossession of his dominions is a fearful blow to the highest interests, as of all other Catholics, so of Romans inclusively; and on that account they keep up a perpetual protest against such dispossession. What has led these Romans to such an opinion, is an inquiry simply irrelevant: the result of their action is, that the Government is anywhere rather than in a state of peaceful possession. Catholics, in fact, may reasonably colour the argument much more vividly; they may say that the priests are the very salt of a country, and incomparably the most essential part of it; so that no action of any kind can rightfully be called an action of the "whole" *community*, against which a large proportion of the priests protest.

This does not seem to us a strained and insufficient argument. If however it be so voted, we are prepared to take much stronger ground. The Pope, in virtue of his ecclesiastical office, has the power of deposing any sovereign, whose government he may consider injurious to the spiritual welfare of that country. Even supposing then that the Italian Government were ever to acquire over the Roman States what would otherwise be a legitimate sovereignty—by his spiritual power alone (i.e. by the indirect temporal power included in his spiritual office) he can depose, not only that Government, but any other except his own which may succeed in its place. Moreover he has defined, that his civil principedom has a spiritual character from its relation to the Church's good. There would be quite immeasurably stronger ground therefore for his exercising his indirect temporal power in behalf of that principedom, than in the case of any other civil government which can be named.

IV. Assuredly the Pope cannot, consistently with the doctrine which he has taught *ex cathedrâ*, confer a constitutional charter on the Romans, in the sense in which Louis XVIII. conferred one on the French; for if he did so, he would no longer be temporal sovereign at all, and his temporal sovereignty would be non-existent.

V. On the other hand it is thoroughly open to him to give them representative institutions, such as for a brief period he did give them, and such as the Count de Chambord is prepared to give. It would be the business of such a representative body, to deliberate on measures adapted to the welfare of the nation, mature them, and submit them to him: but it would rest exclusively with him to accept or reject them; to dissolve

the representative body itself, if he should think expedient; or (of course) in any way to alter its constitution. More than once in his Pontifical Acts he has referred to what he once did, in the way of giving his subjects representative institutions; and he everywhere implies that (however over-sanguine he may have been as to the *success* of those institutions) there was nothing in them at all incompatible with his true position. We venture to conjecture that, whenever in happier times the Pope shall regain possession of his civil rights, he will establish some such institutions as these. But this is of course the merest conjecture, and we do not dream of building on it any part of our argument.

VI. There would be nothing at all absurd in the supposition, that God calls on the Romans to live under a less beneficial civil rule than otherwise would be theirs, for the sake of those great benefits which accrue to the Church from the Pope's temporal sovereignty. Still such a supposition would be a harsh one; and it is our firm conviction, that far from their being called to any such sacrifice—the Pope's temporal government is by far the best temporal government in the world. We hold that if every nation in Europe could have the Pope for its sovereign and were contented to have him, Europe (*cæteris paribus*) would be far happier than it is. Of course there is no civil government which is not liable to very great evils and abuses. But we contend (1), that these are far fewer and far less in the Pontifical Government than in any other; and (2) that the Pontifical Government derives its excellence, not at all from its being an absolute monarchy, but exclusively from its *being* the Pontifical Government.

Now firstly, the evils, incidental to all absolute monarchies, are reduced to a minimum under the Holy Father. A secular absolute monarch (as a general rule) will either be devoted to pleasure and self-indulgence (and we need not waste time in showing what a calamity is this); or else he will make his kingdom what may be called his “hobby,” insomuch that his crude theories shall be ventilated at the expense of his unlucky people; or else he will grind them down with taxation, for the sake of carrying on aggressive war and promoting national glory and greatness. But the Pope's chief interest will always lie in the affairs of the Church: there may be danger of his comparatively *neglecting* the temporal interests of the Romans, but very little of his wantonly and capriciously harassing them. And when we speak of “neglecting their temporal interests,” we do not mean neglecting to procure for them security of person and property—because that is a matter of pressing concern to ecclesiastics as well as laics—but neg-

lecting to take such measures as a vigorous secular king might take, for promoting industrial enterprise, developing the national resources, &c. &c. Now with one class of liberals this ought to be a recommendation ; because "*laissez faire*" is their ideal, as to the proper function of civil government. But in the eye of all moderate and thoughtful persons, undue neglect of such matters is a much less evil, than vexatious, teasing, and crotchety interference.

Let us now come to the positive advantages possessed by the subjects of a Pontiff King, as compared with the inhabitants of any other nation. And first on the side of special Providence. Divine Providence doubtless watches over all earthly things ; but there is no reason whatever for supposing that it provides more particularly for the succession of a good hereditary king, than for the election of a good representative assembly, or for a good harvest, or for the prevention of sickness, or a thousand other such blessings as mankind desire. On the other hand there is no one thing which is more certainly the object of a most special and singular Providence, than the choosing of Christ's Vicar ; of the infallible teacher, supreme ruler, and universal pastor, of that Church which God died to found. By a truly singular favour—such as all other Catholics may regard with holy envy—the Romans are privileged (did they but value that privilege) to possess this specially elect servant of God, as their sovereign even in temporals.*

We have here assumed the very special providence with which God watches over the Papal election. If ever there were a case in which doctrine and pious anticipation have been confirmed by facts, it is this. After making every possible allowance for "bad Popes"—what series of men in the whole history of the world can be pointed to, as having even approached the Popes in solid virtue of every kind ? The effect of modern criticism has indisputably been, not to discredit this statement, but most strongly to confirm it.

Then look on the human side. In secular absolute monarchies, how many are the chances, that even a moderately competent sovereign will be on the throne ? even moderately competent, as regards uniting (1) piety of character, (2) zeal for his subjects' highest good, (3) sound judgment as to the means of promoting such good ? So far from there being any security for this—in hereditary monarchies, the ordinary antecedent to sovereignty is the being heir apparent ; than which no worse preparation for a life of solid self-sacrificing work can well be imagined. Passing from absolute monarchies to constitutional governments—if any individual faithfully represents the mass of the people, a strong presumption thence arises, that he has

no standard or aims above the lowest and vulgarest. In truth the benefits of constitutional government rather arise from evil of one kind counterbalancing evil of another kind, than from any probability that more than a very small minority of legislators have any proper notion of their legislative duty. But those who elect the Supreme Pontiff, are persons more likely than any other class to regard with due veneration moral and religious excellence. They are necessarily actuated by the strongest motives, to let their election fall on *him*, who shall be the fittest in character and attainments to rule that Kingdom of Christ, the whole strength of which rests on sanctity and unworldliness. Now—though the primary duty of civil government is protection of person and property—yet immeasurably its highest function is to promote, under the Church's direction, the people's spiritual benefit.* Which is more likely to perform this service well?—A monarch succeeding by the accident of birth, and commonly prepared for the throne by an early life of frivolity? An assembly, chosen by the multitude, and on grounds in which virtue and piety have in general very little share? Or a Pontiff, who has been educated as a priest, and has been chosen by a body of priests on the ground of his pre-eminence in an important class of priestly virtues? † If the highest function of civil government were to promote national glory and greatness, our mouth would be stopped as regards our present argument. But if (as we contend) this is not only not the highest function, but not even *any legitimate function whatever* of civil government,—then it is our opponents whose mouths are stopped.

And this brings us to the central point of the whole matter. In our article just mentioned on the intrinsic end of civil government, we earnestly argued, that no contrast could be more fallacious and even unmeaning, than the contrast often attempted between a nation's spiritual and temporal interests. Beyond possibility of question, "the temporal good of the whole community will be best promoted, if the poor are contented, sober, indus-

* For our proof of this statement, we must refer to the article on "The Intrinsic End of Civil Government," which appeared in the first number of our New Series, and to which we referred at the outset of this article.

† The Papacy "is an elective monarchy, the possessor of which, always old and always unmarried, is elected by a small number of electors, elected by his predecessors, all unmarried like himself, and chosen without any necessary reference to birth, wealth, or even native place. If one examines carefully this form of government, one will find that it excludes the inconveniences of elective monarchy, without losing the advantages of hereditary monarchy."—De Maistre, "Du Pape," end of third book.

This does not express the matter from our special point of view, but it is worth quoting.

trious, and loyal, while the rich are disinterestedly and prudently benevolent; if the laws are so administered that the poorest shall have equal security for their rights with the richest; if politicians, whether speculative or active, give up all self-seeking and ambition, give up all exclusive regard to class interests, and devote themselves with pure intention, with untiring zeal, with their whole intellectual resources, to the material well-being of the masses. Facts will at best, alas! be ever miserably below such an ideal as this; but so far as it is even distantly approached, an amount of temporal good will accrue to the great majority, in comparison with which all benefits arising from free trade, or railway extension, or postal facilities, or commercial treaties, are literally but as dust in the balance. Supposing, therefore, that the highest legitimate end of civil government were the permanent and abiding promotion of temporal good, such is the picture which a ruler should ever keep before his mind: to this purpose should he direct his chief policy, that future generations shall be trained in such habits as we have just described. But in this direction he is powerless to advance one step, he stands as it were helpless and paralyzed, unless he call to his aid the agencies of pure religion." The increase of innocent enjoyment, the diminution of squalid poverty, the habit of contented industry, the accessibility of medical aid for illness and of legal redress for injuries, the power of attaining so much intellectual cultivation as will relieve tedium and ennui—in these and other things of the same kind lies the true promotion of men's temporal interests. There is not one of them, which will not be greatly helped forward by the prevalence of a religious spirit in the community. No influence is comparable with that of religion, in generating a genuine and self-sacrificing philanthropy.

That which may be *truly* contrasted with the promotion of a nation's spiritual interests, is the promotion of its temporal glory, greatness, fame. The pursuit of these delusive phantoms has been (to our mind) the one prominent calamity of the political world; and in proportion as the civil ruler aims at such ends, he transgresses the duties of his sacred office. But this whole consideration is so vitally important towards exhibiting the Pope's immeasurable superiority over all other temporal sovereigns, that we will take the liberty of making a long extract from our earlier article.

There is no more wonderful phenomenon in the whole world, though its very commonness in fact prevents us from wondering at it, than the way in which a great multitude of men accept Christian morality. Every Catholic will speculatively admit those moral principles mentioned by us in a previous page. He will admit that the true path of virtue lies in the way of humility,

forgiveness, and indifference to the world's censure ; in the constant readiness to hear and obey God's voice. Nor can a Protestant, who with any kind of sincerity accepts the Bible as his rule of faith, hold any different speculative view of true morality. And yet great numbers of these very persons, when they come across the throng of men, form their judgments of individual character on principles directly contrary. They profess speculatively that the truly virtuous man, in proportion as he is such, cares little for the world's praise and everything for God's ; but in practice they admire far more highly one who is quick to discern and to resent misconstruction, and who is punctiliously jealous of *his own honour*. They profess speculatively that humility is among the highest of graces, and pride among the most heinous of sins ; but when they are brought into contact with a truly humble man, they regard him as poor-spirited and chicken-hearted. They profess speculatively, that he is most truly virtuous who ardently loves God, and is keenly sensitive of insults against His holy Name ; but they rather recoil from such a man if they actually meet him, and they estimate far more highly one who has no keen sensitiveness at all for God's honour and glory, but who is genial, amiable, and kindly. Some qualities they admire as virtues which are not virtues at all ; and others which are truly such they admire out of all due proportion. No two things can well be more different, than the morality which they speculatively profess and that which they practically hold.

On no point do these two standards of morality come into more manifest conflict, than on what the two parties respectively call "patriotism." In one sense of the word, patriotism is a quality which every Christian moralist will approve. A Christian father takes a special interest in the welfare of his own children, altogether apart from that with which he regards the welfare of mankind in general. He labours in a special sense that his own children may enjoy temporal and (far more) spiritual good ; and rejoices in a special sense if they do enjoy it. And in a way altogether similar, though of course far less in degree, it is at least permissible that we should take far greater interest in our own country's temporal and spiritual advancement than in that of other nations. Nay, there is a sense in which love of country is justly counted by S. Thomas as among the greatest of virtues ; that love of country, namely, which "prefers the common good to personal advantage." Such love is exemplified wherever a citizen endures self-restraint and privation, in order that he may the more largely benefit his fellow-countrymen spiritually or temporally ; that he may endow, for their service, priests, or schools, or hospitals.

But far different from this is the patriotism so admired by those whom we are now criticising. The patriotic man, according to their acceptation of the term, is more interested in his country's temporal than its spiritual good, and very far more in its external glory and greatness than in either. The patriot of this stamp takes very far greater delight in a military victory achieved by his countrymen against superior force, than in the most triumphant success obtained by a Catholic missionary towards reforming their moral practice, or the most valuable improvement of medicine or of law ; and this quite apart from the justice of his country's cause—simply through pride

at her military prowess. Nay, so far as he does grieve over the national sins, it is far rather as being an element of national weakness, than as being the offences of his loved fellow-countrymen against their Almighty Creator. It would be waste of time to set about proving what is so abundantly evident—viz., that patriotism in this sense is no virtue at all, but is merely one aspect of general worldliness and ungodliness.

We say, then, that when these worldly men cry aloud that the State has no concern with spiritual interests, they by no means think of excluding from its province the promotion of that morality which they practically hold, but only of that which they speculatively profess. They pursue as politicians the very same ends which they pursue as men. In fact, they express their own doctrine far too favourably, when they profess to desire that government shall devote itself to the people's temporal good. Their main desire is by no means that temporal enjoyment may be diffused and temporal suffering diminished; but rather that their country may possess that great show of military power abroad, that great display of material wealth and luxury at home, which may impress both themselves and others with the idea of national greatness. It is not their country's *good* which they seek, whether spiritual or temporal, but her supposed *greatness*. Now, our position throughout has been, that though temporal good should be subordinated to spiritual, yet the pursuit of temporal good is in itself a most legitimate and laudable function of government. But we are quite unable to say so much for pursuit of national greatness, unless, indeed, it be merely sought as a *means* for national good. In national greatness we are quite unable to see anything whatever intrinsically desirable; while we see much which is full of peril to the nation's highest good. And let this also be further observed, though we have no space to enlarge on its truth and its importance: the pursuit of national good tends to international union, but the pursuit of national greatness to international discord. It is from this very cause, from this proud and unchastened desire of national pre-eminence, that have arisen by far the greater part of those desolating wars, which have made so fearful an addition to human misery. So far from our holding that governments have cared *too much* for their people's temporal good, to our mind one of the most deplorable facts in all history is their having cared for it *so little*.

We believe there is no temporal government on earth except the Pope's, which does not (as far as it can) indulge in that idolatrous pursuit of national glory and greatness, which we have ventured so severely to denounce. If therefore such pursuit is profoundly injurious to a nation's spiritual and temporal interests, then the Romans, while remaining the Pope's subjects, were so far happier than any other nation on the earth.

There are two principal objections, which will be made to the preceding argument; but these objections, when duly considered, will be converted into arguments for our own thesis. Firstly, it will be objected, that even though we estimate the fruits of Papal government by the standard of the people's

temporal interests rather than of their temporal greatness,—still facts are against us. The Romans, it will be alleged, while under Papal government, fell far behind other states of Europe in development and organization of industry, and generally in everything which makes a nation materially prosperous, and which tends therefore to its temporal well-being.

Now in the first place, we deny altogether that the vigorous prosecution of commercial industry is in itself the promotion of a nation's temporal interests: whether it be so, depends on the question, how far the fruits of such commerce are diffused among the whole body of inhabitants. Let us ask, then, in what degree the most materially thriving nations have as yet achieved this desideratum. Mr. Stuart Mill, at all events, takes no very sanguine view on this head. "It is questionable," he says (*Political Economy*, book iv. c. vi. s. 2), "if all the mechanical inventions yet made have *lightened the day's toil of any human being*. They have enabled a greater population to live the same life of drudgery and imprisonment, and an increased number of manufacturers and others to make fortunes. They have increased the comforts of the middle classes. But they have not yet *begun* to effect those great changes in human destiny," which Mr. Mill expects as their ultimate result. At best material well-being constitutes only a part—though an important part—even of man's *temporal* enjoyment. A contented mind, health of body, happiness of domestic relations, above all the peace infused by a practice of virtue and piety—these things most importantly sweeten the cup of life. But take material well-being alone: we do not believe there was a people in Europe which possessed more of it, than did the Romans when governed by the Pope. On this head we cannot do better than quote the singularly dispassionate summary of F. O'Reilly, S.J., in his two masterly essays on the Pope's temporal government, which appeared in the two last numbers of the "Month" for 1871. He writes for convenience' sake in the present tense, though what he describes is the Romans' *past* condition. "They are in general well off as regards the necessities of life. They have enough to eat and drink. They are sufficiently clad and provided with dwelling accommodation. There is but little distress, and, I may say, no misery; certainly much less want than is to be found in many countries which are set up as models of prosperity. The taxation is very moderate. There are abundant means of education for the different grades of society; nay more, the children of poor parents have opportunities of high education without expense and at the same time without discredit, such as are certainly not to be found in these countries, nor probably in many

others. There is every facility for literary pursuits, which flourish there extensively. The fine arts, too, are largely cultivated, and with great success. Commercial and industrial enterprise is also encouraged and is progressing. . . . The Roman people are happy, leading a peaceful life, with almost universal sufficiency of means of support, and widely-spread comfort, and no oppression" (pp. 402, 405).

But we confess we should not have thought it a good sign—rather the reverse—had it been found that in the Roman States there was the same amount of industrial vigour and enterprise, which exists in other countries. Or, in other words, the inferiority on this head, which is admitted to exist, is no kind of objection whatever, but the contrary, to our thesis, that no other part of the world has nearly so good a civil government. It seems to us of much importance, that this should be clearly understood.

Let us *assume* then what we are confident is *true*, but which our *argument* only requires us to *assume*: let us assume that the Romans very much exceeded any other people, in their practical sense of religious truth. If this were so, every one would say as a matter of course, that the *reason* for this marked distinction between them and other nations is their being temporally governed by the Pope. On the other hand (as we have said before) the highest and noblest function of the civil ruler is to promote his subjects' religious welfare under the Church's guidance and direction. Suppose then it were true that the Romans, as compared with other nations, possess that much greater religious-mindedness of which we speak, the inevitable conclusion would be, that the Pope fulfils the highest function of civil sovereignty far more effectively than does any other civil sovereign.

But if such were the special character of the Romans, it would follow with absolute certainty, that there would be much less commercial vigour and industry among them than among other nations. We do not of course doubt that industry and commerce are altogether laudable pursuits. Nor do we doubt that a man who is (if we may so express ourselves) *equally* pious—who gives no undue preponderance to one part of his duty over another,—that such a man will zealously labour at his worldly calling, in order to fulfil the duties imposed on him by his Creator. But surely the most obvious common sense and experience declare, that those who achieve a *brilliant success* in commercial undertakings, are almost always those whose *whole heart* is in the work. Just so far then as Romans have their heart in religion and not exclusively in industrial pursuits,—in that very proportion they will be inferior to other

nations, in what may be called the *heroic* practice and the heroic successes of industry and commerce. Nor will they on that account be one whit worse off, even as regards this life's happiness; but much the contrary. Those whose whole heart is in commerce are afflicted, more than almost any other class, with repeated visitations of anxiety, care, and terror.

Our present argument, summed up, is this. So far as it is true that the Romans were more notably pious than other people, in that proportion the Pope excelled other civil rulers in the fulfilment of what is their highest function. But so far as the Romans were more notably pious than other people, they would fall short of other peoples (speaking generally) in the grander and higher enterprises of commerce. The fact therefore that they *do* thus fall short, is (to say the least) no argument against the excellence of the Pope's civil government. If B would necessarily follow from A, it is strange reasoning to urge, that the existence of B disproves the existence of A. In other words—if the people governed by the Pope were found to equal other peoples in commercial zeal and success, such a fact would be almost a conclusive proof, that the Pope had not exceeded other rulers in the highest function of civil government.

And here we see why it is, that anarchists and revolutionists regard the Pope's temporal sovereignty with such intense detestation. The Pope is constantly illustrating by example that doctrine on the intrinsic end of civil government, which revolts every deepest feeling of their nature. It is not to be expected that Antichrist shall be deeply sympathetic with the maxims and ways of Christ. And (not to speak of Protestants) even Catholics may have been unconsciously so influenced by the deadly circumambient poison of worldliness, as to look down with a kind of contempt on that freedom from worldly aspirations and from dreams of national greatness, which is the blessedness offered to the Roman people.

It must be fully understood at the same time, that we are advocating no perfectionist view. It is confessed by all, that a Pontiff may make serious mistakes in his government of the Church; and it would be strange indeed if he possessed *greater* immunity from error as a temporal sovereign. Perhaps more might have been advantageously done for the Romans than *has* been done, in the way of directly furthering industry and commerce; it may be that no adequate scope has been provided for the legitimate energy of active-minded laymen; it may be that the relations between the spiritual and temporal have not been always arranged in the wisest possible way. These and a thousand such criticisms have been made by one or other opponent, and

we are not at all called on to maintain that there is no ground for them. The question we suggest, is not at all whether the Papal government has been free from very serious error; but whether its errors and shortcomings are even comparable, in point of gravity, with those of every other temporal government under the sun.

Some persons are disposed to think it an evil that—so far at least as the Pope's influence was felt—there was no *national spirit* among the Romans; no such spirit e.g. as unites Englishman with Englishmen, Frenchman with Frenchmen, German with Germans. For our own part we think this a good and not an evil; as we shall set forth, in answering the second objection.

It is objected then secondly, that if the Romans were indeed happy, they were strangely blind to their own happiness; for that they were always a dissatisfied and disaffected population. We will not pause to examine how far this allegation is true, which certainly has been very confidently denied by many thoroughly well-informed persons. But we will express our own humble opinion, (1) that it would be a most surprising circumstance, and (2) a circumstance by no means honourable to the Papal Government, if the Romans *did* possess the same zeal and attachment to their country, which is conspicuous in what we may call the nations of this world. Saintry men are everywhere, and by a kind of law, immeasurably fewer than ordinary Christians; and though doubtless a far larger proportion of Romans were saintly than of any other people, still they could not have made up one-millionth part of the whole population. But (as a general rule) all men who are not saintly, are largely imbued with that zeal for national greatness and glory, on which we have so repeatedly spoken. The sympathies of such men will always be out of harmony with what is their *interest*, even as regards this world alone; and the very fact that they are so far better governed than any other people, will lead them to cry out, like the Jews of old, for "a king like the nations." Such is the corruption of human nature and its morbid tendency to objects of this world,—and so few are those who fully resist that tendency,—that the most pious nation can never present an appearance of greatness on the spiritual side, comparable to that which an irreligious nation can exhibit on the worldly side. It is this necessary appearance of littleness in all good existing on a large scale, which is one of Satan's most powerful instruments in perverting men's minds. The great majority of men then,—thinking much more of national greatness than of either national virtue or even happiness,—will ever despise those very facts and institutions, which are most to be admired. If the Pope's maxims of government

had not been commonly regarded as little and despicable, we might have been sure that they did not possess that unapproached excellence, which we confidently ascribe to them.

And now as to "national spirit." When the Romans return to their legitimate sovereign, we trust they will see that they are called as a nation to a far higher destiny, than that of cherishing a peculiar "national spirit" of their own. It is their blessedness, that their true national spirit is neither more nor less than the spirit of the Catholic Church. Englishmen shall canonize one type of worldly character; Frenchmen a second; Germans a third: but it is the high prerogative of loyal Romans, to know no patriotism, except the truly Christian virtue so called; to love every quality which God loves, and abhor every quality which He abhors; to care nothing about Italy being inferior to France or France to Italy, except indeed so far as spiritual interests may be affected by the alternative; to care nothing about kingdoms of this world, and everything about the Kingdom of Christ. Such is the aim of all men, we need hardly say, so far as they are truly pious; but Romans are free from those unintermitting and most subtle snares in an opposite direction, which are spread, throughout the length and breadth of other nations, by that gigantic issue and exhibition of worldliness which is called national spirit. That the Roman people will ever rise as a whole to the height of its position, is of course too much to hope; for saintly men (as we have already urged) constitute everywhere a small minority. But that a constantly increasing number may do so in a constantly increasing degree, is one important element on which the world's future well-being depends.

In what has hitherto been said, we have implied rather than expressed those facts, which of course lie at the root of that singular excellence whereby the Pontifical Government is distinguished from all others. Nor shall we here enlarge on them; because they have been set forth by such writers as the Archbishop and F. Coleridge, with far greater power than we could command on such a theme. In matters which lie so closely at the very foundation of society as those which concern education and marriage, it is this Government alone, which has kept its legislation in close and perfect harmony with Catholic doctrine. As F. Coleridge expresses it, the Papal dominion was "the one State in Europe, which was still thoroughly Christian; still the home and refuge of all those regenerating and elevating principles of social order, which had been undermined in detail elsewhere."

We hope then we have proved our point. Firstly the Pope's civil government stands unrivalled in excellence, indefinitely

raised above all secular governments;* secondly, however it does so, not at all because the Sovereign is an absolute monarch, but exclusively because he is the Pope. One excellent Catholic may prefer an absolute monarchy among secular governments, another a constitutional monarchy, a third a conservative republic; but all three, if Catholicly minded and reasonable, will agree that the Pontifical Government is indefinitely superior to any one of the number.

Until very recently, it has been an axiom in Catholic controversy, that the Church is equally suited and equally well disposed to every lawful form of government. But quite of late there seems rising in certain quarters a kind of reaction against this common view; it seems sometimes implied, that those Catholics who are heartily and unreservedly loyal to the Holy See, must as a matter of course regard absolute monarchy as the only satisfactory régime. We are quite open to conviction on the subject; but as at present advised, we can see no vestige of foundation for this statement. Indeed as regards that particular theory which is more commonly *identified* with absolute monarchy—the theory called by its upholders “legitimism”—so far from crediting it with any special orthodoxy, we are quite unable to see how it can even be reconciled with received Catholic doctrine. Nor can we reflect without deep regret, that had he not learned to identify his cause with this theory, the Count de Chambord would at this moment in all probability be the constitutional King of France.†

* As the Pope has defined that his temporal government may truly be called “spiritual” from its intimate connection with spirituals, we may perhaps appropriately call other civil governments by the name “secular,” in the way of distinction.

† It was not open to the Count to adopt Louis XVIII.’s ingenious device. The latter was called to the throne on the very conditions afterwards engrossed in the Charter: see Alison’s “History,” vol. xviii. p. 228. But (as our readers have already seen) he avoided the necessity of surrendering his doctrine that he had hitherto been *de jure* Absolute Monarch, by claiming to *confer* the Charter as his own free gift. Even at that time, as Alison mentions, “a feeling of surprise and murmur of dissatisfaction ran through the Assembly,” when this claim was expressed. And the indignation, which was aroused by the Count de Chambord’s far more cautiously worded manifesto, shows how impossible it would have been for him to take up openly the position assumed by Louis XVIII.

It seems to us, that the *de jure* sovereignty of Napoleon I. was brought to an end by the act of the allied monarchs, who conquered him in a most just war, and refused to recognize him longer as Emperor of France. The people then (with sanction of the victors) re-entered into their right of appointing a new sovereign person or body.

Reverting to the Count de Chambord,—now that we are able to judge by

It seems to us indeed, we confess, that a very great misdirection of Catholic effort would result, if it were once supposed that *forms of government* are the chief matters, on which in the political order such effort should be occupied. That a tremendous conflict is being waged between the forces of order and of anarchy, and that on the issue of this conflict the world's whole future depends,—no one feels more keenly than we do; but we cannot for the life of us see, that the re-establishment of absolute monarchies, even were it practicable, would be of any service to the good cause. When, some eighty years ago, the old system in which the civilized world had been reposing was violently assailed and subverted, it was not political events, commonly so called, which originated the calamity; these were but instruments in the hand of those detestable philosophical doctrines which, beginning with Voltaire and Rousseau, issued in "the principles of '89." On the same ground on which the calamity effected its entrance, on that ground it must now be principally resisted; it is speculative convictions, not material strongholds, which the loyal Catholic has mainly to attack. If in some republic the body of influential politicians come to recognize, that civil institutions cannot be really good unless intimately bound up with religion,—in that republic the Revolution is being (so far) successfully confronted and driven back. If some absolute monarch opposes himself to the Church, he may be the most effective of all promoters of godless anarchy and turbulence. One form of government is expedient at one time and place, another at another: it is the Church alone, whose constitution is as unchangeable as her doctrines.

And yet (as has been said) one exception must be made to this statement. There is one civil government—just one—which may be called the satellite and reflection of the Church herself, and which largely shares in her immortality of form: the Holy Father's temporal dominion. The soundness of political morality, which prevails throughout the civilized world at any given time, may be tested by the degree in which states recognize the independence of that Government, and look to it for their example. Those who despise the Pope's method of administration, despise really (though they may not know it) the essential features of Christian morality. As Mr. Mill and others have pointed out, the prevalent morality of European nations is a mongrel mortality,

the light of recent events, we cannot think that he was ever at all so near to mounting the throne as was once supposed. He was supported by two different parties, diverging from each other fundamentally both as to the principles on which they acted and the end at which they aimed.

consisting partly of Christian but largely also of heathen elements; and those imbued with it—as in private life they despise the saintly Christian—so in public life despise the one Government which faithfully reflects Christianity. Meanwhile, in the view of right-minded Catholics, the Pope's civil principedom is not only necessary for the freedom and independence of the Holy See, but is the very bulwark and citadel of Catholic order, liberty, and progress.

ART. II.—SAINT CÆCILIA AND ROMAN SOCIETY.

Sainte Cécile et la Société Romaine des deux premiers Siècles. By DOM GUÉRANGER. Paris, 1874.

DOM GUÉRANGER'S splendid volume is worthy of its Benedictine origin. Its object is, first, to refute the anti-Christian school, that would fain persuade us that for two centuries Christianity was a mere superstition without any definite dogma, professed by the poor and ignorant alone; and secondly, to vindicate the authenticity of the beautiful story of S. Cæcilia's martyrdom. The first point resolves itself into the two questions, whether the primitive Christians belonged exclusively to the lower classes, and whether the present definite Christian dogma then existed. Both may be most fairly answered by examining the state of the Church in Rome during this period, when the City was the centre of the civilized world.

In glancing over the early history of Rome we meet at every page the names of a few distinguished patrician families. Of these none were more illustrious than the Cornelii and the Cæcili Metelli. Hand in hand they subjugated the petty states of Italy, and when Rome's ambition took a wider flight, they still led her armies and her fleets to victory. They were united in the great-grandson of Scipio Nasica, who, having been adopted by the Metelli, was henceforth known as Q. Cæcilius Metellus Pius Scipio. Both families were closely connected by marriage and adoption with several other great patrician houses; and thus, any important event which deeply affected a single individual of any one of them, must necessarily have stirred a large portion of the highest society in Rome. Under the Empire they are no longer seen at the head of public affairs, and only occasionally in subordinate positions, or on the roll of consuls, now reduced to a mere titular honour.

But they thus retire from national life only to reappear on a nobler field. They had formerly conquered the world for Rome, and now it was their task to conquer Rome for Christ.

The connecting link between Pagan and Christian Rome, is the baptism of the centurion Cornelius, A.D. 39. S. Luke tells us that he desired Peter to tarry with him some days. Thus was established between the Roman patrician and the Christian Apostle the bond of hospitality, which not only linked them personally by a tie more sacred than even those of blood and affinity, but connected the Apostle with the family of Cornelius and the knot of patricians above spoken of, among whom the conversion of the centurion and his household must have made a great sensation. Three years later, A.D. 42, S. Peter, after his liberation from prison by an angel, went to Rome. According to Apostolic custom he began his work with the Jews. The church of S. Pietro in Montorio stands on the site of the house in which he is said to have taken up his abode; and the inscriptions in a recently-discovered cemetery in the neighbourhood prove that this was the Jewish quarter.

But the tie of hospitality required his early removal to the Vicus Patricius, where the Corneliæ dwelt. The acts of S. Praxedes and the most ancient martyrologies agree in stating that he was the guest of Pudens, a man of senatorial rank, whose house was on the Viminal. Pudens is a cognomen very common among the Corneliæ; and one of five inscriptions of the year 70, recording the homage offered to Vespasian on his birthday by the Tribus Succusana, which had its abode on the Viminal and Esquiline, proves that if S. Peter's host was not the centurion of Cæsaria, he was at least a Cornelius, and the head of a devoted Christian family. Four of these inscriptions are dedicated to the Goddesses of Fortune, Victory, and Peace, and one of them is subscribed by eight hundred young men of the tribe, among whom are no less than twenty Corneliæ. But to the fifth inscription, dated only two days later and belonging to the same body of young men, only five names are affixed. Why did not these five sign with the rest of their tribe? Why did one of them, Q. Cornelius Pudentianus, the son of Quintus, separate himself from the twenty other members of his gens? The explanation is afforded by the dedication, which is to Public Joy, a term flattering to Vespasian, but devoid of any idolatrous allusion. Two others of these five young men were D. Furius Firmus and Titus Claudius Lemnus Fortunatus, possibly the Fortunatus who was the bearer of S. Clement's letter to the Church of Corinth, and both of them are patrician names. Nor were they the only Christians of their respective families; for among a number of inscriptions of the first century discovered in the cata-

combs of the Via Nomentana, De Rossi has found one of L. Furius Ur——, one of Claudius Atticianus, and two of the wife and freedman of L. Clodius Crescens—this name being written indifferently Clodius or Claudius—and there is reason to believe that S. Clement also belonged to this *gens*. The foregoing mention of Q. Cornelius Pudentianus, father and son, corrects a trifling error of the copyist of the acts of S. Praxedes in the fourth century, who treated the two as one person. The younger Pudens seems to have lived till the Pontificate of Pius I., and the virgins, Pudentiana and Praxedes, who spent their lives in prayer, and distributed their patrimony among the poor, would have been his daughters. The house of the elder Cornelius Pudens, now known as the Basilica of S. Pudentiana, was the first place of religious reunion, and the most ancient Title in Rome. In this church may now be seen an inscription of a Cornelia Pudentiana in the style characteristic of the two first centuries, which was found in the catacombs of the Via Appia. A *titulus* of the year 222, engraved on copper, and offered by a town in Spain to Gaius Marius Pudens Cornelianus, a person of senatorial rank, was found in 1776 in the church of S. Prisca on the Aventine, which was known from the earliest times as the title of Aquila and Prisca, whose house it had been. The position of this *titulus* confirms De Rossi's assertion, that the connection of these friends of the Apostles with the family of Cornelius Pudens, is one of the facts of early Christian history best established by old monuments. The name Priscilla, of which Prisca is an abbreviation, indicates, when borne by a Jewess, that she was the freedwoman of some great Roman lady; and as the wife of Pudens was called Priscilla, no doubt it was from her that the Jewess derived her name.

Another large group of Christians of high position springs from Pomponia Græcina, the daughter of a consul, and a relative of Cicero's friend, Pomponius Atticus. Tacitus tells us that for forty years after her friend and relative, Julia, the daughter of Drusus, had been put to death by Claudius and Messalina, she was distinguished by her absence from all joyous festivals and her continued mournful deportment, and Rome admired this bold protest against Imperial tyranny.* She had, however, another motive for this conduct. Her uncle, Pomponius Flaccus, had been legate of Syria during the years of our Lord's preaching and crucifixion, and events deemed of sufficient importance to be reported to Tiberius, must have attracted his attention. The Pomponii were also connected with the Cæcili, and through them with the Corneli, and thus Pomponia's conversion to Christianity can be easily accounted for. In the year 57 she was accused before the family council of

* Annales, l. 13, c. xxxii.

having abandoned the religion of the Empire, and embraced a foreign superstition. But her husband, Aulus Plautius, acquitted her; and henceforth protected by him, and exempted by her mourning from attending public ceremonies, she enjoyed greater independence than hitherto. She and her husband patronized the family of the Flavii; and while Plautius advanced their worldly career, Pomponia converted Titus Flavius Sabinus, the elder brother of Vespasian, to the Christian faith, and gave him her daughter Plautia in marriage. They had a daughter, Plautilla, and two sons, T. Flavius Sabinus and T. Flavius Clemens. Plautilla is said to have lent her veil to S. Paul to bandage his eyes when he was beheaded; and De Rossi has recognized this tradition in the sculpture on a Christian sarcophagus of the end of the fourth, or beginning of the fifth century, in the Abbey of S. Victor at Marseilles. She died young and left a daughter, Flavia Domitilla, who is revered as the first martyr for Christian virginity. T. Flavius Clemens is accused by Suetonius of "most contemptible inertia," and by Dio. Cassius of atheism, and going after the manners and customs of the Jews. He suffered martyrdom under Domitian, together with Acilius Glabrio, a recent consul, and many other persons who were accused of the same crime; and his wife, Flavia Domitilla, the grand-daughter of Vespasian, was banished to the island of Pandataria. The mother of this Flavia Domitilla was daughter to Vespasian, and bore the same name; and as it appears from several inscriptions, that the land under which was excavated at this time the Catacomb of Domitilla, belonged to her and her daughter, it is probable that she also was a Christian, and that the catacomb was their joint work. But the most celebrated of the family was Flavia Domitilla, the daughter of Plautilla, already mentioned. She was educated by her uncle, Flavius Clemens, and when she arrived at womanhood was sought in marriage by Aurelius Fulvus, Præfect of Rome. But having learned from two of her servants, Nereus and Achilleus, the surpassing beauty of virginity, she consecrated herself to our Lord, and refused an earthly spouse. When her uncle suffered martyrdom, and his wife was banished to the island of Pandataria, she was carried to the neighbouring island of Pontia, where Aurelius pressed his addresses on her. Failing to seduce her faithful servants, Nereus and Achilleus, he removed them to Terracina, where they were beheaded as Christians, but their bodies were taken to Rome and buried in the Catacomb of Domitilla. When Aurelius found that he had gained nothing by the removal of Flavia Domitilla's servants, and that his suit was hopeless, he conveyed her to Terracina, where probably he had a villa, and shut her up with two of her attendants in a house which was set on fire, and all three perished in the flames.

There was also a young girl, Aurelia Petronilla, who was connected with this family, and who, after being instructed by S. Peter himself, took a vow of virginity. From an apparent similarity of name she was long supposed to be the natural, and not the spiritual, daughter of S. Peter; but Baronius has pointed out that Petronilla comes not from Petrus, but from Petronius, and probably from Flavius Petro, an ancestor of the Flavii; and De Rossi adds that her other name, Aurelia, connects her with the *gens* Aurelia, thus showing that Christianity had made its way into another distinguished family. Her sarcophagus was in the Catacomb of Domitilla till S. Paul I. transferred it, in 760, to the chapel of S. Petronilla, adjoining the Vatican Basilica. Within the last few months a magnificent basilica, dating from 390 to 395, has been discovered in the second story of this catacomb, and an inscription by Pope S. Damasus tells us that this was the basilica of Petronilla and the sepulchre of SS. Nereus and Achilleus. It appears, after having undergone great repairs, to have been dismantled and closed on account of its dilapidated state by Pope S. Leo III.; and Michele de Rossi is of opinion that it was subsequently destroyed by an earthquake. Here, on the 19th of last May, the feast of SS. Nereus and Achilleus, after the silence of a thousand years, masses were again celebrated from early morn to mid-day. Half of an inscription, with apparently the words "Sepulcrum Flaviorum," has also been found. In a garden on the Esquiline has been discovered the inscription of a Flavia Domitilla, the niece of Vespasian and daughter of Lentinus Sabinus "Vir Religiosus," in the Catacomb Ostrianus, a marble with the name Titus Flavius Felicissimus, and in the Catacomb of S. Paul *fuori le mura*, an inscription of Titus Flavius Eutychus, which De Rossi considers one of the most ancient in Rome.* But nothing more is known of these persons beyond the fact that there were four more Christian Flavii. There have also been found among the inscriptions near the Catacomb Ostrianus, already mentioned, the noble names of Q. Memmius Felix, C. Mimatius, Octavianus, ———ius Rufinus (the Rufini were a branch of the Cornelii), Tullia Paulina, Ulpia Agrippina, and Vibia Attica. Eusebius and S. Jerome tell us that Philo, the learned Jew, made a second journey to Rome to see S. Peter. Though there is not sufficient evidence that he was baptized, but afterwards apostatized through pride, as some early writers have related, his writings place it beyond doubt that he was familiar with Christian customs, and "not only knew but approved, whilst he extolled and revered the Apostolic men of his day."† During the few years that

* "Roma Sotteranea," by Rev. Dr. Northcote and Rev. W. B. Brownlow, l. 2, c. i. p. 66.

† Eusebius, "Eccles. Hist." l. 2, c. xvii.

S. Peter now remained in Rome he took so strong a hold on the City, that S. Paul was able shortly after to thank God, because the faith of this Church was spoken of in the whole world.

S. Paul also had his share in the conversion of the highest classes in Rome. He, too, had contracted a close bond of union with a patrician, Sergius Paulus, whom he converted, and whose name he henceforth bore, thus carrying Christianity into another distinguished Roman family. S. Paul, when he was brought a prisoner to Rome, was permitted to live in his private house on the site where now stands the church of Santa Maria in Via Lata, in which a marble column, from which hangs a chain, preserves the memory of his captivity. Both Jews and Gentiles of all classes flocked to hear him; and among the latter tradition mentions Seneca, in whose writings occur so many expressions similar to those in Christian books, and especially in the Epistles of S. Paul, that Tertullian said of him significantly, "Seneca, often ours" (*Seneca sæpe noster*). Some of his family, the Annea, are found by a funeral inscription of M. Anneus Paulus to his son, M. Anneus Paulus Petrus, which was discovered at Ostia by De Rossi in 1867, to have embraced Christianity. After two years' imprisonment S. Paul appeared before Nero, and was acquitted; but all that had befallen him had tended to the furtherance of the Gospel, so that his bonds were "made manifest in Christ, in all the court, and in all other places."*

Up to the year 64 the Christians were unmolested, being confounded with the Jews, whose religion was recognized by law. They were, however, already objects of universal hatred. But now Nero, in order to divert to them the odium that he had incurred by the burning of Rome, began that tremendous persecution which Tacitus has recorded, and in which an "immense multitude" of Christians suffered tortures, the intensity of which awoke the compassion even of those who, like himself, believed them worthy of capital punishment.† We are unable to enter into the details of the martyrdom of the Apostolic Princes, of which Dom Guéranger, by collecting the various traditions on the subject, has drawn a graphic picture, but must pass on to some points connected with S. Peter's successors, which bear upon our argument. All ancient writers agree that Linus was the first Pope. But there is a difficulty in determining the order of the next three, the most ancient Roman catalogue, which Dom Guéranger follows, making Clement the second, Cletus the third, and Anacletus the fourth, while the Eastern and other distant Churches put Cletus before Clement, and some consider Cletus and Anacletus as one person. We are greatly surprised that, in violation of sound criticism,

* Phil. c. i. v. 12, 13.

† Annales, l. 15, c. xlv.

Dom Guéranger should refer to the *Recognitions of Clement*, a work which is universally acknowledged to be a tale of fiction, and only as such is curious and interesting, in order to prove that S. Clement belonged to the Imperial family. His conjecture that he was a member of the patrician *gens* Claudia, which had already given four Emperors to Rome, has a better foundation in the appearance of the name, Claudius Clemens, among the inscriptions of this *gens* in the reign of Vespasian, and in the position of S. Clement's house, which has been recently found under the old basilica that bears his name at the foot of Mount Cælius, which was the quarter in which the Claudii dwelt. We learn from the *Liber Pontificalis* that Cletus also belonged to a patrician family, the *Æmilia*, Cletus being only a Christian name signifying "called." S. Clement appointed seven notaries to record the details of the acts of the martyrs in the seven divisions into which he partitioned the city. S. Cletus, in obedience to the desire of S. Peter, increased the number of priests in Rome to twenty-five. S. Anacletus, who had been ordained priest by S. Peter, and was the last of the Popes who received holy orders direct from the Apostle, adorned the Vatican Crypt with paintings, which were found to be in existence in the sixteenth century when this crypt, which had been closed by the walls of Constantine's church above it, was re-opened in digging the foundations of the present S. Peter's. S. Evaristus was able to set apart twenty-five titles and appoint a priest to each, and also seven deacons to assist the bishop in preaching the Gospel. All these measures prove that by the beginning of the second century the Church in Rome had attained to an important position as regards both wealth and numbers.

The patrician names in the foregoing pages, which we have culled from merely fragmentary records, prove conclusively that from the very first persons of the highest class embraced Christianity. A further proof is afforded by a letter from S. Dionysius of Corinth to the Church in Rome during the pontificate of S. Soter (161-171), thanking the Romans for the traditional munificence with which, following the example set them by their fathers from the beginning, they were accustomed to provide numerous Churches with the necessities of life.* But the most indisputable proof is that of the catacombs. We have treated this subject in a former article,† and therefore we shall now only remind our readers that the catacombs have been proved to be totally distinct from the old *Arenaria*, or quarries, with which they were long ignorantly confounded, and that their innumerable corridors, calculated to measure at least 360 miles, could have been excavated only at great expense. The beautiful

* Eusebius, "Eccles. Hist." l. 4, c. xxiii.

† October, 1869, "Roma Sotteranea."

paintings in them are evidences of wealth. The land above them must also have belonged to Christians. For at the present moment De Rossi's researches in the Catacomb of Pretextatus are suspended by the owner of the land above it. Twenty years ago they were similarly stopped in the Catacomb of Domitilla, where they have been resumed only a few months ago, when the late Monsignor de Mérode came into possession of the land ; and it cannot be supposed that professed Pagan proprietors would have been more favourable to Christian excavations.

The oldest catacomb is that of Ostrianus, near the Via Nomentana, which was begun during S. Peter's first residence in Rome. In ancient documents it is described as the cemetery "where Peter baptized" (*ubi Petrus baptizabat*), or "*ad nymphas*," or "*Fontis S. Petri*." Here stood till the seventh century the chair which he used during his first visit to Rome ; and among the holy oils from the underground sanctuaries of Rome, which S. Gregory the Great sent to Theodolinda, Queen of the Lombards, a list of which, with many of the phials, may still be seen at Monza, there is a phial marked "Oil from the chair on which S. Peter first sat" (*Oleum de sede ubi prius sedit S. Petrus*). This chair is to be distinguished from that in the house of Cornelius Pudens, which he used on his second visit, and the existence of which has been attested from century to century, till in 1867 it was exposed by Pius IX. for the veneration of the faithful. Canon Crostarosa, to whom belongs the land under which this catacomb is supposed to lie, has within the last few months discovered a large chapel with an *arcosolium*,* and a circular table on the right and a chair on the left, cut out of the tufa. The next oldest catacomb is that of Priscilla, the wife of Cornelius Pudens, on the Via Salaria, in which her family, and also S. Petronilla, were buried. The frescoes in it are in the style of those of Pompeii. The Catacomb of the Vatican, in which S. Peter was buried, must have been opened before his martyrdom. So also must those of Lucina at Ostia and in the Via Aurelia, in which S. Paul and SS. Processus and Martinianus were laid. She had also a third catacomb in the Via Appia, in which she herself was buried. Lucina is not a Roman name, for *Lucius* would give *Lucia*, *Luciana*, or *Lucilla*, but apparently a Christian cognomen derived from *Lux*, *Lucis*, light, a figure by which the early Christians often designated baptism. De Rossi suggested that the rich and noble matron Lucina could be no other than Pomponia Græcina ; and the examination of her catacomb in the Via Appia having proved that it was the burial-place of the Christian Pomponii, his conjecture has been verified.

* An *arcosolium* is a recess, generally arched over, in which was placed a sarcophagus closed with a marble slab, which served as an altar.

Thus the argument by which the enemies of Christianity hoped to sap its historical foundations, turns against themselves. These patricians who embraced Christianity from the first moment it set foot within the city, could test the accuracy of Christian statements by official records no longer in existence, by the evidence of Pontius Pilate when he was in Rome before he was banished to Vienna,* and of other eye-witnesses of the great Christian facts, and by that of the persons who were healed or raised from the dead by our Lord, and who, as the Apologist Quadratus wrote to Hadrian in 126, lived even to his own time.† Rome was full of sophists who must have freely discussed the Apostolic doctrines, as Seneca and Philo did. Yet Jew and Gentile, Josephus and Tacitus alike, confirmed the testimony of the Apostles; and the entire body of evidence was deemed so irrefragable by multitudes of contemporaries best qualified by position and education to weigh it judicially, that they devoted themselves with the noblest enthusiasm to their new Lord and God, and joyfully accepted, not only contempt and hatred, but the most horrible tortures, and even death itself.

Having proved our point in the first century, it is unnecessary to continue the argument through the second; though it requires self-denial to refrain from following out Dom Guéranger's fascinating narrative. The history of S. Felicitas and her seven sons has a peculiar interest at the present moment, because De Rossi, after discovering in 1857 the tomb of her eldest son, Januarius, in the Catacomb of Pretextatus, has just found in the Catacomb of the Jordani part of an inscription, which promises to be that of three others of her sons, who were buried there.

It is interesting to notice how the history of the Church corresponds with that of the Pagan world around it. A new family takes possession of the Imperial throne; and in the catacombs are found numerous inscriptions of the Aurelii, the Ælii, and the Veri. Herodes Atticus is known as the tutor and adviser of Marcus Aurelius, and in the Catacomb of Pretextatus appears the funeral inscription of his daughter Urania. Tertullian tells us that among the Christians were many *Clarissimi*,‡ and the wealth and luxury of the period are represented by the Christian women to whom he addressed his advice. The age of the Antonines was that of the philosophers, and among the Christians are found, on the one hand, a number of heresies of a philosophic character, and on the other, Christian philosophers and founders of schools—S. Justin at Rome, Athenagoras at Athens, Bardesanes in Mesopotamia, and Pantænus and Clement in Alexandria. A host of writers, Quadratus,

* Geschichte der Stadt Rom. v. Reumont, part i. l. 2, c. viii.

† Euseb. "Eccles. Hist.," l. 4, c. iii.

‡ Ad Scapulam, c. iv.

Aristides, Hegesippus, Philip, Melito, Modestus, Musanus, Theophilus, Dionysius of Corinth, all of whom are mentioned by Eusebius, besides S. Irenæus and Tertullian, prove the intellectual activity and power of the Christians. The growing influence of Christianity on Pagan philosophy is striking. Scarcely had Christianity appeared in Rome than a new race of philosophers sprang up, distinguished from their great predecessors alike by their inferior genius and their superior notions of the unity and character of God, of the natural equality of all men, and of morality, the points on which especially the influence of Christianity would naturally have been felt. Plato was far in advance of the rest of the Pagan world when he combated the prevalent notion that the gods were jealous of man's happiness, and in the glimpses that he had of the unity of God; but Plutarch and Epictetus were able to speak of God in his paternal character as a beneficent Providence,* and Athenagoras could exclaim, "All the philosophers now proclaim God's unity. Why, then, are we alone forbidden to say what all the world believes"? Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero would have been scandalized to hear Seneca speak of slaves as his unhappy friends, and invite them to his table, while Dion Chrysostom, a few years later, denied the lawfulness of slavery. The improvement in moral purity, where indeed it was most needed, was not so great; but even there it was visible in increased respect for the conjugal tie, in a certain influence granted to tender and legitimate family affection, and in the reprobation of what neither Socrates nor Plato regarded as infamous.† From the very first Christianity never fluctuated, but philosophy was progressive, and never attained to the highest point of perfection; and while philosophy prided itself on esoteric doctrines, revealed to choice spirits alone, Christianity opened its wide embrace to all mankind. A moral influence, which even in the two first centuries had boldly taken its place as the conqueror of the Pagan world, could not possibly have been a mere superstition confined to the poor and ignorant, whom that world regarded with scorn and contempt.

We will now pass on to our second question, whether during the two first centuries the present definite Christian dogma existed. This question is easily answered from the paintings and sculptures in the catacombs. Happily for our purpose, so remarkable a deterioration of art took place in the third century, when emperors were chosen from the provinces, and especially from the East, that the paintings in the catacombs which belong to the previous period, can be easily distinguished by their superior execution. One of

* Hettinger, "Apologie," part ii. c. xi.

† Champagny, "Les Antonins," l. 5, c. viii.; l. 3, c. v. sect. 2; l. 6, c. ix. sect. 2.

their striking characteristics is their dogmatic symbolism, so that even in treating historical subjects, the dogmatic signification predominates over the historical fact; and as the meaning of the symbols can be traced to Holy Scripture or to early Christian writers, no room is left for fanciful conjecture or controversial explanations. Thus, Noah appears, not as in history with the ark, his family and all living creatures, but alone in a boat, or rather box, on the water, with the dove bringing him the olive-branch, thus setting forth S. Peter's doctrine of salvation through baptism.* Sometimes a woman takes Noah's place, and once the name of the person, Juliana, on whose grave it is painted, is given.† The giving of the Law is not depicted with the sublime circumstances of the historical fact, but Moses simply receives it from God's hand, thus symbolising the source of the Church's teaching. Under various forms the grace of the Sacraments is shown to proceed from Christ, the Rock, which Moses strikes; on some of the gilded glass, S. Peter is substituted for Moses; and it is worthy of notice that the rod of Divine power is never seen in other hands than those of our Lord, Moses, and S. Peter.‡ The oldest fresco of our Lady is in the Catacomb of Priscilla, and in the style of the age of the Flavii. She sits with the Child at her breast, beside her stands a person with a roll of prophecies in his hand, and above her shines the Star of the Magi. In the same catacomb she again appears seated on a throne, or chair of honour, preparing to suckle the Child, and in a beautiful ceiling she is similarly seated, receiving the Annunciation from the archangel. In the Catacomb of SS. Nereus and Achilleus, she is again on the throne receiving the homage of the Magi. The Sacrament of Penance is represented by the raising of Lazarus either by the rod of Divine power or the priest's blessing, the Good Shepherd fondling goats as well as lambs, and various instances of our Lord's miraculous cures. The Eucharist appears under the well-known symbol of the fish, on a spit about to be placed on the fire of sacrifice, or identified with the eucharistic elements in a basket on its back, or served up on a table with bread; and also under the symbol of milk, which the Lamb carries on its back or suspends from its crook. The Church's authority is symbolized by a chair, on the back of which sits the Dove; her indefectibility, by a pillar beside which stands the Dove; her orders, by the rite of ordination; her persecution and purity, by a woman with a scourge and a lily beside her; her unceasing prayer, by the well-known figure of the Orante; and her appreciation of virginity, by a bishop giving the veil to a virgin. The Resurrection is taught by the symbolic peacock, the phoenix or

* 1 Peter, c. iii. v. 21.

† "Roma Sotteranea," l. 4, c. iv.

‡ Ibid, l. 4, c. viii.

palm-bird, the succession of the seasons, and Jonas and the whale. Dom Guéranger gives engravings of these and many other subjects, which furnish a complete series of dogmatic instructions. The Crucifixion alone is not to be found, though the Cross, veiled under symbolic forms, is often met with. But what is wanting in the Christian catacomb is supplied by the Pagan guard-room. On the wall of a ruined apartment on the Palatine, which was used as a guard-room about the time of Marcus Aurelius, there is a caricature of a man with an ass's head on a cross, beside which is a grotesque figure in the act of adoration, and underneath is a rude scrawl, "Alexamenos adores his God." At a little distance is written in a better hand, "Alexamenos faithful" (*fidelis*). Thus, so far from there having been no formal Christian dogma during this early period, there existed a complete dogmatic theology, from which the primitive Christians derived subjects for constant contemplation, for consolation in life, and for hope in death.

The story of S. Cæcilia, and the proofs of the authenticity of her Acts, form the second part of Dom Guéranger's work. It is well known that the original manuscripts of all the classics and of the earliest Christian writings, are lost. Consequently, critics have been compelled to adopt the following rules for general guidance. I. That a work, of which the original is lost, does not lose its value because it is known to us only through a copy. II. That mistakes and interpolations in secondary details do not destroy the authenticity of the copy. III. That even in the least authentic manuscripts fragments of the original manuscript, which it is impossible to reject, are constantly found. All the classical works which we now possess, have been reconstructed in accordance with the above canons of criticism by the monks from the seventh century downwards, due weight being in each case given to interior evidences of authenticity, to the circumstances under which the copy was made, whether directly from originals, and by persons sufficiently conversant with classical details to avoid errors in secondary matters, and to the authority of those best qualified to form an opinion as to the fidelity of the copy. Sound criticism demands that the same rules should be applied to Christian writings. It is not disputed that the Acts of the Martyrs were read in the churches from contemporary times till the beginning of the fourth century, when the original manuscripts of most of them, and all those of the Holy Scriptures, perished in the Diocletian persecution. Immediately after the Peace of Constantine, competent persons were appointed, under the Church's authority and supervision, to reconstruct the Acts from the fragments of the originals that could be recovered, and the *primâ facie* probability of authenticity is greater in their case than in that of the classics; for while a gap of centuries intervened between the general study

of the latter and the commencement of their revision in the seventh century, the public perusal of the former was interrupted for only a few years, and their revision dates from the fourth and fifth centuries. The Acts of S. Cæcilia were not taken in hand till the beginning of the fifth century, but happily the style of the editor falls so far below the purer Latinity of the second century, that it is easy to distinguish his work from the fragments of the original which he has preserved; and his evident ignorance, or that of a later copyist, of petty details of the government of the Church and the City in the bygone Pagan age, easily accounts for the few secondary mistakes which are found in the existing manuscripts. These mistakes are confined to the title of Pope given to Urban, thereby creating a difficulty as to date, and the name and title of the magistrate, Turcius Almachius, who tried S. Cæcilia.

To begin with the date. At the end of the Acts is the phrase, "*Passa est Marco Aurelio et Commodò Imperatoribus;*" and this date is borne out by the reference in the Acts to two emperors being on the throne, and to the raging of a fierce persecution. But the title of Pope given to Urban, transfers the martyrdom to the time of Alexander Severus, who reigned alone, when there was no regular persecution, and when S. Cæcilia's martyrdom would have been impossible, because this prince claimed to be descended from the Cæciliæ Metelli.* It was evident that there was a mistake somewhere, and it has long been generally supposed that it was in the date at the end of the Acts, and that the martyrdom took place in the reign of Alexander Severus. Henschenius seems, however, to have been puzzled by the mention of both the Catacomb of Pretextatus and that of Calixtus as the burial-place of S. Urban.† The Jesuit Lesley was the first to conjecture what De Rossi's archæological researches have recently proved, that there were two Urbans, and that the saint of that name in the time of S. Cæcilia was not the Pope, but a bishop appointed by S. Eleutherius as his vicar, to take charge of the populous Christian district near the Via Appia. The Acts of S. Urban, the position of his church, and several of the old itineraries place it beyond doubt that a saint of this name is buried in the Catacomb of Pretextatus, while, on the contrary, the name of S. Urban, Pope, appears in the inscription which Sixtus III. placed over the entrance to the Papal Crypt adjoining the Catacomb of Calixtus, whence his body was translated by Paschal I., and where De Rossi has lately found the lid of his sarcophagus.

As to the name of S. Cæcilia's judge or Almachius, it is generally

* Ado in his Martyrology retains the name of Urban, but says that S. Cæcilia suffered about A.D. 177.—"*Roma Sott.*" l. 3, c. iv. p. 163.

† *Acta*, S. S. Maii. 25.

agreed that it is not conformable to the genius of the Latin language. But on one of the monuments of the *Tribus Succusana* appears the name *Acemachus*, derived from the Greek *Ἀεμαχῆ* (who always fights), and De Rossi has found the inscription of an *Amachius* (who does not fight), and it is easily conceivable that one or other, and especially the latter, may in the course of centuries have been changed into *Almachius*. As to his title of *Præfect of Rome*, his name is absent from the lists of *Præfects* that we possess, and it is probable that he was *Prætor of the City*. This title, however, is proved to have been an interpolation of late date, because it is not found in the Greek translation of the *Acts* made by *Metaphrastes* in the tenth century, nor in a number of Latin copies still extant, which are distinguished by their simple classical style.* Thus every one of the three mistakes, on the strength of which *Tillemont* and his followers have declared *S. Cæcilia's Acts* to be a tissue of fables, proves to be only very secondary, and such as an honest copyist, not well up in historical details, might easily slip into.

S. Cæcilia appears to have been the heiress of *Q. Cæcilius Metellus Numidicus*, the celebrated *Censor*, whose splendid villa on the *Via Tiburtina* was at a very early period turned into a church in her honour, which implied that it had been her property. For an old canon forbade the name of any person to be given to a church unless it stood on the site of his martyrdom, or had been his property or residence. The cognomen *Pius* was hereditary in this family, one of whom, *L. Cæcilius Balbinus Vibullius Pius* was *Consul* in 137, and was probably the father or grandfather of *S. Cæcilia*; and his *prænomen*, *Lucius*, being found in the catacombs on a fragment of the inscription of a *Cæcilius*, gives rise to the conjecture that he was a Christian. The house in which *S. Cæcilia* lived till her marriage, was in the *Campus Martius*, and was early converted into a church under the name of *S. Cæcilia de Domo*. It was rebuilt in the last century, and is now popularly known as *Santa Maria del Divino Amore*; and in it may still be seen an inscription of the Middle Ages taken from the old church, "*Hæc est domus in qua orabat Sancta Cæcilia.*" Reared in the midst of martyrs she early imbibed the heroic spirit of the age. The Gospels, which she ever carried in her hand or in her bosom, were her unceasing study; active charity to Christ's poor was her constant occupation; and the fervour of her love expressed itself in a secret vow, by which she consecrated her virginity to Jesus. Her birth and wealth, her beauty and rare

* In "*Roma Sotteranea*," note B, p. 387, may be seen the contrast between these earlier copies and the later ones, in a part of *St. Cæcilia's* examination taken from both, and printed in opposite columns.

virtues, attracted many suitors for her hand, among whom her parents chose a young Pagan, Valerian, the descendant of Valerius Poplicola. In obedience to divine guidance and confidence in the promised protection of her guardian angel, she still kept her vow secret, and prepared herself by prayer, by fasts, by a hair shirt worn under her gold embroidered robe, and other austerities, for the combat that lay before her.

The house of the Valerii was on the Trastevere, and the adjoining quarter is called in ancient topographies, *Vicus Statue Valerianæ*, from the statue which was dedicated to Valeria, the daughter of Poplicola. Thither during the winter of 177, 178, Cæcilia was conducted as a bride. During the nuptial banquet, while vocal and instrumental music resounded through the chamber, she sang with the angels in her heart to our Lord, "Let my heart be undefiled in Thy justifications that I may not be confounded." As soon as she was alone with Valerian, she said to him: "Dearest friend, I have a secret to confide to thee, but swear to me that thou wilt not reveal it." Valerian having sworn that no power on earth should force it from him, she proceeded, "An angel of God guards my virginity. If thou darest in the least to injure it, he will strike thee dead in the flower of thy youth. But if thou lovest me with a chaste love, he will love thee as he loves me and will lavish his favours on thee." Greatly troubled, but unconsciously under the influence of Divine grace, Valerian answered, "Let me see thy angel. If I see that he is really an angel of God, I will do as thou askest; but if thou lovest another man, my sword will pierce you both on the spot." Cæcilia explained to him that he must be purified by baptism before he could see the angel; and on his consenting she directed him to go along the Appian Road to the third milestone, where he would find some poor pensioners of hers, and on mentioning her name to them they would conduct him to a holy old man, Urban, who would perform the necessary rite. With the first peep of dawn, Valerian set out and made his way to Urban, who greeted him joyfully. After receiving the necessary instruction, and being favoured with a vision of St. Paul to confirm his faith, he was baptized, and returned to Cæcilia. On entering the room where he had left her, he found her prostrate in prayer, and at her side he beheld an angel holding two crowns of roses and lilies, which he placed on the heads of the young couple, saying, "These flowers which I bring you from heaven, will never fade or lose their sweet perfume; but no one will be able to see them except those who, like you, have merited heavenly favours by their purity. Jesus Christ has sent me to thee, Valerian, to grant any request that thou wilt make." Valerian asked for the conversion of his brother Tiburtius, which the angel promised, adding that both should attain to martyrdom.

Before long Tiburtius came to see them, and wondering at the scent of roses and lilies which filled the room, though it was now the middle of winter, was told about the supernatural source whence it proceeded. Here the Acts give us in a dialogue, one of the fragments which evidently belonged to the original MS. Tiburtius makes no difficulty in forsaking the heathen gods, in whom, like all educated Pagans, he has long lost faith; but he starts at the proposal of going to Urban,* who has twice been arraigned before the judge, and is now in hiding in fear of death. When Cæcilia reassures him by the promise of a future life, he exclaims, in the doubting spirit of the age, "But who has ever gone into this life? Who has ever returned to teach us what happens there? On whose authority can we believe it?" When he is puzzled by the doctrine of the Trinity, Cæcilia explains it to him, not by the Nicene formula which the writer of the fifth century would certainly have adopted, but in the language of the ante-Nicene period, referring to the philosophic idea of the Eternal Wisdom, in which are comprehended the three faculties, genius (*ingenium*), memory, and understanding. Finally, she addresses him in an eloquent harangue, which runs in the same strain as the simple sermons of the Apostles, appealing to the mournful consciousness of the miseries of human nature and the yearning hope after a Divine Redeemer, which pervaded the Pagan world, and then proclaiming joyfully that this hope has actually been fulfilled by One whose miracles, sufferings, and resurrection from death, have confirmed His divine character and teaching. Tiburtius was converted by her words, and going to Urban, was baptized.

At this time the persecution, so far as it affected the upper classes, had been allowed to subside, but it continued to rage fiercely against the lower orders, who were deemed of no account. As the catacombs were being quickly filled, Cæcilia opened a new one on the Via Appia, under land on which the ruins of a columbarium belonging to the freedmen of the Cæciliæ have been found, thus proving that it was the property of her family. Valerian and Tiburtius distinguished themselves by their zeal in burying the martyrs, and were consequently brought before Almachius, who, being unwilling to proceed to extremities against two young men of such high position, tried to induce them to offer incense to the gods. Here the Acts give us another dialogue, evidently taken down by the Christian notaries appointed for the purpose. Almachius, impelled by the prevalent feeling of doubt and unreality, catches eagerly at some words uttered by Tiburtius, and asks, "What it is which appears to be something and is nothing?" And again, "What it is which does not yet appear and yet is the

* In the Acts Tiburtius says, "he whom the Christians call their Pope."

sole reality'?" Whence he passes on to a philosophical disquisition, of which the two young men avail themselves to proclaim to the surrounding crowd the futility of worshipping the statues of the gods, and even those of the emperors. Their words make a great impression on the bystanders, but Almachius still hesitates on account of their rank, till his assessor, Tarquinius, suggests that they are very rich. Then he condemns them to be led to the temple of Jupiter in the Pagus Triopius, where, if they will not offer incense, they are to be beheaded. On their way, Maximus, the officer who guarded them, was easily persuaded to defer their execution till the next day, and meanwhile to take them to his own house, where they were joined by Cæcilia and several priests, and before morning he, his soldiers, and his whole family were baptized. Valerian and Tiburtius were beheaded on the Pagus Triopius; and Maximus declaring that at the same moment he beheld God's angels, resplendent as the sun, carrying their souls up to heaven, great numbers of the bystanders were converted. Whereupon Almachius was so greatly enraged that he condemned him, as a person of inferior rank, to be beaten to death with scourges loaded with lead. Cæcilia buried him, together with Valerian and Tiburtius, in the Catacomb of Pretextatus, her own catacomb being apparently not ready to receive them; and on Maximus's sarcophagus she caused a phoenix to be engraved, because this was the type by which Tiburtius had explained to him the resurrection.

The execution of the two young patricians made such a sensation in Rome that Almachius hesitated to seize the wealth of the Valerii, and it was only after five months that he sent his apparitors privately to Cæcilia to induce her to perform some small act of idolatry. Noticing that they treated her with great respect, she said to them, "Fellow-citizens and brothers, listen to me. You act under the orders of the magistrate, but in the bottom of your hearts you abhor his impiety. As for me, it is joy and glory to suffer for the name of Christ; but I pity you, who are still young, and have the misfortune to be subject to so unjust a judge." She then proceeded to compare the worthlessness of this world with the Christian's certain hope of a future and eternal life. Seeing that her words told on them, in a transport of apostolic zeal she sprang on a block of marble that stood near, and continued to press on them arguments which they must have already heard from Valerian and Tiburtius, as well as Maximus and his soldiers, till at length she exclaimed, "Do you believe what I have just told you?" And all answering with one voice, "Yes, we believe that Christ is the true God," she replied, "Go, then, to the unhappy Almachius, and tell him that I beg for a short delay; and afterwards return hither that you may become heirs of eternal life." Urban now came to Cæcilia's house, and during the next few days he instructed and

baptized no less than four hundred persons of all classes. Cæcilia's only remaining wish was, that the house which had been sanctified by her chaste marriage, should be consecrated as a church; and, therefore, in order that it should not be confiscated after her death, she made it over to Gordian, a man of high rank, who had just been baptized.

On the 12th September she was brought before Almachius, who held his court near the house of the Cæcili and the amphitheatre of Statilius Taurus, the ruins of which are on Monte Giordano, where, in the Middle Ages, was built a church called S. Cæcilia de Lupo Pacho, and also Turre Campi. The details of her examination, which must have been written down by the registrars of the court and the Christian notaries, contrast strikingly with the style of the later editor of the Acts, and leave no doubt as to their authenticity. Dom Guéranger gives them in full, and they are most interesting and characteristic of the dignified freedom with which a patrician matron would address a magistrate greatly her inferior in social position. After some discussion, in the course of which Almachius quoted the Imperial edict in the very words that are given in the authentic Acts of S. Symphorian of Autun, that those who would not deny that they were Christians should be punished, and those who denied it should be acquitted, he exclaimed, "Unhappy woman, art thou ignorant that the Invincible Princes have given me the power of life and death?" She boldly replied, "If thou fearest not once more to hear the truth, I will show thee that what thou hast just said is false. . . . Didst thou not say that thy princes had given thee the power of life and death? But thou knowest that thou hast the power of death alone. Thou canst take away life, but thou canst not restore it. Say, then, that thy emperors have made thee a minister of death, and nothing more. To say more is to lie, and to lie foolishly." Greatly irritated, Almachius rejoined, "Enough of this audacity. Sacrifice to the gods!" at the same time pointing to the statues which stood around. Cæcilia answered: "I know not what has happened to thine eyes, or how thou hast lost the use of them. I, and all present who have clear sight, see in the gods of whom thou speakest only stone, brass, and lead. Touch them, and thou wilt feel what they are made of. Why expose thyself thus to the derision of the populace? Every one knows that God is in heaven. As to these statues of stone, they would do better service if they were thrown into a furnace and converted into lime. They wear out in their idleness, and are powerless to defend themselves from the flames, as well as to save thee from ruin. Christ alone saves from death; alone He delivers guilty man from eternal fire." These were the last words that Cæcilia spoke to the representative of Paganism. They re-

sounded throughout Rome, and created such an impression that Almachius did not dare to put her publicly to death. He therefore condemned her to be suffocated in the vapour-bath (*caldarium*) attached to her house. For the rest of that day and the whole of the following night she remained in the *caldarium*, which was heated to the highest possible point, but not a drop of moisture exuded from her skin ; for a heavenly dew, like that which refreshed the Children in the furnace, tempered the scorching atmosphere, or, as S. Leo said of S. Lawrence, "the fire of love which consumed her within, neutralized the power of the material fire that surrounded her." Thus miraculously baffled, it was now impossible for Almachius to stop, and he sent an executioner to behead her in the *caldarium*. She knelt and joyfully bowed her head to receive the blow. The man struck thrice, but the head remained unsevered. The law forbade him to strike more than thrice, and he fled in terror. Through the door of the bath, which he left open, a crowd of Christians who were waiting without, passed in. They beheld Cæcilia lying on the floor in the last agony, smiling on the poor whom she loved, on the neophytes to whom her word had opened the path of life. For three days she lay on the pavement of the bath. Each moment appeared as if it would be her last, and yet she lived on by a supernatural force, distributing her remaining treasures to the poor, exhorting those around her to remain firm in their faith. Urban came to give her the last consolations, and turning her dying eyes to him, she said, "Father, I have asked our Lord for these three days in order to place in thy hands the poor whom I fed, and this house to be consecrated for ever as a church." She was lying on her right side, her knees modestly drawn up, and her hands crossed, the fingers indicating in the usual way the Trinity in Unity ; and after she had thus spoken, she turned her head quite round, so as to hide her face against the ground, as if withdrawing into her inmost soul to meet her Spouse, and without a sigh, her soul gently departed. The catacomb on the Appian Road which she had opened, and in which she was to be buried, being still in an unfinished state, Urban, in order to secure her body from injury, put it in a light cypress coffin, which was then quite unusual. The attitude in which she expired, was respectfully maintained, her gold embroidered robe was not removed, and the pieces of linen with which her blood had been staunched, were placed at her feet. As soon as the principal crypt at the entrance of the catacomb was finished, she was deposited in it, in the place of honour exactly opposite the entrance, within an arch on the level of the floor.

When Almachius found that the wealth of the Valerii and Cæcilius had eluded his grasp, he seized Urban, and two priests, and three deacons, who were hidden with him in a cave, and as he

could obtain nothing from them, he ordered them all to be beheaded at a temple of Diana. All records agree that Urban was buried in the Catacomb of Pretextatus, where a large sepulchral chamber, of which his tomb was the centre, was built by a rich lady whom the Acts call Marmenia; but this not being a Roman name, De Rossi thinks it is a corruption of Armenia, which was the name of an illustrious family of that period, one of whose inscriptions he has found in this catacomb. There is now on the Pagus Triopius a Pagan temple, long converted into a church dedicated to S. Urban. This dedication attests his residence in the neighbourhood, and confirms the statements of the Acts as to his relations with S. Cæcilia. Within a few years after S. Cæcilia's death such an immense number of patricians embraced Christianity, whole families with their households entering the Church together,* that it has not been possible to deny that henceforth Christianity was professed by the upper classes. There can be little doubt that the impression created by the martyrdoms of S. Cæcilia, S. Valerian, and S. Tiburtius must have contributed to this great movement.

For twenty years the Catacomb of the Cæcili, which is called in some old topographies *Ad Sanctam Cæciliam*, was a favourite place of interment. But after the year 197, when S. Zephyrinus became Pope, a great change was made in it. One of Zephyrinus's first acts, as we learn from the *Philosophumena*, was to appoint Calixtus his archdeacon, and give him charge of the Catacomb, which name, De Rossi has shown, was then limited to the Vatican crypt, in which all S. Peter's successors had hitherto been buried. Some reason, which is unknown to us, rendered it desirable to form a new burial-place for future popes, and the chamber at the entrance to the Catacomb of the Cæcili being selected for the purpose, S. Cæcilia was removed to another chamber immediately contiguous. There is no record of this translation, but circumstantial evidence leaves little or no doubt of it. The interment of Valerian and Tiburtius in the Catacomb of Pretextatus shows that the Catacomb of the Cæcili was then not sufficiently advanced to receive them, and the fact that five months later Cæcilia was placed in a coffin, proves that even the first chamber was then in an unfinished state, and consequently her deposition at that time in the second and inner chamber must have been next to impossible. The catacomb being her own property, and the name *Ad Sanctam Cæciliam*, also indicate that she must have occupied the place of honour; and recent researches prove this almost to demonstration; for, exactly in this position, behind the altar in the Papal Crypt, there has been found an empty *arcosolium* long closed up with a brick partition, which could have been intended only to contain a

* Eusebius, "Eccles. Hist." l. 5, p. 321.

sarcophagus. A further proof is afforded by the Acts, the editor of which says that Urban placed her "among his episcopal colleagues" (inter collegas suos episcopos). That Paschal did not find her among them, is proved by the pictures of herself and S. Urban, and the inscription "*Decori Sepulcri S. Cæciliae*," which De Rossi has discovered beside an empty loculus in the adjoining chamber; and therefore we can only suppose that the editor, observing the mention in the older MSS. of her deposition in the chamber, which he knew was then the Papal Crypt, but of which he knew not the history, substituted these words for the original in order to make the matter more clear, and thus fell into a topographical and chronological error. It is scarcely necessary to point out that the interment of Valerian and his companions elsewhere than in this catacomb, and S. Cæcilia's being placed in a coffin, prove that they were martyred while it was still in an unfinished state; and consequently long before the reign of Alexander Severus, when the Papal Crypt and S. Calixtus's additions had been for many years in existence.

For four centuries after the Peace of Constantine pilgrims from all parts of the world flocked to the catacombs. Paintings and inscriptions, and often magnificent chapels, adorned the tombs of the martyrs; solemn masses and processions commemorated their festivals; their Acts were collected and publicly read; and every means was adopted to perpetuate the remembrance of their heroic lives. But with the lapse of time, after the catacombs had suffered from the ravages of successive hordes of barbarians, and the wealth of Rome had passed into the hands of her spoilers, the Popes having no longer the means to keep them in repair, Paul I. in 761 began, and his successors continued, the translation of the principal relics to the various churches and monasteries within the City. One day in the year 821 Pope Paschal I. happening to go and pray in the Church of S. Cæcilia, was struck with its ruinous state, and resolved to restore it, and, if possible, to find and place in it the body of the saint, which the Lombards were reported, though not proved, to have carried off. But after a careful search, in which he personally took part, he arrived at the conclusion that they had really taken her away. Early one Sunday, however, as he was assisting at the nocturnal service at S. Peter's, during Lauds he was overcome by sleep, and suddenly S. Cæcilia stood before him and said, "I owe thee many thanks. But on the strength of mere popular tales and false rumours hast thou abandoned thy attempts to find me? Once thou wast so near me that we might have spoken to each other. . . . Proceed as thou hast begun; for it is God's will to reveal me to thee. Take my body, and those of the saints who are near me, and place us in the Title which thou art restoring." At these words she vanished. It

would appear that, misled by the words of her Acts, Paschal had hitherto searched for her in the Papal Crypt, and that he now examined the adjoining chamber, where he discovered on the level of the floor a loculus closed by a low brick partition, which had evidently been built to deceive the Lombards. The wall of tufa between the loculus and the Papal Crypt was so thin that Paschal's voice could have been heard through it, as S. Cæcilia had said. On removing the brick partition he found the body of the saint in a robe embroidered with gold and sprinkled with blood, and at her feet lay the blood-stained linen. Paschal formally asserts that he found Valerian near Cæcilia, whence it appears that he must have been removed thither as a precautionary measure. He now placed her in a marble sarcophagus under the high altar of her church. A second sarcophagus received Valerian, Tiburtius, and Maximus, except the head of Tiburtius, which Paschal removed and put in a silver reliquary; and a third sarcophagus contained the bodies of Popes S. Urban and S. Lucius, which he took from the church of S. Praxedes, where he had formerly placed them. Finally, he deposited in the vault a poetical inscription recording the names of the martyrs whom it contained.

Dom Guéranger gives a most interesting sketch of the devotion to S. Cæcilia in connection with art. John of Bruges, commonly known as Van Eyck, was the first who represented her as the patroness of music, placing her at an organ among a number of saints who are singing the Divine praises, evidently from a misconception of the words of her Acts, "*Cantantibus organis Cæcilia Domino decantabat in corde suo.*" Ignorance of the kind of vapour baths which the Romans were in the habit of using, led to her being painted, even by Francia and Raphael, standing in a cauldron of boiling water.

An unparalleled succession of political troubles reduced Rome by the middle of the fifteenth century to a mere dwelling of herdsmen. Cattle wandered about as in a village, wild ducks flocked in the marshes, buttresses propped up the crumbling houses, and even S. Peter's was falling into ruins.* The catacombs were almost inaccessible, and the names of the several cemeteries being preserved while their position was lost, a false topography sprang up, and a few corridors still open round the Church of S. Sebastian, were supposed to be the Catacomb of S. Calixtus, and incorrect names were attached to various tombs. In 1409 Bois-Ratier, Archbishop of Bourges, placed an inscription over the site where S. Cæcilia was supposed to have lain before her translation; and so completely was this false tradition established, that in 1849 Dom Guéranger accepted it undoubtingly, and even in 1853, when

* Ranke, "Hist. Popes," l. 4, sect. 8.

De Rossi had discovered the clue to the truth, he still pertinaciously held to it. It was in this catacomb that S. Philip Neri made his long vigils; in it he received the Holy Ghost in the form of a globe of fire; and in it he imbibed the devotion to S. Cæcilia, which made him select her feast for taking possession of the new house of the Oratory in the Vallicella.

The reconstruction of Rome was begun by Nicholas V. (1447-1455), and each of his successors down to Pius IX., has left his mark on the City. In 1591 Paolo Emilio Sfondrato being made cardinal with the Title of S. Cæcilia, devoted himself to the restoration of his titular church; and when the most necessary repairs were completed he resolved to examine the state of the saints who lay under the altar. On the 20th of October, 1599, he found two sarcophagi of white marble three feet below ground, and exactly under the altar. In the first was the cypress box, and when the lid, which was a sliding one, was drawn back, Cæcilia was seen as if she had just fallen asleep, in the attitude already described, and in which the life-like *pose* proved that she must have expired, the gold on her blood-bespattered robe glittering with extraordinary brilliancy, and the blood-stained linen lying at her feet. Her stature, after making due allowance for the natural shrinking of the body, was below the middle height, thus revealing the motive of her springing on the marble block, and confirming the details of the Acts. In the second sarcophagus were Tiburtius, Valerian, and Maximus, who were easily distinguished by the head of Tiburtius being wanting, that of Valerian being cut off and placed on the body, and that of Maximus being unseparated, but terribly fractured by the leaden balls which had killed him. A third sarcophagus contained Popes S. Urban and S. Lucius. For above a month S. Cæcilia was exposed for public veneration, but no incense was allowed to be used, because of the sweet perfume that issued from her body. All Rome—Pope, Cardinals, Ambassadors, Princes and Princesses, rich and poor, down to the lowest beggar—thronged the church in such crowds that Sfondrato, who never quitted the spot, was often in danger of being crushed to death. Painters were allowed to make drawings of the saint, and one of these which is preserved in the Abbey of Solesmes, shows that her robe was green, with several bands of gold round the skirt and sleeves, like the Roman cyclade. Maderna chiselled the exquisite figure, which may now be seen in a recess lined with precious stones under the high altar over her tomb. Such extraordinary reverence breathed around her, as if one would say, "Stir not up nor awake my beloved till she please," that none dared touch her; but some of the linen and a piece of her robe were removed, and in taking the latter Sfondrato felt the hair shirt mentioned in the Acts. The heads of Valerian and Maximus

were also taken, and placed in silver reliquaries beside that of Tiburtius. Finally, on the 22nd November, the Pope, Clement VIII., enclosed the cypress coffin in a silver chest, and replaced S. Cæcilia and the other saints with extraordinary pomp in the vault under the high altar. In repairing the chapel on the right of the entrance into the church, which from time immemorial had been known as S. Cæcilia's bath, there was found beneath the pavement a vault, fitted up with a cauldron, pipes, and openings in the roof, similar to those in Roman *sudatoria*, or vapour baths, and proving by its small dimensions that it was intended only for private use. Sfondrato cleared away all obstructions, and placed in the floor gratings, through which the entire apparatus may now be seen. He also founded a maintenance for two Dominican priests to serve the Church of S. Cæcilia de Domo, and rebuilt the church of S. Cæcilia a Monte Giordano. In 1621, after his death, the Fathers of the Oratory wishing to enlarge their house, which was contiguous to the latter, got leave from Gregory XV. to take possession of it, on condition that the high altar in the Chiesa Nuova should be dedicated to S. Cæcilia in conjunction with S. Philip.

In the course of the marvellous reconstruction of subterranean Rome, which has been effected by the genius of De Rossi, he has found the lid of Pope S. Urban's sarcophagus in the Papal Crypt, and in the adjoining chamber beside an empty loculus, a fresco of S. Cæcilia as an Orante, dressed in the Byzantine fashion, and standing on a bed of roses. Beneath are a head of Our Lord and a figure of a priest with the name S. Urban written along it, the inscription, "*Decori Sepulcri S. Cæciliae*," showing that they were painted after her translation. On the 26th April, 1856, a French priest said Mass on this spot on an altar formed of the scattered marble slabs, which had once closed the adjacent tomb; and six years later the Pope made all necessary arrangements for the annual celebration of Mass on the 22nd November by all who should desire it. The devotion to no other saint, with the exception of our Lady and the Apostolic Princes, has been so widespread and enduring as that to S. Cæcilia. Nor is it surprising that it should be so, since to the glorious crowns of virgin and martyr she unites the zeal of an apostle and the dignity of married life, and thus she appeals to all the highest and purest Christian feelings. We hail the revival of devotion to her within the last few years as a promising sign of the times, and we cordially hope that it may be still more widely spread by the circulation of Dom Guéranger's beautiful and interesting book.

ART. III.—THE BABINGTON CONSPIRACY.
—MARY STUART.

Mary Queen of Scots and her Accusers: Embracing a Narrative of Events from the Death of James V. in 1542, until the Death of Queen Mary in 1587. By JOHN HOSACK, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, vol. II. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood. 1874.

The Letter-Books of Sir Amias Poulet, Keeper of Mary Queen of Scots. Edited by JOHN MORRIS, S.J. London: Burns & Oates. 1874.

History of Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots. Translated from the original and unpublished MS. of Professor Petit. By CHARLES DE FLANDRE, F.S.A.Scot. 2 vols. 4to. London: Longman. 1874.

History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada. By JOHN ANTHONY FROUDE, M.A. Vol. XII. London: Longman. 1870.

Mary Queen of Scots and her latest English History. By JAMES F. MELINE. 8vo. New York Catholic Publication Society. 1871.

The History of Scotland from Agricola's Invasion to the Revolution of 1688. By J. H. BURTON. Vol. VI. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1867.

OUR last article* on the life of Mary Queen of Scots was devoted to the subject of the well-known "Casket Letters," upon which much new and interesting light had been thrown by Mr. Hosack in the first volume of his "Mary Queen of Scots and her Accusers." We were obliged on that occasion to reserve for after consideration the equally debated question as to Mary's knowledge or approval of the Babington Conspiracy. Since the publication of the article to which we allude four years have elapsed; but we thought it desirable, before resuming the subject, to await the completion of the work of Mr. Hosack, who was known to be engaged in a careful and exhaustive examination of all the accessible materials, printed or manuscript, of the later history of the unhappy Queen, and especially in a searching criticism of Mr. Froude's pitiless and passionately criminatory narrative of her last years, her trial, and her execution. We trust that we may congratulate our readers on this delay. We are happy to say that Mr. Hosack is not alone in his generous endeavour to secure a favourable hearing of the cause of the Scottish Queen, or at least a calm and temperate discussion of the new evidence which recent research has brought to light. Almost simul-

* Supra, vol. xiv. pp. 123 and fol. n.s.

taneously with Mr. Hosack's second volume, we have to welcome the elaborate work prepared (it is said under the auspices of the Empress Eugenie) by the late M. Petit, but first issued in the English translation of Professor Charles de Flandre, which embraces the earlier life of Mary; and for our special inquiry the infinitely more valuable volume of Father Morris on the Letter Book of Sir Amias Paulet, keeper of Mary Queen of Scots, which for extent and originality of research, acuteness of criticism, and breadth and comprehensiveness of view, may claim the very highest rank in the long array of literature, Latin, French, Italian, and English, devoted to the vindication of this ill-fated lady.

The interest of the inquiry as to Mary's alleged complicity in Babington's conspiracy has been partially eclipsed by the more tragical horrors of the Darnley and Bothwell episode. Neither Hume, who regards her as guilty, nor Robertson, who assumes her innocence, can be said to have really investigated the question. The animated controversy in the end of the last century, which produced the voluminous essays of Whitaker, William Tytler, and Goodall, was confined almost altogether to the Darnley murder and the casket letters; and although a large number of documents connected with the history of the Babington Plot had already appeared in the State trials and in the collection of Murdin, the first really careful exploration of the original materials of that story were those of Dr. Lingard, Prince Labanoff, and Mr. Patrick Frazer Tytler. All these distinguished writers pronounced an opinion in favour of Queen Mary's innocence, at least as regards the projected assassination of Elizabeth.

Among later historians, Mr. Burton has taken the strange course of altogether declining the inquiry as to Mary's share in the conspiracy to put Elizabeth to death; although he sufficiently indicates his own prepossessions by a sarcasm as to "devotees" whom "historical evidence is not powerful enough to satisfy."* Yet Mr. Burton has inadvertently conceded the entire question at issue by laying down the important principle that, "if we suppose a certain cipher to have been forged by Walsingham's instruments, then the charge [of complicity] has not been proved.†

Mr. Froude, here as in the earlier history of Mary, has at least the merit of being outspoken. His incrimination of the unhappy Queen is distinct, unhesitating, passionate, and embittered, one might almost say, if such a thing were possible, by personal vindictiveness. But fortunately for the

* "History of Scotland," vol. vi. p. 114.

† Ibid.

purposes of history he has not, like Mr. Burton, declined *periculum sui facere*. He has not contented himself with presenting his own version of the facts. He professes to weigh carefully all the authorities, and his worst allegations against Queen Mary claim to be based on contemporary documents, nay, are often ostentatiously presented in the very words of the State papers of the day. His footnotes are crowded, in addition to extracts from the printed collections of Murdin, Labanoff, and Teulet, with references to the Queen of Scots MSS. in the State Papers Office and other manuscript sources; and the great interest of the recent publications of Mr. Hosack and Father Morris consists in their having tracked Mr. Froude through the successive stages of the story of Queen Mary, and sifted a second time this printed and manuscript evidence on which he pronounces so sweeping a verdict. The great popularity of his History, and the applause with which it was received by a certain section of the press, may fairly entitle us to regard it as the accredited modern representative of the party in English literature hostile to the memory of Mary Stuart.

Our purpose, therefore, in the following pages is to present a summary of the result of the re-examination of Mr. Froude's materials by these authors; and it fortunately happens that the criticisms of Mr. Froude by Mr. Hosack and Father Morris, although issued almost simultaneously, are quite independent of each other, and deal, if not with different branches of the case of Mary Stuart, at least with different aspects of the evidence on which Mr. Froude has relied in his incrimination of that unhappy Queen.

The outline of the story of Babington's conspiracy is sufficiently familiar, and its main facts are well ascertained. The controversy regarding it relates chiefly to the construction to be put on the facts, and to the motives and the secret dealings of the actors in the plot or in its discovery. The incidents are detailed by Mr. Froude with his accustomed brilliancy and picturesqueness. We shall present them briefly as related by him; and we shall afterwards consider the view of the most important incidents which he presents to his readers, and the conclusions which he draws from them as to the criminality of the Scottish Queen.

The catalogue of Mary's successive places of imprisonment during her nineteen years of captivity in England is a lengthy one—beginning at Carlisle and ending at the fatal Fotheringay. From Sheffield, where thirteen of these dreary years had been passed, she had been transferred in September, 1584, under

the charge of Sir Ralph Sadler, to Wingfield, another house of the Earl of Shrewsbury; and in the following January, to the still more comfortless castle of Tutbury, which had already on two previous occasions been for a short time the scene of her captivity. A few months later, Sir Ralph Sadler was released, on the plea of age and infirmity, from his distasteful office of keeper, and after this perilous and responsible post had been offered in vain to Lord St. John, of Bletsoe, the choice ultimately fell upon Sir Amias Paulet, under whose ominous guardianship the tragic story was destined to find its final denouement. The circumstances and motives of this choice, into which Mr. Froude has not thought proper to enter, will call for some notice hereafter.

Under Paulet's charge at Tutbury, the surveillance of Mary's person, and of her intercourse with the outer world, became complete. Not one of her people "was allowed to leave the castle without a soldier in close attendance. The coachman who exercised her horses, the almoner who distributed her charities among the poor, in vain attempted to evade Paulet's scrutiny. Nothing of any kind reached his prisoner's hands which had not been searched with an ingenuity which left no chances of concealment."* The discomforts of her position at Tutbury, as well as the painful restrictions under which she chafed, prepared the unhappy prisoner to fall an easy victim to the deep and complicated plan for the discovery, if not for the suggestion, of the fatal conspiracy in which her alleged complicity eventually formed the plea for her condemnation and execution.

It was while the painful isolation, thus industriously created and maintained, was at its worst, that the well-known plan for the detection of any secrets which Mary might have brought into operation. All at once "there dropped upon her, as from an invisible hand, a ciphered letter from the faithful Morgan."† The manipulators of this plan were Sir Amias Paulet, Walsingham's secretary, Phillipps, "an accomplished master of the art of cypher," and a brewer at Burton who supplied Chartley with ale. The particulars of the mode of secret communication are very curious.

A separate cask was furnished for the Queen of Scots' ladies and secretaries; a hint was in the same way conveyed to Nau to examine it closely, and when the ale was drawn off there was found at the bottom a small water-tight box of wood, in which was Morgan's packet. It contained an introduction of Gilbert Gifford, as "a Catholic gentleman,

* Froude's "History of England," vol. xii. p. 211. † Ibid. p. 218.
VOL. XXIII.—NO. XLVI. [*New Series.*] 2 A

well brought up in learning," on whom the Queen of Scots might thoroughly depend, and through whose assistance she might correspond with himself [Morgan] and with her other friends in England and elsewhere. The cask came in weekly. The box re-inclosed in the empty barrel would carry out her answers, and the chain of communication was at once complete. The brewer had been purchased by high and complicated bribes. He was first paid by Walsingham; next he was assured of lavish rewards from the Queen of Scots, which to secure her confidence it was necessary to permit him to receive. Lastly, like a true English scoundrel, he used the possession of a State secret to exact a higher price for his beer. Phillipps came to reside at Chartley, under the pretence of assisting Paulet in the management of the household. Every letter conveyed to the Queen of Scots and every letter which she sent in return was examined and copied by him before it was forwarded to its destination, and Morgan's introduction of Gifford, which betrayed her into Walsingham's hands, was the first on which he had to exercise his skill.

Six persons only were in possession of the full secret. Elizabeth and Walsingham, by whom the plot had been contrived; Gifford and the brewer, who were its instruments; Phillipps, by whom the ciphers were transcribed and read; and Paulet, whom it had been found necessary to trust. All the rest were puppets who played their part at the young Jesuit's will. The ciphers threatened at first to be a difficulty. Phillipps was a practised expert, and with time could perhaps have mastered all of them. But time was an element of which there was none to spare, where a correspondence was to be watched but not detained, and where a delay in the transmission might lead to discovery. The over-confidence of Morgan, however, in Gifford's probity deprived the unlucky Mary of this last protection. Fearing that his old ciphers might have been discovered, he drew fresh tables, not for his own use only, but for the whole party of the Paris conspirators, for Guise, for Mendoza, for the Archbishop of Glasgow, for Paget, and for Arundel; and he forwarded duplicates to the Queen of Scots. The key of his own, which unlocked the rest, he gave to Gifford to carry to her, and the very first letter which she availed herself of her recovered opportunity to write, was in this identical cipher." (Froude's "History of England," vol. xii. p. 216-219.)

The Gilbert Gifford referred to was the mainspring of the scheme. We shall have occasion hereafter to enter more specially into his antecedents. For the present, it is enough to say that he was the third son of an uncompromisingly Catholic family of Staffordshire, the head of which had been imprisoned for recusancy; and of the elder members of which, one, George, is described by Mr. Froude as "a Jesuit in the Seminary at Rheims, where he was a priest and reader of Divinity;" the other was in the Queen's Guard, on service at the Palace. In Gilbert himself, Mr. Froude tells us,—

the Jesuit training produced a character of a different type. He was taken from England when he was eleven years old, and the order, therefore had him entirely to themselves, to shape for good or evil. In age, he was by this time about twenty-five, and looking younger, with a smooth, beardless face. He had been ordained deacon, and had been a reader of philosophy at the seminary ; but being a good linguist, he had travelled on the business of the order, and had made acquaintance with Morgan in the Bastille, with Charles Paget, his cousin Throgmorton, and the Archbishop of Glasgow. Having been at a later period of his life discovered in a brothel, he perhaps formed other connections also there of a yet less reputable kind, and either as an effect of looseness of life, or from inherent scoundrelism of temperament, he offered his services and the opportunities at his command to the English Government. In the spring of 1585 he was communicating in a tentative manner with Sir Edward Stafford, the English ambassador. A little after we find him engaged with Walsingham.

So far as possessing the confidence of the ultra-Catholics he was everything that could be desired. His father was a confessor. One of his brothers was the confidant of Parma and aspiring to regicide. Another was in a position, if he could be prevailed on, to assist in striking the blow. He himself was dextrous, subtle, many-tongued, and a thoroughly and completely trained pupil of the Jesuit school. He had already gained the regard of Morgan. To be trusted by Morgan was to be trusted by the Queen of Scots. On all sides he was exactly suited to Walsingham's purpose. ("History of England," vol. xii. pp. 210, 211.)

For the purposes of the intrigue at Chartley, Gilbert Gifford had special qualifications. It adjoined his father's residence. He was "familiar with house and grounds as boys only are, or can be. He knew where the walls could be scaled for birds' nests, and where there were hiding-places which would baffle Paulet's sentinels." A Gifford, "dear for his own sake, and dearer for his father's persecution, would find sworn friends in every peasant's cottage."*

By a coincidence, unlucky for the confederates, but, as Mr. Froude vehemently affirms, entirely uninfluenced by Elizabeth or her ministers, "the famous Babington Conspiracy organized itself into shape," just as the last details of this machinery for its discovery were brought to perfection. Mr. Froude traces the origin of the conspiracy to a knot of devout young gentlemen, who on Campian's coming to London formed themselves into a society for the protection and support of the Jesuits; one of whom was Anthony Babington, of Dethick, Derbyshire, a young man of considerable fortune; although Mr. Froude thinks the original instigator was John Ballard, "one of the two Jesuits who had sought and obtained

* Froude's "History of England," vol. xii. p. 217.

the sanction of Gregory III. for the Queen's murder, and who had since clung to his purpose with all the tenacity of a sleuth-hound."* We need not enter into particulars regarding the other conspirators, who are in no way connected with our present purpose. It will be enough to state that they had bound themselves by a common oath to kill the Queen, if it were necessary, under the very cloth of State itself, and that the Queen having been dispatched first, Cecil, Walsingham, Hunsdon, and Sir Francis Knollys were to follow. They waited only "till means should be provided for the escape or rescue of the Queen of Scots at Chartley, and till either the Prince of Parma or a fleet from Lisbon was ready to strike in at the moment of the confusion." †

Mr. Froude's account of the manner in which Mary was informed of the design is very precise and circumstantial. He affirms that Gifford, "although he accompanied Ballard from Paris to England, was personally ignorant of what was going forward." We shall see later how far this statement is sustained by evidence. At all events, it is certain that the letters which were conveyed through Gifford's instrumentality to the Queen of Scots at Chartley contained mysterious hints that there was "something in progress besides and beyond a mere insurrection."

In the beginning, Mr. Froude admits that there was nothing to connect Mary with any knowledge, much less any approval, of the details of the conspiracy. Mr. Froude ascribes to Ballard the first suggestion that it should be communicated to her. He had at last informed Gifford of the design, and he now told him that, before anything could be done, he must obtain the Queen of Scots' hand and seal to allow of all that must be practised for her. For this purpose, Babington arranged to make use of the introduction to the Queen with which Morgan (the Queen of Scots' agent in Paris) had furnished him, and "Gifford was to convey her letter by the secret channel." The letter was written. It distinctly intimated that "for the dispatch of the usurper, from the obedience of whom they were by the excommunication of his Holiness made free, there were six noble gentlemen, his private friends, who, for the zeal they bore to the cause and her Majesty's service, were ready to undertake that tragical

* Froude's "History of England," vol. xii. p. 227. Although Mr. Froude states this fact so positively, he himself admits in another place (vol. xi. p. 304) that Tyrrell, on whose confession, made in the Tower, the statement rests, afterwards recanted the confession, and although Tyrrell repeated it a second time, he was a person utterly unworthy of belief.

† Froude's "History of England," vol. xii. p. 229.

execution." This letter was given to Gifford; it was examined by Walsingham; deciphered by Phillipps, who was in London, and dispatched by the usual road; and Phillipps returned to Chartley to watch the result. If Mary wrote in reply, she could not fail to commit herself fatally. "We attend," Phillipps wrote to Walsingham, on ascertaining that the letter had reached her, "*we attend her very heart in the next.*"

Mr. Froude relates the result without suggesting the slightest doubt as to the truth of his story. Mary's answer, he says, came at last, after five days spent in composing it and other letters which she despatched by the same messenger. After a summary of the other letters, upon which we need not dwell, Mr. Froude proceeds:—

Besides these, and probably composed before any of them, was the answer to "the distinguished Catholic," Anthony Babington himself, containing "her very heart," as Phillipps expected that it would. Babington had written to her as his sovereign. She addressed him in turn as "trusty and well-beloved." She applauded his zeal in the cause of herself and the Church. She bade him weigh well his resources, calculate the numbers that he could bring into the field, the towns that he could gain possession of, the succours on which he could rely from abroad. She advised that the Catholics should be told everywhere to collect arms privately, as if to defend themselves against some intended violence, and she bade Babington to learn from Mendoza when help might be looked for, and time movements accordingly.

"When all is ready," she then continued, "the six gentlemen must be set to work, and you will provide that, on their design being accomplished, I may be myself rescued from this place, and be in safe keeping till our friends arrive. It will be hard to fix a day for the execution; you must have a party, therefore, in readiness to carry me off. And you will keep four men with horses saddled, to bring word when the deed is done, that they may be here before my guardian learns of it. To prevent accident, let the horsemen choose different routes, that if one is intercepted another may get through. It will be well also to have the common posts and couriers stopped. Give the gentlemen all the assurances which they require on my part. You will consider and consult together whether if, as is possible, they cannot execute their particular purpose, it will then be expedient to proceed with the rest of the enterprise. If the difficulty be only with myself, if you cannot manage my own rescue because I am in the Tower, or in some other place too strong for you, do not hesitate on that account. Go on for the honour of God. I would gladly die at any time, could I but know that the Catholics were out of bondage. I will do what I can to raise Scotland and Ireland. Beware of traitors. There are even priests in the service of the enemy. Keep no compromising papers about you, and reveal as little of your intentions as you can to the French ambassador. He is a good man; but his master is too nearly allied with this Queen and may cross our purpose.

"There are three ways in which my escape may be managed. I ride sometimes in the open ground between this and Stafford. It is usually an entire solitude, and my guardian who attends me takes but eighteen or twenty horse with him, only armed with pistols. We could arrange a day, and fifty or sixty well-mounted men could carry me off with ease.

"Or you might fire the stables and farm-buildings here some midnight, and your people might surprise the house in the confusion. They might wear a badge to recognise each other.

"Or again, carts come in here every morning with stores. You might personate a driver, and upset one of the carts in the gateway; and the rest of you lying concealed among the bushes might rush in. The guard's lodgings are half a mile off.

"Burn this immediately.

A postscript adds :—"I would be glad to know the names and qualities of the six gentlemen which are to accomplish the designment, for that it may be I shall be able upon knowledge of the parties to give you some further advice necessary to be followed therein; *and even so do I wish to be made acquainted with the names of all such principal persons, as also who be already as also who be*—as also from time to time particularly how you proceed, and as soon as you may, for the same purpose, who be already, and how far every one is privy hereunto."

Phillipps, in sending the decipher of this letter to Walsingham, advised the arrest of the principal conspirators. But the Secretary was in no haste. He wanted more precise information, which was supplied by the inconceivable folly of the conspirators, who "had their portraits taken in a group as the deliverers of their country, with Babington in the midst of them." Soon afterwards, alarmed by discovering that a servant of Ballard's, who was deep in their secrets, had long been in the pay of Walsingham, Babington "instantly revealed the base material of which he was made, by writing to Pooley, one of Walsingham's secretaries, to tell the minister that there was a conspiracy on hand, and that he (Babington) was prepared to reveal it."* Even still no answer was returned, and any alarm which might have been created by the only step which was taken, the arrest of Ballard, was removed by his being arrested, not as charged with treason, but as a disguised seminary priest. With a view to obtain the further evidence which was required, it had become desirable to betray or force one of the party to confess; and it is no obscure indication of the nature of the courses which were considered permissible in such matters, that the Queen herself "suggested that a ciphered letter might be conveyed to Ballard, as if from one of the confederates, to which Ballard

* Froude's "History of England," vol. xii. p. 553.

might be tempted to write an answer." As no key for any of Ballard's ciphers was accessible to Phillipps, this suggestion could not be acted upon; and a proposal to arrest Gifford and confine him in Ballard's cell, in order to worm his secrets from him, was defeated by Ballard's growing distrust of that double-dyed traitor. Meanwhile, Babington again urged his offers of betrayal, but with the same dilatory answer from Walsingham, who was now sure of his game; and in the end, discovering accidentally that his own movements were under the surveillance of the agents of the Government, Babington slipped away in the dark from the tavern in which he was supping with two of Walsingham's servants, "leaving his cloak and sword behind him; flew to such of his friends as he could find, and told them that all was lost. They scattered instantly, self-condemned, completing by their flight the evidence of their guilt. Babington, with four others, plunged into St. John's Wood, then a forest interspersed with farms; and after vainly trying to obtain horses, they disguised themselves as labourers, stained their faces with walnut juice, and lay concealed in a barn at Harrow." At the end of ten days, Babington and four others, were dragged from under the straw, and carried amid bells and bonfires to London. The rest were captured in succession, with the exception of two, Sir Thomas Gerard, and the brother of Lord Windsor, who escaped to the Continent.

The after-proceedings as to the conspirators are well-known, as well as the public course held in regard to the Queen of Scots; the arrest of herself and her two secretaries, during a hunting-party arranged for the purpose; her removal to Tixall; the search of her closets and cabinets at Chartley; the seizure of her papers, ciphers, and correspondence; her return to Chartley, "to find drawers and boxes open and empty," and her most secret papers gone; her removal after much debate and perplexity to Fotheringay, and finally her trial and execution in that celebrated castle.

There are many details in Mr. Froude's narrative of these memorable events which might call for criticism and correction, and we may incidentally notice a few of the details; but our real concern is not with the details of his narrative, but with his main conception of the entire story, in so far as it concerns the memory of the unhappy Queen, and her treatment by the ministers of the crown of England.

Two questions of the last importance arise as to the Babington conspiracy.

I. First, as regards Walsingham. What was his attitude in reference to that dark and daring attempt?

Was he merely, as Mr. Froude represents, a concealed

looker-on, secretly watching the development of the scheme; using, it is true, hidden instruments for the discovery of its details; employing crafty, and it must be confessed, treacherous devices to facilitate, and even to invite, such intercourse of the conspirators with his prisoner as might lead to the laying open of their common design, but yet "entirely unconnected with the origin of that design, whether by himself or by his instruments."

Or was the plot in its progress, and perhaps in its very initiation, Walsingham's own work, "set on foot by him to tempt the Queen of Scots to ruin herself?" Were the agents whom he confessedly employed, not merely "detectives" whose function it was to discover evidence of a conspiracy which had grown up independently of them?—or were they themselves the originators, or, at all events, the instigators of the design inciting Babington and his friends to undertake it; tempting or betraying Mary into a guilty complicity, or, at least, a compromising knowledge; nay even, when Mary withstood these treacherous allurements, fabricating, by the blackest arts of forgery, fictitious documentary evidence of her complicity which they had failed to obtain from herself?

II. As regards the Queen of Scots.

The second question puts aside the consideration of Walsingham's share in the matter, and raises the absolute issue whether Mary was cognisant of the details of Babington's design and a consenting party to its execution.

On both these questions Mr. Froude's judgment is unhesitating and absolute.

On the one hand, he affirms "it to be false, utterly and absolutely, that any plot was set on foot by Walsingham to tempt Mary to join it in her desperation and then to destroy her."*

On the other hand, Mary, he declares, approved and consented to every particular† of Babington's guilty design, not merely for her own deliverance from captivity but for the assassination of Elizabeth.

On both points Mr. Hosack and Father Morris are at issue with him, not only as to his conclusions, but also as to the evidence on which he relies and the manner in which he deals with it.

I. First, as to Walsingham's connection with the conspiracy.

Mr. Hosack does not absolutely pronounce Walsingham guilty, but he indicates his opinion in a manner not to be mistaken; and in so doing he gives a summary account of the

* Froude's "History of England," vol. xii. p. 246,

† Ibid. p. 243,

principal agent of the Queen's ruin, the infamous Gilbert Gifford.

Whether that plot was the spontaneous effort of a few rash young men to liberate the Queen of Scots and restore the ancient faith, or whether they were induced to engage in it through the artifices of Walsingham or his agents, is a question which will probably ever remain in doubt. Although we may hesitate to pronounce the Secretary guilty of the heavy charge which was certainly made against him at the time by persons well qualified to form a just opinion, an examination of the circumstances which led to the discovery of the conspiracy must convince us that his conduct, to say the least, was open to very strong suspicion. It is well known that he kept in his pay at this time a number of Catholic as well as Protestant spies; and one of the former, named Gilbert Gifford, is alleged to have been the real author of the Babington conspiracy. Gifford was a young man of a good Catholic family in Staffordshire. His father had been imprisoned on account of his religion, and he himself had been sent to France in his boyhood, and educated at the Jesuit seminary at Rheims. At what time and under what circumstances he was first employed by Walsingham is not known; but, from the description left of him by the French ambassador, he must have been a very young man. For several months during the year 1585 we find that he was in Paris. The chief partisans of Mary in that city were her ambassador the Archbishop of Glasgow, Charles Paget, and Thomas Morgan, who was still an inmate of the Bastille. They were well aware of the rigorous nature of her imprisonment under her new keeper; and when Gifford suggested to them a plan by which she might be enabled to communicate with her friends, they listened readily to his proposals. Like the Master of Gray, Gifford professed himself a devoted adherent of the captive queen; and the religion and the family connections of the young Jesuit disarmed all suspicion on the part of Mary's friends, who naturally regarded him as a valuable ally, and sent him in December, 1585, with a strong recommendation to the French ambassador in London. It was duty of one of the secretaries named Cordaillot to attend to the affairs of the Queen of Scots; and on Gifford presenting himself at the embassy, he explained that he had come to England for the purpose of devising some plan by which the Queen of Scots might be enabled to correspond with her friends, a privilege which was now wholly denied to her. He added that as Chartley, where she was then confined, was but a short distance from his father's house, he hoped to find some means of accomplishing this important object. On being introduced to the ambassador, M. de Châteauneuf, who had succeeded Castelnau at the Court of London, Gifford repeated his story with profound expressions of attachment to the cause of his religion and of the Queen of Scots. But he either overacted his part, or Châteauneuf was too wary to trust a stranger, who, at the very first, he suspected might be a spy of Walsingham. A number of letters were at this time lying at the embassy addressed to the Scottish queen, as her keeper had for some time past cut her off from all communication with the outer world; but Châteauneuf

declined to trust any of them to the care of Gifford until he was satisfied as to his true character and objects.

Although baffled for the time, Gifford did not abandon his project. He remained in London during the whole month of January, making frequent visits to the French embassy, where various letters were addressed to him under the name of "Nicolas Cornelius." During this time, through his acquaintance with the English refugees in Paris, he obtained ready access to the houses of the principal Catholics, and to them, as well as to the French ambassador, he continued to express the utmost sympathy for the Queen of Scots. Chateaufort, still suspicious, at length determined to put his fidelity to the test. He intrusted him with a letter containing some matter of no importance, to be transmitted to the Scottish queen. On receiving it, Gifford set out immediately for Staffordshire, and took up his residence at the house of an uncle, who lived a few miles distant from Chartley. Burton was then, as now, famed for the excellence of its beer, and he ascertained that once a-week a supply was brought to the castle by a certain brewer of that ancient town. With the knowledge and connivance of Sir Amias Paulet, Gifford introduced himself to this man, and proposed that he should become the channel of communication between the Queen of Scots and her pretended friends. The brewer, whose name has not been preserved, received from those who employed him the derisive designation of "the honest man." Being assured that Sir Amias Paulet approved of it, and expecting to be well rewarded for his trouble, "the honest man" readily assented to Gifford's scheme. A small box was constructed and made to fit into the bottom, probably a false one, of the barrel of beer, which arrived once a-week at Chartley. The butler who drew off the beer then delivered the box to one of Mary's secretaries, who opened it and handed the letters or papers which it contained to his mistress. In the following week, when the "honest man" returned, the box with the reply of the queen or her secretaries was replaced in the empty barrel, and in due time reached Gifford's hands. As the whole of Mary's correspondence was at this time carried on in cipher, the letters were then sent up to London to be deciphered. Copies were then made, and the ciphered letters were either detained or sent on to the persons to whom they were addressed, as Walsingham might determine. But whether they always left the office of the Secretary in the same condition in which they reached it, is a question which it is impossible to answer in the affirmative. (pp. 333-337.)

Gifford, when he was in London, it was afterwards ascertained, lodged with Thomas Phillipps, the decipherer. The services of yet another person were required to enable Walsingham to unfold the secrets of Mary's correspondence, and there was attached to his office one Arthur Gregory,* whose sole duty it was to open and counterfeit seals, an art in which he especially excelled. The web of treachery which had been woven round the captive queen was now complete. Gifford having gained the

* Arthur Gregory "sealed them up again in such sort that no man could judge they had been opened."—Camden, 305.

confidence of the French ambassador, and corrupted the "honest man," had access to the whole of her correspondence. The letters were afterwards opened by Gregory and deciphered by Phillipps. They were then, if it was determined to forward them to their destination, so carefully resealed by Gregory that the most practised eye was unable to detect the fraud. It is obvious that, as soon as this artful scheme was organised, Mary's life was in the hands of Walsingham, or, to speak more accurately, of the decipherer, Phillipps. If she failed in her correspondence to criminate herself, nothing was easier than to interpolate a ciphered letter by introducing matter sufficient to bring her within the penalties of the recent statute. It will be found in the sequel that this device was eventually adopted. (p. 388.)

Father Morris proceeds more judicially in the discussion of the question as to Walsingham's share in the transactions, by examining the nature of the secretary's actual and previous relations with the several instruments whom he employed in dealing with Mary and her friends at this period. The chief of these are enumerated in the above extract, viz. "Sir Amias Paulet, Gilbert Gifford, and Phillipps, the decipherer. Arthur Gregory, the counterfeiter of seals, does not appear in any overt act of this dark transaction.

Mr. Froude sees no reason to connect any of these with the origination or instigation of the design of Babington or his fellow-conspirators, or with any treachery against the Queen of Scots, except in discovering and unveiling her own independent machinations. Father Morris, on the other hand, has unravelled the threads of this complicated web of fraud and treachery. He has traced the antecedents of each of the agents employed by Walsingham, and has found abundant reason in the circumstances of each to exhibit them all as already engaged with Walsingham in secret machinations against the Queen of Scots, and to brand two at least of them, Gifford and Phillipps, as utterly vile and abandoned, habituated to every form of treachery, and ready to undertake for hire every species of forgery and fraud.

(1). The first of these, Sir Amias Paulet,* is one of Mr. Froude's especial heroes, and he writes him up on all occasions with his habitual exaggeration. He was a rigid disciple of Mr. Froude's favourite sect—the Puritans, † and he possessed Mr. Froude's most prized characteristic, "downrightness," in a high degree. Mr. Froude can see no treachery in his hero's nature. Paulet could not, we are told, be "diverted

* Father Morris adopts the orthography of his original, which is Poulet.

† Froude's "History of England, vol. xii. p. 95.

from his duty by hope of gain, fear of loss, or any private respect whatsoever.”* And, as is usual with Mr. Froude, he dresses up in support of this view a picturesque story, all the details of which he relates with circumstantial minuteness. He describes Mary as trying upon this stern Puritan, “notwithstanding his forbidding creed,” all the “enchantments” of which she was an accomplished mistress. Paulet had been governor of Jersey; and an assurance of the same post from Mary herself as sovereign, under improved conditions of honour and emolument, was the charm by which he was to be won.

“She hinted,” Mr. Froude says, “by the advice of Morgan, that if ever she came to the crown, ‘he might have another manner of assurance of that island [Jersey] than ever was given to an English subject.’” What authority has Mr. Froude for putting such words into Mary’s mouth? Any reader would think that Poulet was the authority. “He understood her perfectly,” he adds: that is, Poulet, understood those words when uttered by Mary. And “he replied,” says Mr. Froude, to the hint respecting the island of Jersey, that he could not be “diverted from his duty for hope of gain, for fear of loss, or for any other respect whatsoever.”†

This circumstantial story of Mr. Froude’s is built up, like many of his most positive averments on matters of far higher moment, on the authority of a letter of Morgan, Queen Mary’s French agent, written from the Bastille, and, as Mr. Froude supposes, “smuggled into Tutbury.”‡ And undoubtedly Morgan did write such a letter, and in that letter does convey such a suggestion to Mary. Nor is it at all unlikely that Mary would have acted on the suggestion, had the letter actually reached her early in her intercourse with Paulet. But unfortunately for Mr. Froude’s theory, Morgan’s letter, although written March 30 (old style), 1585, did not reach the Queen of Scots’ hands for fully twelve months, being one of the eight letters which had lain for months in the French ambassador’s hands in London, and which were delivered together to her in April, 1586, *a full year after the date of Mr. Froude’s imaginary interview!*

Nor is it merely by exposure of these small inaccuracies, which are unhappily but too familiar to Mr. Froude’s critics, that Father Morris has overthrown the credibility of that luckless historian. He has entered into a full and dispassionate examination of Paulet’s true relations with Walsingham, partly

* Froude’s “History of England,” vol. xii. p. 9.

† Paulet’s “Letter Book,” pp. 18, 19.

‡ Froude’s “History of England,” vol. xii. p. 95.

in the illustrative notes interspersed among the documents in the letter-book, but more particularly in a most interesting preface, with extracts from Paulet's letters during his embassy at Paris, for which he professes himself indebted to a friend. It is impossible for us, of course, to enter into the details. We shall only say that they exhibit Paulet as holding in effect that "all means used towards a good end become lawful" (p. xxii.), as acting and living in habitual relations with "hired Papists, who traded in the secrets of the Catholic party with Walsingham" (preface xxxi.), "bargaining for their recompense" (ibid.), negotiating for the purchase of a service against Morgan, very similar to that with which Walsingham is charged against Mary (xxviii.), deprecating the foolish parsimony of the Queen in putting the paltry price of a hundred crowns on the services of one of these instruments (p. xxxv.), and frankly professing that "rewards and pensions are the merchandise of princes" (ibid.). In a word, this clear and able summary of Paulet's Paris letters abundantly demonstrates the fact that "Walsingham, when he sent Sir Amias down to Tutbury, knew him from past experience for a man who would be willing to connect himself with "instruments" like Gifford and Phelippes,* and who would, keeping the end in view, approve and abet the worst intrigues against Mary Stuart" (p. xxxix.). And the author of the preface significantly adds that "Elizabeth's knowledge of the plot against Morgan, goes some way to explain her anger and disappointment when Paulet refused to act upon her instigation for secretly cutting off his prisoner" (p. xxxix.).

(2). With the second of Walsingham's instruments, Gifford, Mr. Froude deals less tenderly. He does not disguise or soften any portion of Gifford's baseness and villany. But while in his exposure of the personal baseness and depravity of Gifford, he is unsparing and outspoken, he distinctly dissociates Walsingham from him in every other relation than that of a mere detective and spy. And as regards the origin of the Babington conspiracy, he positively asserts that Walsingham had no connection with it by himself or by his instruments; that the channel of communication which Gilbert Gifford had opened was made use of by the conspirators, but that the purpose had no existence in Walsingham's original design, and that it does not appear that Gifford himself was even trusted with the secret, or was more than partially, accidentally, and

* Such is the orthography of the original papers, which Father Morris follows throughout. We have followed that of the received modern histories.

externally connected with either Babington or his accomplices. (xii. p. 226.)

Space does not permit us to enter fully into the evidence which Father Morris brings together, not only of Gifford's being in the pay of Walsingham long before the point of the Babington conspiracy, at which Mr. Froude brings him upon the stage, but also of his entering as a partner and even an instigator into this and other similar plots. We can but indicate a few of the points.

Blackwood states* that two years earlier Gifford was acting as Walsingham's spy at Rheims, and had come twice to London to incite Savage to regicide.† And both Morgan's correspondence and Châteauneuf's memoir mark out Gifford as the prime mover in the plot. For eight months before it was fully organized he had been living in close intimacy with Morgan and the other refugees in Paris. Gifford, Poley, and Phelippes were all in Paris during the summer of 1585, insinuated themselves into the confidence of Mary Stuart through Morgan. Walsingham's agents were already associated with Babington,‡ for letters from Morgan and Paget of that date recommend the trio, Babington, Poley, and Gifford as persons able and willing to serve the Queen of Scots. In December, 1585, Gifford returned to England, furnished with ample recommendations to Mary from Morgan and from the Archbishop of Glasgow.§ After presenting himself at the French embassy in London, he went straight to Phelippes' house, where he lived during the month of January, "practising secretly among the Catholics," that is, insinuating himself into the confidence of Babington and his friends, and opening Walsingham's route of communication with Chartley.

But it does stop here. We must make room for another specimen of Mr. Froude's utter untrustworthiness in the matter of historical authorities, which Father Morris has pointed out in his account of Gifford's antecedents.

One of Mr. Froude's authorities is a Memoir by the French Ambassador, Châteauneuf, which distinctly alludes to Gifford

* Jebb, "De vita et rebus gestis Mariæ, 1725," vol. i. p. 281,—*"Ledit Gifford (comme il se verra ci-après) était un homme suscité par les signeurs du Conseil d'Angleterre pour perdre la Reine d'Escoce, comme par toutes les cours de l'Europe ils ont des hommes, lesquels, sous ombre d'être Catholiques, leur servent d'espions, et n'y a Collège de Jésuites, ni à Rome ni en France, où ils n'en trouvent qui disent tous les jours la messe pour se couvrir et mieux servir à cette Princesse [Elizabeth]; même il y a beaucoup de prêtres en Angleterre tolérés par elle pour pouvoir, par le moyen des confessions auriculaires, découvrir les menées des Catholiques."*—Châteauneuf's "Memoir," Labanoff, tom. vi. p. 279.

† Gifford's name appears in the indictment of Savage as having urged him to assassinate Elizabeth.—Howell's "State Trials," vol. i. p. 1120.

‡ Labanoff, tom. iv. pp. 212, 328.

§ Châteauneuf's "Memoir," Labanoff, tom. vi. p. 281.

by name as connected with the plots in progress, both before and after the organization of the conspiracy of Babington. Now, although Mr. Froude draws a good deal of material from this Memoir, he takes no notice whatever of these inconvenient facts as to Gifford. And the suppression is not confined to this.

During the spring and summer, Gifford, in concert with Babington and Ballard, was actively developing the conspiracy, crossing frequently to Paris, where he associated himself with Morgan and Paget, and laid their projects of revolt and regicide before Bernardino de Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, who, smarting under his own expulsion from England, and resenting on his master's behalf the action of the English Government in the Low Countries, lent a ready ear. "A cette occasion," says Châteauneuf,* "le dit de Mendoza n'oublia rien de belles promesses, tant au dit Gifford et à ceux qui étaient à Paris, qu'aux autres qui étaient en Angleterre pour les y inciter, avec promesses d'une armée de mer et de tous les moyens de son maître." Of these facts Mr. Froude, though he draws a good deal of material from Châteauneuf's memoir, takes no notice whatever.

Nor is this all. Châteauneuf's statements are confirmed in full by a letter,† of which Mr. Froude has made ample use, from Mendoza to Philip, August 13, 1586. In Mr. Froude's *resumé* of this despatch,‡ Ballard is represented as laying before Mendoza the full details of a formidable conspiracy. He describes the state of religion in England, and gives the particulars of the strength of the Catholic party in the different counties, with a roll-call of noblemen and gentry prepared to rise in revolt.§ In short, the envoy furnishes full information respecting a triple conspiracy, including a plan for a general Catholic rising, a scheme for Elizabeth's assassination, and proposals for a Spanish invasion. So "Ballard told his story" to the Spaniard, who heartily approves everything, particularly the plan of assassination. "Ballard's story" is pretty accurately repeated by Mr. Froude from his authority, with one startling variation. He has from first to last substituted Ballard's name for that of Gifford in the original. Mendoza opens his report by informing Philip that, some months previously, "*un clérigo*"|| had come over to acquaint him with the Catholic movement in England,¶ but that the information supplied being incomplete, he had answered only in general terms, at the same time requiring further particulars. In consequence, he reports, the Catholics

* Labanoff, tom. vi. p. 287.

† Simancas Archives, B 57, printed by Teulet, "Histoire de l'Écosse au XVI. siècle," vol. iii. p. 423, Bannatyne Club edition.

‡ "Hist." vol. xii. p. 128.

§ Among them appears "milord Gifford, persona de hedad, es padre del gentilhomme que me ha venido a hablar."

|| Ballard is always so designated in Mendoza's letters.

¶ Mendoza to Idiaquez, May 12, 1586. Simancas, B 57, n. 310; Teulet.

had sent a second envoy,* a gentleman named Gifford, of good family, well accredited, and furnished with ample instructions. Mendoza writes in full confidence towards Gifford, or, as he more often styles him, "*el gentilhombre*," as will appear from the passage which Mr. Froude has had the courage to *reproduce and apply to Ballard*.† So the letter proceeds. *Throughout it is Gifford, not Ballard*, to whom the mission of the Catholic party is confided, who *unfolds the secrets of the confederacy and lays open the plan for regicide*. It is Walsingham's agent whom Mendoza unsuspectingly welcomes as the negotiator of proposals "so profitable in the interests both of religion and of the King of Spain." (pp. 145, 146.)

It is difficult to account for so glaring a mis-reading of a very plain and straightforward narrative.

But whatever conclusion as to Mr. Froude's trustworthiness in the use of authorities may be drawn from this perversion, it is impossible to doubt that he utterly ignores the clearest evidence of history in denying Gifford's full cognisance and active complicity in Babington's plot from the beginning; and that in withholding that fact from his readers, in order to relieve Walsingham from the suspicion of contriving, or even encouraging the conspiracy, he has violated the very first principles of historical impartiality.

(3). Mr. Froude's treatment of the case of the third of Walsingham's instruments, Thomas Phillipps is even more extraordinary, when it is considered that the whole case of the Queen of Scots, as regards complicity in Babington's conspiracy, absolutely and entirely hinges on the credibility of his testimony, and the trustworthiness of the documents which came from his pen. Mr. Burton, whom no one will suspect of prepossession in Mary's favour, has truly said that "if we suppose a certain cipher to have been forged by Walsingham's instruments, then the charge against the Queen of Scots has not been proved."‡ Now, the "instrument" to whom Mr. Burton refers, is no other than Thomas Phillipps, and the only transcript of this all-important cipher which is available now, or which was laid before the Commissioners at Mary's trial, is the decipher from Thomas Phillipps's practised hand. How entirely the case depends on this single witness is admirably summed up by Father Morris:—

* "Han me embiado los Catholicos un gentilhombre llamado Maistre Gifford, de buena casa, con señas en su creencia."

† "Hist.," vol. xii. p. 130. The whole document, in which the Queen of Scots is only slightly mentioned, will repay examination. Gifford had evidently imposed grossly exaggerated statements upon Mendoza respecting the Catholic party.

‡ Burton's "History of Scotland," vol. vi. p. 14.

On the veracity of Phelippes, as Mary's life depended then, so do her character and history depend now. In the Calendar of the "Mary Queen of Scots" State Papers, no less than one hundred and eight are expressly stated to be in this man's handwriting, either that we are dependent on him for the decipher, or that the copy surviving is in his hand. When Mary's papers were seized, it is extremely improbable that the letters in cipher only should have been preserved, and the decipherers made for her use by her secretaries should have all been destroyed. Yet the Calendar attributes but fifteen to Curle, and none to Nau; and of those by Curle most, if not all, were deciphered when he was a prisoner. This Curle himself has been careful to record, though the Calendar neglects to notice it. Over and over and over again* we come upon "Deciphered by me, Gilbert Curle, 5th October, 1586." Then we have to another letter † his indorsement, "Upon notes of the Queen's Majesty my mistress, written by me, Gilbert Curle, 5th October, 1586." And again, ‡ "From me to Barnaby [Gilbert Gifford] at the Queen's Majesty, my mistress' commandment, Gilbert Curle, 5th October, 1586." Curle and Nau were arrested in August, and their lives were in grave danger. A note § of "matters wherewith Curle is to be charged respecting Babington's letter to the Queen of Scots," is dated September 21, and in September Sir Francis Walsingham wrote || to Curle "that the favour already granted to him is extraordinary, considering the foulness of his offence," and that he should "have better ground to intercede for him when he shall lay himself open, and show a disposition to deserve the Queen's favour." Under this pressure Curle made ¶ the decipherers that have been mentioned.

It comes then to this: the decipherers made for Mary have been destroyed, and those made by Phelippes alone survive. When the secret letters are quoted, this should always be borne in mind. (Paulet's "Letter Book," pp. 117, 118.)

One might expect that a careful historian would bestow some pains upon so important a witness, particularly that he would make an effort to weigh judicially his trustworthiness in the especial matter which depends so entirely upon him. But strange as it may seem, Mr. Froude has not a word, and does not seem to have bestowed a thought upon this vital question. He coolly describes him as "an accomplished master of the art of cipher"

* Vol. xvi. n. 21; vol. xvii. n. 7, 56; vol. xviii. n. 6 (two letters), and 10.

† Vol. xvii. n. 80.

‡ Vol. xviii. n. 10.

§ Vol. xix. n. 107.

|| Vol. xix. n. 119.

¶ If these decipherers were not made, but only attested by Curle at this time, the case is all the stronger; for if these were forthcoming, who suppressed the rest? Prince Labanoff (tom. vi. p. 322) gives an attestation by Curle, dated September 2nd, 1586, of a letter intended for use in Mary's trial, and in which a paragraph mentioning Poley and Blount was omitted.

(p. 218), and as "a practised expert" (p. 221). He contrives, as is his wont, to heighten the picturesqueness of his portrait by little personal touches, informing his readers that Phillipps was "spare" and "pock-marked," that he "had red hair," and that "Mary had been struck by his appearance." But of his character or antecedents not a word is told.

And yet there existed, ready to Mr. Froude's hand, abundant grounds, not merely for suggesting doubts of Phillipps' reliableness, but for directly impeaching his integrity in this and many analogous matters of the highest importance. Mr. Tytler, in the appendix of his *History of Scotland* * has made it plain that Phillipps was utterly unscrupulous in the matter of forging correspondence, and Father Morris has brought the charge directly home to him in the case of Queen Mary. What other construction is to be put on the unwonted generosity with which he is treated?

It is significant that while he was busily engaged in this work, May 3, 1586, Sir Francis Walsingham writes to tell him that "the Queen has signed his bill for a pension of one hundred marks, and takes his services in good part." Hardly less significant is Poulet's promise to him a month later, that he "will let him know if he hears anything of Lord Paget's meet for him." (Poulet's "Letter-Book," p. 115).

On the accession of James I., Phelippes had other terms to look for from the son of the Queen, whose death was brought about by his means. His "apology" (in May, 1603), for meddling in the affairs of the Queen of Scots, falsely declares that the only part he took was deciphering for Government the letters relating to Babington's conspiracy. Then in January, 1604, there is a packet of pretended intercepted letters, indorsed in Cecil's hand, "Letters written by Phelippes, and suggested by him to be counterfeited." The fact was that he spent his life in counterfeiting, and after Walsingham's death he seems to have carried on the old trade that he might get possession of Catholic secrets to sell. As Mrs. Green points out in her preface to one of the volumes of the *Calendar of State Papers*, his position in the Custom House was favourable to the receipt and despatch of letters. There is a very curious collection of drafts of letters "suggested by Phelippes," to be written by his instruments, Thomas Barnes and others, to Charles Paget and other Catholics, who little dreamt who their correspondent really was.

At last he corresponded directly with Hugh Owen, who was implicated by Fawkes's confession in the Gunpowder Plot. When arrested on suspicion, he at once offered to carry on the correspondence for the purpose of betraying the secrets confided to him, as the price of his own liberty. Neither this offer, nor protestations of innocence, with assurances that his sole faults in intriguing with Owen were "seeking some recompense," and

* Vol. vii. pp. 459 and foll.

"delay in making disclosures till he had things fully ripe," saved him from the Tower. Curiously enough, his old spy and instrument, Thomas Barnes, reported the substance of his correspondence with Owen, and the Lieutenant of the Tower during his imprisonment was Sir William Waad, the same who had been sent to rifle the Queen of Scots' cabinets, when the Babington conspiracy exploded. Mr. Tytler gives at length, in proof of the writer's utter baseness and unscrupulousness, the memorial that Phelippes addressed to Waad in which he acknowledges, under his own hand, the forging of a whole series of letters addressed to an agent of the Spanish Government. (Paulet's "Letter-Book," pp. 115, 116).

Mr. Hosack, in a singularly able and temperate summary of the facts, has added further matter of the gravest suspicion against Phillipps. He has printed * a letter of Gifford to Phillipps, which not only establishes the closest concert between these skulking plotters in their devices of treachery, but also exhibits Gifford as engaging Phillipps *to forge letters in furtherance of their scheme*; and although he admits that it would be "unfair to conclude that Phillipps was a practised forger, merely from the fact that Gifford asked him to fabricate two letters," he produces "abundant proof from other sources that Phillipps possessed extraordinary skill in the art—for such in this age it was considered—of forgery. There is in the Cotton Library a confession of one Thomas Harrison, styling himself secretary to Sir Francis Walsingham, who states that Phillipps would imitate exactly almost any handwriting, and of this statement we have an absolute confirmation from himself. He was at this time, from Mary's description of him, but a young man; but twenty years later, namely, in the year 1606, we find him confessing to the then Earl of Salisbury, that during the previous reign he had carried on with some base object an entirely fictitious correspondence.

Such are a few of the more than suspicious circumstances tending to impeach the trustworthiness of Phillipps, not one of which Mr. Froude has thought proper to take into account as suggesting a doubt of his credibility, or even to bring before his readers with a view to their forming for themselves a judgment regarding them. We shall see other circumstances even more fatally suggestive of Walsingham's direct complicity with him.

There is a letter of Sir Amias Paulet, dated 29th of June, 1586, which it seems impossible to read without arriving at the conviction that he was a party to every detail of the treachery with which the unfortunate Queen was beset. Phillipps, as we gather from this letter, had laid some unex-

* "Mary Queen of Scots and her Accusers," vol. ii. p. 380.

plained plan for entrapping her, and had transmitted to Paulet a packet which he had prepared in furtherance of it, to be entrusted to the Burton brewer for delivery through the secret channel. Paulet's less daring nature for some cause shrank from the danger which this course seemed to him to involve. He undertook on his own responsibility to depart from Phillipps's directions, and he wrote to Phillipps a short note informing him of the departure from the course which he had directed to be followed. Had the matter lain between the "instruments alone," it would naturally have rested here; but there is a second and far more explicit letter of Paulet to Walsingham himself, which it is impossible to read without being convinced that he was the director and even the mover of every detail of this flagitious machinery. We must make room for an extract:—

Mr. Phelippes hath set down a course for many things to be done which surely I dare not put in execution for fear of the event, wherein I am also the more fearful because it seemeth there is hope that, the 3rd of this present, great matters will come from this people, which might be in danger to be stayed if [by] any mean cause of suspicion or minished by any of the agents of this intercourse.

Mr. Phelippes would have the substitute to seize upon this little packet now returned from you unto me, whereunto the "honest man" will never assent without my especial direction, because he is now to receive the said packet at my hands. This adventure might breed many dangers, and seemeth to serve no other purpose than merely to deliver a letter from the substitute to Curle, the said letter containing no matter which requireth especial haste, and which may not be done more safely by your friend at his coming.

All is now well, thanks be to God, and I should think myself very unhappy if, upon any instructions to proceed from me, this intercourse so well advanced should be overthrown. I have therefore resolved to open the returned packet, and to deliver to the "honest man" only the letter for the second messenger therein-contained, reserving the rest according to Mr. Phelippes' direction, so as if any question grow hereafter (which is not likely) it shall be said that the substitute, finding the said packet in the "honest man's" hands, seized upon it and took out thereof what pleased him. (Paulet's "Letter-Book," pp. 212, 213.)*

Can any one reading this letter to Walsingham doubt that *whatever may have been the nature of the machinations* of these base and unscrupulous instruments, he must not only have been cognisant of them, but was their moving spirit and director?

The plot to destroy the ill-fated Queen which has been

* Paulet to Walsingham, June 29th, 1586.

charged against her enemies by Tytler, Prince Labanoff, and Lingard, but which is passionately repudiated by Mr. Froude, and which is now renewed by Mr. Hosack and Father Morris, consisted in the fraudulent insertion of a compromising statement in Babington's letter to her, and a similar addition to her reply to Babington, the effect of which fabrications is to connect her as a fully cognisant and consenting party to the conspiracy for the killing of Elizabeth. The direct grounds on which this allegation is supported we shall see hereafter. For the present we shall merely point out that the facts which are stated above, and which Mr. Froude has studiously ignored, are such as antecedently to render the charge by no means improbable.

(1.) The tampering with correspondence, nay, even the fraudulent fabrication of correspondence, for the purposes of betrayal, was a familiar art of Phillipps and his confederates. It had been repeatedly practised in other instances with the consent of Walsingham, and even under his direction.

(2.) Mr. Froude confesses that at a later stage of the conspiracy Elizabeth herself suggested, in a letter to this very Walsingham, "that a ciphered letter might be conveyed to Ballard, as if from one of the confederates, to which he might be tempted to write an answer;"* and his foot-note represents Walsingham as complimenting the Queen on the device which she "politically adviseth."

(3.) At the Fotheringay trial, Mary, while she denied that the deciphered letter to Babington produced at the trial was hers, reminded the Commissioners that "cipher was easily counterfeited, and that for all she knew the letter might have been composed by Walsingham." Walsingham solemnly repudiated the imputation, we need hardly say, but the fact remains not the less certain that reports to that effect were current at the time and had reached the Queen of Scots.†

(4.) Phillipps's services in this matter must have been of a nature quite beyond the common work of a decipherer. We have seen how lavish of reward and promises of reward his employer was. Father Morris quotes a further promise of Elizabeth to be "otherwise good to him."‡ One mark of this "goodness" of the Queen was his appointment as "customer," that is, collector of petty customs of the port of London. In the course of two years Phillipps contrived to contract in this office a debt to the Crown, for those days enormous, of no less

* "History of England," vol. xii. p. 253.

† Ibid. pp. 283, 284.

‡ "Letter Book," p. 115.

than £11,683. 6s. 6½d. Those alone who know the hard and exacting habits of Elizabeth in all matters connected with the revenue and its administration, will understand what a crime the embezzlement of public money constituted in her eyes, and they alone will fully estimate how grave must have been the motives which could influence her to overlook or to condone it. What then are we to conclude as to Phillipps's hold upon her and on her ministers, when we find him equivalently pardoned this enormous malversation? He was arrested, it is true, and his office was of course withdrawn. But what are we to surmise as to the reasons for securing his silence, which could have led so rigorous an administrator to liberate the offender from prison, to continue his annuity, and even to restore his lands, on a promise to repay the money in eighteen months? And the more especially, seeing that, as Father Morris infers from the papers, "he did not pay it, at least in full, and seems to have dictated his own terms, for the draft of the warrant of the Exchequer was drawn up by him."* Will any one believe that all this tenderness towards a malversation of such proportions would have been extended to Phillipps, had his services simply consisted in the skilful and zealous exercise of his art as a decipherer? May it not rather be inferred with certainty that he must have held in his possession some dark and compromising secret, the suppression of which it was necessary to purchase, even at a sacrifice thus painful to the penurious heart of Elizabeth?

II. But the question as to the Queen of Scots' knowledge and approval of the plot is of far greater importance: and to this question both Mr. Hosack and Father Morris have addressed themselves more directly, as well as to the examination of the evidence alleged by Mr. Froude in support of the verdict which he pronounces against her. The decision may be said to turn almost entirely on the letter of Babington to the Queen and her reply. If these letters, such as they now exist, be genuine, no reasonable person can doubt Mary's complicity in all the worst details of the conspiracy. It will be seen from the summary already given of Mr. Froude's narrative that he accepts as certainly genuine both these documents in their present form. He has appended a note which professes to discuss the arguments by which Mary's defenders have sought to impeach their genuineness, and while he puts forward as entirely unquestionable the facts on which he grounds his own view, he rejects as utterly futile, and all but preposterous, the allega-

* "Letter-Book," p. 115.

tions of Prince Labanoff and others upon the opposite side. We shall take separately the two branches of his criticism of the letters.*

He himself declares them unquestionably authentic, for the following reasons:—

(1.) Mary's letter "was sworn to by the two secretaries as having been written by Nau from minutes in the Queen's hand, translated into English by Curle, and read over to herself and approved by her before it was ciphered." (2.) Though the autograph could not be found, Nau's minutes of it were found. (3.) It was acknowledged by Babington as the same which he received in cipher. (4.) Phillipps's copy of the cipher was examined by the Privy Council, and the decipher verified, and it bears the signature of the noblemen by whom it was examined.

It would be difficult to heap together an equal number of reckless statements. Not a single one of these assertions, positive as they are, will bear examination.

(1.) Far from its being true that Mary's letter was unreservedly sworn to by the two secretaries, with all this detail of circumstances, Nau merely said that "*he thought it was the letter, as far as he remembered*" (*je pense de vray, comme il me souvenir*); while Curle's even more hesitating statement is only that it "*seems such as, or like* (*telle ou semblable me semble*) the answer." And reserved and faltering as is the confession which Mr. Froude thus boldly parades, he does not even inform the reader of the manner in which it was obtained from the secretaries. He does not tell that they were confined in Walsingham's own house, and beset with alternate threats and promises; that when their first admissions were found insufficient to convict the Queen, Lord Burghley, in brutal phrase, suggested that "they would yield somewhat to confirm their mistress's crime, if they were persuaded that themselves might scape, and the blow fall on their mistress, betwixt her head and shoulders"; that even still they refused to authenticate the decipher of the answer to Babington with their signatures; and that ultimately, when, under threat of removal to the Tower, they yielded a qualified attestation, it was not to the deciphered letter itself, but to an "abstract of the principal points," regarding which there is not the slightest evidence that it contained the passages which were disclaimed by Mary, and on which the whole question of her complicity

* Mr. Froude says, "In the deciphered form in which it was produced by Walsingham." It was in reality a French translation, and is endorsed "*Tournée d'Anglays en Français.*"

in the plot to assassinate Elizabeth depends.* Finally, he forgets that, whatever may be the seeming effect of these confessions, as implicating Mary in the plot to assassinate Elizabeth, all such consequences were subsequently repudiated by both the secretaries, and especially by Nau.†

(2). The statement that Nau's minutes of Mary's letter to Babington were found, is equally wide of the truth. The document thus boldly described as Minutes of Mary's letter to Babington, contained in reality the heads of three letters written in cipher to the Archbishop of Glasgow, to Mendoza, and to Charles Paget. They are described as such by Nau himself, and they correspond exactly with the contents of these letters, and do not contain any reference to the only disputed part of the letter to Babington—the assassination of Elizabeth. On the contrary, it is plain from Nau's defence of himself, in respect of the letter to Babington, that he considered the most compromising parts of that letter to be those in which are suggested the escape of Mary from Chartley, and the proposal to set the outhouses on fire. If it be contended that these "heads" also included the letter to Babington, along with the three letters above-named, Father Morris's reply is perfectly conclusive.

One of these two things is true, and either exculpates Mary. Either the heads produced were really those of Mary's letter to Babington, as asserted, and then those notes are identical with those of her letters to Glasgow, Mendoza, and Paget, in none of which is the *coup*, Elizabeth's assassination, but the enterprise upon Chartley for Mary's rescue, in which case the same heads for the letter to Babington will mean that the same things were to be written to Babington. Not then, the assassination, but the assault upon Chartley, is the *coup*. Or else, which is far more likely, the heads produced at the trial were really those of the letters to Glasgow, Mendoza, and Paget, wilfully separated from Nau's statement to that effect; separated, because if they had been known to be the heads of letters that were then produced, the real meaning of the word *coup* would have been unmistakable. ("Letter Book," pp. 229, 230.)

(3.) On Mr. Froude's allegation that the letter, such as we now have it, was acknowledged by Babington to be the same which he received in cipher, it is hardly necessary to observe, that, even supposing this to be literally true, it would by no means follow that the letter received by Babington was the same as that dictated by Mary, and put in cipher by her secretaries. On the contrary, Lingard, Tytler, Labanoff, all suggest the probability of the cipher having been tampered with by

* See Lingard's "History of England," vol. vi. p. 432.

† Ibid. pp. 702, 703.

Phillipps before its transmission to Babington, whom it did not reach for nearly a fortnight after it was despatched through the Burton brewer. The value, therefore, of Babington's acknowledgment is not to be disposed of in a few decreterial words such as those of Mr. Froude. Dr. Lingard had long ago called attention to the deceptive way in which the attestations and subscriptions were exhibited. By an ingenious contrivance, men not admitted to the secret were led to believe that the instrument to which the subscriptions were attached was a copy of the letter actually received by Babington. Burghley himself seems to have understood it so. In a letter to Walsingham of the 8th of September, he says of Nau's subscription on the 6th, "Nau hath amply confessed by his handwriting to have written by the Queen's inditing and her own minute the long letter to Babington." The same, he adds, was the persuasion entertained at the trial at Fotheringay, and the same has generally been repeated by writers since that period. It was, indeed, endorsed by Phillipps, "Queen of Scots to Babington, 17th July, 1586," and subscribed by Babington, "C'est la copie des lettres de la Roynne d'Escoce dernièrement à moy envoyées.—Anthonie Babington." But how, Dr. Lingard asks, could that be so? "The letter which Babington had received was written in the English language: this to which he subscribes is written in the French language. . . . The fact is, the instrument laid before them was not openly propounded as a copy of the letter actually received by Babington, but as a copy of the French letter composed by Nau from the minute and the dictation of Mary Stuart; the very letter, in fact, which Nau maintained that they possessed, and to which he appealed in defence of his own innocence and that of the Scottish Queen as far as concerned the project of assassination." This he shows from the testimony of Curle, at both his examinations of September 5th and September 21st; and he can see but one explanation of Walsingham's producing the copy of that letter;—namely, that the original did not contain any allusion to the projected murder of Elizabeth, but the letter which he had forwarded to Babington was known to contain several such allusions, and it therefore became necessary to suppress the original and to exhibit a pretended copy into which he might introduce all the murderous passages contained in the letter received by Babington.*

(4.) No less confident is Mr. Froude's assertion that Phillipps's deciphered copy of the letter was examined and verified by the Privy Council and bears their signatures.

* "History of England," vol. vi. pp. 700, 701.

What will the reader say on contrasting with it the following startling statement of Mr. Hosack :—

Mr. Froude, on the subject of the documents still preserved relative to Mary's complicity with Babington, expresses himself as follows : "Every document of consequence was submitted to a committee, of which two peers were members who had been hitherto the keenest advocates of her claims—Shrewsbury, in whom she had herself the most perfect confidence, and Cobham, who had more than once been implicated in conspiracies in her favour. *Every deciphered letter in the vast collection bears endorsed upon it the signatures of Shrewsbury and Cobham, besides those of Burghley and Walsingham and Sir Francis Knollys.* The cipher keys themselves bear signs of no less scrupulous examination. The most exaggerated precautions were thought necessary against suspicion of unfair dealing." (Vol. xii. 258.) In this extraordinary passage Mr. Froude has surpassed himself. The documents to which he refers are contained in two volumes of State papers in the Record Office, entitled "Mary Queen of Scots," vols. xviii. and xix. I have carefully examined them all, and I find only one solitary paper attested in the manner Mr. Froude describes, and bearing the signatures of Burghley, Shrewsbury, Hunsdon, Cobham, and Walsingham. But the document upon which these names appear is neither original nor important. It is a deciphered copy, in the handwriting of Phillipps, of a letter from Morgan to the Queen of Scots, dated the 9th of July. It is printed in Murdin, p. 528 ; and on referring to it, the reader will find it contains no allusion to the Babington conspiracy.

This is the only deciphered letter in the whole collection which bears an original attestation. There is at the end of the deciphered French copy of Mary's letter to Babington an attestation by Babington himself, as well as by Mary's secretaries. But this important document is not attested by any of Elizabeth's ministers. It is wholly in the handwriting of Phillipps. (Hosack, vol. ii. pp. 390, 391.)

(5.) Mr. Froude rejects, with a mixture of contempt and pity, what he sneeringly designates as the "chivalry" of Prince Labanoff and other advocates of Mary in suggesting that the compromising sentences were interpolated in a letter to Babington, and ridicules the idea of such forgery itself as gratuitous, inasmuch as Mary was already sufficiently compromised by Babington's own letter to her informing her of the intended assassination, the genuineness of which letter he asserts "is neither questionable nor questioned." Space does not permit us to enter into Mr. Hosack's examination of Babington's letter, in which he shows ground for detecting the very same interpolations which have been alleged as to Mary's reply. We can but refer to Mr. Hosack's most interesting discussion of this point (pp. 348-53), our main concern being with the reply which Mr. Froude attempts to the arguments which Prince Labanoff has advanced to prove

the forgery of the compromising passages in Mary's letter. He reduces these arguments to three. (1.) From the original ciphered letter not having been dispatched direct to its destination, but brought by Phillipps to London to Walsingham; (2.) From its being detained eleven days before it was in Babington's hands, presumably with a dishonest intention; (3.) From the famous "postscript" preserved in the Public Record Office, and first made public by Mr. Tytler. Father Morris has treated this intricate subject so lucidly, and with so perfect an appreciation of every incident in the narrative of facts, and every fragment of the documentary evidence, that we should but mar the effect of his argument by altering its form. We shall present it as far as possible in his own words. Mr. Froude makes the same reply to Prince Labanoff's first and second point:—

Mr. Froude says that Phelippes sent the original ciphered letters to Babington, and that the reason it was not received by him for eleven days was that Barnes could not find him. This is, he says, in answer to the argument of Prince Labanoff, that the original cipher was detained by Phelippes for eleven days, in order that it might be tampered with. But even though the dates when the letter reached and left Phelippes had been those that Prince Labanoff supposes, the present question would not have been affected, for that original cipher is not forthcoming, and we are concerned only with the translation into French, and that Phelippes had undoubtedly the leisure to manipulate at will.

Mr. Froude contends that Mary's letter to Babington of July $\frac{17}{2}$ was forwarded to its destination on the very day after it reached Phelippes's hands, "like the rest of her letters." The facts show that from first to last all Mary's letters remained for some time in the decipherer's hands. Take for instance her packet to the French ambassador intercepted by Phelippes at Stilton, on his way down to Chartley, July 8, of which he writes to Walsingham that after having manipulated it "he will send it with all speed." Poulet does not forward the packet to Walsingham until July 14. Phelippes's letter to Walsingham, July 19, by no means proves that the original cipher to Babington had already passed out of his hands. His chief evidently knew that he still held it, for writing to recal him in answer to Phelippes's letter, he simply requests the decipherer to bring with him the original. Phelippes too it up with him July 26. Babington did not receive it till the 29th. Of course Babington was easily persuaded that the delay was solely due to his absence from Lichfield. ("Letter Book," p. 233.)

It is plain, therefore, that the original cipher remained in the power, if not in the actual possession, of Phillipps during the entire interval of eleven days, for which Babington was absent from Lichfield. But even if it were certain that Phillipps had not had it for more than the twenty-four hours

which are beyond all dispute, that time would have been quite sufficient for the execution of his design, and especially as the well-known incident of the postscript may seem to indicate haste and pressure.

Father Morris's treatment of this now celebrated fragment appears to us a masterpiece of historical criticism.

We come now to the forged postscript, the authenticity of which Mr. Froude boldly maintains against every respectable authority on the subject, from Camden downwards. The generally received view of this forgery—that after its fabrication by Phelippes, that particular scheme for connecting the Queen of Scots with the six conspirators being abandoned, the sentences fixing guilt upon her were interpolated into the body of her letter,—this very probable hypothesis is presented by Mr. Froude, with a half-sneer at the “chivalry” which suggested it, as a theory set up by Prince Labanoff. Mr. Froude apparently forgets that the prince simply reproduces Mr. Tytler's line of argument, and that the judgment pronounced on the postscript is not merely that of a chivalrous partisan, but a judicial verdict of a high historical authority.

Prince Labanoff has pointed out that eight contemporary copies of Mary's letter to Babington are in existence, some in English and some in French, and that in none of them is this postscript found. Nothing is produced for it whatever from among the papers of the Queen of Scots that were seized at Chartley, nor is any mention made of it in any of their letters by Phelippes or Poulet. Nothing was said about it at Mary's trial, nor at any of the previous examinations of her secretaries. Nau's letter to Babington about Poley was produced, but of this important postscript not a word was heard. The copies of the Babington correspondence sent over to Paris by the English Government before the trial at Fotheringay did not include it.* Surely in such a case the negative argument is conclusive proof, and to it may be added the fact that the cipher endorsed by Phelippes looks to the eye extremely unlike those which are Curle's undoubted work. In fact, what Mr. Tytler found in the Record Office, endorsed by Phelippes as “The postscript of the Scottish Queen's letter to

* The summary of Mary's letter to Babington made by Mendoza for Philip is conclusive on this point. Mr. Froude asserts that Mendoza believed that Mary was a party to the assassination plot, and “told the king that she had implicitly acknowledged it in a letter to himself.” This letter, Mendoza expressly says, is not in cipher. Would Mary have been so imprudent as to write of Elizabeth's murder without that safeguard? Besides, all her correspondence having passed through Walsingham's hands, can it be supposed that such a letter as Mr. Froude suggests was actually written, and no copy of it produced at the trial? The letter really referred to the Spanish invasion. So far was Mendoza from belief in Mary's guilt, that he replied to Elizabeth's Government in respect of Mary's letter to Babington, that this was not the first occasion upon which Walsingham and Cecil had forged letters, and that having the ciphers of the Queen of Scots in their hands, they could insert at will passages inculcating her. (Mendoza to Philip, 8th November, 1586. Teulet.)

Babington," is his first draft of an addition made by him to the letter to Babington, in which, as it was only a draft, it was not worth his while to imitate Curle's ciphers. The sentence erased in the middle of the postscript bears out this view.

Camden informs us that the postscript was "craftily added in the same cipher" to the letter sent to Babington. "Subdole additum eodem charactero postscriptum, ut nomina sex nobilium ederet, si non et alia." Now why should such a postscript have been added if the inculcating passages were in the original letter? Babington was intended to gather from it that Mary approved of the assassination; which in the body of the letter she had tacitly condemned, assuming, as we have said, the life of Elizabeth and not her death. The postscript had its purpose to serve with Babington, but it would not have been evidence against Mary, and therefore the postscript was abandoned and the insertion made in the text of the letter.

Mr. Froude says that Prince Labanoff "conceives that Phelippes intended first to make a mere addition, that he changed his mind, and recomposed afterwards the entire letter, that it was detained for that purpose, and that, although one of the most dexterous manipulators of cipher in Europe, he did his work so clumsily that it can be seen through with ease by a critic of the nineteenth century."

Granted that Phelippes was a most skilful decipherer, he was here employed in copying or translating, and not in deciphering. Though "one of the most dexterous manipulators of cipher in Europe," the insertions are clumsily done, so that "they can be seen through with ease by a critic of the nineteenth century." If Phelippes had brought his skill in ciphering to bear, he might have baffled us no doubt, but he had no unusual skill that would enable him to insert phrases into a letter that were inconsistent with its tenour.

Mr. Froude finds it hard to say what other name should be given to Prince Labanoff's argument from the postscript than the epithet "preposterous," for it implies that "Phelippes preserved, endorsed, and placed among the papers to be examined by the Privy Council, his own first draft of a forgery which he rejected as unsuited to his purpose." That Phelippes preserved and endorsed the paper it is true, but how does Mr. Froude know that it was placed before the Privy Council? If it had been, it would have been signed by the Lords of the Council. It was given to Walsingham no doubt, and thus it has come down to us amongst the State Papers. If Walsingham was in possession of a note so compromising to Mary in the original cipher, why did he not produce it against her? We are told that the original cipher of the letter to Babington was sent to him and could not be recovered. According to Mr. Froude, Barnes or Emilio took charge of this postscript together with the letter. How came the cipher of one to be recoverable and not of the other? Having it, we should suppose that they would have supplied for the absence of the original of the long letter, by at least producing that which they had, the cipher of the postscript, which itself contained matter that would bring Mary's head on the block. What explanation is there but that of Prince Labanoff, preposterous as it seems

to Mr. Froude, that Phelippes and his master were content with one forgery without producing a second? If this postscript had been produced, some recognition of it would have had to be extorted from Nau and Curle. It was easier far to get from them who knew that a long letter had been written, an attestation of a copy into which passages had been inserted without their knowledge, than it would have been to induce them to authenticate a fabricated postscript. And how does it happen that Nau and Curle were not taxed with having written it? ("Lettter Book," pp. 236-239.)

These arguments appear to us to admit of no answer. Father Morris's simple and consistent account of the postscript bears out in every substantial particular, but with much additional evidence, the views of Prince Labanoff and Mr. Tytler, and the impartial reader will feel that it leaves little to be explained.

Mr. Froude, however, is pleased to regard it as only not "preposterous," and undertakes, with an evident feeling of pity for the credulity of the advocates of the Queen, to tender his own explanation. "A note from Curle to Emilio," he says, explains the mystery. Some "additions" to the letter had been sent by mistake. It had perplexed Emilio, who had written to know what it was, and what he was to do with it. Curle answered, "I doubt by your former, which I found some difficulty in deciphering, that myself have erred in setting down the *addition* which I sent you through some haste I had then in despatching thereof. I pray you forbear using the said addition until that, against the next, I put the whole at more leisure in better order for your greater ease and mine." Curle was by this time aware that Babington had not been at Lichfield, and therefore supposed rightly that the letter was still in Emilio's keeping. *His description applies exactly to the postscript which forms Prince Labanoff's text.*"*

Father Morris very ingeniously begins by proposing to test this theory of Mr. Froude, by substituting the word "*postscript*" for "*addition*" in Curle's letter quoted by him. With this substitution the letter becomes absolute nonsense. How was his correspondent to forbear using the *postscript*? or how could the writer of the letter put the whole *postscript* at more leisure into better order for Emilio's greater ease and his own? What possible meaning could the letter convey if this be supposed to be the sense of the word *addition*?

But Father Morris's answer to Mr. Froude's solution of the mystery does not rest here. The "addition" referred to by Curle had nothing whatever to do with the contents of Mary's

* Froude's "History of England," vol. xii. p. 243.

letter or with its postscript. It was simply *a supplement to the cipher*, by means of which the secret correspondence of Curle and Emilio was carried on.

Every one of these practisers or intelligencers had his separate alphabet or cipher. Mary's letters tell us so plainly. For instance, she says to Morgan, "Mercier, for whom you have sent me an alphabet hath yet written nothing unto me. Herewith be three other alphabets to be distributed as you find cause, until I send you more." Indeed, in her letter of the second of July, she speaks of a man who, "coming near to this house sent me your foresaid last which he delivered by Pietro [Gifford] his means, and the same man, having written unto me a very honest letter in Pietro his alphabet, hath omitted the uttering of his name therein, neither given me any sign whereby I may know how to discern him assuredly by [from] another. For I have not, nor cannot yet employ him, albeit I have sent my answer with a particular alphabet for himself whosoever he be." He was Barnes, as his own declaration at the end of his letter of June 10th shows most decisively, though why he should have communicated anonymously with Mary, making an offer of his service, when he was already in correspondence with Curle, it is not easy to see. Mary's answer to him, dated June 19th, says, "In the meanwhile I do herewith send you a new alphabet, conform to your desire."

As Mr. Froude must have seen from the letter on which he builds his theory, Barnes brought Mary "such occurrents" that she gave him "continual thanks for his care and travail." To communicate this news he needed an alphabet or cipher. Curle sent him some addition to it, and as it was written down in haste, he concluded that there must in consequence have been some error in it. He therefore prayed him to "forbear the using of the said addition until that, against the next, he should put the whole at more leisure, in better order as he hoped to do both for Barnes's greater ease and his own," for Curle had "found Barnes's letters difficile in deciphering, and therefore some points less intelligible than he wished." This could surely have been gathered from the letter Curle wrote to "Emilio," and even from that part of it that Mr. Froude quotes. ("Letter Book," pp. 239, 240.)

And, conclusive as is this argument against Mr. Froude's theory, the matter does not depend upon mere inference. Had Mr. Froude read a little more closely the correspondence of Curle and Emilio, he could not have failed to discover his mistake; he would have found each of them referring in terms which it is impossible to misunderstand, to this "mysterious addition." Curle, writing on the 27th of July, says that he sends "herewith the addition to the *alphabet*." Emilio answers on the 20th that he "has received the alteration of the *alphabet*," and, to make it even more plain that he is speaking of the cipher to be used in the correspondence, he expresses a wish that for the purpose of greater expedition,

Curle would further "assign special characters for a number of the most common words;"—a request on which Curle in his answer of the 22nd of July promises that he will do his best to satisfy him.

Having said so much on Mr. Froude's argument for the genuineness of the compromising letters of Babington and Mary, we must deal very briefly with the direct proof of their fabrication.

And we regret that here too we must commence by drawing attention to Mr. Froude's unaccountable suppression, in the summary which he gives of Mary's letter to Babington, of a passage on which the whole question of her guilt or innocence as to the murder of Elizabeth will be found to hinge. The exigencies of space compel us to be content with a reference to the original text of this celebrated letter in Prince Labanoff, or to the contemporary English translation presented by Mr. Hosack, as conveying the full import and character of the alleged interpolations, their connection, and their bearing upon the general text. It will be enough to state that the substance and effect of the alleged interpolation is to represent Mary, not only as accepting and approving the project of the "six gentlemen" for the murder of Elizabeth, but also as offering suggestions and advice as to the mode of carrying it into execution. It is only by an inspection of the text as presented by the writers named above, with its alleged additions, distinguished by brackets or italics, that a full conception can be formed as well of the feasibility of the interpolation in itself, as of the incongruous result which it has entailed in the text. Mr. Froude, as the reader will remember, has carefully incorporated in the summary which he gives of the letter, all the particulars of the undertaking of the six gentlemen. But he has altogether suppressed, both in words and in substance, the very passage on which Mary's defenders confidently rely as proving beyond controversy that she never could have written in the same letter which contains such a passage the compromising sentences which are ascribed to her in what they regard as the fabricated cipher of Phillipps. The case will hardly be intelligible without an inspection of at least the following extract. We give it in the French text, rather than in the English version, which is confused, and, in fact, almost unintelligible.

Les choses estant ainsy préparées et les forces, tant dedans que dehors le royaulme, toutes prestes, il faultdra [*alors mettre les six gentilshommes en besoigne et*] donner ordre que [*leur desseing estant effectué*] je puisse, quant et quant, estre tirée hors d'icy, et que toutes voz forces soynt en ung

mesmes temps en campagne pour me recevoir pendant qu'on attendra le secours estranger, qu'il faudra alors haster en toute dilligence. [*Or, d'autant qu'on ne peult constituer ung jour préfix pour l'accomplissement de ce que lesdicts gentilshommes ont entrepris, je voudrois qu'ilz eussent tous-jours auprès d'eulx ou pour le moins en cour, quatre vaillans hommes bien montés pour donner advis en toute dilligence du succez dudict desseing, aussy-tost qu'il sera effectué, à ceulx qui auront charge de me tirer hors d'icy, afin de s'y pouvoir transporter avant que mon gardien soyt advertis de ladicte execution, ou, à tout le moins, avant qu'il ayt le loisir de se fortifier dedans la maison, ou de me mener ailleurs. Il seroyt necessaire qu'on envoyast deux ou trois de dicts adverteurs par divers chemins, afin que l'ung venant à faillir, l'autre puisse passer oultre, et faudroyt en ung mesme instant essayer d'empescher les passages ordinaires aux postes et courriers.*]

All these bloody suggestions Mr. Froude has carefully condensed; but he passes over without even an allusion what immediately follows, and especially what we have printed in small capitals:—

C'est le project que je trouve le plus a propos pour ceste entreprinse, afin de la conduire avecq esgard de nostre propre seureté. De s'esmouvoir de ce costé devant que vous soyez asseurez d'ung bon secours estrangier, ne seroyt que vous mettre, sans aucun propos, en dangier de participer à la miserable fortune d'autres qui ont par cydevant entrepris sur ce sujet ;
ET DE ME TIRER HORS D'ICY SANS ESTRE PREMIÈREMENT BIEN ASSEUREZ DE ME POUVOIR METTRE AU MILIEU D'UNE BONNE ARMÉE OU EN QUELQUE LIEU DE SEURETÉ, JUSQUES À CE QUE NOZ FORCES FUSSENT ASSEMBLÉES ET LES ESTRANGIERS ARRIVÉS, NE SEROYT QUE DONNER ASSES D'OCCASION À CESTE ROYNE LÀ, SI ELLE ME PRENOYT DE RECHIEF, DE M'ENCLORRE EN QUELQUE FOSSE D'OÙ JE NE POURRIS JAMAIS SORTIR, SI POUR LE MOINGS, J'EN POUVOIS ESCHAPER À CE PRIX LÀ, ET DE PERSÉCUTER AVECQ TOUTE EXTRÉMITÉ CEUX QUI M'AUROYNT ASSISTE, DONT J'AUROYS PLUS DE REGRET QUE D'ADVERSITÉ QUELCONQUE QUI ME POURROYT ESCHOIR À MOY MESMES.

Taking this extraordinary passage just as it stands, no reader can fail to be struck by the flagrant inconsistency between the italicised passages in the first paragraph and that printed in capitals in the second. The criticism of Father Morris is perfectly unanswerable. If the italicised passages had been part of the original letter, it would have run thus:—"When your preparations in England and abroad are complete let the six gentlemen who have undertaken to assassinate Elizabeth proceed to their work; and *when she is dead—leur desseing estant effectué*—then come and set me free; and be sure you have at least four men ready to bring me the *earliest information of the Queen's death—du succez dudict desseing*. But do not take any steps towards my liberation until you are in such force that you may be able to put me in some place of perfect security,

lest [the deceased] *Queen Elizabeth* should take me again and shut me up in some inaccessible dungeon, or lest, if she should fail in recapturing me, she should persecute to extremity those who have helped me, which I should feel more than any adversity of my own."

"Could Prince Labanoff," Father Morris concludes, "help saying that there is here an evident contradiction?" *Could* Mary have said, "Do not move till Elizabeth is *dead*, and *after that* so manage that *she may not be able to hurt* me or my friends?" Mr. Froude, we must suppose, is not convinced by this reasoning. But what are we to think of his fairness in not merely, while he is professing to represent Prince Labanoff's view, withholding from the reader what is the very pith and marrow of the Prince's argument, but even suppressing all allusion to the existence of such a passage in the text which he condenses, or to the inference which Mary's friends have drawn from it in vindication of her innocence? We confess that of the many injustices to the good fame of the ill-fated Queen of Scots with which Mr. Froude has been charged, there is not one which we regard as more grievous in itself or more inexcusable in its author; and the more so, inasmuch as the suppression of this vital passage in Mr. Froude's condensed version of the letter, is accompanied by a persistent distortion of its general purport, the effect of which is to refer what the Queen says of the plan for her deliverance and for the invasion of England to the suspected conspiracy for Elizabeth's assassination.

Having said so much of Mr. Froude's mode of treating the question, it remains to state very briefly the direct grounds for believing that the compromising passages in the letter to Babington produced by Walsingham at Fotheringay, formed no part of the original letter of the Scottish Queen. It is hardly necessary to recall to the reader's mind the important distinction between the two parts of the alleged conspiracy—the plot for the deliverance of Mary from prison, with a simultaneous invasion and insurrection, and the darker design of the so-called "six gentlemen" for the murder of Queen Elizabeth. Of the former design Mary admitted, or at least, did not deny, her knowledge and approval. In the latter, she indignantly disclaimed all complicity; nor is there anything in her correspondence to connect her with it, outside of these passages the authenticity of which is here impeached.

In the first place, it appears absolutely incredible, that if Mary had written approving the murder of Elizabeth, she would have inserted in the same letter an instruction such as

that pointed out in the passage which Mr. Froude has suppressed, and which plainly supposes Elizabeth to be still alive, and possessed of the means of recapturing her prisoner. One or other of the two passages must of necessity be an interpolation, and no one has ever suggested this of the latter.

Secondly, the passage approving the intended assassination was not contained in the copy of Babington's letter, which was sent to Paris by the English Government, before the Fotheringay trial. We have already shown from the correspondence of Mendoza, that the "postscript" cannot have formed a part of that copy. And the very same reasons apply to the compromising passages in the body of the letter.

Thirdly, it is clear from the terms in which Nau attempted to exculpate himself in his confession of September 5th, that he had not up to that time heard anything of this approval of the assassination, as being contained in the letter which he had put in cipher for the Queen. He defends himself by alleging that what he wrote he "wrote by Mary's express commandment"; and in thus making his defence he would of necessity have alluded to the most grievous part of the charge—the intended assassination. Now he never once refers to it. He dwells entirely on the setting fire to the outhouses at Chartley, and the other instructions for affecting Mary's deliverance from her confinement; nor is there even the faintest allusion to "the six gentlemen," or their bloody design.

Fourthly, the same inference may be drawn with equal certainty from the course which was taken by Walsingham and Lord Burleigh, in conjunction with Phillipps, in order to extract from Mary's secretaries information sufficient to criminate their mistress. The course of this proceeding is very clearly traceable in a series of original documents in the Public Record Office, which Mr. Tytler has analysed with great ingenuity and force. We must refer for the details to the elaborate note, No. 1, appended to the seventh volume of his History. The main outline is as follows:—

Nau had declared that the greater part of Mary's letter to Babington was put into cipher by him, *from an original in Mary's handwriting*, and that this minute of his would be found at Chartley. The minute either was not found, or, if found, could not be produced, as not substantiating against her the charge of complicity in the plot for the assassination of Elizabeth. It became necessary, therefore, in default of proof in her handwriting, to extract from the secretaries a confession criminating their mistress as to this special charge.

Trial was made, as we have already seen, of tempting them

by promises of favour and reward. It was in vain ; and recourse was then had to intimidation. Phillipps suggested that they might be intimidated by showing them that, even by what they had already confessed, they had sufficiently compromised their case to draw on themselves the penalties of treason, and that they might be induced to add such further revelations as would connect their mistress with the design against the Queen's life, by holding out to them, on that condition, the hope of their own pardon. Accordingly, on the 4th September, Phillipps drew up a paper (which is still extant, endorsed in Lord Burleigh's hand "from Phillipps") entitled "Extract of the points contained in the minutes written by Nau and Curle arguing their privy to the *enterprise of the Catholics and their mistress's plot.*" Mr. Tytler shows from this paper, that, although the summary of proofs which it urges was evidently founded on all the original letters which had then been recovered, and with which Nau and Curle could be connected, there is not advanced the slightest proof of Mary's participation in Babington's plot against the Queen's life ;—the proofs put forward in the paper referring exclusively to the projected invasion of England and to the plans for Mary's escape from prison.

This failure would appear to have suggested a further effort, in supplement of the first ; and accordingly there is extant a second summary, similarly endorsed by Burleigh, and entitled "Arguments of Nau and Curle's privy to the *whole conspiracy*, as well of invasion as *rebellion and murder of the Queen's person.*"

Mr. Tytler's inference from this second paper seems equally conclusive. The proof of the secretaries' privy to the design against the Queen's life is not a direct one, such as would be drawn from a letter containing the compromising passages, but a mere deduction ; first, from the fact that, as she had confessedly given them instructions for the letters to Mendoza, Paget, Englefield, and the Bishop of Glasgow, "the like hint was not unlikely to be given for writing to Babington" ; second, from the "*heads of the bloody letter sent to Babington touching the designment of the Queen's person being in Nau's hand.*" The latter of these two points has been already disposed of ; and from the former it is plain that the letter of Mary itself, such as it had originally emanated from the secretaries, could not possibly have contained the compromising passages which were produced at Fotheringay.

We have reserved for the last place what Mr. Froude treats very lightly, or rather puts altogether aside, as utterly undeserving of account in estimating the genuineness of

these compromising passages; viz., Mary's own indignant repudiation of them, and her direct counter-charge that "cipher was easily counterfeited, and that, for all that she knew, the letter might have been composed by Walsingham."*

It is true that, in itself, the plea of not guilty on the part of the accused cannot safely be urged beyond its technical effect, which is merely to throw the burden of proof upon the adverse party. But it is very different with a challenge of the evidence, such as that made by the Queen of Scots at the trial, openly accusing the adverse party of fabricating the evidence upon which alone the proof of the charge is made to rest. Mr. Froude describes Mary's challenge as "a random shot"; but in this he is sufficiently refuted from his own pages. Mary distinctly says that "reports had reached her,"† and Mr. Froude himself allows that "rumours may have been abroad that there had been treachery, and that Walsingham was concerned in it." That such a rumour was not only common, but also enduring, we have already seen in Camden's distinct and unqualified statement, that "the postscript and perhaps other passages were craftily (*subdole*) added to the Queen's letter to Babington."‡

It is not, however, upon the existence of these rumours that we would rely as evidence of the forgery. The true proof of it will be found in the very course of the procedure regarding it at Fotheringay, and in the conduct of Walsingham and the other ministers under the charge.

(1.) On the one hand we find the accused not alone disclaim the deciphered copies of her alleged letters and demand that the originals should be produced, but even directly charge some enemy, and perhaps even Walsingham himself, with fabricating the decipher in order to compass her destruction.

On the other side, what is the conduct of Walsingham? Many ways were open to him in which the disgraceful imputation could be put to the test. First of all, if it be said that the original cipher, which having passed through the hands of Walsingham's decipherer, Phillipps, had been transmitted to Babington, was no longer available in evidence, there is direct evidence that the minute of the letter had been made by Mary herself for her secretary Nau, and that a French minute had been made therefrom by Nau, and an English minute by Curle, as well as a ciphered copy by the latter, all of which Nau declared to be among the papers seized at Chartley. That these papers were in Mary's cabinet at the time of her arrest

* Froude's "History of England," vol. xii. p. 283. † Ibid.

‡ "Annales Rerum Anglicanarum," p. 438. 1625.

was distinctly confessed by the secretaries, and Nau actually declares them to have been in Walsingham's hands. Yet none of these was produced in answer to Mary's challenge. It was alleged that they could not be found at Chartley; but how is this to be reconciled with the declaration of Nau?

Dr. Lingard gives an extract from a confession by Nau, of the same date as this letter of Walsingham's, which mentions "*une minute de lettre escripte de sa main, qu'il lui plust me baillier pour la polir et mectre au net, ainsi qu'il apparoit a vos hon. ayant l'une et l'autres entres vos mains.*" Relying on this, Dr. Lingard says, "At her trial, the minute by herself and French letter by Nau, which were in the hands of the prosecutors, were suppressed." Prince Labanoff gives up Mary's autograph minute, but takes for granted that Nau's French minute was found. "*La correspondance de Walsingham et de Phelippes prouve qu'il fut impossible de découvrir la minute autographe dont Nau avait parlé, et qui la seule chose que l'on trouva, lors de la saisie. . . . ce fut la minute française écrite par Nau.*" It is very surprising that Nau should have taken for granted that Mary's minute and his draft were in Walsingham's hands, and that they should not have been found. It is very suspicious, for, if Mary's letter was to be altered, the original drafts would have been an embarrassment to the forger; but, forger as Walsingham undoubtedly was in the matter of this letter, it seems impossible that he could have written as he has written to Phelippes, if either of these minutes had been taken at Chartley.

But though the minutes were not found, there was the cipher which Burghley noted was to be taken to Fotheringay, and there was the decipher made by Phelippes for Walsingham as soon as the letter reached his hands, and neither of these was produced at Mary's trial, or is now forthcoming. The argument does not need to be strengthened. ("Letter Book," p. 281.)

(2.) Secondly, if it be admitted that it was impossible for Walsingham to have produced these minutes of the letter, there was still available a further and independent test of the charge of forgery. It was in Walsingham's power to produce and examine in her presence the two secretaries, who, it was alleged, had taken down the fatal letter to Babington from her draft or dictation, had translated it into English, and had put it into cipher. It may be said that the confessions of these secretaries were produced at the trial. But it will be remembered how halting, how reserved, how undefined as to their object, and how open to general suspicion, were these confessions; and, even such as the confessions were, Mary openly declared that their authors could be "bribed or frightened into swearing anything."* She loudly demanded that they should be brought in person and "placed face to face with her." This was the

* "Froude's "History of England," vol. xii. p. 284.

natural course, and the course which the first principles of justice would demand. But, notwithstanding the appeal, Walsingham did not avail himself of this mode of answering the charge of forgery. There seems but one possible inference.

(3.) Lastly, there was yet another and even more obvious test of Walsingham's fair dealing, which was obviously within his reach.

His confidant and instrument throughout the entire transaction had been his secretary and decipherer, Phillipps. Every document had passed through Phillipps's hands. All the ciphers and decipherers produced at the trial had been made by him. He had corresponded most confidentially with Walsingham on every incident of the case; and, when Mary alleged that "ciphers had been counterfeited," it was his handiwork that she aimed at. In one word, the charge of forgery, if it had any signification at all, hung upon the person of Phillipps, and must stand or fall with him.

What, therefore, more natural and necessary than to produce Phillipps, to speak to the receipt of Mary's letters, to the fact of his having deciphered them, and to the accuracy of his decipher?

Mr. Froude, with his habitual confidence and circumstantiality, relates that "Phillipps's copy of the cipher was examined by the Privy Council, and the decipher verified," and that "it still bears upon it the signatures of the noblemen by whom it was examined."* But there does not appear in any existing record the slightest evidence of such action on the part of the Privy Council. Even if it had taken place, it would prove nothing as to the fidelity of Phillipps's copy of the original cipher, which had been passed on to Babington and disappeared.

But Phillipps himself might have been questioned, face to face with the accused, as to the contents of the original. Why was not Phillipps produced? Can it be doubted that Walsingham did not dare to produce him? It is impossible to offer any other explanation than that, as in the case of his fellow-traitor and spy, Gilbert Gifford, it was because, although he was ready to ply his odious trade in the dark and apart, "he feared to be brought to witness some matters concerning the Scottish Queen face to face."†

Such is an outline of the main results of the re-examination by Mr. Froude's various critics of so much of the historical

* Froude's "History of England," vol. xii. p. 242.

† Gifford to Phillipps, quoted by Hosack, vol. ii. 379.

evidence in the case of Mary Stuart as bears upon her alleged complicity in the celebrated Babington conspiracy. The length to which these observations have run compels us to pass over many other topics of interest to which these writers, and their able and incisive fellow-critic from the other side of the Atlantic, Mr. Meline, have addressed themselves. Even as regards the story of the Babington plot itself, we feel how impossible it is to do full justice to a subject so full of romantic interest in a purely critical essay ; and we shall be well content if we have succeeded in awakening an interest in this old and memorable controversy. The reader will not fail to pursue it with renewed enjoyment in the admirable illustrative notes of Father Morris's "Letter-Book of Sir Amias Paulet," in Mr. Hosack's picturesque narrative, and in the learned and graceful pages of M. Charles de Flandre. Old as is this tragical story, its materials are still unexhausted. It has engaged the pens of the scholars and critics of three centuries, and its interest is hardly less fresh to-day than it was when the bloody scene of Fotheringay first shocked and startled the world.

ART. IV.—THE PILGRIMAGE TO PONTIGNY.

The Times, September 2, 3, 4, 5, &c.

The Standard, ditto.

The Daily News, ditto.

The Daily Telegraph, ditto.

The John Bull, ditto.

The Pall Mall Gazette, ditto.

&c. &c. &c.

WHEN Lady Blarney and the Honourable Wilhelmina Amelia Skegs wished to convey to the family of Dr. Primrose, vicar of Wakefield, a salutary impression of their exalted breeding, they entered on a dialogue partly narrative, partly didactic, or exegetic, concerning the doings and sayings of the unknown great world (unknown to the Vicar and his family), on which Oliver Goldsmith slyly remarks, that,

As every reader, however beggarly himself, is fond of high-lived dialogues, with anecdotes of lords, ladies, and knights of the Garter, he must beg leave to give the concluding part of the conversation : "All that

I know of the matter," cried Miss Skegs, "is this—that it may be true or it may not be true ; but this I can assure your ladyship : that the whole rout was in amaze ; his lordship turned all manner of colours ; my lady fell into a swoon ; but Sir Tomkyn, drawing his sword, swore he was hers to the last drop of his blood ! " " Well," replied our peeress, " this I can say—that the duchess never told me a word of it, and I believe her grace would keep nothing a secret from *me*. This you may depend on as fact, that the next morning my lord duke cried out three times to his valet-de-chambre : ' Jernigan ! Jernigan ! Jernigan ! bring me my garters ! ' "

A careful perusal and collation of the utterances of the daily and weekly press, commencing with the "leading organ" (*ab Jove principium*), and descending to the *Pall Mall Gazette*, Dr. Kenealy's *Englishman*, and Dr. Cumming's sermon as reported in the *Telegraph*, will, we believe, give to any intelligent reader nearly as accurate, full, and particular information about the pilgrimage, its origin, objects, and progress, as the Misses Primrose no doubt acquired concerning "high life" by listening to the two ladies whom Goldsmith has embedded for ever (like flies in the classic amber of his tale) in our national literature.*

It is, therefore, with the idea that some approach to a consistent and truthful narrative of the Pontigny pilgrimage may be desired by readers really interested in it, and as really puzzled and amazed by the wondrous tales about it contained in the newspapers, that we have penned the following pages while the impressions made on us as ocular witnesses are still fresh in our memory. The Press of course opened its mighty utterances on the occasion by certain philippics anent all pilgrimages and all veneration of saints and holy places, relics, images, and the like ; we may therefore perhaps be allowed to preface our reminiscences of this particular pilgrimage by some remarks on the history and doctrine of pilgrimage generally.

And, first, as to its history, it is not an exaggeration to say that pilgrimage, in the wide and popular sense, is coeval with our race. Wherever great deeds have been wrought by

* Doubtless a great deal of carefully acquired and conscientiously detailed information may be gleaned from such accounts as those in the papers named at the head of this article and in others ; but it is hardly to be wondered at that, partly from the extreme hurry necessary to enable correspondents to despatch their daily budget of letterpress, and partly from a natural, but lamentable ignorance of the whole range of Catholic ideas, doctrines, and practices, there is withal in them a mixture of extraordinary inaccuracies and misrepresentations, in their turn commented on by other writers, ignorant at any rate on these special topics, and often fatally prejudiced and hostile to everything Catholic.

man, thither man has gone, as by a natural instinct, to tread the sacred soil with awe and reverence, and try and drink in the lingering aroma of the mighty past. Philosophy, in the bad sense of that most abused word, may do its best to denounce such a cultus, but while man is man his "common sense," of all times and places, will prompt him to draw near to and cherish spots made venerable by the prowess or the sufferings of the noblest. While time lasts and the records of the past, Marathon and Thermopylæ, Leipsic and Waterloo, Stratford-on-Avon and Abbotsford, the dwellings and the tombs of the mighty, from Tiryns to S. Paul's, will have their yearly tribute of pilgrims from the old world and from the new, from all, in a word, who have a soul and a mind capable of rising to any appreciation of the heroic, even in the natural order. All the fine writing and all the indignation of the most virtuous writers in (say) the *Pall Mall Gazette* will never destroy this noble instinct. What wonder, then, if He who "came not to destroy but to complete the law," even that least perfect law which God has written in our hearts by creating us such as we are, should have, from the very moment when He ceased to dwell *visibly* on earth, received, and sanctioned, and elevated to the supernatural order this among the other good instincts of the natural man. That preliminary law of Moses which was the "pedagogue" (as S. Paul says) sent to lead on His people to the knowledge of the perfect truth revealed by His incarnate Word, had recognized and hallowed this instinct by a hundred enactments and declarations, and not one jot or tittle was to pass till all had their perfect fulfilment in the new and final law of Christ. Thus, to cite but one palmary instance, the whole of Christ's flock—Mary, Peter, the apostles, the disciples, and holy women—were bidden by Him to await locally in the Holy City of the old law the personal descent of the Holy Ghost; and to this same Holy Place S. Paul himself, the eminent representative of the "newness of the Spirit," and the apostle, in a peculiar sense, of God's *Catholic* Church as distinguished from the local synagogue, betakes himself once and again to see and confer with its Visible Head, S. Peter, at Jerusalem, and in pilgrimage to keep *there* the Feast of Pentecost. What wonder, then, if from the earliest Christian times Christians flocked from far and near to Palestine to tread with reverence and adoring awe the hill of Calvary, and weep with Christ beneath the olive-trees of Gethsemane, so that from age to age the stream of pilgrims grew and swelled until they became armed myriads of crusaders bent on rescuing from the heathen, for the advantage of future pilgrims, the places for ever rendered holy by the presence and

passion of our Redeemer.* To this Christian instinct we owe it, under God, that the tide of Moslem invasion was stayed and eventually, after six centuries of struggle, turned back from its more advanced positions in Eastern Europe.

As time develops the great drama of the Church's action, the tombs of the primitive martyrs, from Stephen and Polycarp to the latest victims of Diocletian, become the object of pilgrimage; and the gravest and most authentic records of those ages down to S. Cyprian, S. Jerome, and S. Augustine, witness that the Almighty gave the sanction of an almost endless series of astonishing miracles to this pious practice.† Next to these

* It is provoking to read the shallow sciolism of ephemeral writers, who talk of the Crusades as lamentable excesses, the result of ignorant fanaticism. Gibbon did not so judge them when he says that the first crusade "prevented the fall of the declining empire" ("Decline and Fall," c. 59), a remark which he would have extended to the later crusades had they come within his scope. What was at first an instinct, remained so indeed in the masses, but in the hands of the great Innocent and his successors became a policy, whose results we are yet enjoying in this nineteenth century. Frederick II.'s policy was an error as well as a crime.

† One is almost ashamed of repeating things which one had thought known to every educated person; but really it would seem that no knowledge on Catholic subjects can be taken for granted; we therefore call attention to the well-known 8th chapter of the 22nd book of S. Augustine's treatise "*De Civitate Dei*." No one pretends either that the book is not authentic, or that S. Augustine is untruthful or deluded. The miracle, among so many which he there mentions of a kindred nature, of the blind woman who recovered her sight by assisting at a procession of the relics of S. Stephen, the first martyr, and applying to her eyes some flowers which she had brought and touched with the relics, attests what was the practice, what the recognized doctrine and the divine sanction given to them, of the Catholic Church in the fifth century. Here is the passage—after alleging in substance that dilemma from which unbelievers have never been able to escape, that either the Christian miracles are true or they are not: "If these miracles exist, then that faith in whose confirmation they are wrought is true; if, on the other hand, these miracles do not exist, then the existence and spread [and continuance we may now add] of the faith without such confirmation, is in itself a greater miracle than any S. Augustine mentions; the cure of the blind man at the tomb of the martyrs SS. Protasius and Gervasius, whose hitherto unknown resting-place, he says, was revealed to S. Ambrose the Bishop in a dream, and that of Innocent, ex-advocate of the Præfectorial Vicariate at Carthage, of both of which he was a witness. Among many others, he says, "*ad aquas Tibilitanas Episcopo afferente (Projecto) reliquias gloriosissimi Martyris Stephani, ad ejus memoriam veniebat magnæ multitudinis concursus et occursum. Ibi cæca mulier, ut ad Episcopum portantem (pignora sacra) duceretur oravit: flores quos ferebat dedit; accepit, oculis admovit, protinus vidit. Stupentibus qui aderant, præibat exsultans, viam carpens, et viæ ducem ulterius non requirens.*" "At the waters of Tibilis, when the bishop (Projectus) brought there the relics of the most glorious martyr Stephen, there was an immense concourse and throng of people to

phenomena which the mere invective of modern sceptics can no more invalidate than the yelping of village dogs can mar the splendour or arrest the march of the moon, appears the unceasing attraction of Rome—the limina apostolorum—to every successively Christianized race of the North, the hither-East, and the West. To use the beautiful simile of Cardinal Wiseman, Christians recognize in Palestine the reliquary, and in Rome the tabernacle of living Christian sacred tradition, and will ever flock in pilgrimage to either.

Now, one word as to the precise form of pilgrimage, of which this year's English pilgrimage to Pontigny is a specimen, and we will pass on to describe it. This pilgrimage was one motived (as the French say) by the desire to venerate the sacred relics of S. Edmund's body. It is this which seems specially to stir the bile of so many of our newspapers. It of course involves the doctrine, that these relics have some virtue attached to them not common to the remains of ordinary men, and this we are told in a hundred different tones of wrath, contempt, and derision, is an intolerable superstition, which no sane person can possibly believe. Catholics of course know as well as any other people that the bones of a saint are composed of as much phosphate of lime and other ingredients, and in the same proportion of animal and calcareous matter, as those of other men; and they also know that such matter, as such, can have no virtue or power whatever except the material chemical properties which it has pleased the Creator to bestow on them. And yet, strange to say, they do implicitly and entirely believe (for instance) as part of the written revelation of Divine truth, the whole narrative of the resuscitation of a dead man by mere casual contact with the relics of a saint;* and they add to this folly a similar belief with regard to the history of healing virtue going forth, not only from dead bones, but even from the hem of a garment worn by the Redeemer of the World;† and of similar power proceeding from articles of wearing apparel of one apostle, and even from the very shadow of

his shrine. There a blind woman begged that she might be led to the bishop (who was carrying the sacred treasure); she gave some flowers which she had brought, received them back, applied them to her eyes, and immediately she saw. Amidst the wonder of those present she went before them rejoicing, and went her way, no longer requiring any one to guide her."

* "And Eliseus died, and they buried him. And the rovers from Moab came into the land the same year. And some that were burying a man, saw the rovers, and cast the body into the sepulchre of Eliseus. And when it had touched the bones of Eliseus, the man came to life, and stood upon his feet."—4 Kings xiii. 20, 21.

† S. Matthew ix. 20, and xiv. 36, etc.

another.* Furthermore they are so foolish as to think that the Author of Truth, who is the Truth itself, would certainly not have caused these wonders to be wrought, and as certainly not have caused them to be recorded in His-inspired word, unless He meant people to infer that such proceedings were and are quite compatible with His own greatness and majesty and with our reasonable acceptance of them. Catholics are therefore not surprised (though they are not called on to believe it with divine faith) when they read in S. Augustine, for instance, a list of twenty or thirty astonishing miracles of curing, wrought in many cases under his own eye, and in all witnessed by persons known to him and to whole cities, among whose inhabitants he dwelt, and to whose witness he makes confident appeal, in all of which relics of saints, whether bones, or their shrines, then called "*memoriæ*," or objects which had come in contact with them, were the instruments of these miraculous cures. Catholics then believe not that dead bones of saint or of sinner, nor even garments of Christ Himself or of His Apostles, nor the shadow of His Vicar, have virtue in themselves as of themselves, but that He who made them out of nothing can if He pleases and when He pleases, give to them the office of conveying His own power and virtue to heal or to destroy. If we are asked, *cui bono*, what end can the Almighty have in using such means, we (personally) should feel disposed to answer that it is to confound the impertinence of clever fools and to baffle the wisdom of the proud unbeliever, who is thus reduced to the humiliation of denying the evidence of men's (sometimes of his own) senses. When, therefore, the President of S. Edmund's College, accompanied by two other Englishmen, visited the shrine of S. Edmund in September, 1873, it was not to them any matter of surprise to hear of miracles of healing wrought at the shrine on the person of devout pilgrims; nor were they surprised when at Sens, a day or two afterwards, they were introduced to a young lady, who having come to Pontigny on crutches in the spring of that year, had been, as they saw, completely and permanently healed, and had left her crutches at the shrine in witness of this signal favour.† Not having the advantage of that great power

* Acts xix. 12, and v. 15.

† King Henry III. endowed the abbey with a revenue, to be paid by the city of Canterbury, to furnish four wax candles, which were to burn perpetually before the shrine of the saint, and did so till the Reformation annexed the revenue and piously extinguished the candles. S. Edmund, however, has survived, and the young lady whom we have just mentioned has gratefully provided for the continual burning of two lamps in *futuram rei memoriam*.

of incredulity which refuses to admit any and every evidence to a supernatural fact, it was but natural that our travellers should think that what had been so signally blessed to one person might be so again to others, and thus sprung up in their minds the idea that a pilgrimage, if only of a few college friends from the saint's own college in England, might not be unacceptable to him or useless to those who should make it. With this plain statement of fact falls to the ground all the twaddle talked and written about Ultramontane schemes of Archbishops and Monsignori, plots and conspiracies of Rome and at Westminster, and the like. The President of S. Edmund's kept his counsel, and it was not till the early spring, when rumours of a larger pilgrimage to the Holy Land had proved unfounded, that he launched his idea in any public way. At first it seemed to meet with slender attention, and he adhered to his original idea of making a pilgrimage confined to the members, past and present, of S. Edmund's College. This first idea, however, was again relinquished when it became known to him that many others were desirous of joining it. And some, no doubt well meant, but very unwarrantable and unwarranted exaggerations as to the numbers expected to attend, which somehow found their way into the non-Catholic papers, soon attracted the attention of the public in general. Questions were then asked concerning the saint, whose very name was but little known in his own land, for which he laboured and suffered so much, and it was in answer to those questions that the answers (especially the noble and exhaustive discourse of the Archbishop of Westminster at the pro-Cathedral on the 23rd of August), were given, which have caused so much angry writing in the daily and weekly press. First it was insinuated, and sometimes broadly stated, that the relics were not authentic. Next it was confidently declared that the saint was a sufferer in the cause of English resistance to Papal aggression, and finally the whole battery of Protestant accusation was opened, and all the old rubbish, which well-informed Protestants are now thoroughly ashamed of, was hurled, and continues to be hurled, at saints, relics, indulgences, pilgrimages and pilgrims in particular and in general. Voices habitually discordant seem once more attuned to some kind of harmony in abusing Catholics and Catholic things; ritualist and high church, infidel and rationalist, the lofty stomach of the *Pall Mall Gazette* and the senile twaddle of the prophet of Crown Court, all are combined to bespatter us with a nauseous flood of stale invective and watery bile.

Now as to the authenticity of the relics. None, it would seem, have been more overtly, and therefore more authentically

preserved than these. S. Edmund died on the 16th of November, 1242, at Our Lady's Priory of Soisy, some six miles from Pontigny. He had told the monks when he left the abbey in August, that he would come to them for the Feast of S. Edmund, king and martyr, on the 20th of November, and without adverting to it his body, from which the heart had been taken to preserve it at the Abbey Church of S. James at Provins, close by, was brought back on that very day, now six hundred and thirty-four years ago, to Pontigny, and remained exposed in the choir for nearly a week. No sign of corruption was visible when he was placed in a grave in front of the high altar on the 25th, nine days after his decease. Immediately miracles took place at his tomb. The records of the Abbey chronicle nearly two hundred in the course of the next fifty years; and thus the fame of his sanctity, great in life, attracted many to him after death. It is therefore not surprising that his remains should have been disinterred and placed in a more honourable tomb about three months later. The body was found still to be quite incorrupt and fresh, as of one newly deceased. The Pope, Innocent IV., pronounced the beatification of the Saint on the third Sunday of Advent, 1244, at Lyons; and on the 10th of January, 1247, the canonization was published by the same Pope, at Lyons, in a bull addressed to the Archbishop of Lyons and his suffragans, of which the original is carefully preserved in the archives in the possession of the Rev. Fathers of S. Edme at Pontigny.

The Feast naturally was fixed on the day of his entrance into the eternal rest of the just, the 16th of November, but the wish of the king (S. Louis) to assist at the translation, or "elevation" as it was called, of the relics, before his departure for the East, and the popular impatience caused it to be celebrated on the 9th of June,* six months after the canonization.

The saintly king, Blanche of Castile his worthy mother, his three brothers, Robert Count of Artois, Alphonso Count of Poitiers, and Charles of Anjou, afterwards king of Sicily, their sister Isabella, the holy nun, were met on their arrival at Pontigny by Pierre de Colmieu, Cardinal Bishop (of Albano), Cardinal Eudes de Château Roux, Legate of the Holy See, the Archbishops of Sens, Bordeaux, and Bourges, the Bishop of Auxerre, S. Edmund's attached friend S. Richard, Bishop of Chichester, and a vast number of distinguished personages. S. Louis was told that the procession of these great men was organized to do him honour, but with characteristic humility he desired that these honours should be rendered to his mother.

* This feast is now kept at S. Edmund's College, Ware.

As soon as they arrived, they went straight to the church, and then, after a pause for prayer, dispersed to partake of the hospitality of the monks, while vast numbers only found accommodation in the neighbouring villages or camped out in the fields. Before dawn the next morning the Court and clergy entered the church, and thousands of pilgrims from France and from England thronged round the church, and by torch-light, and amidst indescribable emotions the sacred remains were once more uncovered and recognized by the authorities. The whole body was incorrupt, after seven years' sepulture, the limbs flexible, and the hair all preserved and not even changed in colour.* The odour of sanctity perfumed the whole sanctuary, and the awe-stricken silence and tears of all who were near was not broken till the strains of the *Te Deum* breaking forth from a thousand lips gave the signal for the admission of the multitude, and the Bishop of Auxerre, Guy de Mello, transferred with his own hands the sacred relics on to the high altar, where they remained exposed to the veneration of the faithful till nightfall, King Louis giving orders that all the English pilgrims should have precedence, as they came from so far, and as the saint was their countryman.

Night came, but the good Cistercians of Pontigny had but little rest. The abbot and elders maintained that their rule prescribed the utmost simplicity, and that S. Edmund should be consigned to a plain stone tomb in nothing different from those of the other prelates whose remains were interred there. The younger monks took a different view, and declared that the richest and costliest shrine ought to contain the relics of so great a saint. Such, moreover, was the will of the Pope, signified by his Legate. The question was referred to the bishops present, but they were also not unanimous. S. Richard of Chichester and Bertrand, the friend and disciple of S. Edmund, preserved a discreet silence, and finally the advocates of the richer shrine yielded to the authority of the abbot and elder monks, and the relics were consigned to a plain stone tomb, all agreeing that Divine providence would settle the question practically later. This indeed occurred, for at the next election of officers, the abbot, prior, and others were not re-elected, and Bertrand, the saint's faithful disciple, was elected Abbot. His first act was to go to Lyons and obtain from the Pope the authentic expression of his will, in letters apostolic, that a splendid shrine should be constructed. Three bulls of his successor, Alexander IV., confirm these orders, and served to

* No. 8 of the MSS. preserved in the archives at Pontigny, attests these and many more particulars.

stimulate and encourage the piety of the faithful and their trust in S. Edmund's intercession; while in England his immediate successor in the See of Canterbury, Boniface, addressed similar exhortations to all his suffragans. The King and Queen of England, and the two Queens of France, Blanche and Margaret of Provence, made splendid offerings for the shrine; and Richard, brother of King Henry III., who had been cured of an obscure disease which had brought him to death's door, by the Saint's intercession, gave the front of the shrine as a thank-offering.* It was of the most exquisite workmanship and covered with jewels of great price. The second translation of the relics to this shrine took place on the 9th of June, 1249. Guy de Mello again had the happiness to carry the sacred relics to their new resting-place in the choir, where they still repose. At this ceremony the two Queens, the Bishop of Orleans, the Bishops of Norwich and of Chichester, and many other great personages were present. The charters of our kings, Henry III., Edward III., and Richard II., bestowing means to keep wax torches burning for ever before the shrine, are still preserved at Pontigny. This latter sovereign provides that in case of war between France and England the revenue shall still be paid in honour of "Monseigneur S. Edme." From this time forward the body of our saint received the religious veneration which the Church decrees to the sometime tabernacles of God's Holy Spirit, from age to age almost without interruption to the present day. Twice only was it withdrawn from the public gaze for a season. The first occasion was in the latter half of the sixteenth century, during the wars of the Calvinists which devastated France at that period. The Huguenots in 1567 took Auxerre and glutted their religious zeal with plunder and carnage. It was in February, 1568, that they made *main-basse* upon Pontigny, intending to destroy the monks and the abbey together, and to seize on the rich shrine of S. Edmund. "Liberal" principles are always the same in all ages, and though the foresight of the monks had concealed S. Edmund's body in a secret vault and removed his shrine, the church and monastery were sacked and burnt by the Huguenots, the altars and tabernacles thrown down and defiled, and the tombs, especially that of Hugh de Macon, which they mistook for S. Edmund's, opened and rifled, and the bodies burnt and scattered. The saint's shrine, and the jewels and rich offerings surrounding it, were confided to the Procurator Fiscal of the neighbouring

* This prince visited the shrine in April, 1250, and named his child Edmund after our saint, whom he had known in life" (Math. Paris).

Vicomte de S. Florentin. This gentleman was unluckily also a "liberal," and after a long law suit annexed the shrine on the ground that it was treasure-trove.

Next year already the religious efforts of the Huguenots were restrained, and the monks found themselves once more in possession of their ruined church and abbey. The new and far less splendid shrine, which was not placed where it now is till 1687, was, however, equally with the former, the fruit of many offerings from the pious pilgrims and faithful people who never ceased to venerate S. Edmund. The zeal of Abbot Gabriel Grillot, and the care of Monseigneur de Caylus, Bishop of Auxerre, caused the erection of a new altar of S. Edmund beneath his shrine, and thus led to the last translation of his remains in the year 1749, the sacred relics being then raised to a higher position, on the same spot, however, which they had before occupied, and which is now filled by the altar. This was on the Saint's day, November 16th. Forty years later the violence of the great Revolution of 1789 invaded the church and cloister of Pontigny. The "principles" of that memorable year applied themselves in the form of axes and hatchets to the glorious carved work of the sanctuary and to the humble cells which the children of Citeaux had dwelt in for six centuries, with admirable impartiality; but once more S. Edmund's relics were preserved. A band of patriots from a neighbouring village, headed (as local tradition tells) by a blacksmith, rushed into the sanctuary and mounted the stairs leading up to the shrine; but suddenly the ringleader, who had raised his hammer to break it in, checked by some influence, resolvable, we shall be told, into a casual secretion of some phosphate in excess in the cellular tissues of his besotted brain, suddenly turned pale, and facing his astonished following, declared that whatever they might do, he, at any rate, would have no tête-à-tête with S. Edmund. The chemical action became epidemic, and the citizens left the church without accomplishing their errand. Since then these precious remains have been once more disturbed. In 1825 the parish priest, more zealous than discreet, took upon him to substitute a wooden outer shrine for that which had been erected in the last century. During six months the body of the Saint was exposed to the veneration of the faithful, surrounded by a profusion of lights. The consequence of this exposure to the air and heat has been that the remains of S. Edmund have undergone in the last fifty years a greater change in appearance than they had previously done in almost twelve times that number of years. So late as in 1847, when the then President of S. Edmund's College, now Auxiliary Bishop to his Grace the Archbishop of Westminster,

visited the shrine, the flesh appeared white and natural, and the shape of the face and hands quite defined.

We have before us now a most interesting letter addressed by the Archbishop of Sens, and signed by his Vicar-General, M. Chauveau, to the late Cardinal Wiseman, on the occasion of sending a very large relic (the fibula of the left leg) to his Eminence for his College of S. Edmund, where it is now preserved and venerated. This was in consequence of a visit paid by his Eminence to Pontigny in 1840, when he was Bishop of Melipotamus and Coadjutor to the Vicar-Apostolic of the then Midland Vicariate of England. That great man, whom nothing escaped which bore upon the welfare and the history of Catholic England, had gone to venerate the Saint whose successor in the revived Primacy of England he was one day to become; and the memory of his visit, and of the religious emotions which he betrayed as he drew near to the relics of S. Edmund, is still cherished with pious edification at Pontigny. The Archbishop narrates in his letter how he had recently ordered and conducted a canonical examination of the sacred remains by his Vicar-General and several others, and among them a medical doctor of Sens, who gives the scientific names to each bone of the Saint, and describes the condition of preservation in which the articulations, cartilages, teeth, nails, &c., were found. From this list it appears that the whole of the bones of the Saint were, as they now are, preserved, with only the following exceptions. The upper jaw only retains four molar teeth, the lower jaw only five; but it is to be remembered that S. Edmund was probably more than fifty when he died; four bicuspid and six incisor teeth are also wanting in either jaw. Three ribs, one carpal and three bones of the metacarpus, and three phalanges, the left patella, four bones of the tarsus and two metatarsal bones of the left foot, and three fingers of the left hand, the middle, annular, and little finger, are also wanting. The articulations of all these bones remain intact. That of the right arm and humerus had gradually become loose from the practice of raising the arm for the faithful to kiss the right hand, and the arm was then detached, and is preserved in a separate reliquary at Pontigny. The left femur was sent to the Holy Father, Pope Pius IX., some years ago, in whose possession it remains, and the letter closes with the following sentence:—
“ J’ai décidé que le péroné gauche serait offert à Votre Eminence et qu’une phalange du gros orteil droit vous serait aussi envoyé pour l’Eglise de Erdington près Birmingham. Votre Eminence voudra bien les recevoir comme un gage d’union entre le vénérable Archevêque de Westminster et

l'Archevêque de Sens, entre les Catholiques de France et les Catholiques d'Angleterre." It is the former of these relics—viz. the fibula of the left leg—which the late Cardinal gave to S. Edmund's College, where it is now carefully preserved and venerated, not without many and remarkable results.

At the risk of being tedious, we have now traced, as rapidly as is consistent with clearness, the history of these sacred remains, and we say without hesitation that the assertion of the newspapers, who, scoffing at the declaration of the Archbishop (that these relics had been marvellously preserved for six centuries) called them "doubtful," was the result either of a gross ignorance or of wilful misrepresentation on the part of those who pretended to inform the public mind on the matter. It would seem, indeed, impossible for any such objects, dating from so remote a period, to be better authenticated. The truth is that the relics of S. Edmund are far too well authenticated to suit the vulgar Protestant superstition, which requires people to believe "that no relics are authentic," and next (Hibernico more) that when they are, God never uses them for His mysterious interpositions with the ordinary course of human things. Scripture, history, testimony—even that of eye-witnesses, all must go down and disappear before the foregone conclusion of an unreasoning human tradition.

The *Pall Mall Gazette* gracefully tells the pilgrims they are "contemptible, degraded, and immoral" if they allow these sources of the credible to weigh with them for one moment against that ingenious evening paper's *ipse dixit*.* The "early practice of praying for the dead is obviously a mere poetic fancy," and hence the temporal punishment of sin in purgatory, and the doctrine of indulgences are (as obviously) mere fancies also. People who can think such fustian as this "argument," are no doubt capable also of wishing they could thumb-screw us into agreement with them as they did three centuries ago. And all this "sound and fury signifying—nothing," is brought down on the pilgrims to Pontigny because they went there in the hope, among other motives, of gaining the indulgence granted by His Holiness on that occasion. But enough and to spare of such invectives. The other "great point" of our adversaries was that, saint or not, lying at Pontigny or anywhere else, Edmund Rich, Archbishop of Canterbury, was a stout Protestant-minded Englishman, a decided enemy to Papal aggression, and champion of national rights against the encroachments of Rome. Hence the obvious imbecility of the

* The *Pall Mall Gazette*, Sept. 7.

Archbishop of Westminster (so noted for his want of intellect) in choosing S. Edmund as the type of resistance to the Civil power; hence the extraordinary misconduct of Mgr. Patterson (properly rebuked for it by great Zeus himself) in putting forward as a patron of the pilgrimage a "Protestant dignitary." The *Saturday Review** is scandalized at the Archbishop's mingled ignorance and effrontery on this subject. We suspect the writer's wishes have more to do with his opinion than his investigation of documents. Neither the history of S. Edmund's life nor that of his canonization bears out his conclusions — that S. Edmund was anti-papal, and that his canonization was unwillingly conceded by Rome. The action of the Holy See often appears, in the history of a given epoch and country and in relation to one or other person, in an unfavourable light, and we are not concerned to deny such appearances. No one can read ever so little of the history of the Church in our own country without coming across startling instances of this truth. We should remark first, on the whole subject, how precisely analogous is this phenomenon to that which every thinking person must observe in the history of God's action in the world, and especially in the history of the Church. At this very moment, for instance, what is the thought that rises to our natural mind concerning the fortunes of the Church throughout the world? Surely it is amazement that it does please God to allow such evils to invade and almost to overwhelm the Church in so many lands. This is, indeed, so patent, that impious people are quite ready to erect it into an argument against the very existence of Divine Providence. As the wicked reviled the Son of God as He hung for their redemption on the tree — "If Thou art the Son of God, come down from the Cross," so now they mock at His Spouse and at His Vicar—nay, at Himself, defying Him to come down and interfere with their triumph. If we are to be scandalized, then, because we see S. Thomas of Canterbury or S. Edmund not so consistently supported as we might expect by the Holy See, if like S. Edmund, we are shocked at an order from Rome to provide benefices in England for as many as 300 Italians at one time, just when he was straining every nerve to oppose very different and far greater abuses of patronage and the malversation of ecclesiastical revenues by the civil power, we have as good reason to be shocked at the permissive Providence of God as it meets us at every turn within and without us. The truth is, that the action of a superior and wider

* *Saturday Review*, Sept. 6.

authority will always have more or less of this character, for the simple reason that it *is* superior and wider; because, that is, it acts under the sense of an ulterior responsibility, and has the illumination of a deeper experience and the knowledge of a wider sphere of things than falls under the ken of more limited powers. At the very time when S. Edmund was urging his just claims against the usurpations of the civil power and invoking the aid of the Pope to enable him to push things *à outrance*, which would certainly have embroiled him with the King of England and the most powerful estates of his realm, the Holy See was sore beset by the difficulties bequeathed to it. The heroic struggle of Innocent III. with the Emperor and with Philip Augustus at the beginning of the century, was crowned, as all the triumphs of the Church have been, with only a partial success. Pope Honorius III. did not inherit the energy of character of his great predecessor, and the Pontificate of Gregory IX. was one long struggle with Frederick II. With such overpowering odds it was probably a simple impossibility for the Pope to complicate his difficulties by a breach with England. Gregory died one year before S. Edmund, in his hundredth year; Celestin, his successor, reigned but seventeen days, and Innocent IV. was not elected till June, 1243, after an interregnum of a year, during which S. Edmund died, on the 16th of November, 1242. With a brief interval, in 1253, Innocent lived and died in exile from Rome.

The policy of Rome is imperial in a far wider sense than any that the world has ever seen or ever will see, for she rules not only over a wider and more diversified category of men, but also in a more intrinsic and thorough sense, controlling the very thoughts and intentions of men from the throne of their conscience. This is the "unqualified supremacy over human actions" which the world cannot abide, but will have to endure till the end of time, and which even Catholics—nay, even saints—feel painfully when it bears here or there with an unequal pressure, as it seems to us, sparing the evil or the less good, and weighing upon the good even there where they most feel it, in their efforts to do and to suffer for justice' sake. When S. Gregory VII. was dying, at Salerno, he gave vent to the anguish of his soul in these words, "*Dilexi justitiam et odivi iniquitatem, propterea morior in exilio*"; but an older saint had breathed the like complaint when he said, "*In vain I have justified my heart, and washed my hands among the innocent*" (Ps. lxxii.) Such utterances are always to be found in the mouths of those who hunger and thirst for justice, and it is no doubt very natural, but neither historically tolerable nor logically reasonable to interpret the feelings which dictate them

in one age by those which are the growth of another time and of other circumstances. In the thirteenth century no one—least of all an archbishop—dreamt of questioning the lawfulness of Papal authority in its very widest acceptance. As well might one take the grumblings of the Opposition when long deprived of the sweets of office, as evidence of a widespread disloyalty to the Crown and established Constitution of this realm, as interpret some chance expressions of discontent with the conduct of a Papal legate in a chronicler of the thirteenth century, to mean a Protestant rejection of Papal supremacy by men like S. Edmund or S. Richard of Chichester.*

The other "mare's nest" of the reviewers is, that Rome opposed the canonization of our Saint. Unless our readers are prepared to follow us in another ten pages of rather dry citations, we cannot go into the negative of this most gratuitous assertion as we could wish. It will suffice to say that it seems based on one of the postulata of the great Protestant tradition, which teaches that the Popes were always ready to canonize anybody for whom a *prima facie* case of popular testimony to sanctity and the exercise of miraculous power could be made out. A Protestant biographer of S. Edmund,† speaking of the period immediately after his death, says: "Now began a series of miracles, the like of which had perhaps never been seen in this part, at least, of the Western Church since the days of S. Martin, but which in the thirteenth century were certainly without parallel; and this, whether we regard their number, their nature, or the evidence on which they rest." Of 195 miracles which occurred within fifty years of the Saint's death, "thirty," says the same biographer, "are cases of persons raised from the dead. But all objections must be silenced by the nature of the evidence, which is so full, complete, and satisfactory, that all history might as well be rejected if these are to be."

The truth is that S. Edmund's virtues were of that order which does not challenge the attention or appeal to the imagination of the masses, and dying as he did in exile, he was forgotten faster even than most ecclesiastics (and that is saying a good deal) both in his own land and at Rome. The sudden fame of such extraordinary miracles, therefore, was not at the first flush so calculated to attract the sanction as it was to awaken the surprise of Rome. Archbishop Albert, who went

* Archbishop Albert, of Armagh, and afterwards of Livonia and Prussia ("Hist. Canoniz. S. Edmund, ap. Martene").

† "Oxford Lives of the Saints: Life of S. Edmund," p. 83.

to Rome to push the cause, found the Cardinals prepossessed against it. "So great was the contradiction and bad interpretation which our pious affair met with in the Roman curia from the elder and more influential personages, that all that was said or written to them concerning his miracles was taken as the wildest fanaticism. I myself heard a cardinal say, 'You are losing your time and your labour. We do not, to say truth, believe your stories of miracles. I cannot think that our Lord Jesus Christ, who while on earth Himself only restored three to life, would have granted so great a privilege to one of His servants.' " * Thus the very profusion of the gift was made an argument against its existence. Whatever our modern critics may say, we cannot but think they must be a little surprised at finding such a "view" as this in the mouth of a Roman cardinal of the thirteenth century. The truth is, the age was one of anything but uncritical belief among churchmen. Let us not forget to mention, in vindication of this cardinal's memory, that he later saw the inconclusive character of his argument; for, being sent as Legate into France, he came to Pontigny, and convinced of his error, made public confession of it, saying, as he lay prostrate at the door of the church, "They who slandered thee shall draw near to thee, and shall worship the prints of thy footsteps."

No doubt, then, Rome was comparatively slow and cautious, as she always is, in pronouncing, and no doubt the opposition of the royal party in England was powerful and had some weight in the matter. These causes of delay are quite adequate to account for it. They do not suit the *Saturday Review* view of the matter, on which the impartial reader will probably say *tant pis* for the *Saturday Review*. Of all the childish contempt which modern ignorance pours on Catholic doctrine and practice, nothing strikes us as more childish than the talk about canonization. One would think that the doctrine was that of apotheosis, and the practice on a level with the justices' justice of remote places in England during the last century. The annals of the Church in all lands give us testimony of thousands of saintly persons who would seem to any fair mind to have been capable of canonization, and who have yet not been deemed worthy of the Church's public recognition as saints. The whole history and apparatus of canonization is a witness to the extraordinary precautions which the Church takes to

* This cardinal manifestly forgot, at the moment, S. John's declaration that only a small number of our Blessed Lord's actions are recorded in the Gospels, and our Lord's, that greater works than His should be done by His servants, because of His "going to the Father."

repress the natural tendency of good people to exaggerate the virtues of those whom they love, to take the whole process out of inadequate hands, and guard against the abuse of good instincts in the domestic and political orders, which are apt to canonize on a system founded on the degrees of propinquity in blood, or on success in "the court, the camp, and the field."

Now, at length (our readers we fear will say) we must briefly chronicle the round unvarnished tale of our humble pilgrimage. The journey to Paris, and thence to S. Florentin, was quite devoid of striking incident. Our special train left Victoria Station at the appointed time, and amidst the cheers of a large and kindly crowd. In each carriage, or nearly so, one or more ecclesiastics led the devotions, which were of the simplest kind. The Itinerarium, hymns, the mysteries of the Rosary, prayers for the Church, the Holy Father, the conversion of sinners, and of non-Catholics, alternated, and were occasionally audible from carriage to carriage when we halted. The good steamship *Bordeaux* awaited us with steam up, and the flags of the Pope, of S. Edmund, and the Union Jack were flying at fore and main and mizen as we steamed out of Newhaven singing a very charming and appropriate new hymn of S. Edmund, written by one of his own sons—the Rev. F. Stanfield, of S. Mary's, Hertford, the gifted son of a gifted father, the late Clarkson Stanfield, R.A. At Dieppe a deputation, including the Commandant and chief inhabitants, came on board to welcome us to France. We suppose that all Catholic hearts warm to the soil of Catholic France: certainly all ours did as we steamed into the harbour, singing the Magnificat and the Iste Confessor in strains which were taken up from the quays, and saluted the sacred images of our Divine Lord on either hand. The hospitality offered by the Marquis de B., and his mother and family, types of that refined Christian courtesy in which the old aristocracy of France excels the whole world, only a few were able to accept; those who did so will never forget its hearty and yet delicate cordiality, its religious fervour and graceful thoughtfulness. It is on such occasions that Catholics realize vividly the deep truth of the communion of saints, when the conventionality of society, the differences of race, of tongue, and of country all fade away and are lost in the intense union of Catholic minds and souls. To our hosts we were pilgrims of Christ and of His Saints; to us they were the expression of His and their love and care for us. They left to others the task of criticising our motives, our hopes, our conduct, and our bearing, and were content, like poor benighted Papists, to see in us nothing but what challenged regard and affection. At a table presided over by an aged lady in whom the lustre of the very first ancestry in

Christendom was eclipsed by the vividness of her faith and the fervour of her charity, we sat a group of wanderers from beyond the sea, of all ranks and conditions in both Church and State, but equally and impartially honoured and cherished guests, for the sake of Him whom we came to honour on a foreign shore. The moments thus passed were too soon gone, and after a brief visit and common prayer in the ancient church of Dieppe, we hurried on to Paris. At Paris, the next morning, many were present at the Mass, celebrated by Mgr. Guillemin, Vicar-Apostolic in Pekin. This venerable prelate addressed the crowded congregation, who came to testify their interest in our pilgrimage by devoutly assisting at Mass, and many by receiving the Communion; in a few well-chosen sentences, in which he said how much edified Paris and France are by such demonstrations of faith and piety; and took occasion also to thank our whole nation for the generous support which England gives, through her authorities in China, to his arduous and dangerous apostolate. This prelate told us he was possessed of a relic which suggested to him the idea of thus welcoming the English pilgrims of S. Edmund, viz. the pontifical ring of S. Thomas of Canterbury; but not anticipating this occasion, he had not brought it with him to France. Leaving Paris at eight o'clock that morning, Wednesday, September 2, we arrived at Sens, where the Vicar-General and a deputation from the Chapter came to compliment us at the station, about twelve o'clock, and at S. Florentin at 1.35. Here carriages of every kind awaited those who were unable to accomplish the eight kilometres, rather more than five miles, of road to Pontigny on foot. The great mass of the pilgrims, however, walked. The pilgrimage opened with the great banner of white silk damask, having on one side the embroidered effigy of the saint with the legend "S. Edmunde, ora pro nobis," and on the other his arms and the date of the pilgrimage. This was carried alternately by Lord Edmund Fitzalan Howard, representing his brother the Duke of Norfolk, Earl-Marshal of England, who was only prevented by severe indisposition from being himself a pilgrim, and by the Earl of Gainsborough; the gold cords and tassels to steady the banner being held by four other pilgrims of distinction. Then came the bulk of the pilgrims two and two. Then the banner of S. Edmund's College, carried by one of the collegians, Mr. Francis Clifford, and others, and followed by some twenty professors and students of the college, and by the Right Rev. Mgr. Patterson, president. Next came the crimson banner of S. Thomas's College, the seminary of the archdiocese and of the diocese of Southwark, carried by the Rev. Bernard Alexander, and followed by several members

of that college, and by the Right Rev. Mgr. Weathers, President, and Bishop of Amycla, auxiliary of his grace the Archbishop of Westminster. Then came the banner of S. Edward, king and confessor, secondary patron of the archdiocese, and a large number of diocesans of Westminster and of other dioceses. The carriages brought up the rear and closed the long line of march. As we left the station singing the Magnificat, under a brilliant autumnal sun, and wound slowly through the wooded slopes towards Pontigny, the people came and stood or knelt respectfully with uncovered head to do homage to the common faith which bound us, though otherwise so separate, in its close embrace. We know not what effect such a scene had on them, save so far as their attitude bore witness; to us it was a time of the sweetest spiritual joy and consolation. The procession, which after singing Faber's inspiring hymn "Jesus, my Lord," the Ave Maris Stella, Cardinal Wiseman's "O Beate mi Edmund," and others, and saying various portions of the Rosary, had naturally rather relaxed its strict array, from the fatigue of many and the great heat which drove us to the shade of the adjacent woods from the dusty road, was once more formed as we emerged from a wood and saw the long impressive roof-line of the abbey church standing out in the valley on our left. The clergy of all orders and degrees, in their white cottas or their venerable habits, or the purple of their respective ranks, once more intoned the pilgrim's hymn of S. Edmund as we neared the term of our pilgrimage. All our fatigue was forgotten, and every feeling but that of devout emotion and reverence was hushed as we saw coming forth to meet us the long array of the clergy and people of Pontigny, carrying in the midst the sacred relic of S. Edmund's right arm and hand. Immediately after it came our own Archbishop, S. Edmund's successor in England's ancient Primacy. Clad in white alb, cope of cloth of silver, and jewelled mitre, holding his pastoral staff and blessing with his right hand the faithful on either side, the Archbishop walked beneath a white canopy borne by four of the French clergy. Those (and they are many) who know the stately and venerable beauty of one who looks all that he is, can well imagine what a moving spectacle held us enthralled as we approached the station taken up by the Archbishop and the bearers of the sacred relic of his saintly predecessor. It was a moment which we shall never forget, and which we cannot look back upon without emotion. With a refinement of courtesy, natural, it would seem, to French prelates, the Archbishop of Sens had deferred his coming till the next day, in order that all the honours of the occasion should devolve upon the English primate,—a trait which reminded us

of that we have recorded above of S. Louis on a similar occasion. His Grace was accompanied by the Hon. and Right Rev. Mgr. Stonor, from Rome, and other ecclesiastics and laymen from England, who had come with him from Paris the day before. As we drew near the abbey, the hymn "Iste Confessor" was intoned and sung by the whole assembly, and so, with indescribable emotions, we entered the vast and venerable nave of the church so long hallowed by S. Edmund's repose. The relic replaced on its stand surrounded with lights at the entrance of the sanctuary, the Archbishop, who had been received according to the ritual at the great door of the church by the Very Rev. F. Boyer, Superior-General of the congregation of the Fathers of S. Edmund, approached the high altar, and after the cantors had sung the versicle and response "Ora pro nobis, B. Edmundè," "ut digni efficiamur promissionibus Christi," his Grace intoned the prayer of S. Edmund "Deus qui largifluæ bonitatis consilio," &c., and for the first time for so many centuries the ancient vault of Pontigny Abbey Church resounded with the tones of an English primate's voice raised in prayer to God through the intercession of S. Edmund of Canterbury. The Superior-General then pronounced a short but elegant and touching address in Latin, in which he welcomed the Archbishop and the English pilgrims to Pontigny. With visible emotion he touched on the sudden death of the Rev. F. Bertier, procurator of the convent. This excellent priest, whom we had known on a previous visit to Pontigny, had been exerting himself to the utmost to prepare the convent for its guests, for all the English ecclesiastics—about a hundred in number—were to be housed in the convent, and appeared in his usual health but a few minutes before the procession had gone forth to meet us. He was in the library, and was reaching down a book to show it to an Irish priest, when he was seized with a faintness which proved to be the result of aneurism of the heart, and in a few minutes he had breathed his last. His body was laid in a mortuary-chamber close to the domestic chapel of the convent, and vast numbers of pilgrims and others went to pray for his soul's rest on this and the next day, while Mgr. Patterson gave out in the church a notice of the melancholy event and requested the clergy to say Mass for their defunct brother. The Archbishop then ascended the steps of the high altar and gave his pontifical blessing to the multitude. The good fathers conducted all the male pilgrims to the stately cloister, open on one side to the air, one of the chief remaining features of the Cistercian Abbey, in which an abundant though simple dinner was laid out for some 300 or 400 persons.

At seven o'clock the whole pilgrimage, the ladies having been

meanwhile similarly received by the Sisters in the neighbouring monastery, returned to the Abbey Church for Vespers. This was to ourselves perhaps the most impressive public act of the whole pilgrimage. Two of our clergy—the Vicar-General of Southwark, Canon Crookall, and one of the clergy of the archdiocese, the Rev. Edmund Pennington—worthily filled the office of cantors, but the whole assembly of pilgrims, lay and clerical, from the Archbishop on his throne to the last lay person in the church, seemed to unite *uno ore et uno corde* in singing the divine office, with an effect which no one present can ever forget. Antiphons, psalms, chapter, hymns, versicles, Magnificat, all were sung with a majestic and harmonious fervour worthy of the occasion. Out of full hearts, and in the familiar and beloved tones of the Church's plain song, we Englishmen made the glorious vault ring again as we chanted before our English Saint's very altar of rest for these six centuries the praises of his glorious pontificate *—"Ecce Sacerdos magnus qui in diebus suis placuit Deo et inventus est justus!" for true it is, indeed, that the tie of our holy Faith unites us all with a power which can only be His whose Wisdom "reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly"; but yet, when the bond of fatherland, of race and home and tongue and country, is superadded to that of faith, there springs up in the heart of man that ineffable *πρόθος*, the yearning at once of natural and supernatural charity, such as made the great soul of the Apostle of the Gentiles burst forth into the sublime apostrophe which none but Catholics can understand or emulate, the wish to be "anathema from Christ for his brethren's sake." We have no pretence to read the hearts of men, but we are much mistaken if any one among us had other thoughts than those of a longing desire for all good, and, above all, the supreme good of our native land, and a holy confidence that our great Saint would hear us as we sang together the praises of his God and our God, of his Father and our Father.

The hours of the night passed rapidly. Many priests and many penitents used those still hours to reconcile, and be reconciled, to God; and from midnight Mass succeeded Mass at S. Edmund's shrine, till at eight o'clock the Archbishop of Westminster celebrated his low Mass at the High Altar, which also faces the shrine, and the great bulk of pilgrims who had not received Holy Communion at the earlier Masses received It then from his hands; while towards the end

* The Holy Father granted us by special indult leave to sing the solemn first Vespers and the High Mass of the saint.

of the Communion, many French and other pilgrims advanced to the altar for the same object,—one voice at first, and then more and more, as by an impulse, which soon communicated itself to all, raised perhaps the most familiar and the sweetest of all Frederick William Faber's beautiful hymns, "Jesus, my Lord, my God, my all."

The High Mass, which took place at ten o'clock, was again a scene never to be forgotten. Numbers of the clergy from the whole country round, and a multitude which we estimated at some eight or ten thousand, had flocked into the Abbey church. The Archbishops of Sens and of Chambéry and the Lord Abbot of Aiguesbelle, and others, arrived shortly before ten, and after a brief but cordial interview with the English Archbishop and prelates, the procession to the church was organized and all entered the choir, where the Bishop of Amycla, in full pontificals, awaited them at the High Altar. His assistants were the Hon. and Rev. Canon Gilbert Chetwynde Talbot, priest assistant; the Rev. Alfred White, Rev. Wm. Legrave, of S. Edmund's College, deacon and sub-deacon: the Rev. Lord Archibald Douglas, of S. Thomas's Seminary, was Master of Ceremonies, the acolytes being students of the seminary and of S. Edmund's College. The Hon. and Rev. Mgr. E. Stonor, Canon of S. John Lateran, and Mgr. Patterson, President of S. Edmund's, were placed near the altar, and the French archbishops took special care that all the honours of position, the reception of the pax, incensing, etc., should fall to the Archbishop of Westminster and his countrymen. On entering the choir, the cantors delayed for a moment to intone a psalm, and it was the Archbishop of Sens himself who, with a ringing voice full of unction and of emotion, intoned that most appropriate one, "Ecce quam bonum et quam jucundum fratres habitare in unum"—"Behold what a good and joyful thing it is for brethren to dwell together in unity." The music of the mass was the Church's own plain chant; at the Gloria, and especially at the Credo, it was not only the hundreds of the clergy but the thousands of the laity who, as is customary in France, chanted those glorious hymns of praise and of belief with a sublimity and majestic harmony which brought tears of joy and religious emotion into all our eyes. We know not whether, amidst so much to excite the deepest feeling, others found the same consolation which we ourselves experienced in seeing at the altar on this great occasion representatives of various elements in the resuscitated Church of England which those who love to criticise often pronounce to be little in harmony with each other. Before the altar, side by side with the archbishop of the diocese, worthy successor of so many

great and holy men in the chair of S. Savinian and S. Potentianus, S. Curicinus, S. Agericus, and so many more, sat our illustrious metropolitan, type and exemplar at once of our national intellectual civilization and of the graces, beginning with conversion to the faith, and gifts with which in all ages God crowns those who have a special mission to fulfil and a special place to occupy in His eternal counsels for the good of nations and of His Church. The celebrant was the venerated Bishop Weathers, Edmundian of the Edmundians: from the time when as a child he earned, under S. Edmund's wing, at his college, the nickname which he never forfeited, of "the Angel," till he left it without a word, after a presidency of nearly twenty years, at the wish of his superior, the Bishop of Amycla, represents in an eminent way all the virtues which we are accustomed to associate with those who worthily represent an ancestry which has never surrendered its faith at the bidding of the secular power, but have gone on from generation to generation, in spite of axe and scaffold, torture and imprisonment, ruinous fine and discredit, in spite of civil and social disability and all the disastrous consequences of their long martyrdom, witnessing a good confession, our example and our encouragement to the present hour: the priest-assistant, a scion of one of our great historic houses, perhaps the greatest, and one certainly who has worthily borne that great name, and then not least when, in the "mezzo del camonin di nostra vita," at an age when his career and his position, would have made most men shrink from beginning life over again, obedient to the dictates of conscience and laying aside every human consideration, he avowed himself a convert to the maligned and despised church of his ancestors, and going to sit on the benches of the Roman schools with lads who might have been his sons, learnt the science and drank in the wisdom of the saints, that he might fit himself for the ministry of Christ's Church, and, counting all things as detriment, devote himself heart and soul, strength and purse, to the service of Christ's poor and of His little ones. There again were to be found, both among priests and laity, representatives worthy of these two classes; noblemen who are noble men indeed, converts and non-converts. There were to be seen the hard-worked secular canon or parish priest, not only from London or from Manchester, from the crowded city or the lone wilderness of our country places, but from faithful Ireland too, and the distant Scottish land, where, few and far between, the struggling missionaries sow still in sorrow and wait for a harvest not yet ripe: there the barefooted sons of S. Francis and of S. Theresa: there S. Dominic's pure white habit: there, more frequent than the others, the black-robed venerable sons of S. Benedict,

patriarch of our whole western monachism and origin of all our western learning: and there, last, but—oh! how truly—not the least, S. Ignatius's faithful ever-suffering children; for where, if good is to be done, are they wanting? Certainly we know of one priest who begged of S. Edmund to augment and intensify the good will which is so happily increasing and binding us all more and more together in the work of our common Lord and Master. The Archbishop of Westminster preached after the Gospel, and, inspired by the associations of the place, seemed to surpass even his usual beauty of diction and of thought, and to acquire a force and fire such as it is rare to hear in our sober tongue even from its most accomplished masters. He dwelt, among other topics, on the liberties of God's Church, for which S. Edmund suffered and died in exile of a broken heart, and for which S. Thomas of Canterbury shed his life-blood. At the end of the Mass the Archbishop of Sens and Auxerre ascended the pulpit, and in most warm and touching accents praised the edifying example given by the pilgrims and by their illustrious Archbishop in coming there to add fresh lustre to the shrine of S. Edmund and to unite more closely than ever the Church in France and England, and spoke with intense feeling of the Holy Father's constancy and endurance of wrong for conscience' sake and the freedom of His apostolic ministry. The clergy and pilgrims then issued forth processionaly into the park in front of the abbey, and the whole multitude assembled there were solemnly blessed, according to the French custom, by all the prelates at once. The Fathers again entertained at dinner the whole of the male pilgrims, lay and clerical, and the females were similarly entertained by the sisters at their monastery. At the table of the archbishops and the other prelates, the préfet of the department, the general commanding the military district, the Duc de Clermont-Tonnerre, Count de la Bourdonnaye, the Earl of Gainsborough, Lord Edmund Fitzalan Howard, Mr. Aubrey de Vere, Mr. Bagshawe, Q.C., Lord Archibald Douglas, and many others were seated. The Archbishop of Westminster accompanied us on our return march, which commenced about half-past two o'clock, the special train being announced to leave S. Florentin at four o'clock. The chant of the *Te Deum*, the affectionate adieux of our revered hosts, the reiterated exclamations of the French and of the English crying, "*Vive la France*," "*Vive l'Angleterre*," and the exhilarating feeling that the end of our pilgrimage had been attained, and that by God's good providence and the protection of S. Edmund, all had passed off without let or hindrance, gave to this last scene at Pontigny a joyousness and *abandon* by which the most cynical could hardly

have failed to be touched and edified. The return journey to Paris passed without incident, and there the assembly of pilgrims subsided into the privacy which we all felt was right and becoming, now that our object had been attained. We believe that the experience of all coincided with our own—viz., that without exception all were pleased and edified by what they saw, what they heard, and what they did, at our beloved saint's French resting-place.

One word before we add a review of the attitude of the Press upon the pilgrimage. It has been said, among other things, that the pilgrimage was not a representative one. We take leave to say the reverse, and the mere mention of the names of pilgrims, and of the institutions represented by pilgrims, is enough to indicate that such was the case. A body of Catholics containing representatives of all orders and degrees of the clergy, and among the laity, the names of Howard, Talbot, Clifford, Douglas, De Vere, Stonor, Petre, &c., was certainly a representative pilgrimage. No doubt there were not the numbers of last year's great pilgrimage; but if there were fewer of the aristocracy, and far fewer of the poor sent at the charitable expense of others, there were on this occasion some hundreds of the great middle class, the bone and sinew of our Catholic body in England, and worthy representatives of their class. Especially we noticed the number of young laymen with all the manly vigour and activity of their race and land, who added to these natural qualities the fearless manifestation of their faith, which is God's gift to true hearts and consciences void of offence to God and man. None could fail also to recognize that great cordiality and mutual respect and confidence which knits our clergy and laity together. Long may it continue to be a special trait of English Catholicity.

Now to conclude with a brief summary of our newspaper critics' commentaries on a very simple, straightforward act of religion, which, one would have thought, could give little or no offence to any one. The most striking feature appears to us to be the wonderful discrepancy and discordance between the various reports from "our correspondents," and the equally opposed inferences and reflections based upon them by themselves and others.

We gather, for instance, from our critics, not only that "hundreds of the Catholic aristocracy" rushed to secure a place among the pilgrims months before they were to start, and at the same time, that "though the priests and Jesuits had not spared the whip, not one single Roman Catholic of title or of any note could be induced to join the pilgrimage," but we are introduced into the very souls and consciences of the some-

what singular assembly, composed at once of "all the most distinguished of the Roman Catholic body," and of "no men," but a mere handful of women, priests, and children, and (more inexcusable still) of "women neither young nor pretty," but "decidedly ugly"; and we are told how sad it was to perceive that, whereas at Paray-le-Monial "every one believed in the nun's vision," at Pontigny "no one believed in St. Edmund." The distress of mind engendered by this spectacle of unbelief in the soul of the faithful correspondent, it would seem at first sight, would find some alleviation from the fact that S. Edmund was a "pseudo saint," and so does not deserve to be believed in; but this solace is directly cut from under our feet by the ponderous and astonishing erudition of the writer in the *Saturday Review*, who completely rehabilitates S. Edmund, on the ground that the ignorant Archbishop of Westminster, in his blindness, has overlooked that S. Edmund's real claim to the honours of the altar lies in his persistent and stern resistance to the Pope and all his abominable corruptions. "We," again, "do not even know that the mouldering dust, to which the besotted pilgrims betook themselves, in company with archbishops and bishops in fantastic dresses," is that of S. Edmund; but one would think this error of fact would be of little moment to those who have the happiness to be convinced that "there is no efficacy in prayers offered by the shrine of saint or martyr," and "who have no reverence for relics." In short, the argument of the prophet from whose discourse on the pilgrimage reported in the *Daily Telegraph* these gems are extracted, would run thus:—"I believe in none of those things which you go to Pontigny to testify that you do believe in; therefore you ought not to go to Pontigny at all." The crown of this discourse, however, is in the following declaration, that the pilgrims accompanying their bishops, whose costume seems to be so peculiarly irritating to the reverend orator, "bade people as they passed by come and see what holy and devout beings they were, and how certain of getting to heaven," which naturally leads him to the pleasing reflection that his hearers "could afford to smile at pilgrimages indulged in with the parade, the pomp, the vanity, the show, and the excesses of the Pontigny journey," and to rejoice that *they*, as Christians, were "strangers and pilgrims on the earth, looking for rest when numbered with God's saints." We are not informed what the text of this charitable discourse was, but if the learned doctor intends to publish, we would suggest to him that the most appropriate possible would be the pious ejaculation of that holy man who said, "Lord, I thank thee that I am not as other men, nor even as this publican." We confess that we find no-

where in the chronicles of the pilgrimage contained in the newspapers any written warrant for the internal dispositions of vanity and phariseism so kindly ascribed to the poor pilgrims, nor even for their invitation to bystanders to come and see them going to heaven, or for their "excesses," unless sea-sickness comes under that designation; so we are fain to conclude that the reverend prophet of Crown Court educes these phenomena purely from his imagination, just as the German professor constructed the camel "out of his own interior consciousness."

But to turn from this most pitiful exhibition of ignorant ill-will to that which is purely droll, because manifestly not malicious, what can we say of the accuracy and trustworthiness of the daily press when we look through even its well-meant attempts to describe our pilgrimage to the shrine of S. Edmund? Indeed we feel tempted to reverse the text laid down by the prophet when he say that "true pilgrims repudiate tradition unless it could be proved by the evidence of authentic history." Every one knows that the newspapers never err. Do they not correct the errors of the Pope, of the Church, nay even of the very Houses of Parliament, inerrant and omnipotent though they manifestly are whenever they decree anything whatever? And yet, having been at the pilgrimage ourselves, and being therefore a living "tradition" of eye-witness in our own person, we pledge our reputation to the statement which we here make, that a cursory perusal of the articles, correspondence, and notices concerning the pilgrimage, extending over a hundred columns of the ordinary newspaper size, has revealed to us no less than twice that number of instances of errors of fact in these "evidences of authentic history." These include errors concerning the number of pilgrims, their names, quality and condition, habits, sufferings, recreations, *thoughts*, words, deeds, departures, journey, return, lodging, raiment, food, drink, devotions, occupations, objects, means, hopes, fears, anticipations, *motives*, mode of life when at home and when abroad, and, alas! as regards one who was not a pilgrim, but who sacrificed himself in preparing to receive them with a generous and truly French hospitality, even as to the time and manner of his sudden, yet not unprepared, death. Where so much is erroneous it would be as invidious as it would be prolix to cite a great number of instances, but one or two we cannot refrain from mentioning, because they really illustrate fairly the kind of mistake and the kind of way in which the mistake gets stereotyped and repeated *ad infinitum*, to which the hasty newspaper scribe is liable: mistakes inculpable or nearly so, and mistakes bordering on the funny, and sometimes quite arriving at it. In the garden of the convent of the Fathers of

S. Edmund (a congregation of secular priests devoted to missionary work at the bidding of the Archbishop, and not "monks" as our papers invariably call them) a platform was erected from which the Archbishops of Sens, Westminster, and Chambéry, and the Bishop of Amycla, his Grace of Westminster's auxiliary Bishop, were expected to give, and did give, their blessing to the assembled multitudes, for whom the church, large as it is, was not sufficiently capacious. The ingenious correspondent of one of our most respectable daily papers, who appears not to have been strong in French, must have inquired what this was, and the answer probably was, "On fera monter les évêques sur cette estrade" (the bishops are to *mount* on this *platform*), in order to give their benediction with more solemnity. The reporter, catching the words and not the sense, immediately telegraphs to the four winds that from this spot "the blessing was then given by the Bishops *Estrade* and *Montes*," an announcement religiously reproduced by other papers, and so, no doubt, to be regarded as "proved by authentic history."*

Not less authentic no doubt is the statement, with a persistent iteration worthy of a better cause, by one and all the papers, that the Archbishop of Sens is a prelate of "austere manners," "of very austere manners," "of most austere manners," "of singularly austere manners," "of great austerity of manner," &c. One should be aware, to understand the point of this sapient remark, that the Protestant tradition requires that a Popish archbishop should be what one may be allowed to call rather a "fee faw fum" sort of personage. It so happens that Monseigneur Bernadou is a remarkably genial prelate, with a heartiness of manner which we English are apt to consider very natural to ourselves. It was of course a "toss-up" whether they should not have caught up the opposite idea and stamped his Grace as a "jolly" or "jovial" archbishop; because that again is another part of the Protestant tradition; but

* The *Tablet* had quoted a similar mistake shortly before, whereby the papers had been led to state that three respectable persons, MM. Navire, Chaviré, and Bourrasque (*i.e.* boat, gone-to-the-bottom, and storm), had been drowned at sea, and a correspondent wittily suggested that they were probably consoled in their last moments by these two mysterious prelates. We confess that it was on reading this telegram, repeated with due solemnity under date from London, that the great light thrown on the biography of "His Grace the Duke" and his valet Jernigan, by Lady Blarney's contemporary reminiscences, occurred to our mind as a *parallel passage*. Is there no Whalley in the womb of time to improve the "fact" that two bishops with decidedly Spanish names, but, like Melchisedek, appearing and disappearing without antecedents or consequences, blessed the English pilgrims at Pontigny? What "evidence" of political *ultramontane* plots and Carlist sympathies.

as there happened to be another prelate, the Archbishop of Chambéry, present, who has a very serious if not severe look, the "austerity" line probably was taken by some one who mistook him for the Archbishop of Sens, and so all followed the lead, and "authentic history" will hand down the former prelate as austere of manner for all time and beyond all possibility of doubt.

Charles Lamb, in one of his "Essays of Elia" (on newspapers thirty-five years ago), has an amusing account of a poor newspaper scribe, whom he could always trace when attached to this or that paper's staff, by a paragraph of the following purport: "It is not generally known that the three balls at the pawnbroker's shop are the ancient arms of Lombardy. The Lombards were the first money-brokers in Europe." "Bob Allen," says Lamb, "has done more to set the public right on this important point of blazonry than the whole College of Heralds." We cannot help thinking that it must be some literary descendant of Bob Allen who took such infinite pains to set forth to the whole civilized globe, through the medium of the telegraph, that "Messrs. D—, O—, and S—, were sleeping at two kilometres from Pontigny." The gentlemen whose habitat on the 2nd of September has thus been consigned to "authentic history," were respectively two young collegians, one of whom was ill in bed, not at two, but at nearer two thousand, kilometres from Pontigny, and a worthy official of the pilgrimage entrepreneurs, Messrs. Cook & Son; all of whom would, we are sure, be as sincerely amazed to find themselves in "authentic history" as the great Mrs. Siddons was, when some one said in her hearing that the Marquis of Buckingham (a very stout nobleman) had "got into the Cabinet," and the absent-minded queen of tragedy remarked with grave emphasis, "*Poor-r* man, how *ever* gat he there!" Similarly we are told in the most circumstantial manner how the Bishop of Amycla and Mgr. Patterson "dragged their purple cassocks through the dust with a noble disregard of expense." It would seem that the fact is more than doubtful (so we are told on very good authority indeed), and we supposed there was some recon-dite allusion either to the appearance or gait of these ecclesiastics, until we had recourse to Charles Lamb again to elucidate the important statement by the light of Bob Allen's practice, who, he says, made paragraphs out of such matters, thus:

Walking yesterday morning casually down Snow Hill, who should we meet but Mr. Deputy Humphreys! We rejoice to add that the worthy deputy appeared to enjoy a good state of health.

We should however lament if the ingenious chroniclers of the vicissitudes of purple cassocks should meet with poor Bob's fate, who, says Lamb,

Had better have met anything than a common council-man that morning; for his services were shortly after dispensed with, on the plea that his paragraphs of late had been deficient in point.

Then again, great Jupiter, who, though usually wide-awake, we know sometimes naps, like Homer, gives out that irritating statement that sixty priests walked "in white *chasubles*" on the road to Pontigny, which appears so greatly to have exercised the delicate perception of the *πρέπον* in the article of pilgrims' costume, of the Rev. Dr. Cumming. The doctor's righteous soul is vexed within him at such rank idolatry: true the priests did not wear these garments, and truer still Dr. Cumming does not know what they are, but "authentic history" (and tradition too—the Protestant tradition) narrates it, and the doctor has a clear right to "improve" the costume into an attack on his fellow-creatures in what he calls his "sermons." Then there are endless paragraphs on the manners and customs of the pilgrims. Some of our scribes are horrified to find that pilgrims not only eat and drink, though that of course is entirely inexcusable and grossly inappropriate, but some actually smoked. Others again were seen to smile, and laugh and talk gaily between the periods of public recitation of prayers. This is contrary to all the dictates of the great Protestant tradition, which requires us all to be plunged in a religious gloom, such as one might suppose would become members of the Society of Friends reduced to idiotcy. But on the other hand, one correspondent is delighted to chronicle that there was actually one railway carriage without a priest in it, and so no prayers were recited aloud! This piece of intelligence is addressed to another Protestant superstition to the effect that no lay Catholic ever prays at all unless led on, not to say driven on, by sacerdotal violence. The same writer, apparently, gives vent to a burst of amazed eloquence, tintured with the popular tone of scorn which befits the representatives of nineteenth century light when treating of the besotted race of Papists, when he records that there were various kinds of priests, from the ascetic and thin to the corpulent and jolly. One is tempted to ask oneself whether this gentleman is under the impression that the Catholic Church is "established in order to supply the public" with some kind of dietary analogous to Thorley's food for cattle, warranted to bring the whole ecclesiastical staff up (or down as the case may be) to one degree of obesity and one moral complexion? Either he must mean something of this kind by his

elaborate enumeration of the personal peculiarities of priests, as if this tended to show the failure of "the system," or else (like Mr. Robert Allen) he meant—a paragraph, and nothing more, and looked on us all only as so many deputies "walking casually down Snow Hill." We confess we lean to this hypothesis. We might enlarge almost without end on this category of "authentic historic" notes of the pilgrimage; suffice it to say that nothing was said or done, or not said or done, by any one or by no one, but furnished forth some such commentaries as those we have cited, worthy, for the most part, to be classed with the autumnal gigantic gooseberry, the sea-serpent, and the twelve condemned criminals placed (for the sake of experimenting on the nervous system through the imagination) in beds supposed to have been occupied by cholera patients, by order of the Czar in the Raskolnick Hospital at Moscow, and either surviving or dying of fright in different proportions and subsequent paragraphs, as exigency might dictate at this slack season. We remember those criminals from our youth up, and have seen them through many vicissitudes, from partial recovery to insanity or death, from year to year, and in many lands far and near, but always far enough from the scene of the paragraph writer's labours. As a fine specimen of the Protestant large gooseberry paragraph, we may cite the following from the *Telegraph* of Sept. 5 :—

These wanderers [the gipsies whom the writer *did not* see at Pontigny] have no objection to sell rosaries, bottles of miraculous water, medals blessed by the Pope, and *in particular* bits of the straw on which Pio Nono rests in his captivity in an underground dungeon of the Vatican. Such blades of straw, neatly gilt, are *commonly hawked about* the villages of France and Belgium!

We pledge ourselves to pay over to the editor of that print the sum of £100 sterling for every specimen of these valuable relics, duly authenticated, which he will produce between this and the 1st of April next ensuing, the money so accruing to be expended in gooseberry-fool, for the use of imbecile paragraph-writers in general and for the writer of the following (in the *Manchester Guardian*) in particular :—

The Roman Catholic powers that be in England *unanimously* arrived at the conclusion that the effect of this surprising item of news (the Marquis of Ripon's conversion) would be greatly heightened if it were connected with the circumstance of the Pontigny pilgrimage; such a double manifestation of faith, *it was considered*, would be popularly overwhelming. The idea was artistic and astute: it has been acted upon to the letter, and the polite world was acquainted with the upshot of the business three days ago. *I have no more doubt* that every Roman Catholic preacher

in England will speak of the conversion of the Marquis of Ripon to the creed of "the Church," as a signal manifestation of the Divine Spirit to which all pilgrimages are testimonies, than I have that mine is the hand which guides the pen which writes these words.

For our part we have precisely the same kind of certitude, entirely elicited from interior evidence, that this paragraph was written by Mr. Jinks, clerk to that respected magistrate George Nupkins, Esq., before whom Mr. Pickwick's friends appeared, in the custody of Mr. Grummer the beadle, on the occasion of the unfortunate affair with Mr. Peter Magnus. Mr. Jinks, interrogated by the magistrate as to why he smiled at Miss Witherfield's notice of the duel, fails to satisfy him. Mr. Nupkins briefly but emphatically dismisses his evidence in these words: "Mr. Jinks, you are an ass."

It strikes us Catholics as strange that our newspaper correspondents so often draw on their imagination for "facts" when they write about Catholics and their doings; but when one makes allowance first for the extraordinary hurry in which such reports must be written if they are to appear at all, next for the great ignorance of Catholic ideas, doctrines, and practices which prevails in our country even at the present day, and lastly for the exigencies of the public for whom they are written, which does not tolerate a thoroughly fair or uncoloured statement of Catholic events of any moment, we must judge the shortcomings of the "special correspondent" mercifully, and set down but little to malice aforethought. We wish we could always say the same for those who more deliberately revise and alter (not correct) these ready-writers at head-quarters. A further natural cause (for of the supernatural we will not here speak) of the wonderful "views" concerning us and our doings, which we see not only in ephemeral, but in more pretentious literature (if that is possible), lies in the extraordinary force of education and hereditary prejudice. No power but one, that of the Truth itself, can dispel the sort of *glamour* which to those without shrouds us on all sides. It affects people differently, no doubt; but the one result which seems common to all is that it prevents them from seeing things as they are. Sometimes they see things much more favourably than they deserve, as, for instance, when a very poorly provided chapel is described as one of those foci of sensuous ritual by which the unfortunate Papist is brought into a thralldom of mind and will from which he will never escape either here or hereafter. A cheap French cope, six wooden candlesticks, and four china flower-pots; a choir of village children, and a cracked tenor murdering Zingarelli's "Laudate," or singing a Litany to Lord

Mornington's chant, are then described as "the gorgeous ritual by which the astute Church of Rome knows so well how to enchant her votaries and allure the unsuspecting and weak-minded to their destruction." More often the same elements are made to figure as contemptible or ridiculous in a way equally remote from sober fact. In either case the reporter brings his own impression with him ready-made, and imposes it as well as he can on what he sees or hears, whether his cap fits or not, and so "authentic history" is brewed by the gallon to suit the popular taste, and *à priori* conception of the fitness of things. Mr. Disraeli's "Lothair" is a fine specimen of this. Oriental imagination throws a kind of limelight glow over the Catholic *dramatis personæ* in that clever tale, and has had no slight effect in strengthening the Protestant tradition in polite circles as to that *lusus naturæ* the Catholic ecclesiastic of non-Catholic literature — gorgeous, poverty-stricken, astute, foolish, high-minded, grovelling, sensual, ascetic, repulsive, insinuating, imperious, subservient, revolting, delightful, and altogether inscrutable and impossible creature! Criminal and virtuous, holy and abominable in such charmingly adjusted proportions, he is a kind of moral chameleon, ever ready for use, whether to point the loftiest moral, or adorn the most degraded tale. And such as is supremely the ecclesiastic, such, in their degree, are all other Catholics, according to the great Protestant tradition; such their belief, conduct, goings out and comings in, including their pilgrimage to S. Edmund of Canterbury. Our readers will, we trust, have had the means in these pages of testing in some degree the truth of this view so far as it is set forth in the 100 columns of our national Press on the pilgrimage to Pontigny.

On the whole, as a matter of taste, and having, perhaps, some natural sense of the humorous, we prefer the extravagance of the impossible cardinals and monsignori of Mr. Disraeli's novels to the solemn *coram vobis* utterances of his great political rival when he treats us to such portentous stuff as the following, in his recent effusion concerning ritual, but *not* concerning "ritualism." Speaking of "a hopeless and visionary effort to Romanize the Church and people of England," he says, "if it had been possible in the seventeenth or eighteenth century, it would still have been impossible in the nineteenth; when Rome has substituted for the proud boast of *semper eadem* a policy of violence and change in faith: when she has refurbished and paraded anew every rusty tool she was fondly thought to have disused; when no one can become her convert without renouncing his moral and mental freedom, and placing his civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of

another; and when she has equally repudiated modern thought and ancient history." If this is not *fustian*, we confess we know not what is. We will only echo the last sentence, and, slightly altering it, say that in so writing Mr. Gladstone seems to us "equally to have repudiated modern history and ancient thought"; unless he is prepared to maintain that the Pope has deprived Bismarck's emperor of his civil power and that the laws of thought have been "improved off the face of creation."

ART. V.—MR. AUBREY DE VERE'S "ALEXANDER THE GREAT."

Alexander the Great, a Dramatic Poem. By AUBREY DE VERE.

London: Henry H. King & Co.

IT is necessary to recall to the minds of our readers the fact that we have followed with critical care, and with warm sympathy and admiration, Mr. Aubrey de Vere's career; that the learned elegance of his style and the elevation of his thoughts have always received their due tribute from us; that we have been proud, as became us, of our Catholic poet; because we have to commence our notice of his latest work by acknowledging that it has taken us by surprise. Why it has done so, it would not be easy to define. The characteristics which are displayed in "*Alexander the Great*" are not wanting in the writer's previous works; the mastery of the technicalities of the poet's art is no greater than we had a right to expect; nevertheless we did not anticipate that this dramatic poem would be the masterpiece which it is, would be so lofty and so pathetic, so full of historic life, philosophic meaning, and deep human interest.

The figure of Alexander the Great stands out in history, grand indeed, with the grandeur of ruthless power, and the radiance of irresistible success; but, unless one's imagination dwell upon his swiftly-dealt doom, the falling of the night upon his noontide, there is nothing in it to awaken the gentler sympathies; and the touch of *fanfaronade* which has been lent to the image of the great conqueror by popular versions of his character and his deeds has still further removed him from the sphere of sympathetic contemplation. Cold, mighty,

with the stain of debauchery,—infinitely repulsive in such grand conjunction,—“the godlike hero” has hitherto stood, removed from familiar realization, an abstraction among the ancients. He is an abstraction no longer.

Mr. Aubrey de Vere removes Alexander from his almost mythical sphere, and shows him to us, as the legions saw him; as the great captains of his hosts, during the ten years’ meteoric career of conquest which changed the face and the fortunes of a world, saw him; as his unheeded counsellors and his brave generals saw him; as the friend who loved him with a love passing the love of woman, saw him. The difficulties of handling such a subject, with its lapse of time, with its change of circumstance, with its apparent lack of the finer and more complicated emotions and motives requisite for dramatic development, can hardly be over-estimated, when looked at in the mass and in the rough by the reader. Only the writer who has dealt with, can appreciate them in detail, and through all the processes of handling, arranging, and balancing them. Of course, the less we can trace the existence of such difficulties, the greater is the writer’s triumph over them. In the present instance that triumph is complete; and the intensity of the pleasure conveyed by the poem is never marred by a sense of laboriousness, strain, or incongruity. Among its minor, but striking charms, is its equalness; while the proportion of importance between the various characters is scrupulously observed, none is vague; the lesser personages are portrayed with a delicate sharpness like that of fine carving; and not one line could be pointed out as wanting in character, or redundant.

It is, however, with the poet’s conception of the character of Alexander the Great that we must deal in the first instance, before we enter upon the consideration of the power and vividness with which he has represented it; and we find that conception defined in a preface, which ought to be excepted from the general fate of prefaces, by being carefully read. Its perusal will help every reader, learned or unlearned,—those who can follow Mr. Aubrey de Vere along the historic lines which he traces, and those to whom Alexander is but a vague personage of the old Pagan world,—to the due enjoyment of the poem; and it forms a comprehensive and charming essay in itself; exhibiting the great conqueror’s unrivalled powers as an organizer, and tracing the moral ravages wrought in him by his pride—“that all-pervading vice which, except in the rarest instances, blended itself like a poison with pagan greatness, and penetrated into its essence. . . . Pride, which seems to have been not so much a quality in Alexander, as a primary constituent of his being.” The eighteenth century,

of which the intellectual attitude was chiefly a sneer, "thought it philosophical," says Mr. De Vere, "to sneer at the 'Macedonian madman,' and moral to declaim against him as a bandit. Maturer reflection has led us to the discovery that 'a fool's luck' helping a robber's ambition could hardly have enabled a youth but twenty-two years of age when he began his enterprise, to conquer half the world in ten years. The ancients made no such mistake. They admired, and therefore they understood. Heroism stood before them, and they could see; though, with their lights, they could not note its limitations, or appreciate the evil that vitiated the greatness." The drama is to show us in action the character which the writer defines in the following lines, to work out the moral problem which he postulates; to touch the grand figure, seen dimly in the dusk of the far past, with the light and colour of its inalienable humanity; to delineate the groping doubt and spiritual conflict of his contact with the religions which became known to Alexander as he conquered race after race, tribe after tribe, and found them men of like passions indeed, but of widely-varying faith and aspirations.

Alexander was one of those few who combine the highest military genius—in him it was an inspiration—with a statesmanship, instinctive and unerring. His intellect was at once vast and minute. His aim was to consolidate the whole world into a single empire, redeemed from barbarism, and irradiated with Greek science and art, an empire such that its citizens, from the mouths of the Ganges to the Pillars of Hercules, should be gratified to learn from Plato, and to take delight in Sophocles. . . . His mind was at once idealistic and practical. . . . His temper, domineering as it was, while it recoiled before no opposition, yet evaded the battle with the impossible.

. . . Little Greece could not permanently hold down all Asia by material pressure; but, as a presiding mind, it might, even under conditions of equality, lift it up, wield the mass, and rule by not claiming to rule. He doubtless knew that by Hellenizing the East he incurred a risk of orientalizing the West; but not to have faced such a danger would have been to relinquish the greatest enterprise which had ever presented itself to the imagination of warrior and statesman.

Occupied, or rather possessed by this great project, his superhuman energy concentrated upon it, his colossal resources devoted to it, Alexander is depicted in Mr. Aubrey de Vere's poem, under the ever-encroaching dominion of his overmastering fault, pride. If he despised the inferior appetites, as Plutarch affirms, it was because "they reminded him, 'like sleep,' of his mortality. If he paid honour to the gods, it was because he regarded them as members of his royal family, his cousins of Olympus." The rarest, deepest beauties of the poem are to be found in the writer's treatment of Alexander's

friendship with Hephestion, that which he calls his "one human affection," but of which he says, "it did not escape the alloy; and the insatiable grief and the insatiable ambition came from the same unmeasured self-will. These are the offences which invite retribution, and which constitute the tragic in human character. Moralists need not be curious to hunt after additional faults. These are faults that exclude lesser faults, which, if added to them, would be but the addition of minus qualities."

The subtle influence of the various religions which he investigated pervades the whole of the grand and tragic story, in which the writer indicates the vacillating leaning of Alexander's mind towards the Monotheism of the Hebrews, and its pride-inspired temptation to accept the myth of his own divine origin. He has made exquisitely skilful use of the visit of Alexander to Jerusalem,—which rests indeed only on the testimony of the "Antiquities" of Josephus,—by introducing the prophecy of the Prophet Daniel relating to him, and supposing it to have been communicated to him by the High Priest, in the Temple. Mr. Aubrey de Vere regards Alexander's visit to the Temple as authentic, and says that it is easy to understand the reasons for which he would probably have commanded the Greek historians, who do not mention it, to leave it unrecorded. "The reverence which the proudest of earth's conquerors had shown for a despised race would have injured him alike, for different reasons, with Greek and with Persian, with Chaldean and Phœnician—with the pride of intellect, and the pride of empire, with the devotee of the senses, and the trader bent on gain." In this poem we see what were the points at which the speculative systems of the past neared the truth as it is in Christianity, and in the beautiful episodes of the Persian princesses, Arsinoe and Amastris,—the faith and hope, the calm confidence in, and realization of, a future life, of "the world which will set this one right," that form the abiding consolations of the Christian creed, are clearly to be traced. In considering the merits of such a work as this, we must not lose sight of the immense difficulty of avoiding anachronism in thought; and the great, though lesser difficulty, of avoiding it in imagery. Formal correctness may have been comparatively easy of attainment; all but the clumsiest writers can avoid gross errors of this kind, such, for instance, as the employment of physical agencies whose discovery and application are but a few years old, in chronicles of a century ago; but it is rare indeed that a writer can invest himself with the moral and intellectual garb of the men of the old world, can think

their thoughts, convey their aspirations, assume the doubting attitude of their perplexity, and create around them the atmosphere of Pagan speculation and action, in which the Divine revelation and the canon of Christian law and restriction have no place. It is not, perhaps, until we come to measure and weigh the extent and the preponderance of the Christian system over the whole realm of modern thought and daily action, that we are able to estimate that difficulty, and the praise due to the successful surmounting of it aright. To artists in other walks of art than poetry it is far less difficult, though not easy. How often do we detect modernness of air, or attitude, or expression, the outcome of a sentiment which could not have a place in the Pagan mind, in the most elaborately worked-out conceptions of the painters who carry us back to old Greece and old Rome. How often, when there is no tangible anachronism, do we feel that this is mere furniture, decoration, pose, and costume; that the people are modern people, that the sources of their action and the objects of their thoughts and aspirations modern objects! Throughout his drama Mr. Aubrey de Vere never injures, never dispels the illusion, the most thoughtful passages are as truly Greek in spirit as the incidents, the scenes, and the associations are Greek in fact. Only in one single instance does a touch of, not exactly anachronism, but improbability strike us, and we are ready to believe that in that one instance, we, who have no acquaintance with the Persian poets, may be in error. It occurs in the "Marriage Song," which Arsinoe, the daughter of Darius, afterwards wedded to Alexander, reads to her dying cousin, Amastris.

Love is Dream and Vision first :
Proud young Love the earth disdains ;
But his cold streams, mountain-nursed,
Warm them in the fruitful plains
Ere the marriage-day is sped :
Peal the bells ! The bride is wed !

References to the scene in the Temple at Jerusalem run like a refrain through the poem, lending a tender and yearning mysticism to the grand, cold, imperial figure of Alexander, somewhat tempering that supreme pride which well nigh raises him into an abstraction, above all aims, even such as might be considered high, and were surely legitimate. The full revelation of this grand character, which, always revealing, therein proclaims itself, is made in a scene which ensues upon a mutiny of the Greek soldiers at Opis on the Tigris, after the marriages of the king, his generals, and a

great number of Greek officers with ladies of the conquered Persian race. The brief mutiny has been quelled, the ring-leaders have been beheaded, and Alexander, standing alone upon a platform level with the heads of the crowd, addresses to them the following superb invective and grand summary of his deeds :—

Ye swine-herds, and ye goat-herds, and ye shepherds,
That shamelessly in warlike garb usurp'd,
Your vileness cloak, my words are not for you ;
There stand among you others, soldiers' sons,
Male breasts, o'erwrit with chronicles of wars :
To them I speak. What made you that ye are,
The world's wide wonder, and the dread of nations ?
Your king ! What king ? Some king that ruled o'er lands
Illimitable, and golden harvested
From ocean's line to ocean ? Sirs, 'twas one
With petty realm, foe-girt and cleft with treasons,
Dragg'd up from darkness late, and half alive.
From these beginnings I subdued the earth :
For whom ? For you. The increase is yours : for me,
Remains the barren crown and power imperial.
I found but seventy talents in my chest :
Full many a soldier with his bride late spoused,
Got better dowry. In my ports I found
A fleet to Persia's but as one to ten :
I sold my royal farms, and built me ships ;
An army found thin-worn as winter wolves
On Rhodope snow-piled ; my sceptre's gems
I changed to bread and fed it. Forth from nothing
I called that empire which this day I rule.
My father left me this—his Name ; I took it
And kneaded in the hollow of my hands.
I moulded it to substance, nerved it, bowed it
With victories, breathed through it my spirit, its life
Clothed it with vanquish'd nations, sent it forth
Sworded with justice and with wisdom helm'd,
The one just empire of a world made one.
Forget ye, sirs, the things ye saw,—the states
Redeem'd of Lesser Asia, our own blood,—
The States subdued, first Syria, then Phœnicia,
Old Tyre, the war-winged tigress of the seas,
And Egypt next ? The Pyramids broad based
Desecrating far our advent rock'd for fear
Above their buried kings : Assyria bow'd :
The realm of Ninus fought upon her knees
Not long : the realm of Cyrus kiss'd the dust :
From lost Granicus rang the vanquish'd wail

To Issus : on Arbela's plain it died.
 Chaldæa, Persia, Media, Susiana,
 We stepp'd above these corpses in our ride
 To Parthia, and Hyrcania, Bactriana,
 And Scythia's endless waste,—
 The cry from Paromisis answer gave
 To Drangiana's dirge : thy doom, Aria,
 To wan-faced Acherosia spake her own :
 In vain the Indian-Caucasus hurl'd down
 From heaven-topp'd crags her floods to bar my way :
 Flood-like we dash'd on vales till then but known
 To gods, not men of Greece. Bear witness, ye
 Aornus, from thine eagle-baffling crest
 (Vainly by Hercules himself assail'd)
 By us, down pluck'd, and Nysæ, Bacchus built,
 When Bacchus trod the East. What hands were those
 Which from the grove Nysæan and fissured rocks
 The Bacchic ivies rent ? Whose foreheads wore them ?
 Whose lips upraised the Bacchus praising hymn ?
 Whose hands consummated his work—restored
 To liberty and laws the god-built city ?
 Sirs, the vile end of all is briefly told.
 We pierced the precincts of the Rivers Five ;
 Indus, and other four. The jewell'd crowns
 Of those dusk sovereigns fell flat before us :
 The innumerable armies open'd like the wind
 That sighs around an arrow, while we pass'd :
 Those moving mountains, the broad elephants,
 Went down with all their towers. We reached Hydaspes :
 Nations, the horizon blackening, o'er it hung :—
 Porus, exult ! In ruin thine we trace ;
 While mine, in conquest's hour, upon the banks
 Of Hyphasis. What stayed me on my way ?
 An idiot army in mid-victory dumb !
 I gave them time—three days : those three days past,
 Ye heard a voice—"The gods forbid our march" :—
 Sirs, 'twas a falsehood ! On the Olympian height
 That day the immortal concourse crouched for shame :
 Their oracles were dead. 'Twas I that spake it !
 I was, that hour, the Olympian height twelve-throned
 That hid the happy empire in the cloud,
 And this mine oracle—"Of those dumb traitors
 Not one shall wash his foot in Ganges' wave."
 I built twelve altars on that margin, each
 A temple's height, and eastward pointing :—Why ?
 To lift my witness 'gainst you to the gods !
 Once more, as then, I spurn you, slaves ! Your place
 Is vacant. Time shall judge this base desertion

Which leaves me but the conquer'd to complete
The circle of my conquests. Gods, it may be,
Shall vouch it holy, men confirm it just ;
Your places in the ranks are yours no more.

What a marvellous scene those noble lines, poured forth with the rush and swell of exultant, half-ecstatic improvisation, conjure up before us ! The generals, silent, and fearful for the king, the sullenly-muttering crowd of troops, in the martial garb of Greece, pressing round the rock platform, the bleeding corpses of the thirteen ringleaders, stricken with swift death, their heads tossed among the crowd ; and the young sovereign, helmed and armour-clad, alone, on the verge of the great angry multitude, unvisited by the remotest consciousness that there may exist personal danger for him, royally contemptuous of the short-sighted treason of his Greeks, and carried away by the tumultuous passion and pride of his crowding, glorious memories. This is the most outspoken speech of Alexander, but in every line given to him there breathes the grandeur of the Pagan soul ; a superhuman loftiness, the swift decisiveness of the consummately practical genius which compressed the peerless deeds of a lifetime into those ten brief years ; the ruthlessness of his age, the subtlety of his race, and the restless, unsatisfied spirit which could not be filled, or stilled, by any of the theories of the successive mythologies which shared the world among them. Of ruthless personal cruelty Mr. Aubrey de Vere does not hold Alexander to have been guilty ; but he represents, by a few finely artistic strokes, the indifference to human life, the unquestioning readiness to sacrifice, or rather to employ it as a means to an end, common to all great conquerors ; and in his treatment of that difficult and disputed episode in Alexander's career, the execution of Parmenio, he exhibits with exquisite skill the inbred subtlety and foresight of Alexander. The violent half-mad grief and self-condemnation of Alexander, when, moved to a transport of rage by the impertinence of Cleitus, he killed him, was natural to, was harmonious with, the character of the king. It is equally natural and harmonious that having sent Philotas, the son of Parmenio to be judged, with reluctance, indeed, but yet when he is found deserving of death, he should regard the execution of the sentence calmly, and dismiss the subject with astute words in which his own nature finds subtle expression. When the parasites cry "A traitor died this day !" — Alexander answers thus :—

A man whose death was needful died this day ;
Likewise a man whose guilt was probable

To certainty well nigh—but yet, not certain,
 Since cowards, tortured, may confess things false.
 Philotas or conspired or else connived,
 And each of these is capital, or changed
 From keen to dullard in a sort that's death
 In nature's capital code. *I, in his place,*
Had ta'en small umbrage at my days abridged :
There lived nor scope nor purpose in his life
Which death could mar.

The same court has judged Parmenio, who has gone to Ecbatana, and Alexander consents, despite Hephestion's earnest prayer, to the execution of the sentence. After a farewell to Alexander, which is one of the finest passages in the poem, and Alexander, after he has dismissed the generals, Hephestion with them, soliloquizes thus—affording another clear view of his many-sided character :—

Hephestion's cause is stronger than he knows :
 Parmenio's death will much perturb the army ;
 Yet he must die. He'll hear of his son's death
 Ere my best speed could reach Ecbatana :
 The troops around him there are as his children,
 And, with the imperial treasury at his beck,
 Nations will be his friends.
 Parmenio's death will much perturb the army :
 New wars will aptliest teach it to forget—
 To India then ! Thus stands my doubt resolved.
 To that through all this tanglement I leant,
 Yet knew it not till now.
 Yon priest at Hierosolyma, 'tis true,
 Spake much of Term and Limit. *That's for others :*
To grasp a world for me is feasible ;
To keep a half world, not.

Mr. Aubrey de Vere would have made his phrase stronger, and his antithesis more correct, by the substitution of “ hold ” for “ keep ” in the last line.

On his return from his successful expedition to India, Alexander again gives utterance to the religious problems which trouble him ; but pride and success have worked their will with him, and the spiritual is fading fast. He has brought back with him Calanus, a Brahmin, and in his discussion with Hephestion of the strange faith which renders this man,—who asks nothing of the king but a funeral pyre to be furnished at his demand,—so impervious to earthly ambition and human feeling, which makes his genuine disdain of all Alexander's achievements spontaneous as his breathing, and places him entirely beyond the reach of any surprise of the king's, the

following profound and noble passage occurs, with which we must close our quotations from illustrations of the king's character, before we proceed to examine the dramatic form and development of the poem :—

HEPHESTION (speaks).

The Indian's faith may soar as high as heaven :
His pride is narrow as the Cynic's tub.

ALEXANDER.

You hate Calanus.

HEPHESTION.

What I love is Truth :
'Tis great : and therefore humbleness must win it,
Not pride, if won at all.

ALEXANDER.

This only know we—
We walk upon a world not knowable
Save in those things which knowledge least deserve,
Yet capable, not less, of task heroic.
My trust is in my work : on that I fling me,
Trampling all questionings down.

HEPHESTION.

From realm to realm
You've chased the foe like dreams.

ALEXANDER.

I sometimes think
That I am less a person than a power,
Some engine in the right hand of the gods,
Some fateful wheel that, round in darkness rolling,
Knows this—its work ; but not that work's far scope.
Hephestion, what is life ? My life, since boyhood,
Hath been an agony of means to ends :
An ultimate end I find not. For that cause,
On reeling in the oppression of a void,
At times I welcome what I once scarce brook'd,
The opprobrium of blank sleep——”

In these, and many other passages, and by innumerable touches, the poet depicts the great Macedonian, and makes him live. In all, there is no touch of tenderness, no softening of the crystal brilliancy and hardness of the heroic ideal. As we shall presently see, this applies to even the one friendship of Alexander. With skill which demands our utmost admiration, Mr. Aubrey de Vere never brings Alexander on the scene together with the pure and lovely women who play their parts in the drama ; not even with Sisygambis, the mother of Darius, of whom his conception is very noble and pathetic. So slight a circumstance does Alexander hold his

marriage with the daughter of the conquered Persian monarch, —apart from its political significance,—that he merely alludes to it, between the speculative portion of his discourse with Hephestion, and a cunning order that the General shall deny to the army the lists of the dead, slain in the Indian campaign. A casual mention of his demeanour at the wedding feast is made by Ptolemy, the materialist and rationalist, who says :—

My place was on the dais, near the queen :
The strong eye of the king made inquest ever,
As when we fight it roams the battle-field,
Around the hall.

There is no mention of the queen at his death, by Alexander, nor of him by her, in the exquisite scene which contrasts the powerful and pathetic close of the drama, wherein she muses by night over the incurable grief of her sister, Hephestion's widow, and pines for a dearer faith than the fire-worshipping philosophy of Persia, albeit it had consolations all unknown to any other system of Pagan times.

Next to the great study of Alexander which is the life of this noble and beautiful poem, is that of his beloved friend. Mr. Aubrey de Vere has formed an ideal of Hephestion which, while it absolutely contrasts with that of Alexander, is infinitely beautiful in its pure selflessness, its lofty gentleness, its true and tender humanity, its practical self-abnegation, its patient wisdom, its tranquil dutifulness and quiet courage, its justice, its tendency to reverie, and its immense power of loving. The most sympathizing, the most flawlessly true of friends to his great, dread sovereign, he is the wisest, most unflinching of counsellors, though often unheeded, and, himself untouched by ambition, undegraded by the actualities of that stormy and terrible decade of conquest, full of thought and yearning for the solution of the unseen world, he answers to every mood of his friend with all the dexterity and more than the intelligence of a woman. This surpassing love is the key-note of the drama, which has sweet, solemn undertones of a woman's love and lofty self-conquest in it too. Let us see how it is struck. The drama is in a series of *tableaux*, pauses between achievement and recommencement in the conqueror's career. The first act embraces the passage of the Granicus, and the conquest of Persia. The nascent treason of Philotas, and the discontent of Parmenio are indicated in the first scene, which takes place on the shore at Sestos, where the troops are about to be embarked. In the first sentence spoken by Parmenio we find one of the gems

of expression, a phrase and a picture in one, with which the poem is thickly studded.

Calas; yon tide
Will try the nerves of your Thessalian steeds,
And point their boding ears.

In an instant the scene of the embarkation is before us, the high running surf, the dancing galleys, the rearing, recalcitrant horses, with the necks and the nostrils we know from the old friezes. The hurt pride, the snubbed self-importance of the aged general, who had been the friend and guide of Philip of Macedon, his complaints of how this young man picks his brains, undoubting of his own superiority;—his unwilling, but honourable tribute to the youth's capacity as a general, an organizer, a handler of men, are our first taste of the quality of this drama. It is to Ptolemy, the future king of Egypt and historian of the wars, that Parmenio speaks his discontent, when Ptolemy has observed that Alexander "owes him much."

A realm his father owed me,
And knew it well. The son is reverent, too,
But with a difference, sir. In Philip's time
My voice was Delphic on the battle-field:
This young man taps the springs of my experience
As though with water to allay his wine
Of keener inspirations. "Speak thy thought,
Parmenio!" Ere my words are half-way out
He nods approval, or he smiles dissent.
Still, there is like him none! I marvell'd oft
To see him breast that tempest from the north,
Drowning revolt in the Danubian wave.
The foe in sight, instant he knew their numbers;
If distant, guess'd their whereabouts—how lay
The intermediate tract—if fordable
The streams—the vales accessible to horse:
'Twas like the craft of beasts remote from man.

The last line is one of the subtlest beauties of this poem. To appreciate it aright we must bind it up with that other great saying of Parmenio's (in the fourth act) when he and Philotas are journeying along the road to Rhagœ near the Caspian Gates; and Philotas half broaches to his father his treasonable projects, attempting to base them on Alexander's insanity, in which he has affected to believe since the king has claimed kinship with Achilles, and anointed the pillar on his grave

at Troy. The two sayings united form a wonderful definition of heroism illumined by genius. Philotas speaks :—

I grant his greatness were his godship sane !
But note his brow ; 'tis Thought's least earthly temple :
Then mark, beneath, that round, not human eye,
Still glowing like a panther's ! In his body
No passion dwells ; but all his mind is passion,
Wild intellectual appetite and instinct,
That works without a law.

PARMENIO.

But half you know him.

There is a zigzag lightning in his brain
That flies in random flashes, yet not errs :
Chances his victories seem ; but link those chances
And under them a science you shall find,
Though unauthentic, contraband, illicit,
Yea, contumelious oft to laws of war.
Fortune, that as a mistress smiles on others,
Serves him as duty-bound : her blood is he,
Born in the purple of her royalties.

The first glimpse afforded us of Alexander,—in a phrase of Seleucus (afterwards King of Syria, and of Asia to the Indus), —is finely contrived. Craterus, one of the generals, speaks :—

He likes not Troy. His gaze, that's onward ever,
Like gaze of one that watches for the dawn,
Is bent to the earth.

SELEUCUS.

Far other beam'd it late,
When in mid-channel, lifting high the bowl,
He poured to great Poseidon and the nymphs
Their dues ; far other when abroad he flung,
Nighing the shore, his spear, that shook for gladness,
Rooted in Asia's soil.

Alexander and Hephestion enter, and the conqueror haughtily questions the Trojans concerning the fanes, and alludes to the legend of his own descent from Zeus ; alludes to it as a fable and a scandal, but it is there, in his brain, for all that. He and Hephestion walk on together, seeking Achilles' grave. When they reach it, Alexander anoints and crowns the pillar, and apostrophizes Achilles in lines which are to our thinking unmatched for expression. of the loftiest form of the Pagan mind, the belief in the hereafter, the yearning for the real and the visible, the hopelessness in aught but the pale "shades ;" the tribute still within the power of the living to

pay to the dead. We may not quote the whole of this apostrophe, but we cannot forbear a few lines, wonderfully interpenetrated with the spiritual mood of the time.

'Mid the strengthless heads
That, reverent, round thee flock—like thee lamenting,
Despite the embalm'd purpureal airs, and gleam
Immeasurable of amaranthine meads,
The keen, reviving, strenuous airs of earth,
And blasts from battle fields ; like thee detesting
That frustrate, stagnant, ineffectual bourne
Whose substance melts to shadow—lift, great king,
Once more from out the gloom a face sun-bright,
Elysium's wonder, on thy son's, and hear him :
To thee this day he consecrates his greatness :
Whate'er malign and intercepting Death
Detracted from thy greatness, he concedes thee ;
Remands thee from the gulph the deed unborn ;
Yields thee, ere won, his victory, and his empire.

After this outburst, the youthful hero turns away, but Hephestion lingers, and now comes the key-note of this noble and affecting composition. When Hephestion rejoins Alexander, the following dialogue takes place :—

ALEXANDER (speaks).

You tarried : Wherefore ?

HEPHESTION.

For justice' sake, and friendship's. Is there room
For nothing, then, but greatness on the earth ?
I crown'd that other tomb.

ALEXANDER.

What tomb ?

HEPHESTION.

It stood

Close by, the loftier ;—greater love had raised it ;—
Patroclus' tomb.

ALEXANDER.

'Tis strange I mark'd it not.

HEPHESTION.

These two were friends.

ALEXANDER.

Aye : nor in death divided.

HEPHESTION.

Therefore, despite that insolent sect, the gods
Are provident for things on earth.

ALEXANDER.

Hephestion !

That which Patroclus to Achilles was
 Art thou to me—my nearest and mine inmost.
 In them, not lives alone, but fates were join'd.
 Patroclus died—Achilles followed soon.

In these lines we have the first indication of that essential difference of character which renders Hephestion so complete a contrast to his friend, the first lines of that exquisitely finished picture which is unsurpassed, within our knowledge, by any conception of any poet. We dwell upon the character of Hephestion, as the progress of the drama brings it out, with enthusiastic admiration and deep, growing love. Solitary he stands amid the crowd, all lofty personages in their way, because while he fulfils the highest Pagan ideal of honour, courage, devotion, calm, and wisdom, there is a light in his spirit, an influence in his heart, a fore-knowledge in his words far beyond and above that ideal. Peerless among the generals, but holding the conquests of peace above those of war; merciful, "blithesome" and sweet-natured; wise but guileless, of a simple heart, full of loving-kindness and slow to suspicion, gentle and reverent to women, of a pitiful and musing disposition, deep of thought, and eloquent of speech, full of calm foresight, incapable of exultation, and holding grandeur in but light esteem for himself, yet joyously glad in his friend's greatness; pondering on death and the life beyond, without the apprehensive discontent of the Greeks, and touched with the aspiration, loftier if more vague, of the Persian creed;—so wide-minded and incapable of any meanness, that he is unconscious of the jealousy which he excites; his love for Alexander so pure and perfect, that he does not comprehend that any motive less than itself could possibly be assigned to it; and so self-effacing that he does not count it a flaw in its object that the reciprocity of the king is in affection only, not in comprehension and the inner sympathy which he needs, and gets, from Hephestion. In this first scene between the friends we trace the ever-present, delicate, perceptive tenderness of Hephestion—"greater love hath raised it"—his mind is full of the parallel which only comes to Alexander when it is suggested, but which then finds utterance in words full of intense feeling, of almost fierce love, defiant of the Fates. No doubt Alexander is full of pride, inflated with victory, dazzled by the programme which is stretching itself out in his eager mind, but we can see the slight small frame throb with sudden emotion, the grasp of the hand, strong in battle, unerring

in aim, the swift-receding flush spreading to the helmed brow, and the quick softening of the eagle eyes as he turns them on the calm, lovelit face of Hephestion, and utters the protestation which is a prophecy—"My nearest and mine inmost"—only Holy Writ has ever found definition of love to exceed that—"Patroclus died—Achilles followed soon." To feel the full strength and beauty of the words; to realize the lofty meaning of the scene—(what a subject for an artist, the two figures, the world's Wonder and his friend, in the Trojan plains near the crowned tombs!)—we must bear in mind the context,—the fulness of life, the shrinking from death, the dread of Elysium, which have found utterance in Alexander's apostrophe to Achilles just before,—but Alexander, who loves his life, cannot foresee it without Hephestion,—“that frustrate, stagnant, ineffectual bourne” where he should find *him*, were better than the grasped world without him. In another moment the king is busy with the affairs of the war, and ridiculing Parmenio's futile notions of his own importance; but, as Hephestion goes with him to the camp, we feel that his heart must have glowed at the tribute, which, from him to Alexander would be natural as breathing, but from the king to him was as rare as it was precious. Well may he say, in later days, when the protestation has never failed, and the prophecy is near fulfilment,—

His love is with me, though he knew me never.

Only once more, until the end, is there open utterance of Alexander's love for his friend,—it is when the king tells Hephestion that he is to marry the younger of the daughters of Darius;—the elder, whom he had designed for Hephestion, the Princess Arsinoe, being designated by the immemorial laws of Persia to share the mightiest throne on earth, his own. Only a slender strain of love is permitted to mingle with the lofty, and tragic, yet sweet notes of this poem. Its music is all for Hephestion. Arsinoe loves him, Amastris, who dies, loves him, and he wins the love of his unknown girl-bride, as is told in some beautiful lines which point the contrast between the demeanour of Hephestion at the marriage feast, and that of Alexander. The latter we have already commented upon; here are the former:—

Courteous and kind, though grave,
Hephestion reassured a startled bride,
And on a face, whose smiles with tears were spangled,
Made light at last prevail. She sat at first
Heart-wildered—yet amused; her roe-like eyes

The darker for the paleness of her cheeks
 And garland-shaded brows. The feast not o'er,
 Peace came to her through trust in him close by :
 Wife-love had made a seven years' growth.

The extreme beauty of the scene in which Alexander informs his friend of his intentions, is hardly to be exaggerated by praise. The living vividness of the characters and their contrast; the quick sensitiveness of Alexander to Hephestion's looking ill, though he has no conception of his feelings; the entire resignation, the noble self-renunciation of Hephestion, complete the ideal of him in the reader's mind, who is to see and hear him but once again, when he utters a soliloquy, after the king has, unconsciously, dealt him the stroke of keenest disappointment, in his callous way :—

These things are nought. The maids are good alike :
 You'll have the lovelier bride, the nobler I
 In Asian heraldry.

The ceaseless activity of Alexander's mind, ever busy with things great and small, careful of petty details, in the midst of great politics, is dexterously shown here. Seleucus interrupts the interview between the king and Hephestion, by announcing the assembling of the Council ; and Alexander replies :—

Hence ! To the council I divulge this marriage :
 And show this missive from the aged queen,
 So lofty, and yet grateful. I had forgotten :—
 Those spoils by Xerxes filched, those statues twinn'd,
 Harmodius and Aristogeiton styled
 (I deem them unauthentic, like the merit
 Of those seditious boors whose names they boast),
 That shine in brass before the palace portals,
 To Athens send, with orders that they stand
 By Theseus' temple. Be it done this night.

It would be impossible to enumerate the fine touches of skill of this kind which go to the making up of the perfection of this dramatic poem. The reader will hardly discover them on a first perusal ; he will be emotionally impressed by the force, beauty, and interest of the drama,—the difficulties of supplying the connecting links in a design so destructive of “the unities,” and the skill which has surmounted them will strike him at once ; but the lesser lights and shades will require a second and perhaps a third perusal for their due appreciation. After this skilful indication of a leading trait in Alexander's character,—one, however, which most great men possess in

common,—comes Hephestion's soliloquy, which is, taken in conjunction with his later utterances to Arsinoë, where he nobly lauds the king, and seeks to win for him all his bride's reverence and esteem, perhaps the finest passage in what we may call the sentimental and interior interest of the poem :—

HEPHESTION (speaks).

'Twas all but won ; 'tis lost, and lost for ever !
To her no loss : she knew not of my love :
I half foresaw, and sent her never message.
'Twas but a child ! Ah, yes, yet childish eyes
Through darkness shining could illume my dreams,
Star-like could pierce the low-hung battle cloud,
In victory's hour could wake in me a heart
Tenderly righteous. Ah, yes, yet childish hands
'Mid burning wastes could bind my brow with wreaths
Cold as the northern morn ; a childish voice,
Still heard 'mid Lydian measures, could expel
Their venom'd softness, leaving them but plaintive.
Must all end thus ? Oh, mockery, mockery, mockery !
Shall one be zealous for my body's health,
Make inquisition of mine altered cheek,—
Adventure to exalt that fame I laugh at,—
The dignities I spurn, my golden fortunes,
Yet, there where only lives my spirit, lay
A hand more callous than his courser's hoof,
And crush the thing he feels not ? Down, base thoughts !
The crisis of his fortunes is upon him ;
I will not fail him at his utmost need ;
His love is with me, though he knew me never.

Even then the traitor Phylax is plotting against Hephestion's life, to carry out the vengeance bequeathed to him by Philotas, quickened by the unintentional words of Ptolemy, the delineation of whose rationalistic positivist mind is one of Mr. Aubrey de Vere's great achievements. In his prison Philotas had said to Phylax, who asked him if he would have him kill the king :—

Not him,—Hephestion !

'Tis there he's vulnerable. Be it done
When the Alexandrian sun is at its highest.

This scene between Philotas and Phylax contains many fine lines, especially those spoken by the condemned criminal, where Phylax—whose truth to his dead friend's trust is admirable in its wicked way, and heathenishly virtuous—has pledged his promise :—

An ice film gathers on my shiv'ring blood.
Oh happy days of youth ! They 'll laugh at me :

A shadow 'mid the shades, as I have laughed
 At Homer's ghosts bending to victim blood
 A sieve-like throat incapable of joy !
 Tell me these things are fables. I'd not live
 A second time ; for life's too dangerous !
 We come from nothing ; and another nothing,
 A hoary Hunger, couchant at Death's gate,
 Waits to devour us.

When Alexander has conquered India and weds Darius's daughter, Phylax thinks the time has come, and Ptolemy's words confirm him. They are spoken at Susa, in the front of the palace, where the exulting generals are discussing the details of the great campaign, and the dangers that may arise to the king, in peace, from Persian sources. Then Ptolemy says :—

Persia's not the danger :
 He's vulnerable inly, not without,
 Through that fierce will which makes of wrath a madness ;
 Turns love to doom. Hephestion's brave and wise ;
 He takes an ample sweep of virtues ; still,
 In valour he's not greater than Seleucus,
 In insight than Craterus : yet the king
 More loves him than the total host beside.
 Such love is peril ; 'tis to keep two bodies,
 Two separate tenements of one frail life,
 And obvious each to Fortune's shafts,—or Fate's.

In this speech, and in many other slight touches, there thrills through the drama the strong pulses of the king's love for Hephestion, so rarely uttered, seemingly so little effective to sway or change his own headlong will ; and the reader approaches the splendid scenes in which the marriage-pomps are portrayed, full of pity for the exultant young monarch, whose glory is in its zenith, and who is about to be struck to the heart, through its only strong affection. Incomparably fine is the scene between Hephestion and Arsinoë before the marriage, the last in which we hear any utterance of his ; that which brings out strongly the superior spirituality of the Persian religion, and the craving in the higher minds who believed in it for the serenity and the rest of a Divine revelation, to supplement and round their own rough-hewn conceptions of the contending powers of Good and Evil. The glorious loyalty and truth which animate Hephestion's words, spoken to the woman whom he loves, with a love higher it may be than we have any right to associate with the Pagan ideal, concerning the friend who takes her from him ; the sorrowful

sweetness, submission, and wisdom of Arsinoe, full of the sadness which must have been the portion of the groper after truth in those days, as it is the portion of the groper after truth in these; and of the stedfast loftiness of the princely nature (those "royal qualities" which so impressed her husband, later, that he appointed her regent of the kingdom during that campaign in the West which was soon to take place), the perfect self-control of both—all these render this scene supremely beautiful. The thread of human love mingled with the great web of heroic passions and events with which the drama deals, is slight indeed, but it shows out pure and golden in Hephestion's noble assurance to the Persian princess:—

The king will give you of his great, strong heart
What he can spare to woman, and revere
More than he loves. Your faith he honour'd once,
Would it were his!

We hear Hephestion's voice for the last time. With the accomplishment of the odious crime of Phylax, with the fulfilment of his well-planned, justly-estimated revenge, comes a severe test of the writer's capacity to execute the great task he has undertaken. He stands the test most nobly. The king's dreadful grief is as reticent as his deep love. It has ruined his life, broken his heart, and inspired him with a terrible, unmanageable restlessness. The eager bitterness of it, the sickening despair of it, the haunting loneliness of it, the humiliating teaching of it, that death is stronger than the mightiest, and the king master of all save his own life, and that one life without which his own is empty past the power of full-fed ambition to replenish; the moodiness, the increase of self-will and of violence, the stern reluctance to name the name of him who passed away from his hold, just as divine honours—awful irony!—had been decreed to the king; these and many other fine effects are so brought out by the poet that the inmost heart of the reader is keenly touched. The last scene before that terrible episode of Hephestion's death is quite magnificent: it is Alexander's address to his generals and the magnates of his empire, Greek and Asiatic, at the great temple at Ecbatana, in which he announces his intention to institute peace (Hephestion's strong desire), and declares that two decrees have been sent to Greece that day; the first "remands all exiled citizens to their ancient homes," the last

demands for me that titular meed
Which, not alone on offspring of the gods,

But likewise upon mortals well-deserving,
 Though waiting Death's immortalizing touch,
 Mankind with joy confers—honours divine.

Then comes the quick, all expressive question, "Where's Hephestion"? and the bodeful answer, made by Perdiccas:—

Hephestion, sir, is slightly fever-touched,
 And keeps his house.

A short scene, in prose, between Phylax and his page, concludes the fourth act, and is of a quality difficult to overpraise, in the force, the quaintness, the true Greek subtlety and fell humour of it; its terrible contrast with the grand boastfulness of the mighty, powerless, triumphant, wretched mortal to whom it means desperate defect and cruelty.

THE PAGE.

I heard all. The king made a gladsome speech, and showed that how at last his fortune had topped the summit, and sailed away among the stars. There shall be wars no more; but here he will abide in glory and feasting for ever and ever. Hephestion is sick in the lesser palace; and this missive commandeth that thou shalt raise him up, and make him a sound man by eleven o'clock to-morrow; for he must exhort the council at noon.

PHYLAX.

It is well: depart! (*The page retires.*) The gods are turned cynic, and will have jest to rule! My master, Diogenes is dead, and is carried to Olympus: his sign is the constellation of the Tub, and he raineth influence upon earth. Many a month have I lain in wait for Hephestion, and now the king putteth him into my hand! Now also the Alexandrian that is at its highest. [This is a recurrence to the last injunction of Philotas.] I were an infidel if I recognized not the omen. A fresh wind bloweth in from the garden. Red rose, thou blushest unto me! White lily, thou curtsiest unto me! Thais of the Feast and Phryne of the Bath, I scorn you alike! These sealed packets hold minerals more mastering than ever built up woman bones. Here is "courage by the ounce," and there is "needful flight." This is "jealousy," and here is—I have found it at last—"long silence." I could label these heart-quellers with heavenly names; but it sufficeth. Hephestion, if thou meetest Philotas in the shades salute him from me!

The four acts on which we have lightly and all insufficiently dwelt, abound in passages of noble poetry which we can merely indicate. High among them rank the burst of exultant description in which Alexander tells Hephestion his dream of the future Alexandria. It will be found at page 30, and is prefaced by these finely characteristic lines. Alexander is gazing upon the sea from a cliff opposite New Tyre when Hephestion joins him, and says:—

How long you gaze on yonder beaming sea !
It burns mine eyes like fire.

ALEXANDER.

It gladdens mine,
Being irradiate and illimitable.

Alexander's stormy rage when he learns the treachery by which the fall of Damascus was accomplished by his generals ; Hephestion's fulfilment of his mission to the Persian Queen ; the infinite pure tenderness of his later description of her to her orphan daughter ; the soliloquy of Ptolemy at the gate of the temple of Jerusalem : the interview of Alexander with the High Priest ; Alexander's triumph over the fall of Tyre, beginning with the two grand lines :—

So perish sea-born Tyre that ruled the waters !
She sinks, like yonder sun, in a sea all blood :—

the quarrel between Alexander and Parmenio, and the old general's prophetic farewell, than which we do not know statelier verse or grander treatment of a great historic fact ; Alexander's address to the corpse of Darius, when he covers it with his own royal mantle ; the entire episode of Calanus, which is altogether masterly and subtly humorous (especially the touch of practical exposition of his doctrines, and cynical contempt, in his burning himself alive upon the king's marriage day, and Alexander's perception of the bad manners of the deed),—the beauty and the skill of all these cannot fail to strike the reader, the splendid scene of the quelling of the revolt of the Greeks we have already commented upon ; and, most reluctantly, for we would fain linger over many a page in the great story, we must pass on to the fifth act, the crowning achievement of a work which merits immortality.

The reader approaches its perusal under the influence of the concluding scenes of the fourth act, of the triumph of Alexander, whose " fortunes touch at last their zenith height, and sail among the stars," and of the assassin purpose of Phylax, about to turn that triumph to dust and ashes. The fifth act opens on the road to Babylon, whether the troops are marching. Alexander and his generals appear. In the rear ride Ptolemy, Seleucus, Eumenes, and Antigonus, discoursing of the risks which have been incurred by the king's exaction of the extremest tokens of public mourning from all races alike under his rule, and the omens which bode ill to him. In their speech, the desperate anguish of Alexander, to which he gives no vent in words, finds eloquent utterance. Ptolemy, with the keen wariness of a Court historian, speaks warningly of what are to him but prejudices, yet to be soothed, not outraged :—

Sirs, be ye wary in your homeward letters,
 The Greeks are reverential of the gods :
 The fane of Esculapius razed to earth
 In vengeance for Hephestion's death, may move them.

Poor mortal, just made a god by a decree, Alexander has torn down a god's temple, who did not save the life he loved. Childish, natural, unrelieving passion of the Pagan !

Then comes Eumenes' sage reference to the sagacity of that hero, who always reminds us of Louis Philippe and his son-in-law Leopold combined :—

Ulysses, keenest-witted of man's race,
 Made boast, " No Greek with hand so large as mine
 Has paid the gods their dues."

Antigonus has his testimony to bear to the obstinate conservativeness of the Medes, who do not like the novelty of the observances :—

The Medes are wroth :
 Their mules and horses shorn, they deem'd the rite
 The obsequious tribute of a royal mourning :
 When from their city walls the summit fell
 The rite was new : they frowned.

PTOLEMY.

So frown'd the Persians
 Their " quenchless fire " extinguish'd.

SELEUCUS.

Let them frown !
 When that mute tent roll'd forth its thunder peals
 I drew my breath. I said, " the king will live ! "

In all this there comes out the harshness and despotism of the king's grief. He will give pain though he cannot ensure the sharing of his sorrow ; he will enforce the tribute of inanimate things. " His inmost and his nearest " has been taken from him, the peace and joy and counsel of his life are gone ;—shall citadels wear their crests, or cavalcades be gay with braided manes and tails, or worshippers preserve the sacred symbols of light and hope, when these were quenched for Alexander ? He is the Lord of the earth, and he will set upon it marks of his great helpless anguish ; though each mark so set does but grave upon his own spirit its desolation, and upon his pride a cruel scar of mockery and impotence. All true, all natural ; have not we who are Christians, and mourn not as men without hope, felt that we would fain make all the world a grave when the light of our eyes has been hidden in the dust ? He was Alexander, the greatest ; and he

did it. The succeeding lines give a beautiful sad summary of the missing spirit which infused the four acts with its sweet greatness.

PTOLEMY (speaks).

There lives no Greek that wept not for Hephestion ;
Men say, " The army's strength remains : its youth—
The beauty of the battle—victory's gladness—
These, these are dead." 'Twas not his words or deeds :
For this they loved him—that the good in each
Flower'd in his presence, making sweet the soul.

The beauty and the " blithesomeness " lost with Hephestion form an exquisite contrast with the fierce moodiness of the " triply-altered " king, and Seleucus, the optimist general, with whom the king could do no wrong, who could not even brook that the soldiers should dare to perceive that Alexander was not tall, strikes in with the true ring of military pride, and honest hearty friendship.

His cavalry shall bear his name for ever :
Henceforth who rules it as his vicar, rules
Arm'd with his ring. His sister-tended bride
Delights her sad sick-bed with his last words,
" My faithful, true, and honourable wife : "
If any happy lived, and timely died,
It is the man we miss.

Seleucus is a superficial observer, which is consistent with his character, and thinks the king is getting over his grief because he has resumed his ordinary habits, and is going to war again, having cast aside the project of rest and peace so dear to Hephestion. The poem swells to sublime pictorial power in the description of the funeral pyre, " grief's madness—yet its beauty, too,"—" earth's supremest structure, seen, and lost ; " which cannot be quoted whole, and must not be mutilated. With the first words of Alexander, spoken in tones of stern, brief command, we feel the change that has passed upon him ; we feel the truth of Ptolemy's words, when Astar the Magian says to him, surprised : " War with the West ! Your king has changed his purpose."

Sharp grief has changed it. Grief that should be gentle,
To him is storm. Fiercely it bears him on
Through action's angriest skies.

ASTAR.

The king is strong :

His eye as keen and bright, but glad no more ;
That iron will still clutches its Hephestion.

The wise Magian and the cool unbelieving Greek discuss the king, whose pride, while weakening on one side into vanity, is soaring on the other nigh to madness, and the prophecy of Parmenio is beginning to fulfil itself. Another prophecy is uttered by the Persian sage; it ends thus:—

Nations have vanish'd 'neath a conqueror's tread ;
 Nations have perish'd, worn by civil strife ;
 Nations have wither'd, famine-plagued : but Greece,
 The beautiful, the wise, the once heroic,
 A suicide shall die, nor leave a child
 To inearth the barren corpse.

The fifth scene is marvellously skilful as well as beautiful. Every thread of the ten years' story is taken up in it, every chord is touched. It passes on the Lake of Pallacopas, near Babylon, where Alexander caught the cold which killed him; and commences with his command that at break of the next day, ten thousand men shall begin to cut through the rock a channel for Euphrates. The king's barge passes the spot where the Hebrew slaves are working, and Alexander, inquiring about them, is reminded of his old, unachieved purpose to visit once Hierosolyma again. He asks what chant it is they sing, so different to the notes which float towards his barge from those of the Persian and Babylonian escort. Then comes a beautiful paraphrase of the song of the captivity:—

We sate beside the Babylonian river :
 Within the conqueror's bound, weeping we sate :
 We hung our harps upon the trees that quiver
 Above the rushing waters desolate.

A song they claimed—the men our task who meted—
 "A song of Sion sing us, exile band !"
 For song they sued, in pride around us seated ;
 How can we sing it in the stranger's land ?

If I forget thee, Salem, in thy sadness,
 May this right hand forget the harper's art !
 If I forget thee, Salem, in my gladness,
 My tongue dry up, and wither, like my heart !

Daughter of Babylon, with misery wasted,
 Blest shall he be the man who hears thy moans ;
 Who gives thee back the cup that we have tasted ;
 Who lifts thy babes, and hurls them on the stones !

The music thrills the hidden grief-chord in Alexander breast ;
 and it makes impatient moan :—

That song's a dirge, with notes of anger in it :
I hate the grief that nothing is save grief.

The barge passes the Assyrian rock-tombs, and Alexander fixes on the site of his city; but the rain begins to fall, and the king himself "stronger than he was at Tyre," is solicitous for the aged Artabazus. "Our Artabazus is old for summer drenchings," are his kindly words, to which the old man answers:—

Twenty years
Press down my seventy. Sire, I should have pass'd
Long since, yet may outlive the three years' child.

With every line the interest of the fifth act increases, and the beauty of the conception is strengthened. The gathering of the omens, the sickness of the king, the impatient anger of Seleucus:—

He's sick. The tempest drench'd him. Shall a shower
Wash out the one great glory from the earth?
We hid his sickness first: the secret's known:
Since then, the world's gone mad.

The utterances of the various priests, all, save the Magian, silent since the quenching of the Sacred Fire, prodigal of prayer to the Chaldaean, Greek, and Egyptian gods; the awful consternation—all are so exquisitely told, that here we think the poem has reached its utmost perfection. But no, the scenes which pass in Alexander's chamber, and the great hall where he dies, are finer far. Indeed it is difficult to express the feelings which they excite; deeper than admiration, more solemn than delight. They seem to roll back the ages in some wonderful way—the superhuman gift of the poet,—and to place us within sight of the mighty ancient ones. When Ptolemy is sent for by the king, and full of forebodings hears him chafe at the delay, that "his march is hindered," and, trying to hint of danger and needful rest, is met with the half-raving restlessness of the fever-stricken brain, endless orders, vast plans, complaints of errors in details; when he strives to make the king speak of his illness, and gets the disdainful answer:—

With pain I've wrestled oft, and flung it over:

no strong man dying in his prime was ever more real to our sight. How fine a touch of the ruling passion strong in death is this:—

My brain's not touched:
I watch it: if beyond its verge there rise
A cloud, the slenderest of bewilder'd thought,
You'll learn it thus—I close my lips for ever.

How keenly agonizing a suggestion of the unslaked grief

in the great conqueror so near his own defeat, is in the lines that follow :—

PTOLEMY.

Your thoughts are strong, my king, distinct, and plain.

ALEXANDER.

A light of conflagration makes them plain :

'Tis sent as from a pyre.

Then Ptolemy prays the immortal gods for sleep for this "high sufferer," and Alexander, asking him, "Can you guard me 'gainst ill-dreams in slumber?" narrates one, in an impassioned burst of majestic verse which, as we have said of a former gem of this work cannot be quoted, and must not be mutilated. Just one utterance from the inmost heart of the king he vouchsafes to Ptolemy, the last plaint of his consuming grief;—for its final utterance is to be all tenderness, a wondrously skilful striking in the last scene of the chord which is touched in the first. He is referring to his mother, and he says :—

I loved her in the old days : nor years, nor wars

Disturbed that image. But a greater love

In its great anguish, tramples out all others.

Then, once more—

Let not Seleucus near me !

Those onsets of his blundering, blind devotion,

So all unlike—

Yet when Seleucus comes, his noble master greets him heartily, and rousing himself, declares they shall march in five days, at dawn ; but gives him a code for Alexandria's rule,—meaning farewell. When Seleucus leaves him he turns to Ptolemy with these words :—

I note you shaken, Ptolemy : learn thence

Philosophy's a crutch for strength to play with :

It mocks our needs.

Then, dismissing him, Alexander bids him bury him "'mid sands Egyptian—'mid the Ammonian grove in my great father's fane."

The closing scene is incomparably beautiful and touching, true and simple, and contrasted with the subtlest artistic skill with that which immediately precedes it,—a soliloquy of the queen, Arsinoe, on the balcony of the palace at Ecbatana, where she is tending her widowed sister, unconscious that her own widowhood is drawing nigh ;—which we will reserve for a few words of later comment.

Alexander lies on a pallet in the great hall. All hope is

over, and the generals are talking of the oracles, and of the raving and dreaming of the night, now sunk into stupor. The soldiers clamour for entrance, and they let them in—this is the end ; to our mind, supremely beautiful.

SELEUCUS (speaks).

The soldiers' friend ! He hears their stifled moaning :
His eye is following them,—he fain would stretch
Toward them his hand !

EUMENES.

Speak to him, Ptolemy !

PTOLEMY.

Sire, it is come ! The king is king in death :
Speak the king's ordinance. Who shall wear his crown ?

ALEXANDER.

The worthiest head.

(*A long silence.*)

PTOLEMY.

Once more his lips are moving :

Perdiccas, you are keen of ear ; bend low—
Bend to his lips.

EUMENES.

His fingers move. He slides
The royal ring into Perdiccas' hand.

PTOLEMY.

Hear you no words ?

PERDICCAS.

I think he said " Patroclus."

PTOLEMY.

Once more !

PERDICCAS.

He said, " Achilles followed soon."

SELEUCUS.

And died in saying it. 'Tis past. He's gone !

A magnificent panegyric, a sublime requiem, follows, but we do not read it until later with the appreciation it merits ; at first, we cannot, and we would not pass out of the silence which follows the faltering record of that great love, the last strength of the once mighty conqueror of the world.

Whether the Alexander of this great poem be the Alexander of reality, we cannot tell, but henceforth he will be the Alexander of Mr. Aubrey de Vere's readers as wholly and as lovingly as Mr. Tennyson's " ideal knight " is all England's Arthur. With a reference to the aspiration in the soliloquy of the Queen, we must conclude these insufficient remarks. In

the aching longing for spiritual help, beyond the worship of Persia's creed—

The Lord of Light—

Is it a woman's weakness that would wish him

Another, tenderer name, the Lord of Love?

she shadows forth the truth as it was to be revealed in the fulness of time; she says:—

If earth can find,

Indeed, no answer to her children's cry,

Wandering from yon bright host a star will lead

The lowliest of her wanderers, lowly and wise,

In age still faithful to their childhood's longing,

To whom in some obscurest spot lies hid

The Saviour—soul of self-subsistent Truth,

Some great world-conquering, world-delivering might,

The future's cradled Hope.

No such beautiful expression has been given, within our knowledge, to the longing for deliverance, to the Expectation of the Nations, and we recognize in it the strain which harmonizes and completes Mr. de Vere's work. Can that work, for all its perfection as a poem, its power as a drama, be appreciated so highly as it deserves, by non-Catholics, however high their cultivation, or refined their taste? We think not—because none but Catholics can supply the inward contrast which brings the extraordinary beauties of this poem into perfect estimation; the contrast of that calm, unmoved security of belief which we who "*know in whom we believe,*" and why we believe in Him, through His unerring Revelation—offer to the tumult of theory, doubt, assertion, negation, division, and general confusion that reigns among men outside the Church to-day. The tumult assumes different forms indeed, but no less wildly and bewilderingly do the nations rage, and the heathen imagine vain things, than when Alexander of Macedon died in Pagan doubt and darkness, while the Children of the Kingdom were singing the songs of Zion in the courtyard of his palace.

ART. VI.—THE INFIDELITY OF THE DAY.—THE NEW SCHEME OF CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION.

Synodal Letter of the Archbishops and Bishops of the Province of Westminster assembled August 11th, 1874.

THE publication of this Synodal Letter may be considered the virtual inauguration of the new Institution for higher studies; and University College, which is its first fruits, will have opened at Kensington, before this number of our REVIEW is in our reader's hands.* On former occasions we have repeatedly urged the necessity of imparting a specially Catholic higher education to Catholic youths; and also the impossibility of doing this with any effectiveness, except in some college especially devoted to the purpose. In our present article we will take wider ground. We will set forth to the best of our power the necessity of some such Institution as the present, if England is to be saved from a national profession of irreligion and godlessness.† Our argument will be as follows. (1) Atheism‡ is advancing in Great Britain§ with far more

* For ecclesiastical reasons, the Institution is not yet rightly called a University; but the College is called "University College," as implying that it is intended to be the rudimental nucleus of a University.

† Our readers may possibly observe great similarity of thought between our present article, and two which appeared respectively in the "Tablet" of September 5th and September 19th. This does not arise from plagiarism, but from the simple fact that our present contributor was writer of those two articles.

‡ The thinkers to whom we are here referring commonly disclaim the name of "atheist"; because they do not say dogmatically that there is no God, but only that man has no reasonable ground of conjecture whether there be a Personal God or no. In an article like this however, it will be more intelligible and even more correct to call them "atheists." We do so firstly, because that which is not personal is not God; and because, as regards any practical effect on the heart and conduct, there is no difference between the thesis that "there is no God," and the thesis that "men have no reasonable ground of conjecture whether or no there be a God." But, secondly, it is clear that those men do dogmatically deny the existence of a Being, at once Infinitely Good and Infinitely Powerful. So Mr. Stuart Mill ("Autobiography," p. 39) implies that "dogmatic atheism" is "absurd"; while in the very next page he calls it an "open contradiction" to allege, that the world proceeds from "an Author combining infinite power with perfect goodness and righteousness."

§ We say "in Great Britain," because we believe that Ireland is as yet almost entirely exempt from the plague.

rapid strides, than Catholics in general are at all aware of. (2) It cannot be successfully resisted, except on the principles of Catholic theology and philosophy. (3) Non-Catholic Theists can give comparatively little help in the atheistic conflict, and the whole religious future of England therefore depends on efforts put forth by Catholics. (4) But these efforts will be comparatively powerless, if there be not some organization, combining Catholic energies in their movement to the desired end; unless there be some centre and nucleus of operations. (5) The new Institution is inevitably marked out by its very character, as ultimately supplying that organization which is so imperatively necessary; and in vigorously responding therefore to the appeal now placed before them by the Bishops, Catholics support the only practicable means for effectively stemming that tide of unbelief, which increases daily both in extent and power. We will treat successively these five theses; but we will dwell on the first two in particular, at much greater length than is necessary for our argument. We shall do this, partly because such expansion, though not strictly necessary to our argument, will give it nevertheless much greater point and edge. But our chief motive for dwelling on these theses is, because we think it may be serviceable for more reasons than one to place before Catholics some general view, both of the assault which is being made on religion, and of the principles which seem to us most available for its repulsion.

1. First then as to the rapidity with which atheism is advancing. We cannot better introduce what we would say on this head, than by quoting from a very valuable article, which appeared in the "Month" of September. "The advance of infidelity," says our contemporary (pp. 73, 74), "among a large part of the generation now entering, or having entered, upon the full enjoyment and use of life, has reached the line, at which even morality becomes a sentiment rather than a law; conscience a phenomenon, rather than the voice of God sitting in judgment; freewill and responsibility an imagination; the Universe a physical system, self-evolved and self-regulated; the soul of man a mechanism; the future of man a blank; sin, original and actual, a fiction; the Atonement an impossible superstition." Such opinions are even now (as we have said) far more prevalent than Catholics generally suppose, and have a fearfully wide-spread acceptance among British non-Catholics. Nor can we console ourselves with the fancy, that the plague is confined to those more highly educated. Even were this true, it would be a matter of small comfort, because such a plague necessarily in due course proceeds down-

wards. But in the present case this calamity has already occurred. Hear again the "Month."

The advance of infidelity, and of its inseparable shadow immorality, among the lower classes in our towns, the extreme activity with which the poison is spread in books, in cheap newspapers, by lectures, and the like, and the measures by which this activity should be met on the side of all who are for religion and for God, should be subjects of earnest thought and meditation, for all who have duties which bring them frequently across the evils which have just been enumerated.

It is probably within the experience of any one whose calling enables and obliges him to know the state of the minds of the lower orders even among Catholics, that questions about the Faith and the elementary truths of religion are far more rife and more troublesome than was the case twenty years ago. No one whose occupations lie among considerable numbers of men can pass many days or even many hours without hearing religious subjects discussed, and the discussion will too often take a blasphemous tone. The mechanic, the young man in the house of business, the clerk in the office, however good and sound their faith and practice may be, will often hear statements which they cannot contradict, though they feel them to be false; arguments which they cannot answer, though they know them to be fallacious. It is often the case that such persons have to spend the greater part of their time in company in which irreligious talk is *usual or perpetual*. (pp. 70, 71.)

Lord Lyttleton, in the "Contemporary" of September, asks why we should account the infidelity of the nineteenth more perilous than that of the eighteenth century. Several answers may be given to this question. One is, that various branches of science, within comparatively a very few years, have acquired an indefinitely more menacing aspect as against religious truth. But the reply on which we should ourselves lay far the most stress is, that (speaking generally) infidels of the last century were deists, those of the present atheists. It is a common saying among Catholics, that there is no resting-place between Catholicity and atheism; and so much at least must be meant by this saying, that far more substantial objections are adducible against true religion by the atheist than by the deist. Such certainly is our own conviction. In our last number we expressed our opinion (p. 171), that often some indubitable truth is encountered by objections of real force, nay, of very great force; objections which cannot be at all satisfactorily solved, even though the verity against which they are adduced is established by reason with absolute certainty. But we do not think that such objections can be raised, either by Protestants against Catholicity, or by deists against Christianity. The elder Mr. Mill, we are told by his son ("Autobiography," p. 39), considered the argument

of Butler's "Analogy" "as conclusive against the only opponents for whom it is intended." "Those who admit" continues the autobiographer "an omnipotent as well as perfectly just and benevolent maker and ruler of such a world as this, can say little against Christianity, but what can with at least equal force be retorted against themselves."

To our mind indeed, the one objection against religion, which by itself exceeds in force all other objections put together, is the difficulty of supposing, that a world, containing evil such in degree, in kind, in distribution, as is found on earth, can have proceeded from a Being at once Infinitely Powerful and Infinitely Good. The atheistical party go so far as to call this a direct and absolute contradiction. And this their allegation is one which is founded, not on subtle sophisms or dark speculations, but on patent facts, which press themselves on the notice of every man at every turn. Take even the least educated portion of mankind: so soon as their traditional belief in religion is undermined, the allegation we have mentioned often impresses them with the character of a self-evident truth; nor can any fair person doubt that, when an ordinary Catholic meets with it put down in black and white, it may naturally present to him a most formidable appearance. But in truth the putting it on paper by no means does justice to its practical force, as he encounters it in active life. It comes upon him with indefinitely more power and staggering effect, when enlarged on and illustrated in detail by living companions, with the persuasiveness of the human voice; by companions also, who have every appearance of speaking from profound conviction, and who exhibit in their demeanour no obvious appearance of moral depravity. If indeed it were the case that more highly educated men unanimously assured him that such reasoning is fallacious, the temptation no doubt would be indefinitely lessened. Again if the more highly educated class held Theism themselves with firm conviction, doubtless they could do much towards reestablishing among the masses the shattered traditions of the past. But so far is this from being the case, that on the contrary those known to be most advanced in scientific research, are those who express most loudly the very same lesson.

We have been speaking of what seems to us at once the strongest and the most generally persuasive, among anti-religious objections. But there are other arguments also, directed more immediately against *revealed* religion—against the doctrine of miracles e. g., of Scriptural inspiration, and still more against that of eternal punishment—which have

sunk deeply into many strata of the popular mind. And we need hardly mention further the violent anti-Catholic prejudices, which possess the Englishman of every class, and which really at times assume the appearance of insanity.

Such then are the phenomena of English unbelief, which the Catholic must steadily contemplate. The number of highly educated persons is by no means small, who as simply despise the very notion of belief in God,* as they despise the very notion of belief in Jupiter. The enormous majority of non-Catholics (we will presently consider whether and how far there are exceptions) pursue science by a method, which (however little they may suspect the fact) can practically have no other ultimate issue than atheism. Lastly the highly educated atheists defend their irreligion by arguments, which are intensely plausible to the vulgar apprehension, and which in fact extend their influence over the masses with frightful and bewildering rapidity. If ever there were an appalling crisis in the history of the Church, there is one at this moment.

II. Our second thesis is, that this calamity cannot be effectively resisted, except on the principles of Catholic theology and philosophy. The principal (though by no means the sole) ground of this thesis has been emphatically set forth by the Bishops in their Pastoral. We will quote the paragraph to which we refer, italicizing one clause. The Catholic Church, their Lordships say,

retains—and we sorrow for England when we say it—alone retains the method of study, which has created the Christian civilization of the world. It retains, as a first axiom of truth, that all sciences, sacred and secular, flow from one source; and, as a first principle of the highest education of man, that these sciences may never be put asunder. The Christian Philosophy, which made the ancient Universities in vigour and solidity what they were, has given place to a philosophy, *which claims as its perfection that it begins by destroying all belief*. From this sceptical development of the national intellect, penal laws, social exile, exclusion from the public and national schools of learning, have saved us. We have our inheritance by a lineal descent, inviolate in all its principles, instincts, and spirit. What the Supreme Pontiff has laid down as the true basis of scientific education, we still possess as an heirloom from our forefathers. After declaring that Catholics are able, by adhering to the principle of the unity of all truth and the supremacy of revelation, to cultivate, to explain, and to render certain and useful all sciences, His Holiness adds, “which cannot be attained, if the light of human reason, bounded as it is even in the investigation of natural truths attainable by its

* Perhaps it will be better to explain once for all, that, throughout this article, we use the word “God” to denote a Being at once Infinitely Good and Infinitely Powerful.

own powers and faculties, shall not venerate above all, as is due, the infallible and uncreated light of the Divine intelligence, which shines forth everywhere in a wonderful way in the revelation of Christianity. For although the natural sciences depend on their own first principles, which are ascertained by reason, Catholic students ought to have before their eyes Divine revelation as a guiding star, to warn them by its light of quicksands and errors, where, in their studies and researches, they perceive that they may be led, as is often the case, to publish matters more or less contrary to the infallible truth revealed by God." (pp. 10, 11.)

The Catholic accounts it to be a sin which unrepented will entail on him eternal misery, if he allows himself in so much as one fully deliberate doubt on the Faith; and it is involved of course in this doctrine, that he possesses fully sufficient grounds of reason, to warrant absolute and supreme certitude as to the truth of that Faith. It is self-evident that, so long as he firmly preserves this conviction and carries it into practice, no possible pursuit of secular knowledge can do him any harm. Nor yet is he for that reason at all disqualified from holding his own on matters of inductive science, with the most hardened atheist of the lot. He knows with firmest certitude certain all-important verities, on grounds altogether independent of induction; and he knows therefore that every conclusion, inconsistent with those verities, is alien to true science. But the enormous majority of inductive conclusions have not the faintest appearance of clashing with those verities; and even as to those things which faith teaches him with firmest certitude, he is not on that account disqualified from estimating, as fairly as any infidel, the balance of experimental or historical evidence adducible on either side. Suppose a highly intellectual man has to defend himself against a criminal charge, of which he knows with fullest certitude that he is guiltless. Such certitude need not incapacitate him from estimating the *evidence* adducible to the jury pro and con, quite as fairly as any barrister could do it. The parallel is obvious. Even on truths most vital to religion, the Catholic man of science may discuss them as more or less probable on scientific grounds alone, and may join issue from such grounds with an infidel opponent,—without any kind of prejudice to that absolutely certain knowledge of them which he has obtained by faith. And this is the true Catholic scientific method, as set forth *ex cathedrâ* by Pius IX. in the Apostolic Letter quoted by the Bishops.

It appears to us that even many Catholics are by no means adequately aware, how very fundamental and momentous is the truth set forth by Pius IX. and the English Bishops in the above-quoted passage, and how simply it is in practice the one

turning-point of atheistic controversy. We will not hesitate then to occupy four or five pages, in developing what we understand to be the purport of this ecclesiastical teaching.

We will begin by making the hypothesis, that Revelation and supernatural grace had not been given; that man had been left without any aids from God, except those of the natural order. And we will proceed to treat at some little length this imaginary hypothesis, because by doing so we shall be able to set forth more clearly the doctrine on which we desire to insist. Firstly then we will inquire what—on such a hypothesis—would be the process, whereby mankind arrive at a firm and certain knowledge of their Creator. To this question Scripture, and the Church, and the Church's philosophy give one consistent and intelligible answer; which we cannot better exhibit, than in the words of that most eminent Catholic philosopher, F. Kleutgen. We have already once (in Oct. 1869) placed before our readers this very impressive passage; but its bearing on our present purpose is so great, that we will reproduce it in full. The italics throughout are our own.

In many places Scripture declares in the most express manner, that even for those to whom God has not manifested Himself by His prophets or by His Son, there exists a revelation of God in His works, and even within the mind of man, whereby *they can without any difficulty cognize God* their Creator and Maker, as well as His sovereign Law. It is not necessary to point out that Scripture does not in this speak of *any* [supposable] first cause; but of the Living and True God, Who has created heaven and earth, and inscribed His law in the heart of man: and that consequently it speaks also of the moral order. Now it says in the same passages, that men who do not thus cognize their God are without excuse; that they are insensate; that they deserve God's wrath and all His chastisements. It necessarily follows then, that this manifestation of God by His works is such, that men cannot fail by this means to *cognize God with certitude*, unless they commit a grave fault

Assuredly this does not mean that it is *philosophical researches*, continued laboriously through obstacles and doubts, which can alone lead to knowledge of God. *Very few men in fact are capable of these laborious researches*: whereas Scripture speaks of all the heathens in general; and in the Book of Wisdom it is said expressly (xiii. 1), "all men are vanity who do not possess the knowledge of God." The sacred writer even adds that this knowledge, to which he gives the name of "sight" to express *its clearness and certitude* ["*cognoscibiliter poterit Creator horum videri*," v. 5], can be obtained *with as much ease (and even more) as knowledge of this world*: which certainly does not fail any one capable of the least reflection. ["*Si tantum potuerunt scire ut possent aestimare sæculum, quomodo hujus Dominum non facilius inveniunt?*", v. 9] . . . *It is easier therefore to know God the Governor of*

the world, than to know enough of nature to admire its power and its beauty.

It necessarily follows therefore, that *there is a knowledge of God different from philosophical knowledge*; a knowledge so easy to acquire and so certain, that ignorance and doubt on that head cannot be explained, except either *by culpable carelessness or proud obstinacy*. Such is also . . . the common doctrine of the Holy Fathers. *They distinguished that knowledge of God which is obtained by philosophical research from that which springs up spontaneously in every man at the very sight of creation*. This latter kind of knowledge is called by them "a witness of Himself," which God gave to the soul at its creation; "an endowment of nature"; "*an infused knowledge*," inherent in every man without preliminary instruction; a knowledge which springs up in some sense of itself in proportion as reason is developed; and which cannot fail, except in a man either deprived of the use of reason or else given up to vices which have corrupted his nature. *And when the Fathers of the Church declare unanimously on this head that this knowledge is really found and established in all men, the importance of their testimony is better understood by remembering that they lived in the midst of heathen populations.*

God has implanted in our reasonable nature everything which is necessary, that we may know Him, and know Him with facility. Now He does not [after creation] withdraw Himself from creatures, but always remains near them, co-operating with them, exciting them to act, *supporting and directing each one to its end conformably to its nature*. If this is true of all creatures, *how could this concurrence be refused to the most noble of all creatures, those whom God has created for the very purpose of their knowing and loving Him?* Man indeed does not arrive at his end, except by using the powers which God has given him; but the Author of those gifts lends to man his concurrence, in order that he may make due use of them. Since that moral and religious life for which man was created is founded on a knowledge of the truths whereof we speak, *God watches over man, in order that reason, as it is developed, may come to know them with facility and certainty*. Observe the question here is not of of supernatural grace, but is [of the natural order]. . . .

What would not be the misery of man [if there were no reasonable certainty without philosophical argument]? It is easy to show those [ordinary] men who are capable of any reflection at all, that their knowledge of the truth *is not scientific*; that they do not deduce it [consciously and explicitly] from the first principles of thought, and consequently *they cannot defend it against the attacks of scepticism*. If then as soon as we come to know that *our knowledge is not scientific*, the conviction of its truth were at once shaken, what on that supposition would be the lot of man? . . .

The fact is indeed not so: that consciousness, *which every one can interrogate within himself*, attests its denial; and at every period the voice of mankind has confirmed that denial. As soon as we arrive at the use of reason, *the voice of conscience awakes within us*. Whether we choose or no, *we must cognize the distinction between good and evil*. [Again] just as it is absolutely impossible for us to doubt our own existence, [in like manner] we are absolutely compelled to regard as real the external world; [to hold]

that, further, there exists a Supreme Author of our being and of all other things ; and that through Him there is a certain moral order. These also are truths which we cannot refuse to admit. No doubt we can do violence to ourselves in order to produce in ourselves the contrary persuasion, just as we may use efforts to regard the moral conscience itself as an illusion. But *these efforts never succeed*, or, at least, never succeed perfectly ; and we feel ourselves even under an obligation of *condemning the very attempt as immoral*. The mind of man, in fact, is *under the influence of truth which has dominion over it*, and which gives [man] *certainty even against his own wish*. Truth manifests itself to our intelligence, and engenders therein the knowledge of its reality, *even before we [explicitly] know what that truth is*. Still truth [I say] reigns over man and reveals itself to him, *however great may be his resistance*, as a *sacred and sovereign authority*, which commands him and *summons him before its tribunal*. And [standing] before that tribunal, he is obliged to admit the immorality of even attempting to doubt. Just as he is bound to condemn the madness, I will not say of doubting, but of trying to doubt, the reality of the external world,—so he is obliged to regard as an impiety [all] doubt of God's Existence and Providence. . . .

Nor can it be here objected that conscience (in the proper sense of that word, moral conscience) gives us no certainty, so long as its existence within us and its pronouncements are purely spontaneous. Of the conscience, more than of anything else (surtout), it may be said that *it reveals to us its own truth* ; that it compels us to acknowledge *an absolute good and a sovereign rule over our wills and actions* (even though we know not its innermost nature), not only as really existing, but as *an august and sacred power which is [in authority] over us*. Whatever efforts man may make to overthrow and destroy his own intimate persuasion on the truthfulness of conscience, he will never succeed in doing so. Even though he seeks by every possible means to persuade himself that nothing obliges him to regard it as truthful, nevertheless he will always feel himself compelled to acknowledge its authority, and even to condemn his own resistance to it.

It is true indeed that, though conscience *often* speaks against a man's inclinations [so loudly] as to confound (by its manifestation of its own truthfulness) all pride and all the sophistical dreams by which he might wish to stifle it,—it does not *always* so speak and raise its voice, as to take from man *the power of turning from it* and refusing to listen. If he enters into himself and chooses to observe what passes within him, he will obtain that reflex knowledge which, as we said above, is required for actual certainty ; he will know that he cannot prevent himself from acknowledging the truth of what the voice of conscience dictates. But it is in his power, *if not always* at least often, to abstain from *entering into himself and lending his ear to that voice*. He has [often] the power of not hearing it, or of giving it so little attention that he withdraws himself from that influence which would make him certain. It is in this manner that, *for a certain time at least*, notwithstanding the habitual certainty* which nature gives him, he may remain

* By "habitual certainty," as he has explained just before, F. Kleutgen means to express the *proximate power* of actual certainty.

undecided on the truthfulness of conscience, supposing that he has not yet acknowledged that truthfulness by philosophical reflection, or again that he does not seek to know it. But even though we were not able to demonstrate by the intimate experience of every man that the doubt whereof we speak is contrary to the principles of morality, we ought nevertheless to be persuaded of that truth by the judgment of all mankind. Among civilized nations in every time the necessity of philosophical studies has been admitted, and those have been held in high esteem who devoted themselves thereto, and who were regarded as sages. Nevertheless, though the nations (it is true) accepted at the hands of philosophers the solution of many questions, they have never ascribed to these men a decisive judgment on all truth without exception. As to those first truths on which all our convictions rest, *humanity bears within itself the consciousness or intimate persuasion of knowing them with certainty.* Philosophers may make these truths the subject of their speculations; but they are not allowed the right of pronouncing a definite judgment on these truths: and if their researches lead them to deny or doubt them, those very persons who would otherwise be the disciples of these philosophers, rise up against them as judges and condemn them. Was there ever a nation which did not regard it as madness to doubt an external world? a nation which did not hold in horror a man so perverted, as to acknowledge no truth superior to the senses, and reject all distinction between virtue and vice? Has not atheism among all nations been accounted a crime? And by the very fact of seeing *culpability* in denial of these truths, does not the world declare that they cannot possibly be unknown to men of good will?

We may here refer by the way, to the extraordinary significance of one fact, pointed out by F. Kleutgen. The early Fathers, living in the midst of polytheistic populations, declared nevertheless—speaking of what was before their eyes—that the knowledge of God was “found and established” in the mass of men; or in other words that to a vast extent it was really present, concealed under the forms of their professed polytheism.

We now proceed with our argument, still retaining the hypothesis that Christianity had never been given. On that hypothesis (just as is also the case now) the great mass of mankind, on arriving at maturity, possess an absolutely certain knowledge of God’s Existence, resting on grounds super-superabundantly sufficient. The implicit reasoning moreover, which has led them legitimately to that knowledge, has been wrought in their mind throughout by divine agency, insomuch that the Fathers do not hesitate to speak of the knowledge itself as “infused” by God. Those indeed who are able in due course to give their intellect a high training, might very advantageously give themselves to the study of inductive science in its various shapes. At the same time no

merely inductive conclusion can by possibility rest on grounds so firm, as those which base their belief in God's Existence; and it would therefore be their one reasonable course simply to set at nought any such conclusion,—which might otherwise on the surface appear to be sound,—but which should be directly or indirectly at variance with that fundamental verity. Still more laudably, competent philosophers might devote themselves to the *scientific analysis* of that Theistic reasoning, which has *already* convinced them. It would be a dangerous mistake indeed, if they did this under an impression, that the firmness of their own belief in Theism should in any way depend on the completeness of this analysis; because that belief has already, through the legitimate and spontaneous exercise of correct though implicit reasoning, taken root within their minds. Nay, even as regards the deepening, widening, strengthening those roots which already exist, the appropriate method for doing this (according to our humble opinion) is rather the consistent practice of piety, than any philosophical elaboration. Nevertheless such elaboration will probably be of extreme value to them; as removing that temptation to unbelief, which without it would almost certainly arise in active, powerful, and highly-trained intellects.

We will venture to express one further opinion, for which we can claim the authority of F. Dalgairns, as given in one of his admirable articles on Theism in the "Contemporary." We hold indeed with fullest confidence, that arguments for God's Existence can be explicitly and philosophically exhibited, which legitimately generate absolute and unfaltering certitude. Nevertheless we are disposed to think, that several, among those proofs of Theism which are pressed by God in an implicit shape on all mankind, are more persuasive and invigorating,—as being more subtle and profound,—than those which philosophical investigation can bring to light.*

Here therefore—even without supposing Revelation at all—we see engaged face to face those two opposite schools of speculation, which are now being more and more brought into a violent shock of conflict. The conflict is certainly not between faith and reason, for the two cannot possibly be at variance.† As we apprehend things, the fundamental conflict

* We may be allowed to mention an article in our number for October, 1869, as partially exhibiting what we would say on the relation between "explicit and implicit thought."

† "Neque solum fides et ratio inter se dissidere nunquam possunt, sed opem quoque sibi mutuam ferunt."—Vatican Constitution, "Dei Filius," cap. 4.

lies between the *acceptance and rejection, whether of implicit reason, or of knowledge divinely infused by means thereof.* On the one side stands that school, which (as the Bishops express it) “claims as its perfection that it begins by destroying all belief;” while on the other side stands the school, which maintains that, before speculative men enter on any course whatever of investigation and inquiry, they already cognize, through God’s agency, with absolute certitude and on super-superabundantly sufficient grounds, an inestimably valuable body of fundamental truths. We will venture to say—though we have of course here no space for fully defending our proposition—that the latter is the school of *knowledge*, the former the school of *doubt*. On the latter method, the thinker advances, from premisses which are certain, along a train of reasoning which is also certain; whereas the former method is *avowedly* based on the tenet that scepticism is the only reasonable commencement of knowledge, while *in fact* it is entirely unable to arrive at knowledge at all.

Once grant e. g. that there is no valid process of reasoning except only *argument*, and what will follow? It is a matter of simplest common sense, that the enormous majority of men—all in fact except the merest handful—are utterly unable so much as to *apprehend* the philosophical reasoning adducible, for or against the Being of a God; and the Church shows her sense of this, by sternly forbidding all except the aforesaid handful to look at atheistic arguments at all. If therefore there were no valid process of reasoning except argument, it would follow immediately and irresistibly, that the whole mass of mankind (with utterly insignificant exceptions) are unable to hold reasonably any religious belief whatever: we will not say to hold it as certain, but to hold it, as ever so faintly probable. It would follow immediately and irresistibly, that none but a small handful can, without extreme unreason, elicit a single act of worship or obedience towards Almighty God.

But further, what happens even to that very small minority who *are* able to argue on these profound questions, if they reject the validity of implicit reasoning? We reply, that those of them at all events who are confirmed atheists, will fail to be convinced by even *explicit* reasoning, however in itself conclusive. Most certainly indeed a chain of argument may be faultlessly thrown out, link by link, resting on undeniable premisses, and absolutely demonstrative of Theism. But then, as these men have chosen to reject the “royal road” provided by their Creator, they must submit to find this course of explicit argument very long and tedious. Now we say unhesitatingly that, as a matter of fact, they will not have the

patience to pursue carefully and candidly such an argumentative chain. They show moral pravity (as every Catholic will hold) by the very fact of repudiating that infused knowledge of God, which their Creator has given them. And whoever has paid attention to their writings, will not think we speak too strongly, when we say that—by their blind contempt of religion and exclusive idolatry of experimental truth—they have arrived at a kind of intellectual obduration, which practically incapacitates them from patiently and honestly following a course of Theistic argument. We are not for a moment—God forbid!—intending to depreciate the vast importance of such an argumentative chain as we here speak of. One invaluable result of it must be, that philosophical *Theists* at all events shall see the intellectual weakness of atheism; and shall be free from that temptation which would arise, were they left without any argumentative protection for their divinely infused knowledge. Another momentous benefit must accrue, in the case of any poor atheist, who may be moved by the moral voice within him to be restless and unhappy in his present position, and may accordingly be looking round for help. But that any one confirmed, self-confident, self-satisfied, contemptuous atheist was ever drawn by the mere force of argument from the error of his ways—this is a fact which we shall believe when we see it proved, and not before.*

There is another possible class of men however, deserving consideration, apart from confirmed atheists. Let us suppose some thinker, at some moment in his mental progress,—to reject indeed as utterly unreasonable the whole Catholic doctrine concerning infused knowledge and implicit reason,—but nevertheless to admit, that the explicit arguments for Theism have a peremptory claim on his attentive consideration: is it or is it not probable that, by examining these arguments, he will arrive at a true conclusion? For our own part we should say, in the highest degree *improbable*: and part of our reason for this opinion shall be now given.

We should observe at starting, that such an inquirer, by the very fact of repudiating all existent knowledge of God, declares himself an entire alien to all practices of piety. Indeed no

* It may be asked—if this be so, what hope of recovery remains to the unhappy man? Certainly in the case of intellectual, as of other obduration, recovery is rare. The appropriate means for effecting it however, in our humble judgment, are such appeals as may awaken in his mind a sense of his misery and his sin. If this be accomplished, that barrier will be removed which hitherto has prevented him from recognizing God; and the explicit Theistic argument will at this stage be invaluable.

prayer is reasonable in his mouth, except the sceptic's well known supplication: "Oh God, if there is a God, save my soul, if I have a soul." Moreover in the Catholic's judgment, he is shown to be in a state of grave moral obliquity, by having chosen to reject that knowledge of God, which God Himself had infused by means of implicit reason.

But now further. We do not see how it can fairly be doubted, that the system and course of human events, as pressed on every man's notice externally and on the surface, inevitably creates an intense prejudice against Theism, in all who are not protected by strong antagonistic prepossessions.* In a Theistic community each man is spontaneously imbued with most strong antagonistic prepossessions, were it only by the lessons of his childhood and the irresistible influence of those around him. But where, as in so many portions of

* The following passage from F. Newman's "Apologia" will explain part of what we mean in the text:—

"Starting then with the being of a God . . . I look out of myself into the world of men, and there I see a sight which fills me with unspeakable distress. The world seems simply to give the lie to that great truth, of which my whole being is so full; and the effect upon me is, in consequence, as a matter of necessity, as confusing as if it denied that I am in existence myself. If I looked into a mirror and did not see my face, I should have the sort of feeling which actually comes upon me, when I look into this living busy world, and see no reflexion of its Creator. This is, to me, one of the great difficulties of this absolute primary truth, to which I referred just now. Were it not for this voice, speaking so clearly in my conscience and my heart, I should be an atheist, or a pantheist, or a polytheist when I looked into the world. . . . The sight of the world is nothing else than the prophet's scroll, full of 'lamentations, and mourning, and woe.'

"To consider the world in its length and breadth, its various history, the many races of man, their starts, their fortunes, their mutual alienation, their conflicts; and then their ways, habits, governments, forms of worship; their enterprises, their aimless courses, their random achievements and acquisitions, the impotent conclusion of long-standing facts, the tokens so faint and broken of a superintending design, the blind evolution of what turn out to be great powers or truths, the progress of things, as if from unreasoning elements, not towards final causes, the greatness and littleness of man, his far-reaching aims, his short duration, the curtain hung over his futurity, the disappointments of life, the defeat of good, the success of evil, physical pain, mental anguish, the prevalence and intensity of sin, the pervading idolatries, the corruptions, the dreary hopeless irreligion, that condition of the whole race, so fearfully yet exactly described in the Apostle's words, 'having no hope and without God in the world,'—all this is a vision to dizzy and appalling; and inflicts upon the mind the sense of a profound mystery, which is absolutely beyond human solution."

See also the "Grammar of Assent," from p. 391 to p. 394.

Surely indeed the Christian doctrine, which proclaims the world to be so terrible an enemy of believers, implies so much as this; viz., that the impression made on the human mind, by the broad and superficial aspect of social phenomena, is intensely irreligious.

English society just now, external influence tends in quite the opposite direction, how is such antagonistic prepossession to be obtained? It is given in the first instance by God, through that infused knowledge of which we have said so much; and in those who may unhappily be tempted to let go that knowledge, it is best cherished and kept alive, by the practice of pious habits, and by intimate familiarity with devout companions. Consider that distinct testimony, which is given by the moral voice within me, to a Supreme Ruler; a voice, which is ever pressing itself unmistakably and urgently on the notice and attention of pious men. Consider again how exquisite is the adaptation which I experience, between the constitution of my nature on one hand, and the practical effect of Theistic doctrine on the other hand. Consider the extraordinary efficacy of prayer in giving me moral strength; a fact as simply unmistakable, as the efficacy of food in giving me physical.* We are not here referring to these considerations as *arguments*, though surely they *are* strong arguments; but as generating a prepossession in favour of Theism, sufficient to neutralize the opposite prepossession engendered by the course of human events. The inquirer, whom we are here considering, is entirely destitute of such holy prepossessions; and he is a prey therefore—probably a most unsuspecting one—to atheistic prejudice.

It will be said perhaps, that if the Theistic arguments are in themselves so powerful as we maintain, this very circumstance must ensure their victory. And of course we hold confidently that no one, who uses his reason correctly according to its intrinsic laws, can examine the arguments explicitly adducible for Theism, without being persuaded of their conclusiveness. But we cannot admit for a moment, that the mere fact of a thorough logical education will ensure correct exercise of reason according to its intrinsic laws. Take even the most expert arithmetician you can find; and let him be employed for ten hours a-day during a whole year in one long addition sum, without being permitted to revise his work as he proceeds. It is almost infallibly certain, that one or other error will have crept in. Notwithstanding then the unsurpassed soundness of his logical faculty and the unapproached excellence of his arithmetical expertness—he will nevertheless with almost infallible certainty have failed to exercise his reason correctly according to its intrinsic laws. Doubtless the argumentative steps which lead to Theism are indefinitely less numerous, than those which lead to the arith-

* We need hardly point out how indefinitely stronger such considerations become, when we contemplate the special doctrines of Christianity.

metical result of which we speak ; but then on the other hand they are also indefinitely more open to error. It is requisite to weigh most carefully each separate premiss in the argumentative chain, by interrogating, with keen labour and carefully preserved candour, that alleged utterance of the human intellect, on which each premiss purports to be founded ; or to examine carefully that series of external phenomena, which it purports to represent. Why at every step there is indefinite scope for prejudice to mar the inquiry. All thoughtful persons must have observed, how often the most certain *mental* facts in particular are utterly ignored, or on occasion confidently denied, by the prejudiced thinker,—however great may be his logical accomplishments or his intellectual power,—and how hopeless it is to press them on his attention. And in the present case, unless the alleged arguments generate in our inquirer's mind an absolutely undoubting and unfaltering conviction, they fail of their purpose altogether. Perhaps indeed it may be replied that, on the Theistic hypothesis, God may be expected to watch with special care over so vitally important an intellectual process ; but we reply that the very contrary is true. The inquirer has repudiated that way of knowing God, which has been set before him by God Himself ; and there is no reason for supposing that God will help him to arrive at that high goal by his own self-chosen and presumptuous path.

Then there is another particular. All reasoning rests on primary premisses ; and it is very probable, that the same disposition of mind, which leads him to repudiate implicit reason, will also lead him to deny the admissibleness of any primary premisses except experienced facts. He will deny, either that any primary dicta of human reason exist, or else that they are self-evidently true. But no one ever professed to draw out an argument for Theism, which did not partially rest on the primary dicta of reason.

We may here point out however, as showing the disgraceful unfairness of atheists, that hardly one of them (if even one) seems to have acted even with that *profession* of candour, which the above case represents. What one commonly witnesses is, that they permit themselves as a matter of course to drift into that atheism, which the course of human events,—and again the processes of inductive inquiry,—spontaneously suggest, without so much as pausing to attempt any deliberate examination whatever of Theistic arguments.

We may thus sum up what we have been saying. Those who retain their infused knowledge of God, find their convictions strengthened at every turn by philosophical reasoning,

if they are capable of such reasoning. They see vividly the extraordinary cogency of the arguments which prove God's Existence; they see vividly the extraordinary shallowness of atheistic reasoning, and the second no less extraordinary shallowness, whereby the atheistic school blinds itself to the true character of that reasoning; and they see that this latter fact points to some fundamental flaw in atheistic philosophy, such as they at once recognize in its repudiation of implicit reason. On the other hand, let a man reject that knowledge of God which God has pressed on his attention—let him refuse to believe in his Creator until he has diligently and (as he thinks) candidly examined the arguments adducible pro and con—let him accordingly live the most critical years of his life without God in the world—what will follow? Even if, being a rare exception, he does really examine the Theistic argument, it is most improbable that he will be thereby convinced. The whole favourable issue then of the Theistic controversy rests in practice on this fundamental basis, an acceptance of the claims of implicit reason and of the infused knowledge of God.

To such remarks the atheist will not be slow in making his reply; and we will take what is far the strongest point in his case, as our specimen of that reply. He alleges—so he will tell us—not merely that Theism is not proved, but that it is *disproved*; that the co-existence of such evil as is experienced on earth with a Being at once Infinite in Goodness and in Power, is, as Mr. Mill calls it, an “open contradiction.” Now we are not at present in a position to draw out a thorough reply to this argument; because there are various indispensable preliminaries to such a task, and we are working our way to it in our successive articles on Mr. Mill's philosophy. But we may nevertheless with advantage here indicate the ground, which we are prepared in due course confidently to assume. It admits then, we consider, of actual demonstration, that here is no “*open contradiction*” at all. On the other hand we concede, that the objection before us, even as addressed to the reason, is a very strong objection indeed; it is one which—were there no counterbalancing considerations—would warrant the inference, that God's Existence is more or less improbable. But what we say is, that, whereas the *objections* against Theism do not go beyond *probability*, the arguments in *its favour* are irrefragably *conclusive*; and probability on one side is worthless as against certainty on the other. The objection, derived from the existence of evil, is undoubtedly strong (we repeat) as addressed to the *reason*; but it obtains immeasurably its greatest strength, as addressed to the *imagination*.

As so addressed—in the case of certain persons under certain circumstances,—we can understand it as being a thought most difficult to resist; a thought which tends to carry the mind away to atheism, by a kind of almost irresistible violence. And this indeed is one reason (though by no means the only one) why *piety* is so effective a support against atheistic temptations: he whose thoughts are often in the invisible world, feeds his imagination no less than his reason with holy pasture; and he thus more than neutralizes unbelieving imaginations, by imaginations of a higher and more heavenly character.* But at last, as scientific men themselves indeed are very clamorous in asserting, it is one most indispensable business of the true philosopher, to distinguish between the dictates of imagination and of reason; and most remarkably this is the very thing, which atheistic philosophers—as we should say, because of their intellectual obduration—so grievously fail to do.

Before proceeding with our general course of remark, we will mention one inference, deducible from what we have been setting forth. In the matter of Theistic belief, as in so many others, prevention is immeasurably easier than cure; it is immeasurably easier to confirm Theists, than to convert atheists. The conversion of an atheist indeed cannot ordinarily be hoped for (as we have already said) unless a foundation be laid by an appeal to his moral nature; unless he be induced to recognize, however dimly, his own sinfulness and misery. But let this recognition once take place, and the Theistic arguments, if carefully and fully and discriminatingly exhibited, may be to him of invaluable service.

Our readers will of course have understood us all through—not as arguing against the atheistic school—but as placing before *Catholics* the course of treatment, which appears to us practically available against that school. And if the ground we have taken be accepted as solid, three important conclusions will have resulted. Firstly (putting aside Revelation altogether), it is the only true scientific method, to enter on philosophical investigation—not (as is sometimes said) with a mind “free from prejudice”—but on the contrary with a firm conviction, that various fundamental verities (Theism being the chief) are known with absolute certainty as resting on a basis of implicit reasoning, before the path of philosophical investigation has been so much as approached. Secondly, it is important nevertheless that those who are competent to philo-

* We need hardly point out how very practical a support is given by Catholicity to Theism, were it only in this particular way; in the scope afforded by it to holy imaginations.

sophical labours shall draw out this implicit reasoning—so far as this is practicable—in an explicit shape: nor need the certitude with which they start in any way interfere with a perfectly equable balancing of antagonistic arguments. Yet at last, thirdly, a pious life is more conducive than a powerful train of argument, to deeply-rooted strength of Theistic conviction. Now in these, as in other instances, the Catholic Church builds on the basis of natural religion, and strengthens its utterances by supplementary doctrines of her own. Thus take firstly that firmness of assent which, as reason pronounces, should be given from the first by every adult to certain fundamental verities. Revelation not only recognizes this truth, but supplements it by enforcing that still higher kind of firm and absolute assent, which is an act of faith. Such assent is not opposed to reason, but the very contrary; because all Catholics, who have been educated as such,—who have thus learned to know the Church's claims and come into close contact with her manifold power and wisdom,—have obtained by implicit reasoning (through the Holy Ghost's supernatural agency) an absolutely certain conviction, that she is an infallible authority.* Secondly however it is of great importance, in the Catholic's estimation, that the historical proof whether of Christianity or Catholicity be argumentatively exhibited and studied, by persons competent to these respective tasks. Nevertheless thirdly a supernatural or holy life is (speaking generally) more conducive to firmness in the Catholic Faith, than is the being versed in its historical evidence.

We trust then we have accomplished the purpose at which we have been aiming. When the Bishops say that "the true basis of scientific education" is the placing of faith in supremacy over argumentative inquiry—and when they imply that, if science be cultivated on any other basis, there will quite certainly be a large sceptical and atheistical development—they by no means imply, that without faith there is no certain knowledge of God. If a Catholic were addressing non-Catholics, he would no doubt express the matter differently: he would urge on them, that the knowledge of God, infused by Him in the mind of all adults through implicit reasoning, is an absolutely certain knowledge; and that no scientific conclusion can possibly be true, which in any way conflicts with that fundamental verity. But when we come to the case

* See our Number for April, 1871, pp. 269-271. See also the Constitution "*Dei Filius*." "*Ecclesia per se ipsa . . . magnum quoddam et perpetuum est motivum credibilitatis, et divinæ suæ legationis testimonium irrefragabile.*" (c. 2.)

of Catholics, the infused knowledge of which we have been speaking, is in some sense superseded as to its practical working by that still higher knowledge—whether of Him or of dogmata revealed by Him—with which supernatural faith is identical. The practical lesson then, to be enforced on Catholics, is not so much the legitimate supremacy of naturally infused knowledge, but rather the legitimate supremacy of supernatural faith. And this accordingly is the lesson enforced in the Pastoral.*

There is one difficulty, which some readers may feel in what we have been saying; a difficulty however, which a very few words will solve. Doubtless—it may be objected—so long as a Catholic preserves his faith, no scientific investigation can lead him into atheism. To say this indeed, is to propound the merest truism. But what *reason* is to be given him for preserving his faith? Why is it *reasonable*, that those dogmata which the Church proposes should take precedence over those opposite conclusions, which argument may seem on the surface to establish? If we presuppose the ground already taken in this article, the solution of this difficulty is at once obvious. Take any of the thousand instances afforded by every-day life, in which some proposition is known with certitude by means of implicit reasoning. For example, I am a tradesman or mechanic, and know thoroughly well, from the experience of a whole life, that A B is my enemy. I could not possibly lay my finger on the various successive facts and indications, which authorize this conclusion; and still less could I vindicate the reasonableness of my inferential method: but I have no more doubt of the truth of my conclusion (and quite reasonably so) than of my own existence. I am no philosopher, and I do not dream of inquiring on what principle of reason my certitude rests: but I know quite well that my certitude is reasonable; and that your ingenious appeal to a small number of isolated facts, which seem to tell on the other side, is in reason worthless. Now let us suppose (if so strange a supposition may be permitted for the sake of elucidation) that I became on a sudden philosophically competent. I am not on

* From what has been said in the text, our readers will understand the answer which we should ourselves give to a question often asked: viz. whether Catholics are equally “free” with non-Catholics in their prosecution of secular science. If by “freedom” is meant “security that reason shall proceed correctly according to its intrinsic laws,” we should maintain that Catholics are of all men the most scientifically free. But if by “freedom” is meant “the exemption of secular science from check or repression on the part of any authority external to itself,” then we think that non-Catholic scientists are *more* free than children of the Church.

that account less reasonably certain than I was before, that A B is my enemy: the only difference is, that I have a much greater power than I had before of *analysing the grounds* of this certitude. So the Catholic philosopher, no less than the Catholic peasant, knows on sufficient grounds that Catholicity is most certainly true. It is his bounden duty therefore to act on that certainty, whether he has or has not entered into a historical inquiry on the evidence of Revelation. What those sufficient grounds *are*, on which rests the certitude whether of philosopher or peasant, this is not the place to consider; but we have already referred to some few remarks on the matter, which we put forth in our number for April, 1871. At all events, if there be any apparent scientific conclusion which indubitably contradicts a dogma of the Faith—the only inference which a Catholic philosopher can regard as reasonable is, that the said conclusion cannot be *really* scientific; and it will be his business to scent out and bring to light the lurking fallacy. Reason is the one philosophical weapon, and to reason he will appeal.

On the other hand, if the difficulty which we are considering merely implies, that (on our view of the case) it is supremely important to place before Catholic philosophical students the whole doctrine of implicit reason,—we think that this conclusion *does* legitimately follow from our premisses. We have seen how emphatically F. Kleutgen for one inculcates it; and in our view it is one among the many great merits of F. Newman's "Grammar of Assent," that he duly realises the vast importance of this particular subject.*

We have now set forth—we trust not at too great length—our chief reason for holding (as our second thesis expresses) that the infidelity of the day cannot be successfully resisted, except on the principles of Catholic theology and philosophy: for we maintain that it cannot be successfully resisted, except by prominently insisting on that absolutely certain knowledge of divine truth, which exists antecedently to argumentative inquiry, and by which every apparent scientific conclusion must be carefully measured. There are other reasons also for this second thesis of ours, which will duly appear in the course of our remarks on the third.

III. Thirdly then, Protestants at present can confer no thoroughly effective help in the vital conflict. The most

* All Catholic philosophers are in accord on this doctrine: see e. g. what is said by F. Liberatore and by Dmowski, on the "*sensus nature communis*." But we should doubt whether in general they duly appreciate its very fundamental importance.

important particular, under which this thesis should be tested, is connected with all which we have just been saying on divinely infused knowledge. Now the Church's unintermittent and (as we may say) clamorous pronouncements, on the certainty of faith, afford a constant security for the recognition of the claims of implicit reason as guided by divine agency; because the Church's doctrine would be so manifestly and even outrageously unreasonable, except for those claims. This security all Protestants lost at the Reformation, by abandoning the Catholic dogma on the certitude of faith. The Calvinistic tenet indeed on "assurance" presents a corruption and caricature of this dogma; but the dogma itself has retained no recognition whatever, among the Protestant bodies. Even the Tractarians—in other respects so approximating to Catholicity—apparently never even attempted to occupy this position. Butler's saying, that "probability is the very guide of life," was always in their mouths; and they were in general even startled, when they heard what Catholics allege on the infallible certainty of faith.* A recent circumstance brought out this fact very unmistakably. Mr. Capes passed through the regular stages of Tractarianism, mixing freely with its disciples; and yet (as he has expressly told the world) years passed of his life as a professing Catholic, before he had any notion that this certainty of faith is a Catholic doctrine at all.

Now the same course of thought, which rejected the doctrine of certitude as to revealed truth, inevitably in due time leads its disciples to reject the further doctrine of certitude as to natural religion. Still a long period may be occupied by the progress of this legitimate and necessary development; and such has certainly been the case. Go back even some fifty years—the great majority of highly educated Englishmen (we think) assumed the Existence of God as a truth, not only absolutely certain, but instinctively and irresistibly known. We cherish the hope, that even at this day numbers of highly educated non-Catholics so account it, though not doing justice to their convictions by their language. But the *language* of those among them who are Theistical—it appears to us—implies with ever-increasing distinctness, that Theism rests indeed as yet on a large preponderance of argument, but that

* We do not think that this fact is discredited, but rather the reverse, by what F. Newman says in his "Apologia," pp. 78-81. He mentions indeed, that he himself at that time claimed the possession of certitude resting on reasonable grounds, "whether as to the truths of natural theology, or as to the fact of a revelation"; but he rather implies that Tractarians in general did *not* distinctly make such a claim.

according to the weight of conflicting arguments it must be left to stand or fall. Even Canon Liddon, than whom no higher representative of Anglicanism can possibly be found, —though he is far above what we fear is the more common stand-point of his co-religionists—yet does not (if we rightly understand him) rise by any means to the Catholic and patristic doctrine set forth by F. Kleutgen. The “instinctive perception and affirmation of God,” he says, is a “universal hypothesis”; a “world-wide prejudice”; an “anticipation”; a “revelation” indeed in some sense, but only one which “sets man’s thought *in motion* as he gazes on the natural world and bids him *not to rest*, until he has *wrung* from it a *disclosure* of the highest truth which it has to teach him.”* If we rightly understand Canon Liddon,—it appears to us most certain, that no such position as his will suffice in practice to repel the atheistic movement. And as to the Protestant world in general, how violently it is prejudiced against the doctrine we have been defending, is evident from one most significant fact. Protestants commonly allege that the Catholic cannot possibly pursue secular science with due freedom, because he holds himself bound (at starting and throughout) by certain fundamental propositions. Those who thus speak necessarily imply, that for their part there is no fundamental proposition, not even Theism, which they hold as certain irrespectively of scientific inquiry.

So much on Theism. There are several other particulars however, apart from that fundamental question, on which it certainly seems at first sight that important assistance may be derived from non-Catholics. Take for instance arguments for the credibility of miracles, and the divine origin of Christianity. It is quite a mistake (we think) to suppose, that such arguments have not a high legitimate argumentative value even against an atheist. The latter is under an obligation of confronting those historical facts, which the Christian alleges; and of setting forth some theory, which in his view shall either explain the facts themselves or explain away their evidence. And it might naturally be anticipated, that non-Catholics may do important service in pressing on him their consideration. Such anticipation is partly, but not more than partly, fulfilled. Take e.g. the question of miracles: the “Month” has shown with great force, how grievously the Protestant advocate is hampered, by his enforced denial of such miracles e.g. as are proved in processes of canonization. Then as to the historical arguments for the divine origin of Christianity—putting aside the question of

* “Some Elements of Religion,” pp. 51, 52.

miracles on which we have just spoken—the Catholic and Protestant can go along indeed pretty harmoniously together, in proving our Lord's divine mission: and so far the Protestant does excellent service. But at the next step the two are divergent. The Catholic proceeds with great ease to show, that our Lord founded a Church to be the infallible exponent of His doctrine. This impregnable historical ground the Protestant is forced to abandon; and in its stead to drag the inquirer over all that obscure and difficult inquiry, which concerns the genuineness and authority of Scripture. With a Catholic, the authority of Scripture rests on the Church's infallibility; and Protestants, who have to rest it on another basis, are thereby involved in a most unnecessarily arduous historical investigation. Perhaps the particular on which a Protestant can give the most important help, is in answering the common infidel allegations, about the contradictions between Scripture and history, or between one part of Scripture and another. Even here however the Catholic has to consider, whether and how far his Protestant coadjutor may have implied too stringent or too lax a doctrine on inspiration. On the whole then—while we admit that in various details very much indeed may be gained from Protestant writers,—we must nevertheless contend, that their position as a whole entirely disables them from effectively repelling the atheistic current.

It remains, that the whole religious future of England practically depends on the efforts put forth by Catholics. "All these things," says the "Month," (p. 89) "if they are true, are surely full of the most notable warnings to ourselves as Catholics. They show us the immense amount of work which the 'little flock' of English Catholics may have thrown upon them to do. They show how all-important it is for us to wake up to an appreciation, we do not say so much of our danger as of our opportunity—an opportunity which in the language of Scripture, we may venture to call 'the time of our visitation.' It is no time for childishness, or for frittering away our strength and our time upon insignificant or secondary matters. It is no time for jealousies and self-seeking narrowness. We want all our forces at once, and that they all should be allowed the fullest and amplest liberty" which shall be consistent with that corner-stone of the Church's strength ecclesiastical unity. "We are in no danger of having too much activity, too much good controversy, too much solid education, too much learned and popular literature. In all these respects, Catholicism in England requires fostering, supporting, developing to the utmost. It requires of its children nothing short of that devotion which is

ready to put everything aside and sacrifice itself for the truth. If the tide of infidelity may yet be beaten back, if England may yet be made again a nation of believers, what a mission and what a work have fallen to the lot of those Catholic Englishmen, who inherit the name and the faith of a thousand martyrs ! ”

IV. Now what have Catholics in England as yet done, in fulfilment of this most necessary mission ? Well, there is one fact, encouraging as far as it goes ; viz. that none of them, or almost none, have personally yielded to the prevailing pressure, and apostatized from the Faith. Complaints are sometimes made, and we believe with much truth as far as the facts go, that many in the leisured class of English Catholics are under what may almost be called an infatuation,—as regards their indifference to intellectual pursuits or to any higher kind of literature than the merest frivolity. But it is by no means clear to us, that in this the good may not have predominated over the evil. Indifference to intellectual pursuits is in no way inconsistent with habits of solid piety, while at the same time it is among the most infallible of securities against the assaults of infidelity. The new University College will doubtless in due time be directly or indirectly successful, in rousing leisured Catholics from their intellectual apathy ; while at the same time it will imbue their education from first to last with a true Catholic spirit.

But so much having been said, our topics of mitigation and consolation as regards the past are exhausted. What spectacle can be more deplorable than is obtained, by steadily contemplating on one hand the work which Catholics have to do if their country is to be rescued from atheism, and observing on the other hand how much (or rather how incredibly little) they have as yet done ? We do not dream of *blaming* any one, for the present infidel movement has taken the whole Catholic world by surprise : we do but set forth what seems to us the deplorable truth. And if it be thought that we exaggerate, let us ask this simple question. Of course the first thought of zealous Catholics—before they begin endeavouring to convert externs—will be to protect their own co-religionists. Now, in enforcing our first thesis, we set forth the kind of atheistic difficulties, which meet many a poor Catholic at every turn. We ask this simple question—what have Catholics yet done to protect him ? What existing Catholic treatise or manual is there, which professes the purpose of meeting that particular form of unbelief now most prevalent in England ? Or, failing this, what living authority is there, which Catholics can successfully consult ? One isolated Catholic makes his isolated

plaint to one isolated priest, another to another. But neither priest can give the matter any methodical attention; for each is immersed in his own practical work, and neither has any one with whom to compare notes. Moreover there is surely no disrespect in adding, that at last the number of priests is comparatively small, who have sufficient knowledge and power to draw out in shape any reply that can be at all adequate; any reply that may not (from its apparent unsatisfactoriness) do much more harm than good. It is a matter, not of counsel but of necessity, that an end be put to this state of things; that certain carefully selected priests be exempted from the routine of missionary work, and "told off" (as military men call it) for the very purpose of combining, and comparing notes, and concerting measures, as to the best available mode of stemming the deadly stream of unbelief; and that laymen, possessing the requisite knowledge and ability, be invited to co-operate in the work. The infidelity of the day is so multi-form, and directs its assault from so large a variety of quarters, that it is absolutely impossible for Catholics duly and comprehensively to resist it, except by means of collaboration and mutual consultation. In one word, the Church has before her a tremendous work;* and she cannot hope to accomplish it, except by means of a distinct and effective organization.

V. Now this new system of Catholic higher education, taken in its entirety, exactly represents the kind of organization which is required. Mgr. Capel, in his various brilliant addresses, has repeatedly referred to this function, as among the most important of those which his College is intended to fulfil. But even had he not expressly contemplated this purpose, its fulfilment would no less be the inevitable result of what has now been done; as will be manifest by considering what University College will have to take in hand at its very outset.

It must not be supposed however for a moment, that the studies of this College will in any way resemble those of an ecclesiastical seminary. The object desired is, not that English Catholics of the leisured class shall form an isolated body, but on the contrary that they shall mix on terms of full intellectual equality with non-Catholics of their own rank and station. Now non-Catholic youths are trained (according to their circumstances and dispositions) in classics, mathematics,

* A year or so ago, F. Newman was reported in the newspapers to have said in a sermon, that the Church's intellectual opponents are immeasurably more formidable now than they were at any former time; and that if S. Athanasius or S. Augustine could revisit earth, they would be not less than appalled by the intellectual phenomena with which they would have to cope.

the various branches of physical science, jurisprudence, political economy, history, psychology, metaphysics; and Catholic youths therefore must be trained in these very same studies. We may add, that even the imperfect list of Professors already published will show, on how complete terms of equality with Protestants their intellectual education will be carried on. And even Protestants have been much struck with the large-mindedness many-sidedness and completeness of all those utterances concerning its scope, which have proceeded from the Rector.

At the same time, in every detail of study, it will of course be the College's very characteristic, that the student be protected from any irreligious or anti-Catholic error, to the support of which such study might otherwise be perverted. Does he give himself to classics and ancient history? He must not be permitted to disparage in his own mind that standard of morality, which alone is the true one, and which the Saints exhibit in its heroic form; but the real character of those moral qualities displayed by the more eminent heathens will be discriminately set forth.* Is he occupied with physical science? The truths of that science will be placed before him with the utmost attainable clearness and accuracy, so far as his proficiency will admit, and every newest discovery will be heartily welcomed; he will be guarded carefully against imagining, that the Church is directly or indirectly other than most favourable to the advance of genuine inductive science; but at the same time every appearance of antagonism to the Faith, which may here or there present itself, will be explained with special carefulness. Is modern history his pursuit? There will be no attempt to disguise facts, or screen from just blame ecclesiastical authorities who in times past may have deserved it: but at the same time he will be diligently indoctrinated in the habit of viewing events from a Catholic stand-point; he will be instructed on the place held by the Church and the Holy See, in the progress of civilization; on the true character, whether of her own acts on one side or her opponents' acts on the other. To Protestants modern history, in its ecclesiastical bearings, is taught rather as romance than history: we have no wish and no expectation, that the Kensington Professor shall cook up an opposition romance; for the interests of the Church and of rigid truth are identical. Again: Does

* On this matter we may perhaps, without impropriety, draw special attention to an invaluable Essay of F. Newman's, which forms one of his "Occasional Sermons."

the student give special attention to political economy? He must be instructed to vindicate the Catholic practical teaching, on usury and again on almsgiving.* Most of all (though most easily of all) he will be scientifically protected against the doctrine, no less childish economically than detestable morally, that real service is done to mankind—in the way of “employing labour” as it is called—by a rich man spending his wealth on his own personal enjoyments. Lastly, is the student competent and disposed for profound philosophical investigation? He will be sedulously guarded against those infidel systems which abound in every direction, and trained in the solid principles of sound Catholic philosophy. So much on separate studies. But in addition to all this, there will be a certain religious training and instruction imparted to all. The Bishops mention (p. 15) “a sound course of . . . the Philosophy of Religion, with a more complete and scientific treatment of the Faith.” All this will of course be given defensively, as well as positively. In other words it will prominently include the presenting before each student that general exhibition of Catholic religious and philosophical principles, which shall serve him as a barrier against the multiform infidelity, with which he would otherwise be stunned and bewildered on entering as a highly educated man into active life.

Now let us see how in due time all this must practically work. Some student enters the College, whom circumstances may have made familiar with various infidel objections, which the Professor hitherto has not heard of. Here is one of the inestimable benefits arising from organization: the objection is brought before the cognizance of one competent to meet it. Then again some student leaves the College and enters into the world; where he meets with this or that infidel argument, against which his Professor has not guarded him. Of course he refers back to said Professor; and would have in some sense a positive right to expect, that the Professor shall respond to his appeal. Again some working priest finds his flock assailed by this or that atheistic allegation, which he has not learned how to meet. It will be his obvious resource to consult those distinguished thinkers, who will have been

* Such language as this sometimes leads an anti-Catholic controversialist to the most absurd comments; as though we implied, that Catholic students are not to be instructed in true science, but only in such science as shall be consistent with Catholicity. Why of course Catholics, being absolutely certain of Catholicity, are absolutely certain that any alleged economical conclusion, which is in any way opposed to the Catholic Faith, is *scientifically* unfounded and false. It is the business of the Catholic teacher of Political Economy to lay his finger on the fallacy, and make the student understand its true character on the ground of reason alone.

designated by ecclesiastical authority to the very work of encountering such allegations. See how, by such facts alone, an increased knowledge and appreciation is constantly growing up within the College, on one hand of the infidel case, and on the other hand of the Catholic reply.

And all this will be still more the case, in proportion as the Bishops' plans are more completely carried into effect; in proportion as all the Catholic colleges in England—whether now existing or hereafter to be founded—shall be gathered round the Institution as round one organized centre, in all which affects Catholic higher education. By degrees—as the weak points of existing Catholic controversy become more and more clearly discerned—the oral instruction, which will have been given from the first, will be more largely and fully developed, and finally issue in written and published works available respectively for every class. And by the time things have arrived at anything like such a state as this, new avenues of future combined action will have been opened; an “*esprit de corps*” will have been created; and a general enthusiasm for the work aroused, which in due time will effect all that we can desire. The habit also of mature and constant consultation on these matters, which will have been exercised by the repeated meetings of the Senate, will have a bearing on the work of the future, which no one as yet can fully apprehend and appreciate.

Some Catholics seem slow to believe that the new Institution can have all the importance which we ascribe to it, because it begins on so comparatively small a scale. But this circumstance ought rather to reassure them. The Catholic Church herself began on the smallest of scales; the number of believers in Jerusalem, her centre, immediately after her Lord's Ascension, not having been more than about one hundred and twenty. But indeed generally, and coming to purely human examples, those undertakings which are found to do a great work are not those that start with a profession of being full-grown, but those on the contrary that go about their immediate business in a sober, quiet, practical way. No doubt it is true that Mgr Capel is taking his immediate measures for no larger a purpose, than that of giving some forty or fifty Catholic youths a higher education. But the fact of his labouring with such singular spirit, wisdom, and address for what he has immediately to do, is no kind of presumption (but most emphatically the contrary) that he will not labour with *equal* spirit, wisdom, and address, when his work shall have so increased on his hands as to have developed quite new functions. All who have come into contact with the Rector

of the new College, have been very greatly impressed by his peculiar power of adapting means to ends. Never was there a stronger instance of "the right man in the right place." But the beginnings of the new Institution must of necessity be comparatively humble. If we look at its immediate work—the conferring higher education on young Catholics of the leisured and higher professional class—so far the truth of our statement is manifest at a glance. The very fact that leisured Catholics are behind non-Catholics of the same rank in higher education, would suffice to make one certain beforehand, that they have in general no lively sense of any great need for an educational movement. Those who appreciate the value of higher intellectual education, we need hardly say, are for the most part those who possess it and not those who are comparatively without it. Then if we turn, from the College's immediate purpose, to the other service which we anticipate in due course at its hands—its affording an organization for the Church's resistance to infidelity—we shall see still more clearly that its early doings will afford a most inadequate measure of its ultimate development. We have already explained how very gradual must be the *internal growth* of such organization: and in like manner it is only by slow degrees that this particular service will receive *from the Catholic body at large* due recognition and support. Many Catholics do not know the *fact*, that the infidelity of this day is at once so deadly in character and so threatening in the terrible rapidity of its growth. Many others, who are more or less acquainted with this fact, are nevertheless not at all aware on one hand how completely the work of resistance must rest on Catholics, and on the other hand how deplorably ill provided these are as yet for the *performance* of that work. Many again—from our own experience we should think this must be the largest class of all—do not see how the new Institution can give any such very important assistance, in supplying the Church's urgent and cruel need. It is only by slow degrees therefore that Catholics, however loyal to the Holy See and the Episcopate, will become entirely alive to the vitally momentous bearing of this scheme; or that they will receive the Bishops' appeal with that full response of energy, generosity, self-sacrifice, which may be confidently anticipated in due course of time. In truth there is one great advantage, which will be derived from the circumstance on which we are commenting. Progress has to be made along a fresh and untrodden path; with perils threatening on the right and on the left, nay with pitfalls lying in the very path itself. Little by little, by gradual efforts, by experiments,

some of which will succeed but some must fail, those who direct the movement will find their course made clear. Such tentative efforts are easily practicable, precisely because the Institution starts in so rudimental a state; whereas if a fabric—we speak of a moral not material fabric—had been erected complete in all its parts, every incidental mistake (and such mistakes must inevitably be many) would be in some sense irreparable.

However we must say for ourselves that, considering the circumstances of the case, so far from accounting Mgr. Capel's commencement to be extraordinarily small in scale, our impression is just the reverse. His immediate work, as we have said, has not been to anticipate remote results which must ensue in due time by the inevitable course of events, but to do what lies before him; to prepare for so educating Catholic youths, that they shall mix on terms of full intellectual equality with their fellow-countrymen, while at the same time they shall be safeguarded against the intellectual perils with which they would otherwise be threatened. We think the most sanguine could not have expected, a year ago, that so much would have been done towards this purpose in so short a time, and that the opening would take place under such favourable auspices. A staff of teachers has been brought together, by the strength of which even the Protestant world confesses itself surprised, and to the great majority of whom the task of teaching is familiar.* It would be invidious to single out special names, and we shall abstain from doing so. But the value of this fact is very far from being exhausted, by the superior efficacy of teaching which must thence ensue. This (we need hardly say) is most important; yet perhaps even more important will be the interest in study, the desire of knowledge, the enthusiasm for intellectual pursuits, which will be thus enkindled in the students. This circumstance alone will constitute quite a new era in Catholic education. The warmest admirers of the existent colleges—and we are ourselves warm admirers of several in their number—will surely admit that, however carefully they may have trained the student in those particular books and treatises which they have chosen as instruments of his education, they have comparatively failed to infuse into him anything which can be called intellectual ardour. In fact—had the means otherwise been at hand—there was extreme difficulty in the way of their doing this, from the mere circum-

* We find a strange report to have been widely circulated, that the Professors are not to lecture except at occasional intervals. On the contrary, they will be occupied in teaching for two or three hours of every day.

stance that young men and boys have been united in the same Institution. There is nothing which we predict with greater confidence, than that what we have just mentioned will be one prominent and unmistakeable characteristic, distinguishing this from the other existing colleges.

At the same time any one must be indeed blind to the signs of the times, who regards this intellectual ardour as an unmixed good; for on the contrary it has been one principal feeder of that infidel movement, under which the civilized world is groaning. Yet none the less it is true, that *without* this quality there can be no genuine intellectual vigour, and the intellectual work so peremptorily required from Catholics cannot be done. What then is needed? Plainly, that intellectual ardour be stimulated indeed, but that also it be masterfully guided and directed into true channels. Here will be another specialty of University College: there will be a school of doctrinal and ascetical instruction, addressed to the very purpose of sanctifying and regulating that intellectual ardour, which it has been the College's very purpose to stimulate. In fact what is that great Catholic need of the time, the supply of which is the immediate purpose for which the Collège has been founded? Precisely this; that a body of young Catholics shall enter on public life, heartily sympathizing with the advance of secular science, heartily relishing every innocent gratification of the intellect, competent to contend on equal terms whether against non-Catholic statesmen or non-Catholic philosophers; while at the same time they remain fixed as on a rock on S. Ignatius's foundation—or rather on the Church's fundamental ascetical principle—that the one end of man is to know and serve and love his Creator.

The number of students prepared to enter the College has taken us by surprise. Even at the moment of opening, the number is seventeen; they are contributed by almost every English Catholic College, from St. Edmund's, the oldest, down to St. George's, Croydon, which is almost the youngest; six more come after Christmas; and there is every hope that by the time of the formal inauguration at Easter, there will be at least thirty. But this of course is a poor measure of the future; because comparatively few parents, without some very strong reason, will remove their son from some other College, in which they may have already placed him and made arrangements for his continuance. Now the present writer mixes very little in general society; and yet he has heard from he cannot tell how many different quarters, of parents who intend sending their sons to Kensington, as soon as these shall have arrived at the due age. It is from persons thus circumstanced,

that the main replenishment of a new College must always be expected.

We do not indeed shut our eyes to the fact, that there is a certain not inconsiderable knot of adverse critics: but we confess that their existence does not generate in us any kind of misgiving. As every one knows,—before the College was decided on, there was much difference of opinion on the best mode of supplying the existent need. Some wished at one time for a Catholic College at Oxford: when that was condemned in 1864-5, the same persons or others desired that some existing Catholic College should be made the centre of operations; others again, that a Catholic University should be established, comprising several Catholic Colleges in one locality. Now, however much any given Catholic might personally have preferred some different decision from that at which the authorities have arrived, the true course of Catholic loyalty would nevertheless have been, that he should give his hearty support, material and moral, to the scheme which the Church has finally sanctioned. Still, though we profoundly regret, we cannot be altogether surprised, that a certain number of them should be lukewarm or not even lukewarm, in their allegiance to a project, which has never seemed to them the most desirable. This however we regard as a purely temporary phenomenon. Whether or no they may retain in theory their abstract preference for some other plan—when they see this one in full operation, it will be impossible but that they should feel practically its inestimable advantages. What *now* practically impresses them, is what they account its comparative inferiority; but what will *then* practically impress them, will be its positive and unmistakeable excellence.

Then again—as was distinctly expressed throughout the original controversy—there was no *possible* line of conduct free from grave objections; and of course therefore there are real and solid objections—as against all possible plans—so inclusively against this. Still we do not ourselves think, that the objections sustainable against this one are even comparable in gravity with those which could be sustained against every other. Some take much exception to the College being in London: nor for our part can we deny, that the circumstance opens a door to serious perils. But the established discipline will afford much protection against these perils: especially the rule, that none of those, who board in the College or the houses therewith connected, will be permitted to go out after night fall. On the other hand much advantage must arise from the fact, that the College raises its front in a great social centre like London. And a still greater advantage derived from

its metropolitan position will be, that so large a number of Catholic parents will be able to obtain a first-rate education for their sons, the latter remaining inmates of the parental home. The more this advantage is pondered, the greater it will appear.

Another objection has been founded on the connection (no very close one however) with London University. We discussed this question at some little length in January last (pp. 198-204), and need not here add anything to what we then said. As time passes on, it cannot but happen that great additional light will be thrown on the matter; and if the connection should be proved an unmanageable difficulty, nothing will be easier than to discontinue it. Our own strong impression continues to be that, during the earlier years at least of University College, the advantages of this connection will preponderate over its evils.

But at last the objection which, as we believe, is in fact more powerful than all others put together, is the *novelty* of the Institution. There is a large number of excellent persons, who distrust what is new, as being by the very force of terms "new-fangled." * This however is an objection, which *must* diminish in every successive year. And we verily believe that some fifty years hence—when the intellectual influence of Catholicity shall have extended, as by the agency of this Institution it must extend—it will be a simple marvel to our posterity, how English Catholics can possibly have remained for so long a period in so crippled, anomalous, discreditable a position, as the being destitute of special and most carefully devised provision for the advancement of higher studies.

One final word, as to that development of infidelity, on which we have said so much in this article, and against which the new Institution will achieve such invaluable service. There is nothing in such development, which Catholics might

* The following came to us on credible authority, and we are entirely disposed to believe it. At all events, it may be recited as a parable. A certain locality, in the South of England, was inhabited by a number of extremely poor Catholics, there being no chapel within a radius of twenty miles. Every Sunday, however, they assembled in some room, and the least incompetent among them led some Catholic devotions, and read some published Catholic sermon. A wealthy Catholic at last, coming into the neighbourhood, afforded means for supporting a priest. "He is a very worthy man," they said; "but he has *new-fangled notions*, about our having a priest to live among us, instead of proceeding on our holy twenty miles' expedition for the Sacraments once a year." We can more easily believe this story, when we see that certain persons, much better instructed than these poor men, account it a *new-fangled notion*, that very special attention should be given to the young Catholic's higher studies.

not have confidently anticipated from their own principles. The great security, given by God for the stability whether of natural religion or of revealed truth, is a certain knowledge, infused by Him into the mind of men through their implicit reason. In the supernatural order this infused knowledge is supernatural faith.* When therefore in the sixteenth century Protestants rejected the Catholic doctrine on the certitude of supernatural faith, a twofold result ensued. Firstly, they brought to an end, as far as they and their successors were concerned, the stability of revealed truth; and on this we need not here descant. But secondly these principles led by inevitable consequence (though Luther and Calvin would have been the very last men to *admit* such consequence) to entire disparagement of implicit reason; to a regarding of scepticism as the only reasonable commencement of knowledge; to a resting of religious truth on the mere balance of philosophical or historical arguments. Now so soon as human thought had largely reached this its lowest phase, nothing could have been reasonably expected by Catholics to result, except that outburst of irrepressible atheism, which is now beginning its career. Doubtless true philosophy and sound argument are triumphantly conclusive of Theism. But "if they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead"; and those who shut their eyes to that knowledge of God which He Himself presses on their attention, are found practically incapable of true philosophy and sound argument, within the sphere of religious truth.

Since the preceding article has been in type, the new College has opened under the happiest possible auspices. It is found by experience, that the Professors give themselves most heartily to their work, and that (as we ventured to predict) the young men are both intensely interested in their studies and entirely devoted thereto. The first lecture in every day is either on Christian doctrine or on the relation of science to religion; and these lectures are attended by every student without exception. We may consider the success of University College as entirely assured.

* When we speak of faith as "knowledge," we do not forget that the principal revealed dogmata are superrational, and incognizable therefore except through God's testimonial of them. But such testification having been given, reason is able to know with certitude its authenticity.

In like manner, in order to the knowledge of superrational truths, it does not suffice of course that God should direct men's implicit reason. There must be some external divine testification (as we have said) of revealed truth, resting on its appropriate evidence which reason can discern.

ART. VII.—AN EXAMINATION OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S PSYCHOLOGY. PART I.

(COMMUNICATED.)

THE DUBLIN REVIEW has now occupied itself for a considerable period with an examination of the system of Mr. John Stuart Mill and his philosophical position, that writer being selected as the best typical example of one school of modern speculative thought. Mr. Herbert Spencer is the best representative man of another phase of the modern school of philosophy. His influence moreover is now extending, not only throughout English-speaking countries,—notably in the United States,—but also in France. It seems therefore desirable that his system should receive a careful and thorough examination.

All the highest questions of philosophy, those concerning God, the human soul, its nature and destiny, have now come to depend on questions of psychology. What are the real declarations of our own consciousness? How far may we rely upon the truthfulness of our mental faculties? Such psychological questions are fundamental indeed. But if the great importance of psychology must be maintained with regard to philosophy generally, it must especially be so maintained with reference to the philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer, because the whole of his system avowedly reposes upon the special psychology he has developed. This psychology may be maintained as correct, although some other parts of his system be shown to be very faulty; but if his psychology be proved fundamentally erroneous, his whole philosophical fabric is thereby doomed to inevitable collapse and ruin, save at the price of such constructive modifications as will entirely alter its essential character.

It is proposed, then, here to undertake a careful examination of Mr. Spencer's psychology. Such a work cannot however be really adequately examined by any ordinary review. It will therefore be necessary to examine the whole two volumes *seriatim*. Thus each chapter will be noticed, and from each will be selected for remark such expressions as may be deemed by the reviewer erroneous, and the truth, according to the best of his knowledge and belief, stated. At the beginning and end of each of the eight parts into which the work is divided, short summaries of the contents and of the arguments for and against the views maintained in it will be presented.

Mr. Spencer's arrangement appears faulty, the distribution of the subject being such that the reader is led to and fro, from objectivity

to subjectivity, in a way which is perplexing. After an opening treatise on the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system, we are taken in the second part into pure subjective psychology. The third part reverts to anatomy and physiology, and the various adjustments found in different groups of animals, between their nervous structure and the conditions of their life; while in the fourth part these adjustments are brought into relation with pure and subjective psychology. In the fifth part he connects his psychological doctrines with the general law of evolution of the whole universe as conceived by him. In the sixth part we are once more in subjectivity, logical relations, the fundamental and ultimate relations of states of consciousness. The seventh part is purely metaphysical; while the eighth part deals with the emotions, and considers psychology in such a manner as to serve as an introduction to sociology.

In this arrangement Mr. Spencer has departed from the order he adopted in the first edition of his "Psychology," wherein he treated of the subjective phenomena of mind before proceeding to the consideration of physiological matters. Considering the existing conditions of philosophical controversy, the change seems unfortunate. As long as the objective validity of subjective conceptions is in dispute, objective truths should not appear first in the field. In a controversy wherein "states of consciousness" are the ultimate criteria, it must be a mistake to begin with considering the structure and functions of nerve-fibres and nerve-cells, a belief in the very objective existence of which is as yet unjustified. Highly reasonable is the declaration elsewhere* made by Mr. Spencer that "the first steps must be to shut out from investigation everything but what is subjective"; and in the very work under examination† he admits "that objective psychology can have no existence as such without borrowing its data from subjective psychology." Were it not for the prevalent cavils against human intelligence, it would be most reasonable to start from the external world, and so make a progressive ascent from mere nutrition to the most abstract intellectual action, according to the great example of psychological investigation set us by Aristotle. But such a process cannot in our days be followed without falling into a *petitio principii*. Now, it is necessary first to justify our perceptions and our reasonings, and only after such an introduction can we logically proceed to investigate the universe of objective being.

The first volume of Mr. Spencer's work consists of five parts.

* "Essays" (stereotyped edition, 1860), vol. ii. p. 400.

† "Psychology," vol. i. p. 141.

PART I.

The first part he entitles **THE DATA OF PSYCHOLOGY**. This is an account of the essential and fundamental structure of the nervous system, with its supposed mode of action, together with the material conditions which influence such action. To this is added a statement of the correlation of feeling and nervous action, and a consideration of the nature and scope of psychology.

And here it may be remarked that a definition of psychology at starting would have been very desirable, as some inconvenience and obscurity arises, as we shall see, from its relegation to the seventh chapter. In that chapter, indeed, he gives a description and explanation of what he means by psychology, but no short and convenient definition of it. He really means by psychology *a science of mind subjectively considered, together with an objective science of the connexion between the two series of (1) external influences and (2) internal responses found in animals generally.*

CHAPTER I.—THE NERVOUS SYSTEM.

This chapter is made up of the following sections:—§ 1. Higher animals are more self-motive. § 2. And have more developed nervous systems. § 3. Both quantitatively. § 4. And qualitatively. § 5. The motions of the higher animals are more complex. § 6. With minor irregularities owing to temperature, &c. § 7. This objective mode of presenting the facts is to be preferred; because—1. They thus become capable of being included in the general process of evolution; 2. Only thus can they be objectively considered; and 3. Preconceptions are thus escaped.

The very first sentence of Mr. Spencer's book is open to criticism, and contains an important *petitio principii*. It runs as follows (p. 3):—"The lowest animal and the highest animal present no contrast more striking than that between the small self-mobility of the one and the great self-mobility of the other."

Now "man" is, as is on all hands admitted, the highest animal and did he, as thus asserted, present no more striking difference from a monad than a different degree of self-mobility, his oneness of nature with the brutes would follow as an inevitable consequence. Therefore in quietly assuming that there is no more striking difference between them than this very degree of self-mobility, the essential oneness of their nature is also quietly assumed, and thus Mr. Spencer actually begs that question, which is the most important of all for the inquiry he has undertaken. But in fact I dispute the accuracy of his assertion, even leaving man out the question, and I unhesitatingly affirm that the orang-utan and the amœba present "contrasts" more striking than their different degrees of self-mobility. Whereas the difference in degree of self-

mobility between the dragon-fly and the cochineal insect, both members of one and the same class, is absolutely greater than the difference in this respect between the dragon-fly and the sloth, though the latter is a member of the very highest class; that, namely, to which man himself belongs. If man be introduced into the comparison, then not mobility but rationality is of course the most striking difference.

In estimating mobility in animals belonging to very different biological groups, he says:—Comparing the movements of a zoophyte with those of a rapidly-flying bird, “masses being supposed equal, the quantity of motion generated in the last case approaches a million times that generated in the first.” This is true if we compare a humming-bird with a sea-anemone of the same mass; but let us suppose a free-swimming infusorian and a chameleon to be equal in mass, and the amount of self-mobility will be greatly in excess in the lower animal. Again, as to rapidity of motion, a similar consideration should surely intervene in estimating the motion-producing power of two animals. Thus, in comparing a hare with a dragon-fly, the number of times each traverses a space equal to its own long diameter in a minute might be taken as a test, and, so estimated, the motion of the invertebrate animal would surely be far the greater. Again, Mr. Spencer speaks of the “immense difference between the slow-crawling of worms and the quicker flight of insects,” and no doubt the difference is very great; still the wonderful rapidity with which the tubicolous annelids withdraw into their tubes when alarmed should not be lost sight of. He also says, “between the inferior or water-breathing vertebrata and superior or air-breathing vertebrata, there is an equally conspicuous unlikeness in energy of movement.” Generally speaking, this is true enough, but it would not be difficult to bring many conflicting instances, such, e.g., as the pike and the tortoise. Once more he remarks (p. 5): “As we ascend from creatures that are inert to creatures that are vivacious, we advance from weak to strong skeletons, internal or external.” But surely the inert tortoise has a skeleton far stronger than that of the agile lizard (such, e.g., as the anolis), and the skeleton of the restlessly active sapajous of the Brazilian forests is at least not stronger than that of the sloth which hangs suspended from the branches of the same trees, on which the former jump and gambol.

As respects the size and structure of the nervous centres, Mr. Spencer draws attention (p. 8) to the well-known but interesting fact of the great size of the porpoise's brain and the rapidity of its motion, and then proceeds to show by a comparison of the small relative excess of a large dog's brain over a small dog's, that the size of the brain does not bear relation to motion only, but also to

the involution and complexity of the motions the various animals perform, culminating in man. Here it may be remarked *in limine* that the apparently materialistic tendency of the observation concerning man's brain has no necessary implication of the kind, since Peripatetics admit that no thought is possible for us, without concurrent play of imagination, and consequently however essentially independent may be mind from matter, mind, *as experienced by us*, is intimately bound up with matter; and we should, therefore, *à priori*, expect an even vaster excess of organs subservient to imagination than in fact exists. But there is another consideration to which Mr. Spencer does not advert, besides that general relation which exists in the higher animals between the size of the body and that of the brain as compared with such body. This consideration is the size of the cerebrum as evidenced by its convoluted condition. It is true that the smaller the body the larger the relative size of the brain, but in another respect the larger the body the larger is the brain; namely, the larger is the amount of surface of the cerebral hemispheres, as indicated by their convolutions. Whenever the cerebrum is in most of the species of any group considerably convoluted (as in the apes), then when we come to species very diminutive in size, as the marmosets, these convolutions all but disappear. Where, as in Rodents, the cerebrum is in most cases smooth and unconvoluted, when we come to species of excessive size, as the capybara, these convolutions immediately reappear.

In man the cerebrum is richly convoluted in accordance with his size, as it is also in the elephant and in the whale, but the excess of the convoluted condition in man over that of the orang is by no means such as we should *à priori* expect from the greater bulk of his body, or as would accord with the conception that the convoluted hemispheres specially minister to the activity of the imagination, and still less with the materialistic belief that pure intellect is cerebral activity. No objection then need be taken to Mr. Spencer's law (p. 13), "that whenever the motion evolved, though not great in quantity, is heterogeneous in kind, a relatively large nervous system exists; and that wherever the evolved motion is both great in quantity and heterogeneous in kind, the largest nervous systems exist"; but when he adds (p. 13), "apart from any doctrine of evolution, true conclusions respecting psychical phenomena must be based on the facts exhibited throughout organic nature," the protest must be repeated, that psychology, in the existing state of controversies, can only be satisfactorily approached from the subjective side. Psychical facts, subjectively considered, are primary, and should therefore be treated first. Moreover, if we begin objectively, we must begin with the lowest of all organisms and work upwards; while as regards *intellect*, we

must begin with the highest, in which alone *mental* phenomena exist. Therefore, instead of saying that our conclusions "must be based upon" the facts of organic nature, we should say, "must be checked by" such facts; otherwise by this very phrase of Mr. Spencer, the question of the real distinctness of mind and mere sentient matter is already "begged" for the second time. Finally in this first chapter, Mr. Spencer tells us (p. 14):—"The actions of all organic beings, including those of our own species, are known to us only as motions." To this may be replied, we know them not *as* motions, but *by* and *through* motions. When a man points out to us an object by gesture, the action is known to us as "a significant gesture," and not as "motions," though on reflection we see that we know his action by and through motions. When we are addressed verbally, we know directly the act of speech and perhaps understand its meaning, but we know the motions through which this is revealed to us only by reflection and examination, and very imperfectly then.

Mr. Spencer speaks of "*inferential interpretations*" and "*hidden implications*," but Mr. Spencer cannot logically affirm, at this preliminary stage of the inquiry, that there cannot be, what the Peripatetic philosophy declares there are, intuitions of the intellect, the intellect intueing the actions of organic beings *by means of* sensible perceptions of various motions, sounds, &c. Finally he tells us: "Those who bring with them to the investigation of psychical phenomena the hypotheses that have descended to us from the past, are almost sure to be more or less biassed thereby," and that by pursuing his method "we escape from preconceptions." But there is more than one kind of *bias*; we may have a *pre-conception* opposed to the more general and common view. Has Mr. Spencer started without preconceptions? Is not his system vitiated by the combined errors of Cartesianism and Protestantism? Has he once seriously attempted to understand and ideally put himself in the intellectual stand-point of the scholastic philosophy? Has he not started with a strong anti-theological prepossession and with a foregone conclusion that a mere difference of degree and not one of kind separates the psychical nature of man from that of all other animals? We have already seen how this conclusion has been twice begged in this first chapter. We cannot but expect that the key-note having been thus struck the same key will be continued in persistently.

CHAPTER II.—THE STRUCTURE OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM.

This chapter consists of the following sections:—§ 8. The nervous system grows complex as we ascend the animal scale. § 9. It consists of nerves and cells respectively capable of isomeric and destructive changes. § 10. The nervous unit con-

sists of a cell with fibres. § 11. The cells are commissurally connected. § 12. And complex interconnexions between them necessitate central agglomerations of nervous tissue. § 13. The cells also act as "multipliers." § 14. The whole nervous system is connected together through the *medulla oblongata* and *cerebrum*. § 15. Besides the foregoing there are the vaso-motor nerves. § 16. Recapitulation.

In this chapter Mr. Spencer gives an admirable sketch of the broadest features of the nervous system generally, and of that of man in particular. The explanations offered are most ingenious, yet, as he himself admits (p. 21, last line), largely hypothetical. The conception of the generation of protuberant masses of ganglionic nervous tissue is especially noteworthy and admirable.

I have no wish to contest Mr. Spencer's facts or conclusions as to nervous anatomy; but, considering the rapid advance of physical discovery, it is a hazardous thing to build metaphysical truths on facts of the detailed kind here given, and Mr. Spencer seems thus to expose himself quite unnecessarily to possible hostile criticism in the future, resulting in a contest beside the main issue. The only fact which is really important is that animals, ourselves included, possess a special system of parts ministering to sensation, and this no one disputes or ever did or can dispute. Mr. Spencer says (p. 43), "Many conspicuous traits of nervous structure, which some will think ought to be set down, are really altogether irrelevant." I believe that much of that which has been set down is irrelevant also.

In this chapter we again meet with that quiet assumption of identity of kind between the intellectual powers of man and the psychical faculties of brutes which it has already been necessary to call attention to. Thus Mr. Spencer says (p. 35):—"As a datum for psychology of the most general kind, the foregoing description of nervous structure might suffice. But having to deal chiefly with that more special psychology distinguished as human, it will be proper to add some account of the human nervous system." Again, he remarks (p. 43) that certain detailed facts of the anatomy of man's spinal marrow throw "no light on the science of mind." Now surely "psychology of the most general kind is one thing" and the "science of *mind*" is another. The former must be studied objectively, but the latter can only be investigated subjectively until certain fundamental facts as to objectivity have been satisfactorily established on a subjective basis, such, e. g., as the existence of the world, the correspondence of signs and feelings, &c. "As a datum for psychology of the most general kind," Mr. Spencer's description of the nervous system does *not* suffice, since actions to all appearance essentially the same as those performed through the aid of a nervous system

are, in the lower animals and in plants, performed without it. "Psychology of the most general kind" can only be satisfactorily investigated by considering all the processes of life, vegetable as well as animal, as was done by Aristotle according to the knowledge of his age.

The "special psychology distinguished as human," on the other hand, being essentially known to us mentally, can only be mentally investigated. Physical conditions, indeed, may become known to us as conditions *sine quâ non* to the mind's action; but such conditions can no more form a proper part of the science of "mind" than sidereal astronomy of pathology. "Psychology" may indeed be used to denote a science which treats of all *those activities which bear relation to the nervous system*, and this is the sense in which, roughly speaking, Mr. Spencer uses the term. It would have saved much ambiguity if Mr. Spencer had given us a preliminary definition of the term "psychology" instead of deferring it to the seventh chapter. In the sense in which it is used by Mr. Spencer, it includes all the processes of mere animal life responsive to external stimuli together with human intellectual activity. Of course we may, if we please, explain vital actions by merely physical terms, till the latter exhibit their own insufficiency to define the former. Similarly, animal actions may be explained by terms denoting vegetable powers, and rational actions by those referring to merely animal powers, until the insufficiency of such terms is also analogously self-revealed. Mr. Spencer cannot perhaps be expected to point out the essential difference of the rational and sensitive natures; it would be enough if he allowed this difference fairly to exhibit itself. But he does not do this; on the contrary, he assumes the identity of fundamental nature in the two, and that the mind of man differs but in degree from the psychical faculties of brutes. We shall see that he does not appear to have realized the difference referred to, even as a thing possibly true, and to be considered and examined, and this defect is the more remarkable on account of the eminence of antecedent and contemporary thinkers who take the opposite view. He has indeed disclaimed (p. 14) "calling in question the truth" of the views referred to, only declaring that "it is proper to ignore them"; but in fact the ignoring is of such a nature that the reader is more or less unconsciously prejudiced against them.

This fault, as we shall see, renders his psychology incomplete, and necessarily results in the ignoring of all the distinguishing phenomena of "mind,"—a singular result in a "Psychology."

CHAPTER III.—THE FUNCTIONS OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM.

The several sections of this chapter are:—§ 17. The nervous system's functions are the receiving, liberating, and apportioning of motion. § 18. The subject must be treated objectively, and there-

fore in terms of motion. § 19. The functions of the grey and white portions of nervous tissue are not absolutely distinct. § 20. Nevertheless the function of the cells is mainly explosive, and that of the fibres mainly conductive. § 21. But the interconnexions are so complex that a touch may cause the whole body to start. § 22. Reflex action. § 23. Inhibitory nerves and vaso-motor action. § 24. As the nervous system becomes more developed its functions become more and more complex.

In describing and defining the functions of the nervous system, Mr. Spencer gives (pp. 48-49) us a "generalized idea" of those functions, together with a division of them into "recipio-motor, libero-motor, and dirigi-motor." "We have," he says (p. 47), "to interpret its passive function as a receiver of disturbances that set it going; its active function as a liberator of motion; and its active function as a distributor or apportioner of the motion liberated." He adds: "Probably it will be thought that there is here introduced a function distinct from those before named, 'because receiving stimuli' can be included neither under the head of disengaging motions nor under the head of co-ordinating motions." But he attempts to obviate the objection by the reflection, "all nervous stimuli are motions, molar or molecular." Granting this, for argument's sake, as regards light, as well as in the case of other stimuli, nevertheless reason compels us to recognize a power* of receiving impressions distinct from those impressions themselves, whether they be molar or molecular, though such impressions are no doubt the necessary conditions for nerve activity and consequent sensation or other active process. Because the stimuli are motions, it by no means follows that the nervous action which responds to such stimuli can be adequately expressed in terms of motion, and our own knowledge of our sentient faculties assures us it cannot. But to this I will return at the end of my notes on this chapter.

In this third chapter there is again set forth much hypothetical matter, highly ingenious as it nevertheless certainly is. Allowing all the hypotheses as to the nature of the action of nerves and ganglia to pass uncontested, the main criticism to which the chapter is open loses none of its force. Certain subordinate statements, moreover, must not be passed over without remark. Thus the author ingeniously suggests that the cerebellum is an organ of doubly-compound co-ordination in space, and the cerebrum a similar organ for time. But surely a frog is not destitute of a multitude of space co-ordinations similar to those possessed by a lizard; rather,

* Mr. Spencer is so compelled himself, and the whole principle of scholastic occult powers and qualities is conceded when he says (as at p. 193), "Mind being composed of feelings and the relations between feelings, and the *aptitudes* of feelings for entering into relations," &c.

considering his combined terrestrial and aquatic locomotion, and his adjustment of eye and tongue to insect-catching, his space co-ordinations must be very complex, and yet in the frog the cerebellum is comparatively rudimentary.

Again as to the cerebrum, it is said by Mr. Spencer (p. 62), to predominate "in creatures showing like ourselves the power of adapting, throughout long periods, concatenated compound actions to concatenated compound impressions." But it may well be asked what special relations to the past and future have whales and porpoises beyond other beasts that they should share with us a specially developed organ for such a function? Yet it is perhaps rather the lower than the higher animals which exhibit the most complex co-ordinations as to time. In the animal kingdom few more striking actions destined for ulterior efficiency can be met with than those of some insects, notably the wasp *Sphex*, which stings, collects and stores up with its eggs the stupefied, paralyzed living prey on which its young when hatched are to feed. Surely this is a case of "involved aggregate actions, simultaneous and successive, which, being adjusted to these involved impressions, achieve remote ends" (p. 60). Yet, however the so-called "cerebral convolutions" of any of the bee and wasp order may be developed, (and it should be recollected they are developed in the common blow-fly also) it cannot be maintained that their relative development is comparable with that of the higher beasts' cerebrum. This is not meant of course to imply that for such complex functions insects have not corresponding structures, but to show how much caution must be exercised in attributing definite functions to definite parts in the way Mr. Spencer attributes them. Even in this third chapter Mr. Spencer exhibits some of that want of refined distinction, and some of that misleading confusion of terms which will often have to be pointed out later. .

Thus as to confusion: after speaking of the adjustment of actions to impressions, he adds (p. 60):—"The general truth of this definition may, I think, be safely assumed; since it is simply a statement in other terms of what, in ordinary language, is called intelligent action; which habitually characterizes vertebrate animals in proportion as these centres are largely developed." Now here is a statement which lends itself to the interpretation that true intelligent action (since whatever may be improperly so termed "in ordinary language," true action of the kind is, in such language, certainly termed intelligent) characterizes vertebrate animals. An interpretation which is contrary to the teaching of the highest philosophers, and which, if deliberately meant, ought not to be assumed or insinuated but proved.

As an example of want of refinement and analytic distinction, the following passage from the note on page 62 may be quoted:—

"Mind, in its ordinary acceptation, means more especially a comparatively intricate co-ordination in time, the consciousness of a creature 'looking before and after,' and using past experiences to regulate future conduct." Now this is made to apply to man and to the higher vertebrata, and of course it does so apply if "using past experiences to regulate future conduct" means such action as that by which dogs and horses learn to avoid pains and punishments, and acquire gratifications and rewards. But then that is not the sense in which "past experiences" are used by man when he is spoken of, *par excellence*, as the animal "looking before and after." The way in which such a being is said to use such experiences is by means of his self-consciousness, his recognition of himself as persisting, of the "past experiences" as things now past, and of the "future conduct" as what is yet to come. Yet Mr. Spencer here confounds things so different as the indeliberate, direct acquisition of sensible experiences, the pleasurable and painful associations and emotions of a brute with the deliberate, reflex acquisition of intellectual experiences, the voluntarily formed associations and intelligent emotions of a man—under the common phrases "using experiences" and "looking," and he fails to notice the mode of "using" and the mode of "looking" though the "how," is so pregnant with far-reaching consequences and implications.

A more important matter is Mr. Spencer's mode of defining the functions of the nervous system. He says (p. 65) it must be defined in terms of motion: "Only in these terms can there be given an adequate definition of fully-developed nervous functions. If we admit any subjective element, our definitions become inapplicable to all those nervous actions which have no subjective accompaniments, which go on without feelings; and a conception of nervous functions which excludes those of organic life cannot be a complete conception. On the other hand, the definition of nervous functions as consisting in the conveyance and multiplication of molecular motions, holds in all cases. It includes equally the conduction of an impression made on a nerve of sense, and the excitement of chemical metamorphoses in a gland."

Now here there seems to be great confusion and great incompleteness. You cannot define a man by his bones, though his skeleton is a necessary condition to his continued life. The chemical composition of a flower will not define it, even though exactly the same composition exists in no other species, and though that particular composition may be indispensable to its existence. To call the assimilative, respiratory, and reproductive actions of a plant "motions," is like calling the art of the sculptor "stonebreaking." Such artistic action is of course a kind of stonebreaking, but it is vastly more. Similarly to

speak of the sensitive faculties of animals as "motions" is an utterly inadequate mode of expression, unless the word "motion" be used in another sense, as when we speak of a motion of the will or intellectual action in seeking to acquire knowledge. To call vegetation or sensitive actions "motions," conveys no real explanation, and cannot be construed in consciousness, however much "motions" may be the necessary conditions or the external signs of growth, reproduction, and sensation. If, as Mr. Spencer says, a definition of nervous functions, which definition excludes those of organic life, "cannot be a complete conception," *à fortiori*, a definition which excludes or neglects sensation cannot certainly be a complete one. Mr. Spencer speaks (p. 65) of his definition as including "the conduction of an impression made on a nerve of sense," but this is but a poor account of what we know as a sensation, and an account which only gives us the "beggarly elements" necessary for its production. What would be thought of the attempt to describe a battle (with all the changes of manœuvre induced by the receipt from time to time of news by the commander-in-chief) in terms of motion, including those of the larynx, optic apparatus, &c., of the commander and his assistants? Yet such an absurdity would follow if we were to act on Mr. Spencer's rule (p. 66) that "the common character of the changes in nervous centres must determine the definition of their common function." The common character of all the phenomenal changes of a battle is motion of one kind or another, but to try to define a battle in terms of motion would be an absurd attempt.

The confusion above referred to is the mixing up the "conditions" of events with the "events themselves." The "incompleteness" is the non-emergence of the qualities and events really referred to from the terms used as the definition of such qualities and events.

The functions of the nervous system are animal functions: to attempt to define them in the terms of vegetative life, and still more in the terms of merely physical existence—as in employing the term "motion" for that purpose—must end in incompleteness—indeed, to make such an endeavour is to attempt an impossibility. And here again we find the want of that preliminary definition of "psychology," the absence of which has been pointed out with blame in the last chapter.

The phenomena of the inorganic world may, doubtless, be defined, sooner or later, in terms of motion. Those of the vegetable world require for their adequate presentation other terms. Fresh terms are similarly required adequately to portray the phenomena of the sentient life of animals, and yet others for the phenomena of the intellectual activities of man.

Nevertheless, as a material structure accompanies and is the area of all these four kinds of activities, physical modifications of that structure are requisite conditions (conditions *sine quâ non*) of the occurrence of all these activities even the highest. Even the highest, because thought, as we experience it, requires sensations as preliminaries; these cannot exist save in a being possessing powers of vegetative life, and such a being of course depends on the physical laws common to all matter. Therefore physical modifications, definable in terms of motion, may be employed in describing all vital activities, but only as denoting the condition of such activities, which conditions serve as the material of which the soul (animal or vegetable, as the case may be) makes use.

Similarly vegetative activities may be employed in describing the activities of animal life, but only again as the conditions for, the materials made use of by, such animal activity.

Similarly again, animal, sentient activities may be employed in describing the activities of intellectual life, but only again as the conditions for, the materials made use of by, such intellectual activity.

All four kinds have physical activities in common.

The three highest have vegetative activities in common.

The two highest have animal, sentient activities in common.

The highest of all has all these as the conditions and materials of the intellectual action of a rational animal.

Nervous functions, then, cannot be really defined in terms of motion; to attempt to define them in such terms is but to denote the conditions of such functions, not the functions themselves, in the only mode in which they are known to us, i.e. in act.

But the whole of this misconception, incompleteness, and confusion, springs from Mr. Spencer's adoption of a particular view as to physiology, and from his first principles of biology. He says (p. 48), "Physiology is an objective science, and is limited to such data as can be reached by observations made on sensible objects. It cannot, therefore, properly appropriate subjective data, wholly inaccessible to external observations." But if not, if physiology cannot take note of *feelings*, which we as animals can understand, so much the worse for physiology. Yet, in fact, a physiology which should take no note of seeing and hearing would be absurd, but seeing and hearing, however ministered to and conditioned by motion, cannot be described in terms of motion—if any one can so describe them let him. Here we find the root of Mr. Spencer's misconception of objective psychology; it lies in his misconception of physiology, of which such psychology is a branch.

CHAPTER IV.—THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO NERVOUS ACTION.

The sections of this chapter are:—§ 25. Non-solution of continuity is a necessary condition to nervous action. § 26. So is a due degree of pressure and no more. § 27. Also a due degree of heat. § 28. A proper quantity of blood nutrition. § 29. A proper state of the blood as to its qualities. § 30. It must not be charged with carbon or urea. § 31. Intermixture of effects.

Against this chapter there is nothing to be said, except that the term “pre-requisite,” sometimes used (p. 76) by Mr. Spencer, is preferable to “conditions.” The latter term better applying to what he names “functions” in Chapter III.

CHAPTER V.—NERVOUS STIMULATION AND NERVOUS DISCHARGE.

The following are the sections herein contained:—§ 32. Each nerve has its own action as to quality, though the quantity of its action increases with its length. § 33. Its action is intermittent. § 34. And not very quick, sometimes thirty yards a second. § 35. The central effect lasts an appreciable time. § 36. The nervous centres become prostrated by excessive action. § 37. There are rhythmical alternations. § 38. And multitudinous reverberations passing in all directions. § 39. Hence there exist constant small general discharges constituting the “tonic state.” § 40. These small discharges are parallel with blood-waves, and the smallest discharges depend on local gushes of nervous energy as of blood.

This is a most ingenious hypothetical account of the way in which the stimulation, &c., of nervous tissue may be supposed to condition sensation and other organic actions in animals. Nothing in this chapter need be here contested.

CHAPTER VI.—ÆSTHO-PHYSIOLOGY.

The various sections which compose this chapter may be summarised as follows:—§ 41. Nervous phenomena may be compared with phenomena of consciousness. § 42. The same physical conditions (such as non-solution of continuity, due pressure, heat, &c. &c.) conduce to the exhibition of both. § 43. Some nervous phenomena are felt and some are not at all felt, while there is every gradation between the two. § 44. Nervous phenomena and phenomena of consciousness have similar relations to “time.” § 45. Both are similarly incapable of immediate repetition. § 46. Certain “feelings” run parallel with dirigo-motor nerve actions. § 47. A quantitative parallelism between feelings and nervous actions exists only within narrow limits. § 48. The “emotions” conform to the laws of “feelings.” § 49. Some feelings are vivid

(sensations), others are faint (ideas). § 50. Desires, are long unused feelings which are excited by faint disturbances, the tendency to act varying inversely with the proximity in time of experienced actual feeling of the kind. § 51. The assumption of a correspondence between subjective feelings and objective phenomena serves to harmonize facts, though its reality is incapable of proof.

This is a most important chapter, as, if its assertions were simply accepted, the whole of materialism would thereby be accepted also. The question of the distinct nature of "intellect," as distinguished from "feeling," is ignored in it, and their essential identity is assumed—the most weighty distinctions are slurred over, apparently unrecognized. Thus Mr. Spencer says (p. 98), "The nervous system can be known only as a structure that undergoes and initiates either changes, or changes that are representable in terms furnished by the visible world; and thus far we have limited ourselves to generalizing the phenomena which it thus points to us objectively." But it is very great mistake to speak as if the "visible world" were the only "objective" world known to us. Our own existence in the past and our own mental states are known to us as objective existences though invisible ones.

Again he says (p. 98), "The changes which, regarded as modes of the Non-Ego, have been expressed in terms of motion, have now, regarded as modes of the Ego, to be expressed in terms of feeling. Having contemplated these changes on their outsides, we have to contemplate them from their insides." But how can we get at a consciousness of the Ego and Non-Ego, as subject and object, unless we directly know the former as subject? And then we know it both as subject and object, and the power by which we do so is the very power by which we can pass from the subjective to the objective and *vice versâ*. Again, how can we know the Ego and Non-Ego reflectively or contrasted, except by considering them as species of the genus Being?

We also, on the very same page, meet with an ambiguity, which may lead to a begging of the question at issue. Mr. Spencer says, "In other words we have to treat of nervous phenomena as phenomena of consciousness." Now if he is here speaking of "direct" cognition only, the expression may pass; but if he is to be understood as speaking of reflex consciousness also (between which and direct there is indeed, in his system, no fundamental distinction), then the question is begged as to whether or not "self-consciousness" is the "inside" of a nervous phenomenon.

Again (p. 99), he adds, "Each individual is absolutely incapable of knowing any feelings but his own." But this is not true; his intellect comes to know the feelings of others, though of course it may be said he is absolutely incapable of feeling the "feelings" of others.

Upon the very same page he proceeds to give the physiological grounds upon which "it is inferred that the human nervous system is the seat of the human feelings;" but even granting this, and granting therefore that man's nervous system does more than minister to his feelings—which is not proved—there is no shadow of ground given for supposing it to be the seat of "thought."

Once more (p. 105), he speaks of sensations and feelings being joined "with a chain of states of consciousness, out of which no sensation is ever known to exist." This can be said if, as Mr. Spencer assumes, consciousness is to stand for sensitive as well as for intellectual cognition, but the one may exist without the other, since we may have feelings which are not intellectually perceived (as complementary spectra sometimes show us), in spite of both sensitive and intellectual cognition being joined (as two faculties in one being) in us. This shows us that there is *à priori* ground for expecting that unintellectual (brute) natures would have this sensitive cognition outside (an, in them, absent) self-consciousness and will, as also that, we may have ourselves "sensations known to exist" outside our consciousness (as it existed at the time the sensations were felt) and recognized only by reflection and recollection.

The sensitive self-cognition, which Mr. Spencer calls consciousness, is, indeed, the *sensus communis*, and as applied to that the following passage (p. 105) is true, though it is not true as applied to the intellect:—"Comparisons of sentient states are impossible, unless the correlative nervous changes are put in connection at one place." This of course applies to sensitive cognition, but intellectual deliberate recognition of sensations as being sensations, is the work of the intellect—for the action of which, in this special matter, the *sensus communis* may serve as the material. Thus when he goes on to say, "the seat of consciousness is that nervous centre to which, mediately or immediately, the most heterogeneous impressions are brought;" this applies admirably to a seat for the *sensus communis*. On the same page we again meet with an instance of confusion. Mr. Spencer says, "Certain nervous changes, which have subjective sides early in life, cease to have them later in life." But a "nervous change," *qua* "nervous," never has any subjective side.

Another passage really serves to show the essential independence of the intellect from sensation. He tells us (pp. 106, 107): "It obviously follows, too, that in adult life a nervous action may or may not have an identifiable subjective aspect, according as it is strong or weak; since, if there comes to a finished ganglion constructed as described, a feeble disturbance, the whole of the small quantity of molecular motion liberated may be drafted off by the efferent fibres; whereas, if the disturbance is great, the disengaged molecular motion, being more than can find its way along the

effluent fibres, will some of it take a centripetal course and cause a subjective change." Now our intellect has the power of disregarding certain relatively strong sensations, and diligently following and attending to much weaker ones; so that we are not, within limits, necessarily dominated by the mere greater strength of a sensation, and this harmonizes with what Mr. Spencer admits as to the absence of any constant quantitative relation between nervous and psychical states. Apropos of a toothache, with its small molecular efferent waves and large motor efferent effects, he observes (p. 118): "To which of these disturbances, centripetal or centrifugal, is the feeling equivalent? We cannot say to both, for one is many times the other in amount; and we have no reason to say that it is equivalent to one rather than to the other: the rational inference being that it is not equivalent to either."

In connexion with the foregoing may be mentioned what he tells us (p. 120), to the effect that "there is no fixed or even approximate quantitative relation between this amount of molecular transformation in the sentient centre, and the peripheral disturbance originally causing it, or the disturbance of the motor apparatus which it may eventually cause." But what becomes, then, of the principle of the persistence of force? How, then, are feelings to be supposed to be produced by nervous changes in accordance with that principle?

But the most important matter is Mr. Spencer's failure to distinguish between thought and feeling. He calls the former faint as compared with the latter, saying (p. 123), "every feeling exists under two strongly contrasted degrees of intensity. There is a vivid form of it which we call an actual feeling, and there is a faint form of it which we call an ideal feeling." But indeed "we" call it no such thing. We admit, of course, that there are imaginary sensations which may be weaker or stronger than ordinary actual sensations, but "we" call them imaginary not "ideal," the latter term being reserved for intellectual psychical states.

Mr. Spencer explains (p. 124) the difference between an idea and a sensation, as related in the second case (sensation) to the direct disturbance of a nervous centre, "by that peripheral impression to which it stands organically related," and in the former case (idea) when the centre is affected by merely secondary waves diffused from other strongly excited parts. "In brief, these vivid states of consciousness, which we know as sensations, accompany direct and therefore strong excitations of nerve-centres; while the faint states of consciousness which we know as remembered sensations, or *ideas of sensations*, accompany indirect and therefore weak excitations of the same nerve-centres." Here is confusion and want of distinction indeed! A revived and recalled sensation occurring

spontaneously and without the mind's reflex apprehension (as when a beaten dog sees again the stick, or the sudden sight of rhubarb and magnesia causes an involuntary shudder), is one thing; a past sensation recalled by a voluntary act and reflexly recognized as a sensation which was formerly experienced, is quite another. Revived feelings centrally initiated are not thoughts, though they may serve as the *materials* of thoughts. A thought of "number," or "substance," or "cause," or "being," or "virtue," or "truth," is not a remembered sensation, because it never was a sensation originally; neither is it a revived relation between sensations, because it never was originally a relation between such, though revealed to us through and occasioned by means of sensations and their inter-relations. Man's "remembered sensations" (ideas) are not recognized as such by *their faintness* but by their representative character. They are reflexly recognized as making that which was past present to us, ideally, once more; or as making that which never was present, present now for the first time.

Mr. Spencer next treats of emotions (p. 125), and says that as these when strongest are centrally initiated, we might *à priori* expect to find, as in fact we do find, the difference between strong and weak similar emotions to be "by no means so great" as between ideas and sensations, "ideal emotion" passing "into actual emotion without any line of demarcation," adding, "obviously this is what might be anticipated." But surely it might be no less anticipated by those who deem "emotions" to be mere "feelings," as contrasted with "thoughts," and it perfectly fits in with the peripatetic philosophy.

Strange to say, Mr. Spencer neglects to take due note of memory. Thus he says, "Feeling of whatever kind is directly known by each person in no other place than his own consciousness." But feelings are known as having been but being no longer in consciousness, even now perhaps forgotten, except that we may know the fact that once they were. Mr. Spencer's words would imply that we do not know that a state of consciousness exists, but only that, as a fact, it is present to us—that it exists in us. He goes on (p. 128) to say, "Nevertheless the evidence, though so indirect, is so extensive, so varied, and so congruous, that we may accept the conclusion without hesitation." But we may not do so unless we can *trust our memory*, i. e. know ourselves as enduring—our past states to be *ours*.

His concluding summary of the correlations between nervous action and psychical states is excellent, as proving that sensation runs parallel to and varies with nervous action, but it does not prove one bit that intellect so runs, except in so far as it makes use of sensation (and therefore also of nervous action) as its mate-

rial. He concludes the chapter (p. 128) as follows:—"Thus impossible as it is to get immediate proof that feeling and nervous action are the inner and outer faces of the same change, yet the hypothesis that they are so harmonizes with all the observed facts." But what in the name of all that is wonderful* makes them "inner" and "outer?" The "inner" is that which relates to the Ego, the "outer" is that which relates to the Non-ego. But this antithesis and the fact that it exists must be known. It cannot be felt now, even if we try and certainly therefore it cannot be a faint revival of anything felt in the past. To assert even that we have the idea of this inner and outer relationship, still more to assert its existence, proves the existence of intellectual activity in him who asserts it—of real intellectual activity, that is, as distinguished from any mere complex associations of related "feelings."

CHAPTER VII.—THE SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGY.

The following are the sections of this chapter:—§ 52. Real psychology has not in fact yet been treated of. § 53. It is the investigation of the correspondence between changes in the organism and changes in the environment. § 54. Psychology is not biology, because this correspondence itself is its exclusive subject. § 55. These sciences graduate one into the other. Psychology being a specialized part of biology. § 56. Subjective psychology is a perfectly distinct science. § 57. Statement of the general arrangement of the subject to be pursued in the rest of the work.

Here at last we have a description and explanation of what Mr. H. Spencer means by psychology. But we have no neat definition only a long description. Mr. Spencer divides psychology into two parts:—A. *Subjective*. B. *Objective*. The former has for its object, states of consciousness as known to their possessor, and as absolutely separated off from every other science. The latter is (p. 138) "a specialized part of biology," treating of the way in which changes in nervous conditions or in states of consciousness correspond with changes in the environment. "Not the connection between the internal phenomena, nor the connection between the external phenomena, but the connection between these two connections" (p. 132).

As to the consideration of the environment being a distinguishing essential of objective psychology, Mr. Spencer (p. 135) says:—"We cannot explain a single act of a fish as it moves about in the water, without taking into account its relations to neighbouring objects

* Elsewhere (p. 133) he speaks of "a nervous change known as sweetness." But "sweetness" is *not* known as a "nervous change," however such nervous change may be a necessary condition for its knowledge.

distinguished by specially-related attributes. The instinctive proceedings of the insect, equally with those which in higher creatures we call intelligent, we are unable even to express without referring to things around." But just the same might be said of vegetable movement, e.g., Venus's fly-trap, nay, even a single act of a "planet" as it moves about in its orbit, cannot be explained "without taking into account its relations to neighbouring objects." Thus, even if we exclude such instances as the last and only include vegetable movements (which are certainly related to "neighbouring objects distinguished by specially-related attributes"), psychology is made so wide that it becomes synonymous with biology, i. e. a science of life. Biology should indeed properly have under it as one subordinate branch, psychology, the science of the three kinds of soul, vegetable, animal, and rational. In one sense this would make it synonymous with physiology, but physiology regards primarily the functions, not the kinds of soul, i. e. the functions as they run through the three souls, e. g. nutrition in plants, animals and cooking man. Therefore psychology and physiology relate to cross-divisions of the same subject-matter. Mr. Herbert Spencer really means by psychology *a science of mind subjectively considered together with an objective science of those animal activities which most seem to resemble our mental activities*. Thus psychology is a science (built up from and on a subjective basis *sui generis*) of the activities of rational and sentient souls in so far as rational and sentient or sentient only.

It is a pity Mr. Spencer did not give this explanation earlier. Here he fully admits that psychology (subjective) is altogether *sui generis*, and (p. 141) "that objective psychology can have no existence as such, without borrowing its data from subjective psychology." Certainly then he should have begun with the subjective, in its most complete and developed condition, and proceeded thence to the objective, to physiology of all kinds, vegetable as well as animal, and finally concluded with the combined teaching of all.

The contents of this first part of Mr. Spencer's work may be summarized as follows:—

Quantity and complexity of self-motion in animals vary with the mass and complexity of their nervous system (consisting of white conducting and grey explosive parts), which requires integrity, nutrition, and warmth for its due action in pulsating, intermittent nerve-reverberations. Feelings run parallel to and follow the laws of nervous action, and psychology is, in fact, a branch of biology.

The whole teaching of this part may, perhaps, be condensed into the following phrase:—"Motion and feelings are parallelly correlated with nervous structure."

To the teaching of this first part there is, on the whole, comparatively little to object. Nevertheless there are, as we have seen, some errors and inaccuracies of detail and some very important "beggings" of the main question as to the distinction between thought and feeling. Together with these defects there are also certain failures of analysis, resulting in a confusion of thought and a mode of treatment tending, by implication, to prejudice readers who are not on their guard, against truths which are not directly attacked or even explicitly referred to.

PART II.

The second part of Mr. Spencer's work is entitled THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.

This is a much more important part, and is an account of feelings from a subjective stand-point. The mind is represented as known only in states (each ultimately compound though seemingly simple), formed of feelings and relations (themselves feelings) between feelings segregated to their like in classes and subclasses, according as they are simultaneous or successive, like or unlike. A real objective cause, it is affirmed, is implied and must be assumed, but neither feelings nor relations are really equivalent to such objective nexus which is unknowable. Feelings and relations are said to be revivable and associable in the degree in which they are relational, and according to the conditions under which they are experienced. Pleasures and pains are represented as due to natural selection, which has evolved them in races which have been preserved by its action.

CHAPTER I.—THE SUBSTANCE OF MIND.

The sections of this chapter are as follows:—§ 58. The mind is only knowable as qualitatively differentiated, i. e., in its states. § 59. This is a truth necessarily conceded by both realists and idealists because unclassable by both. § 60. States of mind apparently (e. g. musical sound) are really compound, and all states are in fact various agglutinations of primitive nervous shocks. § 61. There is a parallelism with this as to matter, which probably consists of one unit variously compounded—all changes being, fundamentally, allotropism. § 62. Neither can the subjective be reduced to the objective, nor *vice versâ*. § 63. Nevertheless, of the two, external force is rather to be translated into terms of mind than the reverse, but both are inexplicable save by some unknowable existence underlying both.

This chapter is at once so important, and so bristles with errors and confusions, that they almost demand a small volume for their adequate exposition. Mr. Spencer says (p. 146), "if we take as

the substance of mind, mind as qualitatively differentiated in each portion that is separable by introspection," then "assuming an underlying something," we may know something of it. But we may well ask, on what ground shall we make this assumption? Unless he grants a self-consciousness which he does not grant, such an assumption will be both groundless and unverifiable. He goes on to say if we take the "underlying something" to be the "substance of mind," then "no amount of what we call intelligence, however transcendent, can grasp such knowledge." He afterwards (as we shall see) proceeds to show that we cannot know it in the way we know other things; but surely our knowledge of self (since there is only one self) may well be a peculiar kind of knowledge. Knowledge is one thing, the way in which we know anything is another. By the argument here used it might be proved, not only that mind is not known but does not exist, since all is knowable that we have any right to call existence. Therefore, since, according to Mr. Spencer, mind is unknowable, we have no right to say it exists; and, by the way, the same argument may be used against his "unknowable" also. Yet if there is one prominent feature of Mr. Spencer's teaching, it is the supreme certainty born in us of the existence of what he calls the "unknowable." But Mr. Spencer, in fact, admits that we do know mind as a persisting something in contrast with transient modifications, i. e., as a substance. He does so when he says (p. 146):—"While each particular impression or idea can be absent, that which holds impressions and ideas together is never absent; and its unceasing presence necessitates, or indeed constitutes, the notion of continuous existence or reality. Existence means nothing* more than persistence; and hence in mind, that which persists in spite of all changes and maintains the unity of the aggregate in defiance of all attempts to divide it, is that of which existence in the full sense of the word must be predicated, that which we must postulate as the substance of mind in contradistinction to the varying forms it assumes." Yet he none the less tells us that the substance of mind cannot possibly be known, because since "every state of mind is some modification of this substance of mind"—in no state of mind can the substance of mind be present unmodified. But this does not prove that the substance of mind is unknowable, but only that it is not knowable except in its modifications. Again, he denies the possibility of such knowledge because of the necessary conditions, according to him, of knowledge.

* This may be questioned as, not to speak of "potentiality," surely it is conceivable that existence may have no more duration than a point has extension.

He may however be met *in limine* thus. There cannot be a consciousness of difference without a comparison, and two things cannot be compared if one is unknown and unknowable. But Mr. Spencer talks of states of mind known as "states of mind," or "modifications of mind." Yet they can only be known as such by comparison with a "persistent substance" of mind, and therefore this must be known in order that we may know "states of mind" as "states of mind."

Now, concerning his argument, he remarks by the way (p. 147), "as in the absence of change there is no consciousness, there can be no knowledge." But how does Mr. Spencer know that? I dispute it, and even if true for us, the expression is too absolute, since in other conditions than those known to us conscious knowledge may endure permanently without change. But he continues his argument to the effect that knowledge can only be the establishment in thought of determinate relations, and that which contemplates is distinct from that which is contemplated, and that which, in knowing, is affected by the thing known, must be substance of mind, and therefore the thing known cannot be the substance of mind also, otherwise "we should have the substance of mind known in a state of mind, *which is a contradiction*. In brief, a thing cannot at the same instant be both the subject and the object of thought; and yet the substance of mind must be this before it can be known." But I deny that there is any necessary contradiction in the substance of mind being made intelligible to us, not *as* but *by* states of mind; its substance (which can never be felt but only perceived, as that which acts) may be made intelligible to us by means of its very acts, i. e., by means of states of mind. Again, why may it not be the exclusive property of mind to be both subject and object simultaneously? Yet even this is not necessary, if the mind is object and subject in successive instants, that alone may suffice to give it knowledge of itself, its nature, its substance, and its states. Indeed the knowledge of the *objectivity* or the *subjectivity* of any objective or subjective entity, positively requires the existence of such a synthesis of subject and object as Mr. Spencer denies the possibility of. It positively requires it, because no objective entity can be known *as objective* without contrasting it with the subject, and similarly you cannot know any subjective entity as subjective without contrasting it with an object, and in each case the subject must be made temporarily objective to obtain the comparison and contrast. But if Mr. Spencer only means that we cannot know our own soul otherwise than in and by its acts, he only asserts what has ever been taught by the schools to which he is the most opposed. No peripatetic ever taught that the soul could be known by us in its essence or otherwise than by its acts. If, on the other hand,

he would deny that we have direct consciousness of an enduring and persistent self, known to us by its acts, as being the author of our volitions, and the subject of our feelings and cognitions, then we might equally deny that he or any man can have any knowledge of his most familiar friend, since he can never know him save in and by some "act," and in some definite state. Similarly, that we cannot know the Ego except as "qualitatively differentiated," is most true, but it is true for the very simple reason that it never exists except in some state. A qualitatively undifferentiated Ego is a pure absurdity and an impossibility. No great wonder, then, that our intellects do not apprehend it. But an attempt to deny our knowledge of the substantial Ego without at the same time implicitly asserting that knowledge, is really an effort to escape self-consciousness, which can be but very inadequately represented by the conception of a man trying to jump away from his own shadow.

Mr. Spencer goes on to observe (p. 148), "to know anything is to distinguish it as such or such—to class it as of this or that order." This is true enough of reflective representation, deliberate knowledge, but not of direct, presentative, indeliberative knowledge, and some knowledge must be direct, as otherwise we have a *regressus ad infinitum*.

No brute knows anything as such or such in the latter sense, though of course it does in the former, as a dog knows the smell of his own species, though not the "smelliness" of the smell, or a species as a species. Again, he says (p. 148), "to know the substance of the mind is to be conscious of some community between it and some other substance." But the question is whether the Ego, the mind, is not the type of unity and of substance to us. Moreover, it may be objected that we cannot know the material universe, since, according to this argument, we must for this "know of some community between it and some other" universe. He continues: "It is equally clear that mind remains unclassable, and therefore unknowable." It may be true that mind in the abstract may be unclassable, although it may be a species of the genus "realities" as distinguished from the genus "possibilities;" but unquestionably every concrete human mind is classable amongst "human minds," and the human mind is a species classable with the minds of pure spirits, and in a sense even with God. Indeed, how can Mr. Spencer assert (p. 148, § 60) our "absolute ignorance of the substance of mind," when he must admit that the mind knows that it knows, and therefore knows activity of its own of a definite kind, and itself as acting and reflecting, and therefore persisting, and therefore substance.

Mr. Spencer now proceeds to his grand type of sense-transformation, that alleged change of feeling of one kind, through more

rapid repetition, into feeling of another kind, consideration of which is to show us how, in a parallel manner, "sensations" may be transformed into "thoughts."*

He says (p. 148, § 60): "Although the individual sensations and emotions, real or ideal, of which consciousness is built up, appear to be severally simple, homogeneous, unanalysable, or of inscrutable natures, yet they are not so. There is at least one kind of feeling which, as ordinarily experienced, seems elementary, that is, demonstrably not elementary." . . . "Musical sound is the name we give to this seemingly simple feeling, which is clearly resolvable into simpler feelings." He then goes on to remind us that slow taps are heard as taps, but when very rapid "the noises are no longer identified in separate states of consciousness, and there arises in place of them a continuous state of consciousness, called a tone," that this rises in pitch with the rapidity of the taps, and that other simultaneous similar series produce *timbre*. This is further enforced elsewhere (p. 199) by recalling to mind how the same vibrating tuning-fork jars the teeth and at the same time "awakens" through the skull "a consciousness of sound," apparently showing that the very same thing is under different circumstances "feeling of touch" and "perception of tone."

But I deny *in toto* the truth of Mr. Spencer's assertions. Not only I deny that the "one kind of feeling" selected is "demonstrably not elementary," but I affirm that it is demonstrable that what Mr. Spencer terms its "proximate components" are *no parts of it at all*. My position may be demonstrated thus:—Recurring sensations of beating and jar do not become a sound, they *are* "sound" at once, as soon as perceived by the auditory organ at all. Similarly a musical note is not made up of rapid audible beats, but only begins to exist when the beat-sounds cease. A "perception of musical tone" and a perception of "beat" are different feelings. All that Mr. Spencer really shows and proves is that diverse conditions result in the evocation of diverse simple perceptions, of which perceptions such conditions are the occasions. He does not in the least show that such perceptions (of a musical note) are made up of other sensations (slightly-heard, shocks, or raps). The first sensations, the heard-raps, cease entirely, and give place to the other musical note, but there is no evidence that they constitute the other.

According to Mr. Spencer's argument, if a certain number of taps produce a pleasant feeling, and an increased number in the same time cause pain, we must conclude that pleasure and pain are the same feeling! The physical conditions of feeling are one thing,

* But there is no ratio or common measure between the *difference* between one feeling and another, and the difference *between* feelings and thoughts.

the feelings themselves are another. With different physical conditions we may have different feelings. Because two kinds of auditory sensation have for cause the same visible object in different states, it no more follows that they are the same than that seeing and hearing are the same because a vibrating cord is seen by the eye as well as heard by the ear.

Mr. Spencer continues (p. 150), "Can we stop here?" But I deny that we have got "here." Arguing by analogy, he goes on: "If the unlikeness among the sensations of each class may be due to unlikenesses among the modes of aggregation of a unit of consciousness common to them all, so, too, may the much greater unlikeness between the sensations of each class and those of other classes." "If" they may, then no doubt we may so analogically argue; but I deny that they may. The modes of aggregation themselves (as we are in the region of consciousness) must be felt, and if so, the units aggregated, or we could not feel their aggregation, and if so, they are not transformed, but remain, since we still feel them. On the other hand since, as is undoubted, different aggregations of similar physical causes are the occasion of feelings of different kinds, these must be due to innate powers in the organism so to respond to such diverse excitations. In other words, the different sensible powers must be innate as "forms"—in the sense of Kant at the least. As Aristotle pointed out,* two thousand years ago, the special aptitudes of the several special senses must be innate before the least particle of such special senses can become actual. To those who object to the operation of occult powers and agencies, it may be replied that they must admit a power of sensation at the least, and the existence of many sensitive and other powers is really no more mysterious than is the existence of one. To attempt to extract different kinds of feeling from different aggregates of units of one kind of feeling is, in fact, to attempt to get the category of difference out of the category of agreement.

Finally, we meet with the following marvellous assertion (p. 150):—"Though we distinguish such a nervous shock as belonging to what we call sounds, yet it does not differ very much from nervous shocks of other kinds"—an assertion not only gratuitous but false. He then (p. 151) argues that because sudden violent affections of the various senses shock the whole body, therefore the various senses are but diverse modifications of a common shock-root. According to this argument, the essential distinction of the different senses is to be denied because a violent sudden stimulation through them may produce similar constitutional effects. He goes on: "The fact that sudden brief disturbances thus set up by dif-

* *De Anima*, book ii.

ferent stimuli through different sets of nerves cause feelings scarcely distinguishable in quality, will not appear strange when we recollect that *distinguishableness of feeling* implies *appreciable duration*; and that when the duration is greatly abridged, nothing more is known than that some mental change has occurred and ceased." But indistinguishableness does not necessarily imply positive similarity. Mr. Spencer, apparently, would prove the fundamental similarity by cases where time enough has not been allowed for distinct sensation at all, but shocks of the different sense-organs, so momentary that they do not fulfil the conditions of sensation, cannot be cited to prove such similarity. As well might it be argued that all plants are similar in their entirety the roots of which are similar. Another remark may here be made. If, as Mr. Spencer says, a certain amount of persistence is necessary for a thing to be known, a certain amount of absence of change is necessary, i.e., *substance* is necessary.

Once more he says (p. 151): "If the state does not last long enough to admit of its being contemplated, it cannot be classed as of this or that kind, and becomes a momentary modification very similar to momentary modifications otherwise caused." But I deny that it is *similar*; it is only "*incapable of being distinguished from*"; a very different matter! We cannot distinguish the polar from the equatorial mountains of the opposite side of the moon; but they are not on that account similar, except of course as similarly unknown.

Another remark may here be made. Mr. Spencer, in the just-quoted passage, speaks of states of mind being "contemplated," but, it may well be asked, what by? He admits that we know the mind as "subject," but if it is known as that which contemplates, and therefore endures, and therefore is a substance, he must admit it to be known as subject and object both.

He proceeds (p. 151): "It is possible, then—may we not even say probable—that something of the same order as that which we call a nervous shock is the ultimate unit of consciousness; and that all the unlikenesses among our feelings result from unlike modes of integration of this ultimate unit." Now, in the first place, even according to Mr. Spencer's here cited avowal, the whole hypothesis is built upon a *possibility* which he interrogatively, and without evidence, suggests should be raised to a probability. But letting this pass, the expression "*result from*" is ambiguous. If he means that various nervous shocks, as subjectively cognized, are the materials of and occasions for the occurrence in act of different potential sensible perceptions, nothing in objection need be said, but he insinuates and means that the "unlikenesses" referred to are nothing but diverse modes of aggregation of nervous shocks as subjectively cognized. Thus he here (as so often elsewhere) neglects

and seems blind to the *formal* element, employing the *material* element only.

Mr. Spencer thinks (p. 152) these constituent nervous shocks must be "faint pulses of subjective change," saying: "Were our various sensations and emotions composed of rapidly-recurring shocks as strong as those ordinarily called shocks, they would be unbearable: indeed life would cease at once." But they would only be unbearable on account of some "feeling" they would cause. Thus it is clear that Mr. Spencer distinguishes between the shock and the feeling. Therefore the feeling is not shock after all, even according to him, but only something occasioned by the shocks. Again, what does he mean by "life would cease at once"? Whose life? Surely if life consists of these shocks, what is the meaning of saying life would cease? In truth, life would cease, because of feelings which are not shocks, and not on account of the shocks themselves, except indirectly as the antecedents of such fatally violent feelings.

In pointing out the congruity between his view of the substance of mind and nerve-action, Mr. Spencer considers (pp. 153-154) the problems: "How is it possible for feelings so different in quality as those of heat, of taste, of colour, of tone, &c., to arise in nervous centres closely allied to one another in composition and structure? And how, in the course of evolution, can there have been gradually differentiated these widely-unlike orders, and genera, and species of feelings?" He replies: "Possible answers are at once supplied if we assume that diverse feelings are produced by diverse modes, and degrees, and complexities of integration of the alleged ultimate unit of consciousness." Now here we meet again the ambiguity before referred to. The "producing" or "causing" is one thing, and "being" is quite another. To produce a rose* is not to be a rose. Yet for the validity of Mr. Spencer's argument it is needed not that diverse feelings, different kinds of sensation, should be *caused by* variously aggregated subjective nervous shocks, but that they should *be* such nervous shocks. Then, again, what does Mr. Spencer mean by a "degree" of integration and "mode" of integration? These "degrees" and "modes" must respond to potentialities of the sentient nature or they could never elicit anything but themselves, and thus we have again innate "forms" of sensation elicited to act by the shocks referred to. But, in truth, this hypothesis is quite superfluous—the hypothesis, that is, of subjective nervous shocks eliciting and producing diverse orders of sensation. It is quite enough to suppose there are objective nervous shocks directly elic-

* To produce is not here used in the sense of create. To create a rose we must, of course, be all a rose is and more.

ing into act the various innate and potential sentient forms of the organism without its being necessary to suppose that such objective shocks elicit subjective shocks, which again elicit the formally complete and various acts of sensation.

He goes on (p. 154) :—

“ If each wave of molecular motion brought by a nerve-fibre to a nerve-centre has for its correlative a shock or pulse of feeling, then we can comprehend how distinguishable differences of feeling may arise from differences in the rates of recurrence of the waves, and we can frame a general idea of the way in which, by the arrival through other fibres of waves recurring at other rates, compound waves of molecular motion may be formed, and give rise to units of compound feelings ; which process of compounding of waves and production of correspondingly-compounded feelings we may imagine to be carried on without limit, and to produce any amount of heterogeneity of feelings. After recognizing this possibility, the visible likenesses of nervous centres that are the seats of different feelings cease to be mysterious ; since the structure of these nervous centres need differ only as much as is requisite to produce different combinations of the waves of molecular motion. Similarly, there disappears the difficulty of understanding how the multitudinous diverse forms of feeling have been evolved from a primitive simple sensibility ; since complications of the molecular motions, and concomitant feelings, must have gone on *pari passu* with correlative complications of minute structures, organized little by little ” (p. 154).

The fallacies and inconclusiveness of this passage will be made most plain by a paraphrase.

If each wave of molecular motion (so to call the unknown action) brought by a nerve-fibre to a nerve-centre has for its correlative the supremely mysterious entity a shock or pulse of feeling, we can comprehend how distinguishable differences of feeling may be conditioned by differences in the rates of recurrence of the waves, since latent potentialities of diverse kinds thus elicited are neither more nor less mysterious than the shock or pulse of feeling above first supposed. We can also form a general (hypothetical) idea of the way in which, by the arrival through other fibres, of waves recurring at other rates, compound waves of molecular motion may be formed conditioning the occurrence of various altogether new feelings distinct in kind. This process of compounding of waves and production of quite distinct feelings we may imagine to be carried on, so as to produce all the heterogeneity of feeling for which we have evidence. After recognizing this possibility, the visible likenesses of nervous centres that are the seats of different feelings have no special mystery. It is highly mysterious how one set of molecular motions can be the condition of the elicitation of a potential feeling into act ; it is no more mysterious how a thousand kinds of waves may condition the elicitation of a thousand potential

feelings into act, since for all we see the structure of these nervous centres need differ only as much as is requisite to produce different combinations of the waves of molecular motion, such being the hypothetical conditions of such different feelings. Similarly, then disappears any special difficulty in understanding how the multitudinous forms of feeling have been evolved,—i.e., have become manifest,—though at first a simple sensibility was alone apparent. Not, of course, that simple sensibility itself could ever grow to be anything more; but if different complications of nervous molecular waves are the conditions of the elicitation of feelings of different kinds, these complications of molecular motion, and of course the so-conditioned new feelings, must have shown themselves *pari passu* with correlative complications of minute structures, organized little by little in a way suitable to produce such complications of motion, i.e., as organic matter became united with forms of higher and higher power and perfection, possessing greater and nobler potentialities of function and structure; such function and structure always arising and becoming manifest in perfectly synchronous harmony.

To attempt to understand evolution without that which evolves, conditions of new sensibility without new sensitive powers, is to attempt to construct the universe from "matter" without "form," and such an attempted universe must collapse into a formless void.

Mr. Spencer then proceeds (p. 154, § 61) to compare his suppositions respecting the nature of mind with the nature of matter, by showing that the latter is heterogeneous when apparently homogeneous. But this was always affirmed of matter in contrast to the simplicity of mind. But he goes on to argue that as, according to him, mind is built of variously aggregated primitive shock-units of one kind, so there is reason to suspect that the so-called simple [material] substances are themselves compound; and that there is but one ultimate form of matter, out of which the successively more complex forms of matter are built up. This however I deny as inconceivable,—*materia prima*, according to philosophy, never can exist by itself since it has no form though it is apt for every form.

As to allotropism "showing us that the same mass of molecules assumes quite different properties when the mode of aggregation is changed," it should be recollected that the "molecules and the aggregation" are both hypothetical; and the real meaning may be like the change from ice into water—the introduction of a new "form" in the old "matter," and whether the forms are essentially or accidentally different would depend on whether only one or a whole plexus of new properties is thereby induced.

He persists in the same strain (p. 155) saying: if "even without assuming that the so-called elements are compound, we remember

how from a few of these there may arise by transformation and by combination numerous seemingly-simple substances, strongly contrasted with their constituents and with one another," we shall then better understand his conception of mind to be congruous. But though of course the juxtaposition of oxygen and hydrogen under suitable conditions occasions the production of water, I for one cannot admit that by any mixing of elements, e.g., "oxygen" and "hydrogen," a new substance "water" is made. The former entities disappear and the latter appears in their place. In fact we have a new substantial form "elicited from potentiality into actuality by the due adjustment of the oxygen and hydrogen"—"transformation" I allow; "combination," meaning (as is here evidently meant) mere complex mixing, has not been proved.

Mr. Spencer incidentally speaks (p. 157) of the distinction of subject and object as that "which is itself the consciousness of and difference transcending all other differences." But I deny that the difference between "subject" and "object" does transcend the difference between "being" and "not being," and I deny that our consciousness that subject and object are distinct, gives a certainty so absolute as the perception of the positive necessity that a thing which thinks should also exist. Indeed elsewhere (p. 161) he allows that "it seems an imaginable possibility that units of external force may be identical in nature with units of the force known as feeling." As to the materialist explanation he well refutes it (p. 158, end of § 62), saying, "the conception of an oscillating molecule is built out of many units of feeling—to identify it with a nervous shock would be to identify a whole congeries of units with a single unit."

He then (p. 158, § 63) proceeds to meet the objections of those who fear materialism in his own system by saying that, in ultimate analysis, matter, motion, and mind are each and all but symbols of an "absolutely" unknown form of existence, and that the question which set of symbols should be chosen for adoption is unimportant. But here it may be said that even if it be true that (as Dr. Newman at least seems to think) all our knowledge is symbolic, yet it is not less knowledge on that account, though it is of course limited knowledge.

Again, if the unknown power is "absolutely" unknown, why does Mr. Spencer say it exists, and why call things "symbols" of it? To be logical he must admit not only that the veiled entity he refers to is known to us as existing, but as existing in a state capable of being represented to us by three sets of symbols.

He gives an excellent passage against materialism, saying, (pp. 160, 161) as external activities [objects] cannot be made subjective, they must remain the unknown correlatives of their effects on mind. Hence if the materialist regards his conceptions

of objects as constituting knowledge of them, "he is deluding himself: he is but representing their activities [objects] in terms of mind, and can never do otherwise." . . . "Clearly if units of external force are regarded as absolutely unknown and unknowable, then to translate units of feeling into them is to translate the known into the unknown, which is absurd. And if they are what they are supposed to be by those who identify them with their symbols, then the difficulty of translating units of feeling into them is insurmountable."

But he goes on to make a very remarkable admission; namely, that it is easier to think the Non-ego to be the same as the Ego, than that the Ego is the same as the Non-Ego. He says (pp. 160, 161), "if units of force as they exist objectively, are essentially the same in nature with those manifested subjectively as units of feeling, then a conceivable hypothesis remains open. Every element of that aggregate of activities constituting a consciousness, is known as belonging to consciousness only by its cohesion with the rest. Beyond the limits of this coherent aggregate of activities, exist activities quite independent of it, and which cannot be brought into it. We may imagine, then, that by their exclusion from the circumscribed activities constituting consciousness, these outer activities, though of the same intrinsic nature, become anti-thetically opposed in aspect. Being disconnected from consciousness, or cut off by its limits, they are thereby rendered foreign to it. Not being incorporated with its activities, or linked with these as they are with one another, consciousness cannot, as it were, run through them; and so they come to be figured as unconscious—are symbolized as having the nature called material as opposed to that called spiritual. While, however, *it thus seems an imaginable possibility that units of external force may be identical in nature with units of the force known as feeling*, yet we cannot by so representing them get any nearer to a comprehension of external force."

So much then for Mr. Spencer's assertion, that our perception of subject and object is the transcendent and supreme truth. It is indeed a fact that we may conceive self and not-self to be modifications of some *tertium quid*, but it is not true that we can conceive that anything which thinks does not at the same time exist, because we clearly see the positive necessity of the presence of "being" wherever there is "thinking." But as we shall see directly (in noticing the concluding words of this chapter), that Mr. Spencer nevertheless not only again admits that an underlying unity may connect subject and object, but speaks as though such unity were a fact. But his repudiation of the coherence and logicity of idealism is in this place a little too hasty and forcible. He continues the quotation last made thus (p. 161):—"For as already shown,

supposing all forms of mind to be composed of homogeneous units of feeling variously aggregated, the resolution of them into such units leaves us as unable as before to think of the substance of mind as it exists in such units; and thus, even could we really figure to ourselves all units of external force as being essentially like units of the force known as feeling, and as so constituting a universal sentiency, we should be as far as ever from forming a conception of that which is universally sentient." Leaving aside here the objections, before made, to our alleged ignorance of the substance of mind, it may still be urged that his expression as to our inability to "form a conception" is too strong. "Knowing" is one thing, merely "forming a conception" is another.

But one more objection to our knowledge of the "substance of mind" should be noted as also untenable. He says (p. 162):—"We cannot think of substance, save in terms that imply material properties." But here he is clearly wrong, as he would soon find if he would consult Kleutgen.

He concludes the chapter in the following words:—"The conditioned form under which being is presented in the subject, cannot, any more than the conditioned form under which being is presented in the object, be the unconditioned being common to the two." Here we meet with a perfectly groundless and gratuitous assumption of the most fundamental subject matter, an assumption which begs the question of pantheism. But what is here also important and interesting to note is Mr. Spencer's representation, not only that subject and object may be conceived to be fundamentally the same, but that they really are so, although he elsewhere grounds his whole philosophy* on their fundamental distinctness, such being the one primary objective truth recognized by the intellect (and by him) as the supreme one. It is on this ground only he attempts to meet the criticism to which he is most certainly open, that his system (like that of Hamilton and Mansell, as well as those of all the modern sensists) involves the denial of all truth, and absolutely stultifies itself by its assertion that all our knowledge is but phenomenal and relative.†

M.

* "Fortnightly Review" for November, 1873.

† See "Quarterly Review," October, 1873, pp. 513, 514.

ART VIII.—CHURCH MUSIC.

(COMMUNICATED.)

WITH the utmost deference to the theoretical, or rather historical, knowledge of Plain-Chant manifested by the contributor to the last Number of the DUBLIN REVIEW, who signs himself "Sacerdos," I will venture to lay before your readers the results of some years' experience in the way of Church Music in this country. Under the guidance of this experience, and some little knowledge of ecclesiastical laws, customs, and, speaking generally, "authority" as to the kind of singing most desirable in our Church Services, I will next endeavour to sketch a brief plan of what I think could feasibly be done to reconcile conflicting interests, opinions, and regulations in this important matter. Finally, I will add a few words which may serve to modify what seem to me the somewhat stringent and sweeping remarks of the contributor in question, against those who are not prepared to commit themselves and their choirs to Plain-Chant *pur et simple*, and to the Ratisbon edition as the only authorized and adequate exponent of the genuine Gregorian Song.

Some half-dozen years ago I became incumbent of a large town mission, and my church was served by what would generally pass as a most efficient choir. In addition to a well-paid professional quartett, there were three amateur sopranos, any one of whom was able at a moment's notice to take the chief treble part in any of the ordinary Haydn and Mozart Masses; also an excellent alto and an excellent tenor. Besides these there was a fair chorus of some six or eight voices. The choir was accompanied by a painstaking, professional organist, and under the conduct of a gentleman, whose name alone, were it mentioned, would be sufficient guarantee that the singers he was in the habit of leading were far above the average of our Catholic choirs. In spite, however, of all these singular advantages the usual inconveniences met with in all choirs dependant upon pay were to be found in mine. To say nothing of others, two were pre-eminently noticeable. The choir either could not or would not sing creditably anything which was out of the usual way. Holy Week was its *crux*. In the second place, the ordinary run of Masses went on precisely the same way during Lent and Advent—organ accompaniment and all, sometimes even other

instruments—as at the other periods of the year. Indeed, is it practicable to sing Haydn's and Mozart's Masses without accompaniment? At any rate, this choir would not or could not; it certainly did not. And from bitter experience with a similar choir, at another church, I knew the danger of any interference beyond mild suggestion.

After two years' endurance of this state of things, a transition stage was entered upon. A number of young men and boys were taught two or three simple Masses, and clad in cassock and surplice, sang alternate portions of them with the nucleus of a choir stationed in the body of the church. It was hoped that the bulk of the congregation would in time join this nucleus in singing alternate portions both of the Mass and of the Evening Service. This Evening Service soon became a great success. The "Glory be to the Father," at the end of each decade of the Rosary, the hymns, both before and after the sermon, and the whole Benediction Service were in a brief time heartily and tunelessly sung by the united voices of the congregation, at times (as in the Litany) alternating with the altar choir, and at times (as in the *O Salutatis, Tantum ergo, &c.*), joining them with what may, without exaggeration, be described as a most overpoweringly devotional effect. Not so, however, the Mass. The nucleus struggled gallantly, but in the end succumbed. The congregation, as a whole, could not be induced to sing. So there was nothing for it but to augment the altar choir, and to confine the singing at Mass to it. This was done. The old "west-end" organ gave place to a sanctuary harmonium—soon to yield to a sanctuary organ; stalls for the adults and benches for the boys, all fitted up with convenient book-stands, &c., were provided; an efficient teacher was engaged; and the plan which has now stood the test of time was started. For three years it has answered well, and its future never appeared more promising than at present. I shall touch later upon the result of experience as to Plain-Chant, but it would hardly do to pass over many other results of this innovation upon the old system of singing in most Catholic churches.

In the first place, the pecuniary gain has amounted to at least £100 per annum. The old choir cost from £120 to £150 per annum. The present choir never exceeds £30. The income, too, of the church from Sunday proceeds has increased £50 per annum. This increase may not be attributable to the change in the singing. It is merely mentioned to meet an objection as to emptying the church by abandoning florid music sung by professionals. The bulk of the congregation prefer the present system, and strangers declare that they can

hear Mass with singing of this description, as opposed to the necessity they feel of attending a Low Mass before being present at a High Mass in other churches. Moreover, they are not wearied with too long services. Our ordinary High Mass—preceded by the Asperges, and including the sermon (of twenty minutes' duration), seldom occupies more than from 60 to 70 minutes. As to the benefit bestowed upon some forty young men and boys by enlisting their interest and their services in the solemn celebration of the Church's most sacred function, I need not dilate upon it. I will merely state for the encouragement of pastors of souls that the satisfaction arising from this result alone is ample recompense for the loss of any pleasure derivable from more skilled execution of a higher kind of composition, and for the trouble necessarily attendant upon *starting* an entirely different system. This chancel-choir also forms a very good chorus at the several concerts organized throughout each year for various charities connected with the mission. But perhaps one of the most marked advantages of the new system consists in the ease with which special or out of the ordinary routine services can be rehearsed and produced creditably. The following lines from a Protestant newspaper will testify to the truth of this observation. "The performance of the surplined choir of St. ———, ———, at the service of the *Tenebræ* was particularly commendable. These offices of the Roman Church are exacting in their demands on the intelligence of singers, and the manner in which Father ———'s choir sustained their reputation in respect to the rendering of the *Canto Firmo* might with advantage be imitated by more pretentious choirs." And it may surely be inferred that a choir capable of such efforts are not shortcoming in the ordinary services, and that these are rendered in a manner not unbecoming the most solemn of the Church's many functions—the High Mass.

Such is the brief record of what has been accomplished at one mission—a mission not more favoured than the average of others with the means for attaining what has now for two or three years been, at least, partially accomplished. It would take too many pages to recount the numerous trials, both as to the kind of music and the mode of executing it, which had to be made before our practice became determined. Suffice it to say that the exigencies of our whole case conspired in the long run to fix us to the following plan. And it is worthy of note that this plan is perhaps more in accord with the requirements of the Holy See as to Church Music, than any at present in vogue at any one of our ordinary missions. Hand-in-hand with economy, with satisfaction to both clergy and laity, and with

manifold advantages to all who take part in it, this system falls within the limits prescribed by the highest authority. Is it too much to assert of it, that a careful examination will convince many of its being that safe "middle course" between operatic music and rigidly exclusive plain-chant.

What, then, is done at the Mass? The ordinary Gregorian *Asperges* is sung at the commencement. Throughout, the greatest attention is paid to the responses, which are harmonized from the Roman Missal. Nothing can exceed their melodious richness when thus rendered. The music of the *Kyrie*, *Gloria*, *Credo*, *Sanctus*, and *Agnus Dei*, is taken principally from Webbe, and others of his simple yet strictly ecclesiastical manner. Solos are for the most part eschewed. The alternate soft portions are sung either in unison by two cantors, or in four parts. The choruses also are sometimes in unison, at other times in parts, according to the nature of the composition. For example, Webbe's Mass in A may be sung throughout in unison, with very good effect; or this unison may be relieved by harmony at the more solemn portions, such as the "*Et incarnatus est.*" I have lately succeeded in getting two or three simple, melodious masses written, with harmonized parts both for the loud and soft portions; and an enterprising London publisher is preparing a cheap edition of a dozen such easy masses. Indeed, there could hardly be a more effective step towards this style of music than the facility of purchasing for a few pence a well-printed copy of an easy and simple Mass. Our Offertory Motetts are few and simple, and always selected with due regard to the festival or season. Here again, let me urge the well-known Motetts by Webbe upon all chancel-choirmasters. It would be difficult indeed to surpass the "*Hæc Dies*," or "*Emitte Spiritum Tuum*," when these burst forth from some forty well-trained voices at the Offertory of the High Mass upon Easter or Whit Sunday.

And now to the question of Plain-Chant. It is acknowledged that the proper of the Mass and the Vespers is far inferior to the music that has come down to us of the Missal and of the *Kyrie*, *Gloria*, &c. So the attempt was made with one or two of the most agreeable Plain-Chant Masses. Though educated, so to speak, in rigid Plain-Chant, I was wedded to no theory of Church music for missions in England. Had Plain-Chant, however, succeeded, I admit that my leanings were towards it—at least for the ordinary of the Mass. But it was not a success. Neither congregation nor singers took to it. They tolerate it in Advent and Lent, but Christmas and Easter would lack something of their wonted joy, were the Mass sung on those glorious festivals in the lugubrious wail of Plain-Chant.

Such was the result of experience. No attempt was made with the *provers* either of the Gradual or Vespers. *A fortiori* if the Masses proved unsuitable, these would never do. Besides, there were other reasons, which will be adduced by way of comment upon "Sacerdos's" paper, which would have kept the Gradual and Vespers in the background, at least for a time, even if the Masses had been a success.

As for a practical plan for the guidance of those interested in Church music, it is difficult to give one clear and succinct, and at the same time adapted to the requirements and means of all missions. Still, I will endeavour to make a few suggestions, which, as I have tried to show, owe their origin to many attempts and to efforts which, without undue self-satisfaction, I may fairly say have met with considerable success.

To begin with, I assume that for the Mass, and, if Vespers are sung, for all portions not taken by the bulk of the congregation, a surpliced chancel-choir, accompanied by a chancel-organ, is the one *sine quâ non* of any attempt to render our choirs economical and edifying.

In small missions—either town or country—this chancel-choir would soon learn a few simple Masses, such as Webbe in A and in D, and the Missa de Angelis. The whole of the music might be divided between a duo and chorus with very good effect. The responses might be all sung in unison. In churches, however, of more abundant facilities and means, these and other Masses of a little more elaborate character might be sung, together with the responses, in harmony. And to render this plan perfectly unobjectionable on the score of defect, the proper of the Mass might be always sung to a simple harmonized chant-like strain. And should exceptional circumstances enable the clergy to command the services of a skilled and sufficiently numerous body of voices, the *proper* might be sung from the Gradual, with the *ordinary* and responses in harmony. This, provided Plain-Chant were exclusively used in Lent and in Advent,* especially as the Plain-Chant *ordinary* is more easily

* The Cæremoniale Episcoporum quite bears me out in the view that figured music of a grave and subdued character is not condemned by ecclesiastical authority. We there read, under the heading "Quæ observanda sint in Dominicis Quadragesimæ circa . . . cantum": "Cantores verò ab hac Dominicâ quintâ Quadragesimæ usque ad Pascha, excepta feriâ quintâ in Cœnâ Domini, non utantur cantu figurato, sed Gregoriano" (l. ii. cap. xx. §§ 4, &c.); and again, "In Missis et Officiis Defunctorum, nec organo, nec musica quam figuratam vocant utimur, sed cantu firmo; quem etiam tempore Adventus et Quadragesimæ in ferialibus convenit adhiberi." (l. i. cap. xxiii. § 13.) Again, directions are laid down as to this figured music, to which Plain-Chant is supposed to give place out of Lent and Advent, and on the Feast of Maunday-Thursday, as follows:—"Idem quoque cantores et musici observent,

sung without accompaniment than a figured *ordinary*, would seem to be the *beau idéal* of Church music, either in this or any other country. "I quite agree with you," a Right Rev. Prelate thus writes to me, "that figured music intermingled with Plain-Chant is very delightful. The choir of S. Chad's, Birmingham, is my favourite choir. They sing the whole of the Proper from the Mechlin Plain-Chant (with a very good tradition, and a very skilful organ accompaniment), and then for the Kyrie, Gloria, &c., break out into the most charming bits from the ancient Italian masters, or sometimes from the moderns—I wish you could hear them."

This, then, being the system I would advocate, it is clear that the objections raised by "Sacerdos" to aught save Plain-Chant *pur et simple*, and that from the Ratisbon edition, must have appeared to me baseless or exaggerated, or I could never have been bold enough to pen these lines, as it were, in their very face.

He classifies his remarks under six heads. With the first two of these I need hardly concern myself. His preference of the Ratisbon edition to the Mechlin is most justifiable after the approbation granted to its editor by the Holy See. Scientifically speaking, however, there is much in favour of the Mechlin edition. So far, it is true, the comparison between them does not admit of much comment, for in publishing a Gradual editors have little choice, and hence the Ratisbon and Mechlin Graduals differ little from each other. But when the Ratisbon editor issues his *Vesperale*, it may be seen how little *principle* he has had to guide him. In other words, unless he edits this after a fashion very different to the Gradual, it will not escape notice that he does not put the long and short notes upon any principle, either syllabic or rhythmical, and only follows the authority of his copy. Hence it is to be apprehended that the *Vespéral* will not be without many unsingable phrases, and a considerable amount of faulty accentuation. As the Holy See, however, has not formally sanctioned the Mechlin edition, and has favoured its rival in so marked a manner, there can be little doubt that the Ratisbon edition will come by degrees into general use. For although the authority it derives from the special encouragement given to its editor savours strongly of mere commercial monopoly, thirty years' possession will give it a claim most difficult to challenge. Yet I venture to think that Sacerdos's more liberal interpretation of this sanction of

ne vocum harmonia, quæ ad pietatem augendam ordinata est, aliquid levitatis aut lasciviæ præ se ferat, ac potius audientium animos a rei divinæ contemplatione avocet, sed sit devota, distincta et intelligibilis." (l. i. cap. xxviii. § 12.)

the Holy See in the latter portion of his remarks, No. I., will be more welcome, at least to Belgian and English advocates of Plain-Chant, than the stringent conclusions he arrives at in remarks, No. II.

Sacerdos's remarks, No. III., are comprised under the following head: "The authoritative sanction of the Church which the Gregorian Chant has always enjoyed, and which the Roman Church at the present day by its official acts still continues to give it." And he furnishes a most instructive list of extracts from the words of Popes and Saints, and the decrees of Councils, which taken by themselves would absolutely condemn any other music in churches save Plain-Chant. Yet for our practical guidance the two passages in which the Sacred Council of Trent treats of ecclesiastical music still remain in undiminished authority. And I would submit that it is by the light shed from these two extracts that we should judge the spirit of the Church in her several subsequent pronouncements. In Chapter IX. of the Thirtieth Session we read: "They (the Ordinaries) shall also banish from churches all those kinds of music, in which, whether by the organ, or in the singing, there is mixed up anything lascivious or impure; as also all secular actions, vain and therefore profane conversations, all walking about, noise and clamour, that so the House of God may be seen to be, and may be called, truly a *house of prayer*."* This is unmistakably the method by which the Bishops are to preserve the decorum due to the House of God in all persons—clergy and laity. Again, we read in the 12th Chapter of the Twenty-fourth Session, which treats exclusively of the obligations of *clerics*, that they are "reverently, distinctly, and devoutly to praise the name of God, in hymns and canticles, in the choir appointed for psalmody As to other matters, regarding the suitable manner of conducting the divine offices, the proper way of singing or chanting therein the Provincial Synod shall prescribe a fixed form on each Head, having regard to the utility and habits of each province."†

It is clear, then, that while from churches in general all music of a lascivious and impure nature is to be banished, the Bishops in their provincial Synods are to prescribe the manner in which *clerics* are to sing the divine office in their collegiate or cathedral churches. And, be it observed, that it is only upon this rendering of the meaning of the Sacred Council that we can now reconcile the several apparently contradictory pronouncements that have since from time to time emanated from ecclesiastical authority upon the subject of Church music. The

* Waterworth's translations, p. 161.
VOL. XXIII.—NO. XLVI. [*New Series.*]

† Ibid. p. 219.
2 M

Cardinal-Vicar of Rome, thus writes: "It is required that a grave and serious character be impressed on the singing, avoiding all that may suggest a recollection of the theatre, or savour of anything profane."* He utters not a word in the way of prescribing Plain-Chant, any more than did the Council of Trent. But for clerics and nuns the case is very different. The Synod of Naples declares that: "Ex decreto Sac. Congregationis non permittatur Monialibus cantus figuratus, *sed tantum Gregorianus*." The italics are those of "Sacerdos"; had I italicised, the word *Monialibus* should have been so printed. The same Synod also prescribed that the *students of the seminary* † should "be instructed in grammar, and the higher subjects, not however in figured music, but only in the Gregorian." And the Synod of Beneventum made a decree that "it was incumbent on the Bishop to see that within a reasonable time *the Canons and those attached to the choir* † should have learnt the Gregorian Chant." Then, too, we have the well-known regulation of our Holy Father, Pope Pius IX., for the *Seminario Pio* "Cantus Gregorianus, omni alio rejecto, tradetur."

But that this view is correct appears not only from its ability to solve those apparent contradictions, which, by the way, become real upon "Sacerdos's" theory, but from its accord with the spirit of modern ecclesiastical legislation. This is abundantly clear from the decrees of the Provincial Synod of Cologne, which he quotes at length. We find there strict regulations with respect to the use of the Gregorian Chant in Cathedral and Collegiate churches. Nay, this Synod goes farther even than any Roman decree in the direction I have sketched as the *beau ideal* of ecclesiastical music, by urging the Bishops to establish choral schools to the end that the Gregorian Chant may be sung—clearly by the laity, *when so trained*—in the Mass. Still, the assembled Fathers "are far from excluding harmony so long as it retains an ecclesiastical character, and they exhort the *rectors of churches* (not the superiors of ecclesiastical establishments) to return to the School of Palestrina," which every one knows to be of an intricate but subdued kind of figured music.

That the obligation of studying the Plain-Chant should be constantly kept before aspirants to the priesthood, must be obvious to any one who reflects upon the singing part of a priest's duty. All the intonations, the prayers, the preface, &c.

* Most of these extracts I have copied from Sacerdos's paper for convenience sake.

† These italics are mine.

are strictly Plain Chant, and these he has to sing frequently, habitually even, unaccompanied either by instrument or other voices. Thus, while the Provincial Synod of Utrecht declares that "figured music, when used, is to adhere strictly to the rules of Christian art," it is very peremptory upon the duty of *ecclesiastics* with respect to the Gregorian Chant. "We seriously admonish all clerics of their obligation to take great pains in learning it, lest they be found incapable of singing those parts of the sacred Liturgy of the divine mysteries, *which are to be solemnly sung by the priest*, which, if the priest does not perform well, the faithful suffer scandal and the worship of God dishonour."

I might follow "*Sacerdos*" in a similar way through all his valuable and highly interesting extracts, and strengthen by so doing the position I consider warranted by the tenor of the decrees of the Council of Trent, and of all subsequent ecclesiastical legislation.

And here I may add a suggestion of which "*Sacerdos's*" extract from the Plenary Council of Baltimore reminds me. This Synod, while ordering that the Gregorian Chant should be taught in all the *seminaries* of the province, prescribes that "the Vespers shall be sung entire upon Sundays in *all* churches after the manner of the Roman Church, as far as can be. . . . And it is very much to be desired that the rudiments of the Gregorian Chant should be taught and practised in our parochial schools, in order that as the number of those who can sing the Psalms will increase by degrees, at least the greater part of the people may learn to sing the Vespers and other parts of the service with the ministers and choir." The suggestion I would make is that our parochial schools should be pressed more perseveringly and more efficaciously into the service of the Church. What difficulty would there be in giving a quarter of an hour, after the regular school hours, to church music, both in boys' and girls' schools, as well as in arranging with the singing-master of the boys to keep back the best voices for an hour's practice once in each week? Thus the Vespers could soon be established in each church, and treble voices trained for the chancel-choir, i. e. for singing the High Mass, and the alternate and more difficult portions of the Vespers.

It would seem, then, that a study of the authorities adduced by "*Sacerdos*" would lead less to the exclusive use under all circumstances of Plain-Chant, than to the use of it generally in cathedral and collegiate churches—in other words—in churches peculiarly favoured with numbers of voices trained to sing it; to the use of figured music written "strictly in accord with the

rules of Christian art" on Sundays (out of Lent and Advent) and Festivals, and, by implication, wherever either the paucity of singers or the lack of the requisite training disqualifies a choir from the use of Plain-Chant; but at the same time, to earnest attempts to train one's choir by degrees to *season*, so to speak, the High Mass with portions of the Plain-Chant, and to encourage its exclusive use (mainly, of course, by reason of its feasibility as compared with the Mass music) at Vespers. Indeed, one might go *theoretically* almost the full length of "Sacerdos's" conclusions; but in practice this would land us in the present age, in all Anglo-Saxon speaking countries at least, in serious difficulties. And this point, I trust, will become clear to him after the few observations I have to make upon his fourth and sixth heads, which I take the liberty of coupling together.

He is enthusiastic upon the powers of Plain-Chant to uplift the soul to true devotion, and very hard upon all music of any other description. At least, he is hard upon it implicitly, inasmuch as he has not a good word for aught save rigid Gregorian. I think again that a middle course is the one that must commend itself to calmer judgments as more consonant with positive facts, and as not opposed to any decisions of authority. But here, once more, I must beg to say that if "Sacerdos" merely puts forth his view as a pleasing theory, and not as a guide to practice *hic et nunc*, I have little to urge against him. I am willing to admit the sublimity and positive *uplifting* power of some, not to say many portions of the Divine Office, when sung in a lofty and spacious church by a well-trained and numerous body of good voices. Indeed, so truly beautiful and melodious are several pieces, such, to mention a few out of many, as the Lamentations, the Litanies, and the Requiem Mass, that a very sublime effect is often produced by them, when rendered under a disadvantage as to numbers and training. But there is another side to the question. To say nothing of the effect of the Requiem Mass sung in harmony, I can assure "Sacerdos" that many who have had, perhaps, the best opportunity of studying *and singing* Plain-Chant in this country, and that under circumstances so advantageous as to be—and that for many years probably to come—almost unique, are far from accepting his unqualified estimate of "the worth and effects of Plain-Chant compared with modern music." For putting Plain-Chant at its best, that is, sung under exceptionally favourable circumstances, they—many of them for old association's sake strongly prejudiced in its favour—reluctantly own to several facts which tell terribly against it under the ordinary circumstances in which it would have to be sung if introduced

throughout this country as the exclusive style of ecclesiastical music. One high authority—high by reason of present ecclesiastical position, great knowledge of, and years spent in teaching and singing, Plain-Chant—thus writes to me:—"The intense ugliness of a great deal of the Plain-Chant is a great drawback to devotion; at least, to unaccustomed ears, for custom will reconcile one to anything, especially in sounds." From another, whom episcopal authority assured me to be as conversant with the whole question of Plain-Chant as any person in this country, I received the following observations, which I take the liberty of giving verbatim. They in almost every particular confirm the view that considerable experience in some of the largest, as well as smallest, missions in this country, has led me to take, and are specially valuable as coming from one more likely to be prejudiced in favour of "Sacerdos's" views than of mine. He heads his remarks thus: "The Practical Side of the Question relative to Plain-Chant," and proceeds—

"We must try to keep in mind a few facts that bear directly upon practice so far as Plain Chant is concerned. We have been flooded with theoretical dissertations from men who apparently have not had much experience in the matter of church music.

"1. Plain-Chant is eminently the work of *ecclesiastics*. It was written for them and by them. Besides, no other body of men can give the proper rendering of the words and the accent of the phrasing, which (*pace* the Ratisbon edition) is the great recommendation of chant. And if it be objected that at St. Chad's Cathedral, Birmingham, a choir of laics render the Mechlin chant in a highly efficient manner, I reply that these choristers are as nearly ecclesiastics as laics could well be. Birmingham is the one solitary town in England which possesses a Catholic establishment devoted to ecclesiastical work, wherein the workmen are consequently ecclesiastical in taste, and have by virtue of their daily occupation an attraction towards the musical services of the Church, especially that kind of music which was in vogue in the days when their art was at its height of perfection. Moreover the *sinews of war* are there; for the late Mr. Hardman left £100 per annum towards the maintenance of Plain-Chant in the Cathedral.

"2. There is the insuperable difficulty of teaching Plain-Chant to that class of young men and boys who would form nine out of ten of the chancel-choirs of this country. But here I should make a distinction. There are two books from which the choral services are chiefly sung. The Gradual contains the music for Mass; the Antiphonary or Vespéral con-

tains the music for the Canonical Hours—Vespers of course included. As regards the Vespers, there is no reason why it should not come into almost universal use. The Psalm tones are easily learned, and even the Antiphons and Hymns present little difficulty. They are for the most part of a tuneful type, and, by the way, perhaps the most ancient remnants of the music of the past. And in practice it is found that they are learned and retained in a congregation without much difficulty. But I refer principally to the Gradual for that ever-changing and difficult music of the Introits, Graduals, and Communions. It would not be easy to discover the ancient forms of this choral-book, but it may be questioned if, rude and rugged as its contents for the most part are, they were ever in a more perfect state. Indeed, so far as we know, it has improved rather than deteriorated, since the days when Palestrina gave up all attempts to do anything for it. But even now, in its corrected state, the phrases are so long, so rugged, and so severe a trial to any but trained musicians, that it is no matter of surprise to find it so universally out of fashion in this country.* Those, therefore, who would revive it, must be prepared to encounter the following difficulties. (1.) A competent organist. An ordinary musician will not do, or even one who can play the published accompaniments to the more common pieces of Plain-Chant. Unless he has completely—by practice and study—mastered what of spirit there undoubtedly is in it, nothing but failure must come to his choir. (2.) The almost insuperable aversion of lay-singers to Plain-Chant. This arises in great measure from its strangeness both to their eyes and ears; from the tortuous intricacies of the Gradual; from their ignorance of Latin and consequent inability to master the proper phrasings and accents. And even where such laymen are assisted by ecclesiastics the result is not usually satisfactory either to themselves or to their hearers. People will not exert themselves unless they see clearly an end to be gained. In the study of Plain-Chant the end is not visible until it is in great part arrived at. So that where no external pressure can be brought to bear, as in most of our choirs, Plain-Chant is next to impracticable. Choirs are not taught upon our missions, as we read of their being managed in the days of St. Gregory—

* In Italy, France, &c., it is kept up by, or at least at the expense of, the ecclesiastical authorities. From personal recollection I must own that hardly any combination of sounds could possibly have a more dismal and church-emptying effect. Only last autumn, to quote one instance from among many, some ten or twelve choristers and ecclesiastics thus sang through a High Mass to a cathedral perfectly empty. And as I listened I could not help inwardly exclaiming, "and no wonder!"

the choir-master holding his music in one hand, and a stout whip in the other. Moreover, while there are few singers who cannot with a little practice readily learn the melody of our ordinary figured Masses, there are very few who can get creditably through a Plain Chant Introit. This requires a constant vigilance of the eye rather than an habitual correctness of ear, which is particularly difficult, as well as distasteful, to ordinary musicians. Undoubtedly the highest pleasures of the musician consists in his ability to render musical phrases justly, and the satisfaction that generally accompanies expression by means of musical sounds. Now all this is lost to most singers of the Gradual. The effort and difficulty stifle all emotion, to say nothing of the depressing effect of the unmelodious character of the majority of the phrases. And after all, what real attraction can lie in music, either for singers or listeners, when shorn of melody and devoid of harmony?

"3. The physical fatigue to be encountered in singing Plain-Chant. I have hardly met with one singer who has had to go through a Plain Chant Mass, and who did not complain of the labour and the strain of voice required. This will be apparent to managers of choirs also by a recollection of the pleasure with which their singers welcome any return to harmonized music.

"4. There is a feeling amongst singers that Plain-Chant spoils the voice for figured music. And this is, doubtless, another reason of that unconquerable opposition in most of them to the Gradual, and partially to the Vespéral also. I am not quite prepared to endorse this sentiment without some reservation. But I have found from experience that it is very damaging to the treble voices of boys.

"5. Finally, Plain-Chant is miserable unless sung by numbers. In the *grand séminaire*, or large monastery, or Cathedral choir, it is always passable, often stirring, and sometimes sublime; but in the parish churches nothing more dismal and undevotional can be well conceived. I know how severely the attempts of our choirs to sing Mozart, Haydn, &c., are criticised, and the good grounds there are for this adverse criticism; but taking figured music with all that may be said against its abuse, I hardly think that the most enthusiastic admirer of Plain-Chant would trust his cause to the result of a *plébiscite* of each congregation."

MONACHUS.

NOTE TO THE FIRST ARTICLE IN OUR LAST NUMBER.

WE find to our regret, that some misconception has arisen as to one rather important particular in the first article of our last Number. The question concerning *the extent of infallibility*, which we discussed some five or six years ago with Catholic opponents, never appeared to us an open one in any proper sense of the word, as we then repeatedly said; and if it was not an open question then, neither is it an open one now. But at the same time it seems to us manifest, that the Definition of 1870 on Papal Infallibility decided nothing, and was not intended to decide anything, on the object and extent of such infallibility: that whole question having been adjourned, by the common consent of all the Fathers, to the second year of the Council.

We find however, that we have been understood quite otherwise. We have been understood as representing, that the Vatican Council implied some kind of *censure* on doctrines opposed to our own concerning the extent of infallibility. We thought we had unmistakably expressed the opposite of this, in p. 12, and again in p. 21; and we can only find one sentence in our article, which (as far as we see) can have conveyed to any one's mind such an impression of our argument as we are here disavowing. We said undoubtedly (p. 18), that "the Definition seems studiously framed to exclude any such narrow interpretation as that suggested." But the purport of this sentence is surely obvious from the context. The Definition—we intended to say—seems studiously so framed, as to prevent the possibility of any one supposing, that it intended to teach that infallibility is confined within the comparatively narrow limits suggested.* But we do not see how any one can doubt on the other hand, that the Council intended to leave all those questions, which concern the extent of infallibility, neither more nor less open than it found them. And we are happy to repeat this statement with whatever emphasis may be desired.

Certainly we added (p. 21) that the Council gave "various

* We admit that one line occurs in our "Table of Contents," which might of itself give reasonable colour to a misapprehension of our meaning. But every one will understand, how hurriedly this table of contents is in general drawn up; nor has it (we may add) the advantage of censorial supervision.

somewhat strong indications" in favour of our own doctrine. In other words, we think there are somewhat strong indications, that if the bishops had published a definition on the extent of infallibility, that definition would have been substantially in our sense and not in the opposite one. But this is in no way inconsistent with our other opinion, that they did *not* intend to pronounce on the matter one way or another.

We are most happy then to explain, that nothing can have been further from our intention, than to imply that the Council, either directly or indirectly, passed any kind of censure on any opinion which has been advocated by any Catholic on the object and extent of infallibility.

Notices of Books.

Protestant Journalism. By the Author of "My Clerical Friends."
London: Burns & Oates.

WE may say without exaggeration, that this work is of inestimable value towards the fulfilment of one very important service. Nothing but familiarity could blind any thinking man to the monstrous position now occupied by journalism in England. Protestants speak with self-complacent scorn, of those days in which the Church was "supreme over thought": well, who or what is "supreme over thought" at present? It would certainly seem to be a first principle, that the multitude of men are to receive instruction from some authority higher than themselves: but where in non-Catholic England is such authority to be found? Protestants may go regularly to church: but is it from the prayer-book or the preacher that they take their standard of morality, when they judge of private or public actions? No: they imbibe their moral notions from the newspaper which they habitually read. "They sit down in child-like confidence," as the "Month" amusingly observes, "at the feet of their unknown and invisible" teachers. But do these teachers even *profess* to address them from some higher platform? On the contrary (to do them justice) they make no secret of the fact, that theirs is a purely commercial enterprise; and that in order to the success of such enterprise they must reflect public opinion. And thus a mysterious chain proceeds of action and reaction. Public opinion is determined by journalistic teaching, and journalistic teaching is determined by public opinion. The world, instead of being accounted the Christian's deadly enemy, is accepted as his recognized teacher.

Nay more. Not only the self-appointed teachers do not profess to be commissioned by any higher authority,—they do not even make serious profession of being guided by *truth*: they avowedly direct their utterances to this main and almost exclusive end, promoting the circulation of their paper. The editor employs those writers—not who shall maintain vigorously what he has convinced himself is important truth,—but who shall put forth what will increase the number of his subscribers. A volume might be written with advantage on the theme we have touched; tracking the amazing phenomena through their various ramifications, and exhibiting their irresistible tendency (so long as they exist) to overthrow the very foundations of society.

The volume before us deals with this theme in a different way. And we may add that, for one man who would be influenced by a philosophical

disquisition, there are a hundred who will relish and profit by such a series of lively sketches as is here presented. Never was an author more precisely fitted with his appropriate work : possessing as he does on one hand a thorough acquaintance with, and passionate love for, the great principles of Catholic dogma ; and on the other hand a vivacity, polish and pointedness of style, which make his work much more lively reading than an ordinary novel. The shallowness, ignorance, swagger, mutual contradictoriness of non-Catholic journalists are exhibited with irresistible effect ; and the scorn with which they affect to treat the Catholic Faith is crushingly retorted on themselves.

Though the matter of the book is very different from spiritual reading, yet in one respect it resembles the latter. It is not put to its best advantage, we think, by being read continuously : rather its reader, having studied one or two essays, should shut the volume and ponder on what he has read. By this course a wholesome mixture of hatred and contempt for English non-Catholic journalism will gradually leaven and purify his mind, and he will become a better man and a better Catholic.

We have implied, that Catholics inclusively will derive much profit from the book. We wish we could think that there are not large numbers of them who greatly need its lessons ; but a chief one among the many miseries of our time is the unhesitating and (we may even add) unscrupulous way in which Catholics permit themselves to be influenced by, almost to sympathise with, one or other non-Catholic journal. With hardly an exception—we know of no other exception but the “Spectator”—while differing in all else, these journals agree in this ; the spirit of worldliness and irreligion with which they are saturated, and their preternatural detestation of the Church. We say “preternatural” ; for it is so blind, passionate, and frantic, that (on sober principles of induction) it cannot reasonably be traced to any other source, than a diabolical.

Exiled Popes. By Right Rev. Monsignore PATTERSON. *Contemporary Review*, August, 1874. London : Strahan.

THIS paper is as well-timed as it is masterly. Now that the Holy Father has been for four years dispossessed de facto of his temporal sovereignty, a certain by no means inconsiderable class of Catholics begin to look on it as almost a matter of course (though doubtless a fact much to be regretted) that he will never return. Moreover, as Catholics of this kind do not in general tend to a desponding view on Catholic matters, they are by no means under the impression that an almost deadly wound has thus been inflicted on the Church's highest interests. And the necessary result of all this is, that (without being themselves at all aware of the fact) the Pope's emphatic teaching on the absolute necessity of his civil principedom for the Church's well-being ceases to produce any effect on their heart and imagination, nay tends to fade from their recollection altogether.

It was high time then to point out, that, if we are to take the past for our guide, nothing can be more simply unfounded than such an adverse vaticination, as to the probability of the Pope's restoration; that his temporary dispossession which has now taken place is a very small matter as compared with the far graver calamities, to which his temporal sovereignty has from time to time succumbed, and which nevertheless it has in every instance successfully overcome.

To attempt (says Monsignore Patterson) even to *enumerate* the restorations of the civil powers of the Popes would be too long a task; it is sufficient to remember that there is hardly any imaginable contingency to which it has not been exposed, and that out of all it has emerged triumphant, and not rarely in the person of the same Pontiff who had suffered its loss.

It is impossible to analyse this Essay, because it is itself mainly an analysis. But as many of our readers may not be in the habit of reading the "Contemporary," we think our best course will be to extract a greater number of passages than is our general habit. And first as to the origin of the Papal dominion.

The providence of God chose that Peter should found his supreme and infallible throne at Rome, the then mistress of the whole known world. Three centuries elapsed, and that which at the first appeared not to be (so faint and so unrecorded is that dawn of the great day which has succeeded), remained in sole possession, and became manifest as the living and energizing heart of the great Christian body throughout the world; while the mortal and corrupt remains of the Imperial polity perished and crumbled age after age, leaving scarcely a trace behind. From out these ruins, rough-hewn at first and incomplete, shaped and fashioned "*tusione plurimâ*" by second causes so manifold and diverse as almost to defy analysis—human passions, human needs, the death throes of effete institutions, the struggles of new nations into life—emerges the temporal power of Christ's Vicars. . . . One sees the undying occupant of S. Peter's barque sailing down the stream of time, ever storm-tossed, yet never submerged, now barely avoiding shoal and rock, now gliding on the smooth treachery of rapids. What S. Paul says of the Apostolic College is eminently true of the Apostolic Head: "We are cast down, but we perish not." What form of suffering, nay, of degradation, has he not passed through; and yet when has the truth of God perished from his lips?

In an article of our present number, we have dwelt on the unearthliness of the Pope's temporal sovereignty; and on its radical difference in spirit from merely human polities, be they absolute monarchies or any other. One of these (so to speak) preternatural facts is the very frequent expulsion of Popes from their territory.

If we run through the pontificates of fifty Popes from S. Gregory II. down to Sylvester II., we shall find that continuous residence in Rome was the exception rather than the rule; if we trace the history of the Popes on through the eleventh century, it is almost the same; from the year 1130 till the end of the twelfth century, the twelve pontiffs who reigned from Innocent II. down to Innocent III. were scarcely ever to be found at Rome. Innocent II. was the longest resident of this series, and he passed not more than seven years there out of the thirteen years of his

pontificate, being disturbed and driven out repeatedly by the turbulence of faction. The glorious pontificate of the great Innocent opened the thirteenth century with the re-integration of the temporal dominions of the Holy See, and an almost continuous residence in Rome for eighteen years. But these eighteen years represent more than half of the period of residence in their See by successive Popes during the remainder of that century. The next century opens with the tragedy of Boniface VIII. Outraged and maltreated, it is yet certain that he died, not at Anagni, as Dante and the Ghibelline authors have it, but after a month's interval from the date of Colonna's violence, and at Rome. His successor, however, never went to Rome; and then, after a long and divided conclave at Perugia, Clement V. was elected, and like his five successors dwelt, in peace at least, but in exile from Rome at Avignon. This brings us to the year 1378. For seventy-two years the Romans saw their Sovereign Pontiff for scarcely four years, in the persons of Urban V. and Gregory XI. Then comes the deplorable forty years' schism, terminated by the election of Martin V., during which Rome was again deserted by her legitimate pastors. The reign of Martin V., which, though he often had to leave Rome, promised an æra of tranquillity for the Holy City, was succeeded by that of the great Eugene IV. Out of the sixteen years of his reign, nearly ten were passed in wandering from place to place.

Such, in brief, have been the exiles and imprisonments of the Popes during the eleven centuries and a half of their possession of temporal sovereignty. Let us now briefly sum them up in two or three ways. If we take them first in the aggregate of time, it will appear that in the first of these centuries the Popes were repeatedly wanderers, seeking aid from the Kings of France against their Lombard and other enemies, so that at least twenty-five years were thus passed away from Rome: the next century gives a similar proportion, emphasized also with violence and bloodshed; while the "iron age" which succeeded gives a still larger proportion of time spent in exile by the Roman Pontiffs: the eleventh century gives the same result. The pontificates were usually short, and that of the most distinguished Pope (S. Leo IX.) was one of constant journeying in the interests of the Church; for here I may notice that, so far as I have observed, there is no trace of any unwillingness to live in Rome on the part of the Popes till we come to the unhappy period of the Avignon exile. Thus, for instance, S. Leo IX., by birth a German, and for twenty years Bishop of Toul, in France, is recorded to have had so tender a veneration for the Holy City that he made for many years a pilgrimage thither, year by year, sometimes accompanied by several hundreds of pilgrims—a marvellous achievement in those disturbed times. These three centuries supply indeed the most disastrous pages in the history of the Popes—and yet even in these what brilliant exceptions are afforded by such pontificates as those of Gregory IV., Leo IV., Benedict III., and Gregory VII. Of the fifty-eight Popes who reigned during those ages of political and social disorder, five were canonized saints—Pascal I., Leo IV., Nicolas I., Leo IX., and Gregory VII.

In the next century, as I have said, the Popes appear to have been almost constantly absent from Rome from 1130 to 1193. During the thirteenth again, not more than thirty-three or thirty-four years were passed at Rome, and during the fourteenth hardly as many.

Passing from facts to general laws :

Regarded as one complex fact, the history of the temporal power presents rather a contrast than a parallel to merely human institutions. They rise by slow degrees, culminate and decline as by a law; but *this* power seems

to baffle precedent and belie anticipation. When it should fall it rises, and vice versâ. It is a kind of comet in our political firmament : no one has defined its orbit, no one can describe its zenith, and no one (save the prophet Cumming) ventures to predict its apogee.

Considering in how thoroughly Catholic a spirit Monsignore Patterson always writes, and with what intense devotion to the Holy See,—considering the large extent of his historical and general knowledge—considering lastly the unusual charm and attractiveness of his style,—we must repeat what we said once before ; viz. that he commits a kind of offence against the interests of the Church, in not writing far more frequently.

Supernatural Religion : an Inquiry into the Reality of Divine Revelation.
In Two Volumes. 8vo. London : Longman, Green, & Co. 1874.

WE intend to review this book at length in a subsequent number, and we confine ourselves therefore for the present to a brief account of its contents and a general estimate of its merits. It is divided into three sections. In the first the author contends, that miracles are directly opposed to the uniformity of nature established by physical science, and that there is, therefore, a vehement presumption against the possibility of their occurrence. He goes on to argue that the belief in the actual occurrence of miracles is in the inverse ratio to the diffusion of knowledge ; that this belief has been strongest in dark and ignorant ages ; that it has grown fainter and fainter as the light of knowledge has increased, till at last it has died out altogether among the educated classes. The second section, which occupies the greater part of the book, deals with the testimony for our Lord's miracles in the synoptic Gospels, and professes to show that these Gospels cannot be received as evidence, since no one can say when or by whom they were composed. The writings both of Fathers and of heretics down to the time of S. Irenæus, who have been supposed to manifest acquaintance with these Gospels, are examined one by one ; and the conclusion is drawn, that early Christian literature, far from confirming the authority or the authenticity of the three first Gospels, furnishes negative evidence which is fatal to their claims. The third and concluding section is concerned with the fourth Gospel : and decides, first, that there is no external evidence of weight in its favour ; next, that there is internal evidence which forbids the supposition that it was written by S. John.

It would be impossible to consider the author's theory of miracles in a notice ; but we cannot forbear saying something on the merits of this work in matters of critical learning. It contains a multitude of references to modern books on biblical and patristic subjects. But every one who has any experience in this kind of literature, knows how easy it is to accumulate references to modern authorities. No doubt it is useful to get the history of opinion on controverted points, but this is an end which the author seldom keeps in view. He heaps references together without regard to completeness, or to chronological order, or to any system whatever which

we can discover. Sometimes he begins by arranging his authorities in alphabetical series, and then, weary even of this rude attempt at system, sinks back into absolute confusion. References are piled up with ostentatious display in matters beyond dispute, while startling assertions are made on the authority of modern critics, without a single reference to the sources from which these critics derive their opinions. Moreover, his references can never be trusted: for he quotes modern critics against the very opinions which they advocate, and he makes such gross mistakes in citing the titles of books as to make it evident that he has never seen them. Still, with all this lack of system and of accuracy, he pursues a definite method, and keeps to it from first to last. He thinks himself at liberty to treat everything as doubtful if a modern critic has doubted it, or as certain if a modern critic has asserted it. Starting from this principle, he proceeds to take the most sceptical view on each detail, forgetting that those views sometimes neutralize each other. Of course he has a profound contempt for "Apologetic" scholars. But indeed the most sceptical of German critics incur his censure, if they make any admission or yield for a moment before plain matter of fact. Even Hilgenfeld, when he allows that Hegisippus shows an acquaintance with S. Luke's gospel, is warned, with ludicrous solemnity, that if this concession is permitted the "function of criticism is at an end."

From beginning to end of the book there is not a sign of independent study of the sources, or of independent views upon them. The early Fathers are misquoted, mistranslated, misrepresented. On some of the more intricate questions we meet with blunders, which would have been impossible to any one who had mastered the elements of the matter in hand, or was in a position to form a judgment upon it. The want of scholarship which the author displays is simply amazing. It is strange that a writer who breaks down in the attempt to translate easy sentences in Greek and Latin should address himself to works of this kind; stranger still that he should assail such a scholar as Westcott with an air of confident superiority. But strange though it be, this is what the author of "Supernatural Religion" has actually done.

We intend, at no very distant date, to point out the real force of the evidences for the Christian religion; and we pledge ourselves to present the fullest justification of the judgment we have given of this book. It has been welcomed in one of the Reviews as a permanent contribution to our theological literature. The Reviewer must have rated theological literature in England low indeed. In Germany there are instances enough of reckless criticism and of fanciful theorising. But we doubt if any German writer ever made a permanent reputation by the mere utterance of extreme theories, without consistency, without knowledge, without the shadow of critical ability.

Life of Mary Cherubina Clare of S. Francis. Translated from the Italian, with a Preface, by Lady HERBERT. London: Washbourne. 1874.

LADY HERBERT has shown her usual discrimination in the selection for translation of the life of this saintly nun of the Monastery of S. Clare at Assisi. Mary Cherubina Clare has a peculiar interest for us, because she was our own contemporary, little more than three years having elapsed since her death. Her life was one long continuous act of love to God. Before the revolution broke out in Italy its details were revealed to her, and the sight of the torrents of blood that would be shed, and the numbers of souls that would be lost for all eternity, many of them even priests, filled her with such mortal terror and agony, that she would exclaim, "I cannot endure so bitter a grief! Would that by the shedding of my blood I could prevent such offences against God, and the loss of so many souls." She heroically placed herself between God's justice and sinners, offering herself as a victim for their salvation, and for the cessation of the Divine chastisements on poor Italy and France. Henceforth her sufferings both of soul and body were so intense that, as her abbess tells us, "she was truly a martyr of love." Her abbess's simple and most interesting narrative, which Lady Herbert has translated, presents her to us with all the characteristics of sanctity, and our Holy Father has removed all doubt on the subject; for in sending her the plenary indulgence *in articulo mortis* the evening before her death, he said, "That soul is going straight to heaven."

But besides the intrinsic merits of this volume, it has a strong claim on us because it is published for the benefit of the community in which Mary Cherubina Clare spent her religious life. Since the seizure of their property by the Italian Government, their only means of subsistence is the nominal pension of sevenpence a day, which is paid for only a certain number of the nuns, and very irregularly. Their misery is, moreover, increased by their having been obliged to afford a refuge to two other communities, who have been forcibly driven out of their own convents. We gladly contribute our part to making this book widely known, and we cordially hope it may have an extensive circulation and a profitable sale.

The Life of B. Giovanni Colombini. By FEO. BELCARI.
London: Washbourne. 1874.

THIS is a very interesting book. The translation retains the quaint simplicity of the old Italian original, and the spirit of fervour that breathes through it, renders it very suitable for spiritual reading. Giovanni Colombini was a rich merchant of Siena, who in 1355 embraced a life of poverty, and, with seventy companions, went about preaching in

Italy, which during the sojourn of the Popes at Avignon, was torn by intestine wars and civil or family feuds. He used to exhort his sons to carry with them "nothing but the love of God deep down in their hearts," and to respond to God's grace with excessive love and charity verging on folly (*che sente del pazzo*); and they were popularly called Gesuati because the name of Jesus was always on their lips. His humility and spirit of obedience, however, preserved them from the errors and disorders into which the Fraticelli had recently fallen. He was always careful to obtain the sanction of the bishops of the province for all his proceedings; and when Pope Urban V. came to Italy in 1367, he awaited his landing at Corneto, submitted himself unconditionally to the Apostolic authority, and received from him a habit and rule for his congregation.

The Life of Anne Catherine Emmerich. By HELEN BAUR.
London: Burns & Oates. 1874.

ANNE CATHERINE EMMERICH was the daughter of a Westphalian peasant, distinguished in the natural order from others of her class only by her great purity and amiable disposition. But from the day of her birth, which was also that of her baptism, she had "the gift of marvellous and almost perpetual insight into spiritual truths in the form of visions representing the life of our Lord and of the Church;" and simultaneously she was endowed with a supernatural sympathy, which fitted her to work out her mysterious vocation of "living, suffering, and dying, as her Lord had lived, suffered, and died, for the welfare of His Church and the salvation of souls." She tells us: "I have ever felt that we are all One Body in Jesus Christ, and therefore, like the fingers to the hand, the grief of my neighbours was hurt to me. From my babyhood I always prayed to take upon myself the illnesses of others. I always thought that God had some special reason for every pain He inflicted, and that there must be a certain penalty to pay. When therefore I sometimes saw sufferings pressing so hardly upon some one person, I thought it was because there was no one willing to help him to pay his debt, and so I then implored God to let me acquit it, and I prayed to the Child Jesus to help me, Who soon sent me as much pain as I could wish." The souls in purgatory, whom she would behold flitting round her "like shining pearls seen through a thick mist," had a large share of her prayers; and God would show her in vision the miseries and sins of persons of all classes, not only in her own neighbourhood, but in all lands wherever the foot of man had trod, whose consolation and deliverance were her appointed task. Her visions "were not meditations upon past events, but the immediate reflexion of the facts themselves presented to" her "mind like a picture mirrored in a lake. . . . Her behaviour was purely passive throughout all the visions of her life; she never attempted to reason mentally about them when her angelic guide did not explain their meaning, and

therefore all that she has related on the subject is distinguished by an admirable simplicity and clearness, although at the same time by a mysterious depth which irresistibly impresses on the reader the conviction that here is nothing invented, nothing which could have derived its origin in the human brain. Her life extended from 1774 to 1824, and in the terrible calamities and awful sins of that period, somewhat similar to our own time, she found ample scope for the exercise of her vocation of intercession and vicarious suffering. There are extant several narratives written or dictated by herself from her visions. She "herself attached no historical value to these narrations," and in the absence of the Church's judgment on them it would be wrong to do so. But the communication of what she saw and heard, revived the faith and rekindled the love of many of her contemporaries; and it may serve the same purpose again in the present day. In the preface, Father Coleridge promises us in a future volume a selection from her "Contemplations," with some remarks on the general subject of her visions, for which we shall look with great interest. Meanwhile her life is in itself a valuable study, which we most heartily recommend to our readers.

The Lives of S. Veronica Giuliani and Blessed Battista Varani.
London: Washbourne. 1874.

THIS volume is the third of the new series of the Oratorian Lives of the Saints. The greater part of it is occupied by the Life of S. Veronica Giuliani, a Capuchin nun and native of the Duchy of Urbino, who died in 1727, and was canonized by Pope Gregory XVI. in 1839, together with S. Alphonso Liguori and several other great Saints. The Italian work of which it is a translation, is taken from three lives of earlier date and the processes of her canonization, and thus it comes to us with the highest claims to authenticity. From her childhood S. Veronica was favoured, in frequent visions, with familiar intercourse with our Lord and His Mother; but it was not till she was above thirty-two years of age, and had been fifteen years in religion, that her peculiar vocation of union with our Lord in all the details of His Passion, manifested itself. This part of her life is very interesting. Its most striking feature is her obedience. Her practice of this virtue was at all times very perfect, inso-much that once when she was in ecstasy, our Lady having invited her to the banquet of eternity, she declined on the ground "that she had not leave for that;" and on her coming to herself and asking her confessor's permission, which he refused, she promptly submitted herself to his will. Her whole being was brought into such supernatural subjection, that her stigmata would re-open and bleed, and then be suddenly healed and covered with a thin skin, her ecstatic participation in our Lord's Passion would begin, be suspended, recommence, and finally cease, at the command of the bishop or her confessor. Even natural accidental injuries, as, for

instance, her broken leg, and her hand that was scorched and shrivelled by fire, were similarly healed. When she was in her last agony, she lingered on, earnestly gazing at her confessor, till he, remembering that she had often told him that she would wish not even to leave this world till dismissed by holy obedience, gave her the order which she was evidently awaiting. Whereupon she cast a last farewell look on her daughters, bowed her head, and expired.

This volume contains also an account of the spiritual life of Blessed Battista Varani, a nun of the Order of S. Clare at Camerino, written in fragments by herself in obedience to her confessors. Though rather diffuse, much instruction may be derived from it. She was never formally beatified, but it is believed that Clement X. authorized the devotions in her honour at Camerino ; and since the beginning of the seventeenth century the title of Blessed has been universally given to her.

Quarterly Review, July, 1874. Article : "Primitive Man."

THE July number of the "*Quarterly Review*" contains a very interesting article, entitled "Primitive Man," which common report ascribes to Mr. St. George Mivart. Its object is to test the progress made by recent Darwinists, Mr. Tyler, Sir John Lubbock, and others, in their attempt to show that man was once represented by a type of savage so low as to differ merely in degree from the brute. Their success would have been undoubtedly a great Darwinist triumph, for, should the essential duality of man and beast disappear, man so degraded could do no less than humbly assume a position in the Darwinian chain of evolution.

The Reviewer congratulates himself upon the fairness of the authors with whom he has to deal. They are honest excavators, turning up what makes against their theory as well as what makes for it, but they have not always recognized the significance of their own discoveries, whilst the public, Darwin-bitten, has passed unnoticed the confessions of failure of the more candid Darwinists. The Reviewer conducts his examination in the following interrogatory :—"1st. Can any direct evidence be found of races of man, past or present, existing in a brutal or irrational condition ? 2. Does available evidence clearly point to the past existence of such a condition ? 3. Are races anywhere to be found in a condition which is less remote from mere animal existence than from the highest human development of which we have as yet experience ?" He calls witnesses, for the most part from the Darwinist ranks, to show that there is no authentic evidence that there is or ever has been a race of savages not possessed of—1st. Speech, sufficiently enunciating by word or gesture, "the what, the how, and the why," and expressing "general conceptions and abstract ideas." 2. A moral sense presenting no contradiction to our own *abstract* moral judgments, although varying indefinitely in its concrete

application. 3. Religion ; some apprehension and recognition, direct or indirect, of God. Therefore no tribe of savage is forthcoming which does not differ essentially from the highest order of brute. He points out moreover that no conditions of savage life have been discovered suggesting anything like a transitional state between brute and man.

The progressive development of races is an undeniable phenomenon in the world's history ; but there is another law, of the operation of which the Reviewer shows us that ethnology offers many examples, the law of degeneration. Isolation, even where races have reached a very high stage of civilization, inevitably produces degeneration. Many of the lowest tribes of Eastern Africa and of Australia retain particular customs out of all keeping with their normal barbarism, which evidently speak of a higher state from which they have fallen.

Whilst laying great stress upon the operation of this important and but little recognized law, the Reviewer is careful to point out that its action in the world's history is not *required* by orthodoxy ; for, although our first parents could not have been savages, there is nothing, theologically speaking, to prevent their immediate descendants from having dropped into the savage state. Ethnology gives us the history of the operation, under varying conditions, of the two laws of Progress and Degeneration ; as to which first came into action Science has as yet obtained no data upon which to gainsay theology.

The Reviewer concludes by bidding us consider how various and how contradictory are the standards by which men measure progress, and warns us that, even amongst ourselves, in the mid-current of our physical progress, there are not wanting signs of a degeneration, none the less grave because it is moral, in our substitution of Pagan for Christian virtues, and in our deliberate preference for physical well-being over well-doing.

Devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. By the Rev. S. FRANCO, S. J.
Baltimore : Murphy & Co. London : Washbourne. 1874.

The Paradise of God ; or, The Virtues of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. By
a Father of the Society of Jesus. Baltimore : Murphy & Co. London : Washbourne. 1874.

BOTH these books appeared originally in the American periodical called the "Messenger of the Sacred Heart." Though their titles are somewhat similar, yet the inexhaustible subject of which they treat, is so differently handled by each writer that there is no repetition, and each stands out separately as a graphic study of that Sacred Heart, the full revelation of Whose treasures has been reserved for these latter days, in fulfilment of the promise, "Where iniquity abounded grace should still more abound." The fact that the authors of both are Jesuits, is the best guarantee for the spiritual profit to be derived from their perusal.

Summer Talks about Lourdes. By CECILIA MARY CADDELL.
London: Burns & Oates. 1874.

MISS CADDELL tells us many true stories about the wonders which are daily drawing crowds to Lourdes to glorify God through the intercession of His Blessed Mother. This little book cannot fail to interest both young and old.

Stories of the Saints. By M. F. S. London: Washbourne. 1874.

THIS is a charming book, written for children, but full of interest for grown people also. The selection is very well made, all being found on the English Kalendar, and all, with the exception of S. Catherine of Alexandria, S. Agnes, S. Lawrence, and S. Cæcilia, of whom one can never hear too much, being modern saints whom one meets with in history or in connexion with existing religious orders.

Sacrum Septenarium; or, The Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost. By the
Rev. HENRY FORMBY. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1874.

THE object of this volume is to awaken in Catholics a more lively faith "in the working of the Holy Ghost in them." The reason that Mr. Formby gives in the preface for writing it is, that one of the causes why so few Christians make progress in the spiritual life and attain to sanctity, is their ignorance of the excellence of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and their importance to every one of us for the sanctification of our souls. "There can be no more affectionate corrective" of this lamentable ignorance "than the example of the Great Mother of the Christian family, mirroring in her own person, for the guidance and instruction of her children, the operation of these Seven Gifts." After "a preliminary address to the daughters of Mary, inviting them to a minute and special study of the example of their Holy Mother," Mr. Formby proceeds to show, in the first place, how, under the natural law of creation, the pattern of the mother of a family is "of sovereign importance to the well-being of the children," and in the second, how, in the economy of the Christian Redemption, the Holy Virgin Mother of Jesus presents to all collectively, and to each singly, of the Christian family of His redeemed, an example in which sublime virtues without equal are combined with the greatest simplicity—"an example perfectly homely, perfectly intelligible, and perfectly within the reach even of our infirm power and capacity to do our best to imitate." In his second chapter Mr. Formby

explains with great clearness, by the authority of S. Thomas, what is the Church's teaching on the Gifts of the Holy Ghost; and that, while the dictates of human reason are a sufficient guide in all natural things properly subject to it, they do not suffice for the attainment of man's final supernatural end, "except there be also besides a movement and an inspiration of the Holy Ghost." Hence it evidently follows that the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are necessary for salvation. In the remainder of the volume these fundamental truths are applied to each of the Seven Gifts separately. After explaining in each case the operation of the corresponding natural virtue, he passes on to show how these natural virtues are perfected and fitted for a supernatural object by the superadded Gift of the Holy Spirit; and finally he illustrates his subject by the example of the Mother of the Christian family. Mr. Formby has turned to good account the wide field for practical instruction which he has thus laid open before him. His style is plain, simple, and yet forcible, and both the plan and details of the work are well calculated to make it generally useful.

Correspondence.

PLAIN-CHANT.

To the Editor of the "DUBLIN REVIEW."

SIR,—As all good Catholics will admit that the question of church music, which has been raised in a communicated article of your July number, should be determined by authority rather than by argument or personal preference, I think that considerable light will be thrown upon the controversy by the subjoined extract from the celebrated work of Pope Benedict XIV. on the Diocesan Synod. For the sake of your readers in general I have translated the passage into English, but I believe that it will be found essentially correct on reference to the original. It is hardly necessary for me to add, that the illustrious Pontiff, from whose work the extract is taken, has an especial claim to deference, on subjects connected with Ecclesiastical discipline and with the conduct of Divine worship.

"No Bishop who desires the love of his people, which is so necessary to the right discharge of his office, should do anything to estrange their minds; nor can he wish, through any act of his own, to bring upon himself the occasion of trouble and offence. Two considerations help to strengthen us in this opinion, and we have treated of them more at length in our Encyclical letter already quoted. One of them is, that at the Council of Trent it was proposed by certain Bishops, zealous for the discipline of the church, that music should be wholly abolished from churches, and the Gregorian mode of singing alone retained. But other Bishops were rightly of opinion, that a novelty of this kind would be the means of opening a door to innumerable complaints and disquietudes, and the following decision was accordingly come to by the Council; namely, that music should not be prohibited in churches, but reformed under certain regulations, with a view to the promotion of piety and gravity. The other ground of our opinion is, that a few years ago there was an examination of the question relating to the use of the organ and other musical instruments. There were certain Bishops, who from motives of most commendable zeal were in favour of prohibiting the use of such instruments in churches, and were encouraged in this view of the case by the example, among others, of our own Pontifical Chapel, and of the Metropolitan Church of Lyons, in which the use of instruments had never been received. Other Bishops, however, animated by the like zeal, contended in favour of retaining the organ and other instruments in the music of the church, and it was sufficiently evident how difficult it would be to exclude them from churches in which they have been previously in use. They judged accordingly that it would be better to adopt a middle course, so as, on the one hand, not to allow, and on the other hand, not to exclude the use of *all* instruments in churches; but retaining the organ and certain other instruments, to forbid those only which are more appropriate

to theatrical performances than to sacred places and to sacred actions, according to the more particular injunctions on the same subject, which are contained in our forementioned Encyclical letter. (De Synod. Dioc. lib. XI., cap. 7.)

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

SACERDOS ALTER.

To the Editor of the "DUBLIN REVIEW."

SIR,—I have found a general concurrence of opinion among those with whom I have happened to converse on the subject—many of them great admirers of *Plaint-chant*—that the views advocated by "*Sacerdos*" in your current number are extreme and mischievous. My own sympathies are heartily with an editorial article, which appeared in the third number of your new Series, called "*Music in its Religious Uses*." But I have no leisure to attempt any argument on the matter.

Whereas however "*Sacerdos*" relies mainly on *authority*, I think he has by no means done justice to the argument from authority drawn out in the article I have named; see p. 143, and pp. 146–151. Thus Benedict XIV. in his great work "*De Synodo Diocesana*" says that it would be a "*novelty*" "to exclude from churches every kind of vocal music except the Gregorian Chant;" and one "which would have opened the door to complaints and troubles without number." Moreover in an Encyclical, directed to the Bishops of the Pontifical States, he expressly permits the use at Mass of the organ, double-bass, violoncello, bassoon, violin, and viola, on the ground that "these instruments serve to strengthen and sustain the voices of the singers."

But "*Sacerdos*'s" own article, it seems to me, affords a still more direct reply to his argument. He says (p. 178) that, according to the "*Cæremoniale Episcoporum*," at certain periods of the year,—such as Advent and Passion-tide,—"*the cantors do not use figured music but the Gregorian Chant*." Surely this affirms by the most undeniable implication, that at ordinary times the cantors use figured music as a matter of course.

I entirely agree, however, with what F. Newman says in a passage to which "*Sacerdos*" refers with assent. "*Gregorian music has so little innate vigour and life that it is in no danger of going out of its place and giving the law to religion*" (p. 202).

I remain, Sir, faithfully yours,

LAICUS.

INDEX.

AMERICAN POETS, 64-86 : Summary of our former article, 64 ; Mr. Lowell's ideal of Poetry, 65 ; his "Biglow Papers," 65 ; the imaginative beauty of his poems, 67 ; general inappreciation by the English public of American Poets, 68 ; Mr. Whittier's "Maud Muller," 69 : extract from his "Brother of Mercy," 70 ; its Protestant character, 71 ; the melancholy life of Edgar Poe, 71 ; his Sonnet to Science, 72 ; popularity of his poem, "The Raven," 73 ; the want of true vitality in his poems, 73 ; Mr. Emerson's poetry, 74 ; its fragmentary nature, 75 ; the Pantheism of some of his poems, 76 ; Hans Breitmann (Mr. Leland), 77 ; his poems, though sometimes coarse, have a substratum of genuine humour, 77 ; Bret Harte's peculiar humour, 79 ; Walt Whitman's poems strongly anti-Catholic, 81 ; in his religious ideas he is a follower of Comte, 82 ; his poems are vigorous, but they lack the religious feeling which Dante and Milton professed, 84 ; the great poet of the age yet to come, 85 ; the essential requisites of one, 86 ; his abundant opportunities, 86.

APPENDIX TO THE ARTICLE ON FREEWILL, 159-172 : The criticism in the *Spectator*, 159 ; we may have failed in our former article to make ourselves sufficiently clear, 161 ; our object in the present article, 162 ; distinction between resolve and desire, 162 ; illustrations in explanation, 163 ; the will is often affected by unconscious influences, 167 ; non-emotional attractions, 168 ; the real issue of the deterministic controversy, 169 ; men often act against their prevailing desire, 169 ; analysis of the determinist reasoning into two propositions, 170 ; we agree with one, but deny the other, 171 ; the determinist theory a mere delusion, 172.

BABINGTON CONSPIRACY (THE).—MARY STUART, 336-378 : The exhaustive character of Mr. Hosack's work, 336 ; value of F. Morris's work, 337 ; Mary's complicity in the projected assassination of Elizabeth disbelieved by most modern writers, 337 ; Mr. Froude may be regarded as the representative of those who are hostile to Mary, 338 ; our purpose in the present article, 338 ; removal of Mary to Tutbury, 339 ; Sir Amias Paulet appointed her keeper, 339 ; her strict surveillance, 339 ; concoction of the Babington Conspiracy, 339 ; the character of Gifford, one of the conspirators, 341 ; organization of the conspiracy, 341 ; the designs

of the conspirators, 342 ; even Mr. Froude acquits Mary of any knowledge of the origin of the conspiracy, 342 ; his account of her reply to the conspirators, 343 ; the conspiracy is revealed to Walsingham, 344 ; arrest of Babington and four others, 345 ; question as to Walsingham's approval of the conspiracy, 345 ; and as to Mary's, 346 ; infamous conduct of Gifford, 347 ; F. Morris's exposure of Mr. Froude's inaccuracies, 349 ; nefarious character of Paulet, 351 ; further proofs of Mr. Froude's untrustworthiness, 352 ; Phillipps, the decipherer, 354 ; his unscrupulousness, 356 ; complicity between him and Gifford, 357 ; Walsingham must have known of their machinations, 358 ; Mr. Froude's wilful ignoring of facts, 359 ; Did Mary approve of the plot? 360 ; the proof rests entirely upon Babington's letter and her reply to it, 360 ; proofs of her ignorance of a portion of it, 361 ; the forged postscript, 365 ; F. Morris's comments upon it, 366 ; Mr. Froude's theory respecting it, 368 ; it will not bear investigation, 369 ; his suppression of a passage of Mary's letter to Babington, 370 ; text of the criminatory letter, 371 ; Mary merely plotted for her escape, 372 ; if she had approved of the design against Elizabeth she would have mentioned it in her letter, 373 ; failure of the design to implicate Mary in a plot against the life of Elizabeth, 374 ; proofs of the forgery, 375 ; impossibility of doing full justice to the subject in a critical essay, 378.

Baur (Miss Ellen) *Life of Anne Catherine Emmerich*, *noticed*, 531.

Beale (Lionel S., M.B.) *Bioplasm : a Contribution to the Physiology of Life*, *noticed*, 226.

Belcari (Feo) *Life of B. Giovanni Colombini*, *noticed*, 530.

Bowles (Miss Emily), *The Three Kings and other Poems*, *noticed*, 256.

Bree (C. R., M.D.), *Fallacies of Darwinism*, *noticed*, 240.

Breitmann (Hans), *Ballads*, *reviewed*, 64.

Burton (J. H.), *The History of Scotland from Agricola's Invasion to the Revolution of 1688*, *reviewed*, 336.

CADDELL (MISS CECILIA), *Summer Talks about Lourdes*, *noticed*, 535.

Carlisle (Mr. T.), *The Unprofessional Vagabond*, *reviewed*, 29.

CASTANIZA'S SPIRITUAL CONFLICT AND CONQUEST, 119-132 : English Catholic literature in the seventeenth century, 120 ; sterling value of the works then printed, 120 ; special interest of the present re-issue, 120 ; the "Spiritual Conflict" and the "Spiritual Combat," 121 ; controversy as to the authorship of the latter, 121 ; great number of early editions, 122 ; character of Canon Vaughan's edition, 125 ; great value of the "Spiritual Combat" as a religious manual, 126 ; whoever first wrote it many subsequent editors added to and improved it, 127 ; the "Spiritual Conquest," 129 ; its highly devotional character, 130 ; Canon Vaughan's Notes and Preface, 131.

Castiniza (Dom J.), *The Spiritual Conflict and Conquest*, *reviewed*, 119.

CHURCH MUSIC, 508-521 : Comments upon the article "Plain-Chant," 509 ; what might be done to reconcile conflicting opinions, 509 ; example of a town mission church with its paid choir, 509 ; introduction

of a surplined choir, and successful endeavour to induce the congregation to join in the singing, 510 ; commendatory notices of the press, 511 ; the excellence of Webbe's Motetts for chapel choirs, 512 ; Plain-Chant, as a rule, liked by neither congregation nor choir, 512 ; the choir at S. Chad's Cathedral, 514 ; imperfect editing of the Ratisbon Gradual, 514 ; the Council of Trent on ecclesiastical music, 515 ; although florid music is forbidden in churches, yet Plain-Chant is not absolutely enjoined, 516 ; the school children should be instructed so that they might assist the choir, 517 ; Plain-Chant suitable in churches with large, well-trained choirs, 518 ; opinions against its exclusive use, 519 ; the practical side of the question, 519.

Coleridge (Rev. F.), The Dialogues of S. Gregory the Great, *noticed*, 223.

Concilio (Rev. J. De), Catholicity and Pantheism, *noticed*, 251.

Constitutio Dogmatica Prima de Ecclesiâ Christi, *reviewed*, 1.

Correspondence : Plain-Chant, 537.

DAILY PRESS (THE) of September 23-4-5, 1874, *reviewed*, 378.

Dame Dolores and other Stories, *noticed*, 250.

DE VERE'S (MR. AUBREY) "ALEXANDER THE GREAT," 412-440 : Superiority of this poem over Mr. De Vere's former works, 412 ; the figure of Alexander the Great in history, 412 ; the poet's conception of his character, 413 ; value of the preface to the poem, 413 ; Alexander's ambitious project, 414 ; his danger from his unmeasured self-will, 415 ; influence upon him of the various religions which he encountered, 415 ; his supposed interview with the high-priest at Jerusalem, 416 ; the poem in spirit and in incident thoroughly Greek, 416 ; Alexander's address to the mutinous Greek soldiery at Opis, 417 ; its grand eloquence, 419 ; the episode of Philotas's treason and the execution of Parmenio, 420 ; the affection of Hephestion for Alexander the key-note of the poem, 422 ; the fretful description of Alexander by Parmenio, 423 ; first appearance of Alexander upon the scene, 424 ; his apostrophe to Achilles, 425 ; Mr. De Vere's exquisite delineation of the character of Hephestion, 426 ; the beautiful soliloquy of Hephestion, 429 ; the plot of Phylax against him, 429 ; his death, 430 ; Alexander's grief, 431 ; masterly beauty of the first four acts, 432 ; description of Alexander at the zenith of his fortunes, 433 ; the "triply-altered" king, 435 ; the fifth act, its skilful construction, the taking up of the strain heard through the first, 436 ; paraphrase of the Song of the Captivity, 436 ; the last illness of the king, 437 ; beauty of the closing scene, 438 ; the queen's prophetic soliloquy, 440 ; on the probable inappreciation of the poem by non-Catholics, 440 ; the confusion of creeds as great in the present day as when Alexander died, 440.

De Vere (Aubrey), Alexander the Great, a dramatic poem, *reviewed*, 412.

Discours de M. le Duc de Broglie devant le 28me Commission d'initiative, 8 Juillet, 1874, *reviewed*, 132.

Dods (M., D.D.), The Works of Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, *noticed*, 211.

EXAMINATION (AN) OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S PSYCHOLOGY, 476-508 :

Mr. John Stuart Mill the representative of one school of modern philosophy and Mr. Herbert Spencer of another, 476 ; the growing influence of the latter, 476 ; the great care required in a review of his work, 476 ; its faulty arrangement, 477 ; the nervous system, 478 ; on the mobility of animals, 479 ; the largest mass of brain not necessarily the greatest intellect, 480 ; the structure of the nervous system, 481 ; the irrelevant character of many of Mr. Spencer's remarks, 482 ; his definition of psychology, 483 ; the functions of the nervous system, 483 ; the power of continuous mental action in man and in some of the lower animals, 485 ; Mr. Spencer's method of describing the functions of the nervous system, 488 ; nervous stimulation and nervous discharge, 489 ; conditions of nervous action, 489 ; æstho-physiology, 489 ; on self-cognition, 491 ; Mr. Spencer's failure to distinguish between thought and feeling, 492 ; scope of physiology, 494 ; what Mr. Spencer means by physiology, 495 ; the substance of mind, 497 ; no consciousness of difference without comparison, 498 ; of the emotions of which consciousness is built up, 500.

FAITH AND FREE THOUGHT, *noticed*, 214.

FALL (THE) OF THE DUC DE BROGLIE AND THE CRISIS IN FRANCE, 132-159 : The Assembly at Bordeaux in 1870, 133 ; deplorable state of France at that time, 133 ; M. Thiers called to power, 134 ; subserviency of all parties to his will, 134 ; the Republican form of Government preserved, 135 ; M. Thiers' leaning towards the Left, 136 ; consequent activity of the Revolutionary Party, 137 ; it establishes a propagandism of socialist doctrines, 137 ; M. Thiers' interference with the debates of the Assembly, 138 ; he is obliged to resign, and is succeeded by Marshal MacMahon, 138 ; character and attitude of the Duc de Broglie, the new Premier, 139 ; Conservative action of the new Cabinet, 140 ; conduct of the Legitimist Party, 141 ; the violent language of the ultra-Legitimist Press, 142 ; the reconciliation between the Comte de Chambord and the Comte de Paris, 142 ; hopes among the Royalists to restore the Monarchy, 144 ; increasing public feeling on the question, 115 ; state of Parties in the Assembly, 145 ; speech of M. de Falloux, 146 ; result of the deputation to Frohsdorf, 147 ; the Comte de Chambord's Letter, 148 ; its effect in France, 148 ; and upon the majority in the Assembly, 149 ; constitution of the Septennate, 150 ; discussions among the Conservatives, 151 ; policy of the Duc de Broglie, 151 ; he attempts to curb the municipal excesses in the country, 151 ; the Ultra-Legitimists, 152 ; the injury they have done to their own cause, 153 ; their policy at the present day a counterpart of that of 1821 and 1830, 154 ; the overthrow of the Duc de Broglie's Government, 155 ; the popularity of MacMahon, 156 ; the question of the Flag, 156 ; the Comte de Chambord's appeal to the French nation, 157 ; regret at the Count's decision respecting the Flag, 158 ; dangerous state of France, 158.

- Favre (Jules), the Government of the National Defence from the 30th of June to the 30th of October, 1872, *noticed*, 247.
- Few Words (A) from Lady Mildred's Housekeeper, *noticed*, 251.
- Flandre (Charles de), History of Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, *reviewed*, 336.
- Formby, (Henry), Sacrum Septenarium ; or, the Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost, *noticed*, 535.
- Franco (Rev. F.), Devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, *noticed*, 534.
- Frey (D. Heinrich), The Microscope and Microscopical Technology, *noticed*, 246.
- Froude (J. A., M.A.), History of England, from the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, *reviewed*, 336.
- GARSDIE (C. B., M.A.), Blessed Margaret Mary Alacocque, *noticed*, 221.
- , Helpers of the Holy Souls, *noticed*, 222.
- Glory and Sorrow, and Selim, the Pasha of Salonica, *noticed*, 258.
- Godard (M. l'Abbé), Les Principes de '89 et la Doctrine Catholique, *reviewed*, 259.
- Graduale de Tempore et de Sanctis, juxta Ritum Sacro-Sancta Romanæ Ecclesia, *reviewed*, 172.
- Greenwood (James), In Strange Company, being the experiences of a Roving Correspondent, *reviewed*, 29.
- Guéranger (Dom), Sainte Cécile et la Société Romaine des deux premiers Siècles, *noticed*, 312.
- HERBERT (LADY), Life of Mary Cherubina Clare of S. Francis, *noticed*, 530.
- Holmes (O. Wendell), The Poet at the Breakfast Table, *reviewed*, 64.
- Hosack (J.), Mary Queen of Scots and her Accusers, *noticed*, 207 ; *reviewed*, 336.
- Humphrey (Rev. F.), Mr. Fitzjames Stephen and Cardinal Bellarmine, *noticed*, 206.
- INFIDELITY (THE) OF THE DAY.—THE NEW SCHEME OF CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION, 441–475 : Opening of the Catholic University College, 441 ; rapid advance of Atheism in Great Britain among all classes, 442 ; why the infidelity of the nineteenth century is more dangerous than that of the eighteenth, 443 ; belief in an Infinite being innate in man, 444 ; the phenomena of English unbelief, 444 ; Atheism cannot be effectively resisted except on Catholic principles, 445 ; the Bishop's Pastoral on the subject, 445 ; scientific knowledge not opposed to religious belief, 446 ; F. Klentgen on man's knowledge of God, 447 ; inductive science a worthy study, 450 ; Atheistic arguments, except to a few, forbidden by the Church, 452 ; and even to that few, if they are confirmed atheists, no argument would be conclusive, 453 ; English opinion in the present day adverse to Theism, 455 ; although the arguments in favour of Theism are powerful, unless they generate undoubting conviction they will fail, 456 ; want of candour in atheists, 456 ; summary of our remarks on Theism, 457 ; probable reply of the atheist, 457 ;

the line of our argument, 458 ; the practical lesson enforced on Catholics by the Pastoral, 460 ; Protestants can give no effective help in the present conflict towards resistance, 461 ; rejection of certitude as to revealed truth leads to rejection of certitude as to natural religion, 462 ; the religious future of England depends upon the Catholics, 464 ; deplorable inefficiency of what they have yet done, 465 ; some Catholic organization is absolutely necessary, 466 ; the new College will, by degrees, inevitably afford this organization, 468 ; the success which may be hoped for when the College is in full activity, 469 ; great completeness with which the Rector has set about his immediate work, 471 ; the College will supply a long-felt want, 472 ; weakness of current objections to the new College, 473 ; the existing outburst of Atheism should have been no surprise to Catholics, 474.

JOHN WESLEY AND THE RISE OF METHODISM, 87-118 : On the origin and causes of all great popular movements, 87 ; condition of society in the period during which Methodism arose, 88 ; to the hypocritical sternness of the Puritans had succeeded the profligacy of the Stuarts, 88 ; the low state to which society had fallen, judging from the pictures of Hogarth, 89 ; degraded state of the English Church Establishment, 90 ; English Catholics at the time, 91 ; Wesley's family and early life, 92 ; the resolute character of his mother, 93 ; supposed supernatural phenomena at Epworth, 94 ; Wesley's early religious influences, 95 ; his educational studies, 96 ; his careful selection of acquaintances, 97 ; beginnings of Methodism, 97 ; origin of the term "Methodist," 98 ; Wesley's scheme of self-examination, 99 ; critical remarks upon it, 100 ; his expedition to Georgia, 101 ; he fails to convert the Indians, 102 ; love affair with Miss Hopkey, 103 ; the match is broken off, and later on he marries a widow, 104 ; he visits the Moravians in Germany, 105 ; effect of that sect upon Wesley, 106 ; he resumes his leadership in London, 108 ; the improvement he wrought upon individuals, 109 ; his spiritual pride, 111 ; difficulties with the Anglican bishops, 112 ; he takes to field preaching, 113 ; reasons for his split with the Moravians, 114 ; his quarrel with the Calvinists, 115 ; character of Methodism as a heresy, 117 ; Bishop Lavington's work on religious manifestations, 117 ; affinity in Wesley's mind to Catholicism, 118.

LAVINGTON (Bishop), The Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists considered, reviewed, 87.

LIVES OF SS. Veronica Guiliari and Blessed Battista Varani, noticed, 532.

LONDON POOR AND LONDON WORK, 29-53 : The time for writing the history of a country in a chivalric manner long past, 29 ; in its temporal aspect the present age possesses many advantages over the past, 30 ; on the relations between rich and poor, 30 ; the distress caused by the dissolution of the monastic houses, 31 ; the abuse of the monastic system of relief, 32 ; increase in the number of vicious poor, 32 ; character of Mr. Greenwood's work, 33 ; the Golden-lane mission, 34 ; Mr. Orsman's

yearly supper to the beggars and tramps, 35 ; a children's dinner, 35 ; the barrow club, 36 ; evasion of the law at tramps' lodging-houses, 37 ; noble conduct of Mr. Orsman, 37 ; a costers' tea, 38 ; deplorable condition of the deserving poor, 40 ; melancholy prospects of their children, 41 ; an episode of three street arabs, 41 ; the Unprofessional Vagabond in the East, 43 ; terrible condition of the poor in the cheap lodging-house, 44 ; sufferings of the poor from the capital and labour warfare, 45 ; a hopeful spirit necessary for a missionary among the poor, 46 ; the good work of the Sisters of Charity, 47 ; wherever a Sister goes improvement is manifest, 47 ; the conditions of true equality and brotherhood, 48 ; the amount of good the well-meaning rich might accomplish, 49 ; true Christian almsgiving, 50 ; the Immaculate Conception Charity, 51 ; amount of work yet to be done, 52 ; the North Hyde Asylum for Boys, 52 ; Canon Gilbert's night refuge, 53.

MELINE (JAMES F.), *Mary Queen of Scots and her latest English History*, reviewed, 336.

Miller (Sr. Joaquin), *Songs of the Sierras*, reviewed, 64.

Montagu (Lord Robert), *On some Popular Errors concerning Politics and Religion*, noticed, 205.

Morris (Rev. F.), *The Letter-Books of Sir Amias Poulet, Keeper of Mary Queen of Scots*, noticed, 209 ; reviewed, 336.

NEVIN (WILLIAM), *The Jesuits and other Essays*, noticed, 250.

Note to the First Article in (this Volume) our last number, 522.

PARADISE OF GOD (THE), or, the Virtues of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, noticed, 534.

Parsons (Mrs.), *Twelve Tales for the Young*, noticed, 250.

Patterson (Right Rev. Mgr.), *Exiled Popes*, noticed, 525.

PILGRIMAGE (THE) TO PONTIGNY, 378-412 : Anxiety of the public to know the doings in " High Life," 378 ; pilgrimage coeval with our race, 379 ; Calvary, the scene of the first Christian pilgrimage, 380 ; the tombs of the early martyrs the next, 381 ; remarks upon this special Pilgrimage 382 ; recorded miracles through the intercession of the saints, 383 ; origin of the Pilgrimage to Pontigny, 384 ; the tone of the Protestant press, 384 ; the beatification of S. Edmund, 385 ; the costly offerings to his shrine, and the high veneration paid to him, 387 ; desecration of his tomb, 388 ; presentation of a relic to the College at Ware, 389 ; the *Pall Mall Gazette* and *Saturday Review* on the Pilgrimage, 391 ; the unfavourable light in which certain actions of the Holy See sometimes appears, 391 ; troubles of the Holy See in the thirteenth century, 392 ; Protestant evidence of the miracles at S. Edmund's tomb, 393 ; Protestant ignorance respecting canonization, 394 ; the journey of the Pilgrims, 395 ; their cordial reception at Dieppe, 395 ; procession of the Pilgrims to Pontigny, 396 ; its impressive character, 397 ; religious services at Pontigny, 398 ; sudden death of the Rev. F. Bertier, 398 ; celebration of Mass by the Archbishop of Westminster, 399 ; imposing scene at High

Mass, 400 ; the representative character of the Pilgrims, 401 ; their return, 402 ; review of the attitude of the English press, 403 ; discrepancy in the various reports, 403 ; deplorable misstatements of the special reporters, 404 ; their erroneous ideas concerning the Pilgrimage, 405 ; droll mistakes of some of the correspondents, 406 ; even the *Times* report was not free from blunders, 408 ; the sensational character of the accounts, 409 ; ignorance of Catholic matters displayed as a rule by public writers, 410 ; Mr. Disraeli's extravagances preferable to Mr. Gladstone's utterances, 411.

PLAIN-CHANT, 172-204 : Bull of Pope Pius V. on the Liturgy, 172 ; decree of the Holy See on uniformity in the liturgical chant, 173 ; account of the Editio Medicea, 174 ; circumstances which led to its being reprinted at Ratisbon, 175 ; the authority which the Ratisbon edition possesses, 178 ; uniformity of chant desired by the Church, 179 ; approval by the Church of the Ratisbon edition, 181 ; the authoritative sanction the Church has always given to Plain-Chant, 182 ; Papal injunctions against figured music, 184 ; the Provincial Synod of Cologne on the use of Plain-Chant, 186 ; other Synods and Councils have also enjoined the use of the Gregorian Chant, 189 ; testimonies to the worth and effects of Plain-Chant, 190 ; objections drawn from the actual state of Church music, especially in Italy, answered, 193 ; music in its moral aspect, tendency, and effect, 197 ; F. Newman on the advantage of the Gregorian Chant, 202 ; we are afraid that until Plain-Chant is better sung, the prejudice against it will continue, 203.

Proposed Offering to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, *noticed*, 257.

Protestant Jerusalem, *noticed*, 524.

QUARTERLY REVIEW, July, 1874. Art. " Primitive Man," *noticed*, 533.

REPLY (A) ON NECESSARY TRUTH, 54-63 : Preliminary explanations, 54 ; necessists and phenomenists, 54 ; on necessary verities, 55 ; on geometrical axioms, 57 ; they are not known by experience, 57 ; but must be acquired by instruction, 58 ; geometrical axioms known as necessary, 59 ; objections drawn from the use of maps, 62 ; arithmetical axioms, 63.

SAINT CÆCILIA AND ROMAN SOCIETY, 312-335 : Objects of Dom Guéranger's work, 312 ; sketch of the family of the Cornelli, 313 ; their early conversion to Christianity, 313 ; their connection with the Apostles Peter and Paul, 314 ; the number of martyrs they furnished, 316 ; proofs that many of the first converts to Christianity were of the highest families in Rome, 318 ; the history of the early Christian Church corresponds with the Pagan world around it, 320 ; the growing influence of Christianity and corresponding improvement in morals, 321 ; the dogmatic symbolism of the paintings in the Catacombs, 322 ; on the authenticity of the Acts of S. Cæcilia, 233 ; the story of S. Cæcilia, 325 ; her marriage with Valerian, 326 ; its supernatural accompaniments, 327 ; martyrdom of Valerian, 328 ; persecution of S. Cæcilia, 329 ; her heroic conduct, 329 ; her martyrdom, 330 ; the Catacombs become the resort of pilgrims, 332 ; discovery of her body in 821, 333 ; political troubles in Rome in the

thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and consequent desecration of the Catacombs, 333; reconstruction of Rome and discovery of the body of the saint in the fifteenth century, 334; widespread devotion to S. Cæcilia, 335.

Southern Poems of the War, *reviewed*, 64.

Southey (Mr. R.), *The Life of Wesley, and the Rise and Progress of Methodism, reviewed*, 87

SOVEREIGNTY (THE) IN MODERN STATES.—THE COUNT DE CHAMBORD AND THE POPE'S CIVIL PRINCEDOM, 259–312: Position of the Count de Chambord, 259; his refusal to accept the throne except as by right divine, 260; outline of our argument, 260; though we disparage the Count's claims we write in no anarchical spirit, 261; declaration of Gregory XVI. on the duty a subject owes to his sovereign, 262; the sign of a good Catholic, 263; summary of the Catholic doctrine on the origin and rights of civil sovereignty, 265; some objections considered, 267; can the vote of the majority in all cases bind the minority? 268; Bossuet's reply to Mr. Jurieu on the sovereignty of the people, 269; Lord Robert Montagu on the divine appointment of kings, 271; the case of constitutional monarchy considered, 273; the position of Louis XVIII. before his accession, 276; and after he had granted a charter to the French people, 277; difference between him and his successor Charles X., 278; revocation of the Charter of 1814 by the latter, 279; the French Revolution of 1830, 283; the Holy See on the behaviour of Bishops towards Louis Philippe, 283; on the right of obedience to a *de facto* and to a *de jure* government, 285; former utterances of the Holy See on this subject, 286; consideration of the Count de Chambord's claims, 286; criticism of the doctrine called by its upholders "Legitimism," 288; the king in their opinion must be an absolute monarch, 289; on the power of the Pope to depose a Catholic sovereign, 289; points upon which all hereditists agree, 290; hereditism has never found favour with theologians, 291; on the contrary, the Church has emphatically condemned it, 292; under some circumstances hereditism is closely allied to anarchy, 293; absolute monarchy, in the opinion of some Catholic theologians, the most perfect form of government, 296; the Pope's civil principedom a striking example, 296; objections which might be made to the legitimacy of the Pope's temporal sovereignty, 298; unapproached excellence of the Pope's civil government, 300; nothing tends to a nation's true greatness so much as the prevalence of a real religious spirit, 302; temporal governments, as a rule, aim only at commercial greatness, 304; Mr. J. Stuart Mill on the inutility of mechanical inventions in lightening the toil of the millions, 305; still, industry and commerce are laudable pursuits; why anarchists regard the Pope's civil sovereignty with disfavour, 307; on "national spirit," 309; different peoples have different ideals, 309; "Legitimism" the only bar which has stood in the way of the Count de Chambord, 310; obedience to the Church the strongest foe to anarchy, 311; the Pope's civil principedom the bulwark of Catholic progress, 312.

St. Clair (George), Darwinism and Design ; or, Creation by Evolution, *noticed*, 232.

Stories of the Saints, *noticed*, 535.

Supernatural Religion : an Inquiry into the Reality of Divine Revelation *noticed*, 528.

Synodal Letter of the Archbishops and Bishops of the Province of Westminster, assembled August 11, 1874, *reviewed*, 441.

TAYLOR (MR. BAYARD), *Lara*, *reviewed*, 64.

URLIN (MR. R. D.), John Wesley's Place in Church History, *reviewed*, 87.

VATICAN DEFINITION (THE) ON INFALLIBILITY, 1-28 : Declaration of the Dogma of Infallibility by the Vatican Council, 1 ; necessity of explaining our reasons for defending the Definition, 2 ; bearing of the Vatican Definition on the extent of Infallibility, 3 ; interior assent is due to various judgments not strictly infallible, 4 ; obedience required from Catholics for doctrinal decrees, 7 ; dangers from the former antagonism of Liberal Catholics to the decree, 9 ; according to the Vatican Definition, the Pontifical Acts mentioned in the "Quantâ Curâ" must be accounted infallible, 12 ; the Archbishop of Westminster's remarks on the denial of infallibility by Catholics, 12 ; objections considered, 13 : the infallibility claimed by the Church is in matters purely secular, 14 ; what the Council means by "new doctrine," 17 ; when the Pope speaks "ex cathedrâ," 20 ; various intimations given at the Council that ex cathedrâ acts are very numerous and frequent, 22 ; necessity of recognizing the prerogative of Papal Infallibility, 24 ; the doctrinal unity of the Church, 26 ; such differences of opinion as exist, on the extent of infallibility, in no way compromise the Church's doctrinal unity, 27.

WEDGWOOD (MISS JULIA), John Wesley and the Evangelical Practices of the Eighteenth Century, *reviewed*, 87.

Wesley (Rev. John), *The Works of the*, *reviewed*, 87.

Westminster (Archbishop of), *The Centenary of S. Peter*, *reviewed*, 1.

———— *The Œcumenical Council*, *reviewed*, 1.

———— *The Vatican Council and its Definitions*, *reviewed*, 1.


———— *Ultramontaniam and Christianity*, *noticed*, 205.

Whitman (Walt), *Poems by*, *reviewed*, 64.

Whittier (Mr. J. G.), *The Pennsylvania Pilgrimage and other Poems*, *reviewed*, 64.

———— *Poetical Works*, *reviewed*, 64.

Wilberforce (H. W.), *The Church and the Empires : Historical Periods*, *noticed*, 217.





Does Not Circulate

AP 4 .D8 SMC

The Dublin review.

.23

AIP-2395 (awab)



